JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J. 1. This petition has been placed before us upon a reference by a learned Single Judge who found that there was a conflict of views on the interpretation and scope of section 16 (5) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (the Act for short) between two learned Single Judges of this Court, viz., Brother B. N. Sapru and Brother S. C. Mathur. The decision of Brother Sapru is reported in 1984 (1) ARC 391, Shyam Dass v. Delegatee District Magistrate, Bijnor while that of brother Mathur is reported in 1981 ARC 241, B. Solomon v. Syed Iltifat Hussain. The reference is by brother V. K. Mehrotra who seems to agree with the opinion expressed by Brother S. C. Mathur. 2. The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties before us may be divided into two part. First, dealing with the issue whether the application filed by Dr. B. S. Saxena, the respondent no. 2 (one of the co- landlords of the premises in question) under Sec. 16 (5) of the Act for review of order of allotment dated 1-2-78 passed in favour of the petitioner Madhu Gopal, was maintainable in law and, second, whether the order of allotment was not made in accordance with clause (a) or(b) of section 16 (1). The difference of opinion that has led to the reference is in regard to the first of these two questions. We will, therefore, deal with that issue first. In order to appreciate the controversy it will be appropriate to have a look at the relevant provisions. Section 16 (1) reads as follows : "16. Allotment and release of vacant building : (1) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the District Magistrate may by order : (a) require the landlord to let any building which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant, or a part of such building but not appurtenant land alone, to any person specified in the order (to be called an allotment order) or ; (b) release the whole or any part or such building, or any land appurtenant thereto, in favour of the landlord (to be called a release order). Provided that in the case of a vacancy referred to in sub-section (4) of section 12, the District Magistrate shall give an opportunity to the landlord or the tenant as the case may be, of showing that the said section is not attracted to his case before making an order under clause (a). (2)............ (3)............ (4)............ (5) (a) Where the landlord or any other person claiming to be a lawful occupant of the building or any part thereof comprised in the allotment or release order satisfies the District Magistrate that such order was not made in accordance with clause (a) or clause (b) as the case may be, of sub-section (1), the District Magistrate may review the order : Provided that no application under this clause shall be entertained later than seven days after the eviction of such person. (b) Where the District Magistrate on review under this sub-section sets aside or modifies his order of allotment or release, he shall put or cause to be put the applicant, if already evicted, back into possession of the building, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary. (6)............ (7) Every order under this section shall subject to any order made under Sec. 18 be final. (8)............ 3. S.C. Mathur, J. with whom Brother V. K. Mehrotra seems to concur is of the opinion that a landlord who was not in actual physical possession until the making of the allotment order or his eviction in pursuance thereof is not competent to make an application for review of the allotment order under section 16 (5) of the Act. B. N. Sapru, J. on the other hand, expressed the view that the words claiming to be a lawful occupant of the building occurring in section 16 (5) (a) refers only to the words ' any other person ' immediately preceding those words and not to the landlord. He is clearly of the opinion that whether in actual physical possession or not the landlord has right to apply for review under section 16 (5). The same view has been expressed by Hon'ble N. D. Ojha, J. (as he then was) in the case of Niren Kumar Das v. The District Judge, Pilibhit. reported in AIR 1977 Alld. 47 = 1977 AWC 148 . 4. The same view has been expressed by Hon'ble N. D. Ojha, J. (as he then was) in the case of Niren Kumar Das v. The District Judge, Pilibhit. reported in AIR 1977 Alld. 47 = 1977 AWC 148 . 4. Before we elaborate these views and comment upon them, we may briefly set out the essential facts which lie within a narrow compass. Premises no. 1/300, Rawatpara Agra is a shop on the ground floor of which there are five owners, namely, R. C. Saxena, D. C. Saxena, Dr. B. S. Saxena (the respondent no. 3 herein) Veeresh Saxena (the respondent no. 4 herein) and Smt. Shanti Saxena. One of these co-owners Veeresh Saxena is said to have been carrying on chemist business in the shop at the relevant time. On 28-1-78 he wrote to the concerned authority under the Act that he was vacating the shop as he desired to close down his business. Some enquiry is said to have been carried out by the rent control inspector as regards whether there was a vacancy. A notice was issued to Veeresh Saxena to appear before the Prescribed Authority on 31-1-78 on which date he appeared and filed an affidavit stating that he was vacating the shop and that the same may be allotted to the petitioner Madhu Gopal. It is said that there was no other application for allotment. Acting on the affidavit of Veeresh Saxena the Prescribed