G. B. PATNAIK, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revisions were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment since common facts are involved. The complainant in IOC 32/82 is the petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 55/84 assailing the order of the learned Magistrate cased 26-9-1983 by which order the Magistrate came to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction to take cognisance under Section 467, I. P. C, in view of the bar provided under section 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused persons and the petitioners in Criminal Revision No. 577/83 challenging the order of the Magistrate dated 26-9-1983 holding the trial of the case against them for the offence under Section 406, I. P. C. to proceed. ( 2 ) THE short facts of the case are that the complainant filed a complaint petition alleging therein that the accused persons committed the offence under Section 406 as well as under Section 467, I. P. C. It was averred therein that the Aska Co-operative Central Bank had filed a dispute case being dispute Case No. 732/78 against the father of the complainant as well as the present accused persons and also against the Service Co-operative Society for realisation of Rs. 2794 40 paise. The further case of the complainant is that his father died on 15-10-1979 and had never incured the loan as alleged. But the accused persons made false entiles in the records of the Society and forged the signature of ihe complainant's father and used the said forged document to show that the complainant's father had incurred the loan. It was also alleged that the accused persons misappropriated the loan amount of rs. 2000/- supposed to have been received from the Society in the name of the complainant's father by using the forged document. he Assistant Registrar, co-operative Societies bad sent a report to the police in this regard. But as police took no action, the complainant filed the petition in Court. On the basis of the allegations in the complaint petition and the initial statement of the complainant, after hearing the Advocate for the complainant, the learned magistrate took cognisanee under Sections 406 and 467, I. P. C. and issued summons to the accused persons by order dated 3-7-1982. On the basis of the allegations in the complaint petition and the initial statement of the complainant, after hearing the Advocate for the complainant, the learned magistrate took cognisanee under Sections 406 and 467, I. P. C. and issued summons to the accused persons by order dated 3-7-1982. On 27-9-1982 on behalf of the accused persons an application was filed challenging the maintainability of the proceedings mainly on the ground that in view of Section 195 (1) (b), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no complaint having been registered by the Assistant Ragistrar, Co operative Societies, the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognisance. After hearing the parties at lenth, the Magistrate had passed the order which is being impugned both by the complainant as well as by the accused person in two different revisions as stated earlier. ( 3 ) SO far as tbe revision at the instance of the complainant is concerned, the short question for consideration is whether the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative societies can be held to be a "court" within the meaning of Section 195 (1) (b)of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code no Court can take cognisance of an offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471, 475 or Section 476 of the Indian Penal Code when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding, in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that court is subordinate. Under Section 463 of the Indian Penal Code whoever makes any false document or pan of a document with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person or to support any claim or title or to cause any person to part with property or to enter iato an express or implied contract or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed commits forgery. Section 467, I. P. C. is the offence of forgery of valuable. security and, therefore, the offence is one described in Section 463 of the Indian penal Code. Section 467, I. P. C. is the offence of forgery of valuable. security and, therefore, the offence is one described in Section 463 of the Indian penal Code. The allegations in the complaint petition being that the said offence was committed in respect of a document produced IB a proceeding before the assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies in the Dispute Case, if it is held that the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies is a Court, then the criminal court cannot take cognisance of the offence without a complaint in writing by the said Assistant Registrar Consequently the sole question for decision is whether the Assistant Registrar cf Co operative Societies while deciding all disputes under the statute is a Court for the purpose of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code cf Criminal Procedure. At this stage it would be appropriate to extract the relevant portion of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, necessary for this case :"section 195. __ (1) No Court shall take cognisance (b) (ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. "in deciding whether the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies is a "court" for the aforesaid purpose, it would also be relevant to extract Section 195 (3) of the Code : "section 195 (3 ). In a clause (b) of sub-section (I) to the term "court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purpose of this section. " the learned Magistrate in tbe impugned order after discussing several case laws on the point and relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. , and another, [ air 1967 SC 1494 ] has held that the Assistant Registrar Co-operative societies is a "court" for the purpose of Section 195 (1) (b) of the code of Criminal Procedure. ( 4 ) MR. ( 4 ) MR. Das, the learned counsel for the complainant and petitioner in criminal Revision No, 55/84 contends that in view of the decision