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1988 DIGILAW 467 (ALL)

Infant Milk Food Factory v. Habibul Rahman Khan

1988-04-26

RAVI S.DHAVAN

body1988
JUDGMENT Ravi S. Dhavan, J. - Heard Sri G. P. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Messrs Sri A.K. Sinha and Sri Shailendra Nath Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This is an unfortunate case where an interim order of this Court passed on 9-1-1984 has been embarrassed compromised and violated. The record shows that the equity has turned against the petitioner and he is not entitled to the continuance of the interim order. The reasons are set hereinafter. 3. The interim order as was passed on 9-1-1984 is reproduced below:- "Issue notice. Meanwhile the operation of the impugned award dated 27-9-1983 shall remain stayed, provided the petitioner pays to the respondent No. 1, the entire wages upto date with effect from 27-9-1983, within a period of two months from today's date. It shall be open to the petitioner either to take work from respondent No. 1 or to continue paying him wages month by month. The wages for the month of March shall be paid on or before 10-4-1984. The wages for the subsequent month shall be paid on or before 10th of each succeeding month. In the event of default of any of the conditions, the interim order stand automatically vacated." Since the interim order was passed in January, 1984, more than four years have elapsed. The respondent, workman, has complained to this Court on more than one occasion that the conditions of the said interim order are not being followed Rather than seeing the version of the workman on the issue whether the interim order has been followed or has not been followed, it would be best to see the submissions of the employer. 4. It is not in dispute that the emoluments were paid to the workman concerned in pursuance of the interim order till June, 1986 when he received it at the rate of Rs. 950. It is contended on behalf of the workman, and on record that he actually received wages for the following months at the following rates, being Rs. 900.55 p. in October, 1985, Rs. 912.90 p. in November, 1985, Rs. 912-90 p. in December, 1985, Rs. 925.25 p. in January, 1986, Rs. 937.65 p. in February, 1986, Rs. 937.65 in March, 1986, Rs. 950/- in April, 1986, Rs. 950/- in May, 1986. and Rs. 950/- in June, 1986. After July, 1986 the workman found himself receiving Rs. 900.55 p. in October, 1985, Rs. 912.90 p. in November, 1985, Rs. 912-90 p. in December, 1985, Rs. 925.25 p. in January, 1986, Rs. 937.65 p. in February, 1986, Rs. 937.65 in March, 1986, Rs. 950/- in April, 1986, Rs. 950/- in May, 1986. and Rs. 950/- in June, 1986. After July, 1986 the workman found himself receiving Rs. 291/- per month, less than one third of what he received before. This fact is also not in issue and accepted in the counter affidavit to Misc. application filed on 7-1-1988, wherein, it is submitted on behalf of the employer : "It is submitted that from July, 1986 onwards the respondent No. 1 has been paid wages at the rate of Rs. 291/- per month." 5. This admission places on record that there has been a gross violation of this Court's order. The employer has been totally conscious about what the conditions of the order had been and after having paid emoluments to the workman in terms of the interim order decided to reduce his wages, unilaterally. This amounts to disrespect to the conditions of an interim order passed by this Court and consequential harassment to the respondent workman who was entitled to receive protection of his wages. 6. The respect that the employer has been totally conscious of the conditions of this order is discernible from the rejoinder affidavit filed on 25-9-1985. In para 4, the facts as emerge are that it took the workman to file an application before the Prescribed Authority under the payment of Wages Act, 1936, in effect, to seek compliance of this Court's order. The Prescribed Authority directed payment, on a computation made, on the basis of which the wages were delivered to the workman effective from June, 1986. The employer accepted the order of Prescribed Authority and did not file an appeal before the District Judge. In para 4 of the aforesaid rejoinder affidavit, it is stated "no useful purpose would have been served by filing appeal before the learned District Judge". Thereafter the submission in this affidavit are upon the interpretation of this Court's stay order. 7. The interpretation of this Court's order was completely understood by the employer when he sought and received the ad-interim order, acted upon it, paid wages to the workman and abruptly decided to reduce them unilaterally. Thereafter the submission in this affidavit are upon the interpretation of this Court's stay order. 7. The interpretation of this Court's order was completely understood by the employer when he sought and received the ad-interim order, acted upon it, paid wages to the workman and abruptly decided to reduce them unilaterally. Indeed if the employer had reservations on the interpretation of the interim order of this Court passed on 9-1-1984 and had even decided not to file an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority, aforesaid, then it ought to have placed his submissions for any clarification which he thought necessary by coming to this Court straightaway. Instead the employer took recourse to two options; (a) not filing an appeal before the District Judge and (b) not seeking a clarification from this Court. The intention, thus, was not to comply with the order. 8. Circumstances like this should not go unnoticed as it affects the respect of orders passed by this Court. The equity has turned against the petitioner and the interim order which was granted as a matter of description must be vacated in the interest of justice, it had in any case stood automatically vacated. On this proposition this Court is fortified by the decision of this Court as reported ID Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram, AIR 1951 Alld. 746 (FB). A party with a background of unfair conduct cannot receive a discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A stay order is one on such relief. The petitioner's conduct in non-observance of this Court's order has not beer good. In fact at every stage, the record shows the intention of the petitioner was not to comply with the terms of the stay order. In effect when the petitioner decided to unilaterally reduce the emoluments paid to the respondent workman when the salary paid to him for June, 1986 at Rs. 950/- was reduced in the subsequent months, the stay order of 9-1-1984 stood automatically vacated. The petitioner had committed default of the terms of the stay order, and as the conditions of the order implied it stood automatically discharged without reference to this Court By this order it is only being reiterated that the stay order bad stood automatically discharged, and will be considered as such.