Judgment :- 1. The predecessor-in-interest of the revision petitioner obtained an order for eviction of the respondents from the disputed building on the ground of bonafide need under S.11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, for short, The Rent Control Act. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner died after the disposal of the revision petition by the District Court but before the disposal of the revision which was pending before this court. The revision before this court was dismissed in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai (1987(1) K.L.T.53(SC)). The order for eviction thus became final. 2. The petitioner in his capacity as the legal representative of the landlord moved E. P. 187/87 under S.14 of The Rent Control Act to execute the above order. The executing court by the order under challenge dismissed the execution petition. The short order of the executing court reads:- "The petition, is opposed by the other side for the reason that the petition was allowed under S.11 (3) of the Act for the bonafide need of the petitioner Manickammal. Since she is dead during the pendency of the C. R. P. in the High Court, the claim of the present petitioner the son of Manickammal cannot stand good in view of the decision rendered in 1982 K.L.T. 872 (Padmanabhan Nair v. Ulahannan). I do not find any reason to disagree with the contention raised by the respondent". 3. That it was on the ground of personal need of the deceased landlord eviction was ordered, is beyond dispute. For that matter the petitioner has no case otherwise. If an order for eviction is passed on the personal need could such an order be executed by the legal representative on the death of the person for whose benefit eviction was ordered, is the question before me. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the executing court cannot deal with this question assuming, it arises for consideration, because its function under law is only to execute the decree as it stands. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the executing court cannot deal with this question assuming, it arises for consideration, because its function under law is only to execute the decree as it stands. By virtue of the provisions contained in S.14 of The Rent Control Act the order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession is a decree for all practical purposes and therefore in executing the said decree the executing court has to execute it as it stands because it is binding and conclusive between the parties. That means, according to him, the executing court has no power to go behind the decree. This argument of the learned counsel, at the first blush is really attractive, but if we analyse the point minutely, it can be seen that the above argument is without substance. 5. As observed by the Supreme Court in Syed Asadullah Kasmi v. Additional District Judge, Allahabad (A.I.R. 1981 SC 1724) a statutory authority or court when considering the proceedings arising out of a landlord's petition for ejectment of a tenant on the ground of the landlord's personal need, is bound to take into account subsequent events. That does not however mean that the court executing an order under the Rent Control Act has the power to go behind the decree. To put it differently the executing court has no power to rewrite the decree and execute it. But the executing court undoubtedly, has the power to declare that the decree is incapable of execution. In holding so, it cannot be said, that the court is going behind the decree. (See Ataat Husain v. Mushtaq Ali (A.I.R.1937 Allahabad 282). In the exercise of that power, in my judgment, the executing court can see whether the personal need which was the ground on which eviction was ordered, still exists and if it is found that it it not available, then the decree as such can be held to be not executable, 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying on a decision of this court in Mathai John v. Kathirkutty and others (1987 (1) K. L. T. 856) construing S.16 of the K. L. R. Act. contended that on the death of the landlord the right to execute the order he had obtained although for personal benefit would survive and therefore the petition is maintainable in law. contended that on the death of the landlord the right to execute the order he had obtained although for personal benefit would survive and therefore the petition is maintainable in law. It is true that in the said decision this court has observed that the right recognised under S.16 survives to the members of the family and his legal representatives. It should in this connection be remembered that the said right was however, found to be more than the personal right of the landlord. A reference in this context to the observations made by Justice M. P. Menon in the decision in Gopalan Nair v. State of Kerala (1980 K. L. T. 259) is relevant: "The resumption under S.16, though primarily designed to meet the landlord's requirement of personal cultivation, is something more than a right personal to him or aright for personal enjoyment only; it is property which he is permitted to acquire on payment of the compensation fixed under S.20". Such a provision is absent in the Rent Control Act and therefore the order for eviction based on the personal need of the landlord will not survive to the legal representatives. The above decisions therefore have no application to the facts of the case. 7. To put it pithily the order granting eviction on personal need does not survive to the legal representatives on the death of the person for whose benefit the order was passed. The court below therefore has rightly rejected the application. The C. R. P. fails. Accordingly the same is dismissed. No costs.