of the supreme Court in the case of Ramrao and another v. Narayan and another, [ air 1969 SC 724 ], the Assistant Registrar cannot be held to be a "court" within the meaning of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code and hence a complaint m writing by the Assistant Registrar is not necessary before the magistrate can take cogmzance of an offence under Section 467,i. P. C. alleged to have been committed in respect oi a document produced or given in evidence by a party to any proceeding before the said Assistant Registrar and the conclusion ot the learned Magrstrate must be held to be erroneous. ( 5 ) MR. Rath, the learned counsel appearing for the accused, on the other hand contends that the decision of the Supreme Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. , and another, (supra)fully applies and the Assistant Registrar must be held to be a 'court' within the meamng ot Section 190 ot the Criminal Procedure Code and consequently the conclusion ot the learned Magistrate is unassailable. In Thakur Jugal Kishore ainha's case (supra), referred to above, the question tor consideration was whether the Assistant Registrar under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies act is a "court" for the purpose of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts act or not. After analysing different provisions of the Co-operative Societies act, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion :"a Registrar exercising powers under Section 48 must, therefore, be held to discharge the duties which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary civil and revenue Courts of the land. The Registrar has not merely a trappings of a Court but in many respects he is gievn the same powers as are given to ordinary civil Courts of the lard by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents, to bear the parties after frming issues, to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of Courts mentioned in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a case there is no difficulty in holding, that in adjudicating upon a dispute referred under Section 48 of the Act, the Registrar is to all intents and put roses, a Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do. "in this case, BO doubt, the Supreme Court holds that the Assistant Registrar under the Co-operative Societies Act is a "court" coming within the ambit of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. It may be noted that in the Contempt of Courts Act, the word "court" has not been defined. Therefore the Supreme court tried to find out as to what is meaning of the word "court" and then after analysing the duties and functions of the Assistant Registrar, came to the conclusion that it is a "court" for Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. But this decision will have no application in coming to the conclusion whether the Assistant Registrar is a Court or not for the purpose of Section 195 of the criminal Procedure Code since sub-section (3) of Section 295 states as to what is the meaning of the term "court" used in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of the said section. In the case of Ramrao and another v. Naroyan and another [ air 1969 SC 724 ], the question came up for consideration directly, namely, whether the Registrar's nominee under Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act is a "court" within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court took into consideration that the expression "court" has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and, therefore, is not restricted to courts, civil, revenue or criminal and includes other tribunals also. But on analysis, it came to the conclusion that duty to act judicially either expressly imposed or arising by necessary implication to the nature of the duties required to be performed, does not of itself make a tribunal judicial or quasi-judicial and thereby a Court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal procedure. But on analysis, it came to the conclusion that duty to act judicially either expressly imposed or arising by necessary implication to the nature of the duties required to be performed, does not of itself make a tribunal judicial or quasi-judicial and thereby a Court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal procedure. It further held that the definition of "court" under Section 3 of the Evidence Act or "court of Justice" under Section 20 of the Penal Code does not apply to the expression "court" used in Criminal Procedure Code, the Supreme Court in the said case after analysing the provisions of the Mebarashtra co-operbtive Societies Act came to the conclusion that though the registrar's nominee is required to act judicially, that is, fairly and impartially, but the obligation to act judicially will not necessarily make him a "court" within the meaning of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code and his position is that of an arbitrator designated under a statutory arbitration to which provisions of Section 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 apply. In paragraph 25 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court held :"after carefully considering the powers conferred and the source of authority of the nominee, we have no doubt that the nominee exercising power to make an award under Section 96 of the Maharashtra co-operative Societies Act, 1960, derives his authority not from the statute but from investment by the Registrar in his individual discretion. The power so invested is liable to be suspended and may be withdrawn. He is, therefore, not entrusted with the judicial power of the State, he is merely an arbitrator authorised within the limits of the power conferred to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to him. "having so held and examining the meaning of "couat" used in Section 195 (2)of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it stood (Criminal Procedure Code, 1898)the Supreme Court held that the Registrar's nominee cannot be held to be a '"court" for the purpose of Criminal Procedure Code. "having so held and examining the meaning of "couat" used in Section 195 (2)of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it stood (Criminal Procedure Code, 1898)the Supreme Court held that the Registrar's nominee cannot be held to be a '"court" for the purpose of Criminal Procedure Code. This decision, therefore, cannot be said to be an authority for the purpose of deciding whether the assistant Registrar, Go-operative Sotieties is a "court" under Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code as it now stands or not, since the provisions of the Orissa Co operative Societies Act are not substantially ths same as the maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 which was being considered by the Supreme Court in Ramarao's case (supra) and the powers of Assistant registrar under the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act are not the same as that of the uominee of the Registrar under Maharashtra Co-operative Societies. Act. It may also be noted that Section 195 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ia somewhat different from Section 195 (3) of the present Code. Section 195 (2) of 1898 Code was to the effect "under clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1)the term "court" includes a civil, revenue or criminal Court but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877". It was an inclusive definition and was of a general nature without defining that the term "court" would mean and necessarily therefore, the decision bad been based on examining the powers and duties which a particular tribunal was exercising. But the present provision with which we are concerned, namely, section 195 (3), Cr. P. C. states that the Court means a civil, revenue or criminal Court and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purpose of the section. In view of this definition, the Assistant Registrar under the Co-operative societies Act cannot be held to be either a civil or revenue or a criminal court and if at all it will be a tribunal under the State Act. If that be so then unless and until the State Act declares the authority to be a Court for the purpose of Section 195, Cr. P. C , then the tribunal will not be a Court for the purpose of Criminal Procedure Cods. If that be so then unless and until the State Act declares the authority to be a Court for the purpose of Section 195, Cr. P. C , then the tribunal will not be a Court for the purpose of Criminal Procedure Cods. The Orissa Co-operative Societies Act does not state that the Assistant Registrar deciding disputes between the parties is a ''court" for the purpose of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure code, Accordingly it must be held that it is not "court" for the said section. Consequently, the bar contained in Section 195 (1) of the Criminal Procedure code does not apply and a Magistrate can take cognisance of the offence under section 467, I. P. C alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence by a party to any proceeding before the said assistant Registrar without a complaint in writing by the said Assistant registrar. The conclusion of the learned Magistrate on that score is accordingly erroneous and the order directing that the cognizance of the offence under Section 467, I. P. C. without a complaint of the Assistant Registrar, co-operative Societies stands barred by Section 195 (i) (b) of the Criminal procedure Code must be set aside. Criminal Revision No. 55/84 has, therefore, to be allowed. ( 6 ) SO far tba other revision, namely, Criminal Revision No. 577/83 is concerned, which has been filed at the instance of the accused, the pith and substance of the argument of the learned counsel is that tbe allegations made in the complaint petition do not make out the offence under Section 406, i. P. C and, therefore, the cognisance on that score must be set aside. As has been held fay several decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme Court, an order of cognisance taken by a Magistrate can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of inherent jurisdiction only when the High Court comes to the conclusion that the averments made in the complaint petition as well as the other materials before the Magistrate taken on their face value do not constitute the offence for which cognisance has been taken. A further word of caution has been given that the inherent power has to be exercised very sparingly and only when the High Court comes to the conclusion that there has been abuse of process of Court or by the impugned order, there has been gross miscarriage of justice. It is not necessary for me to catalogue the catena of cases indicating the circumstances under which inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. can be exercised, it will be sufficient to only notice a few cases : r. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, [ air 1960 SC 866 ], Superintendent and remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W. B. v. Mohan Singh and others, [ air 1975 sc 1002 , Dr. Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, [ air 1977 SC 1754 ], madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, [air 1976 SC 47], Trilok Singh ami others v. Satya Deo Tripathi, [ air 1979 SC 850 ] Achuta alias Achutananda pradhan alias Padhan and two others v. Srimati Bewa, [54 (1982) CLT 369], and Vitla Venkata Rao and othsrs v. Suttapalli Venkaa Rao, 155 (1983) CLT 553. ( 7 ) APPLYING the tests laid down in the aforesaid cases, to the facts and circumstances of the present case and on examining the complaint petition as well as the other materials on record, I am firmly of the opinion that it cannot ba said that the averments made in the complaint petition taken on face value do not constitute the offence under Section 496, I. P. C, and consequently the order of the Magistrate taking cognisance under Section 406,i. P. C. cannot be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court. Accordingly criminal Revisios No. :577/83 has to be rejected. ( 8 ) IN the net result, therefore, Criminal Revision No. 55/84 is allowed and Criminal Revision No. 577/83 is dismissed. The Magistrate would now proceed with the sass both under Section 406 as well as under Section- 467, i. P. C. Criminal Revision No. 55/84 allowed, criminal Revision No, 577/83 dismissed.