Authority allotted the shop by an order dated 1-2-78 in favour of the petitioner Madhugopal. On 25-2-78 Dr. B. S. Saxena filed an application for review under section 16 (5) (a) challenging the allotment order on the assertion that the order had been procured by the petitioner in collusion with Veeresh Saxena without any notice to him and contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. It was alleged that Veeresh Saxena surreptitiously got the shop allotted in favour of the petitioner without any notice to Dr. Saxena and other co-owners. It was further alleged that Veeresh Saxena was only one of the co-owners and he had no right to give a consent for allotment on behalf of everyone. It was alleged that Veeresh Saxena surreptitiously got the shop allotted in favour of the petitioner without any notice to Dr. Saxena and other co-owners. It was further alleged that Veeresh Saxena was only one of the co-owners and he had no right to give a consent for allotment on behalf of everyone. The business which was being carried on in the shop in dispute was ancestral business under the name and style of Messrs Devi Prasad and Sons in he too had a share and consequently he would be deemed to have been in occupation of the building. The accommodation in question had never been let out before nor did he (Dr. Saxena) want to let the same out. Allegations of fraud and misrepresentation were also made in this application. The prayer was that the order of allotment dated 1-2-78 be reviewed and cancelled and suitable reliefs be granted to the applicant. 5. The application was contested by the petitioner, inter alia, on the ground that it was barred by limitation and, in any case it was not maintainable in law as he was not in actual physical possession of the shop. It was also contended that the order of allotment had been made in accordance with law and the application filed by Dr. B. S. Saxena was liable to be dismissed. 6. By an order dated 25-3-80 the Additional City Magistrate exercising the powers of the District Magistrate under section 16 (5) of the Act cancelled the allotment order on the ground that Dr. B. S. Saxena was entitled to notice under rule 9 (3) of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act as well as to a notice under Rule 10 (9) as the building in question had never been let out before, that is, it was a case of first allotment, neither of which had been served on him admittedly. The objection of the petitioner that the review application filed by Dr. Saxena was either barred by limitation or not maintainable was overruled by the Additional City Magistrate. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the aforesaid order by way of a revision under section 18 of the Act before the learned VI Additional District Judge, Agra, who, by his order dated 23-3-82 endorsed the findings of the Additional District Magistrate and dismissed the revision. The petitioner assails the validity of these two orders. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the aforesaid order by way of a revision under section 18 of the Act before the learned VI Additional District Judge, Agra, who, by his order dated 23-3-82 endorsed the findings of the Additional District Magistrate and dismissed the revision. The petitioner assails the validity of these two orders. The matter came up before the learned Single Judge who by his order dated 6-9-85 referred the entire case before us in view of the divergence of opinion noticed above. That is how the case has come before us. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and given them a careful consideration we have not the slightest hesitation in holding that a landlord can apply for review of an order of allotment under section 16 (5) (a) even if he is not in actual physical possession thereof. The words ' claiming to be a lawful occupant of a building or any part thereof ' qualify only the words any other person and not the landlord occurring in sub-section (5) (a) of section 10. It is only in regard to a person other than a landlord that the right to apply for review is restricted to those who claim to be a lawful occupants of the building. This restriction, upon the plain terms of sub-section (5) (a), cannot be read in relation to the landlord applying for review under that provision. Neither the language of that provision nor the scheme of the enactment, as we shall presently demonstrate, justifies the contention that it is only those landlords who may be in actual physical possession on whom the right of review under section 16 (5) has been conferred by the statute. 8. In the case of Niren Kumar Das (supra), Hon'ble N. D. Ojha, J. (as he then was) had occasion to consider the same contention, namely, that it is only that landlord who is in actual physical occupation of the building who can apply for review under section 16 (5) (a). The contention was examined in depth and rejected after a careful and exhaustive analysis of sub-section (5) (a) of section 16 and the scheme of the enactment. The contention was examined in depth and rejected after a careful and exhaustive analysis of sub-section (5) (a) of section 16 and the scheme of the enactment. With respect, we cannot usefully add to the reasoning adopted by his Lordship, and would therefore, content ourselves with quoting the relevant excerpts from the judgment-See paragraph 7 of the report at page 153 of 1977 AWC which reads thus : " According to counsel for the petitioner the words 'claiming to be lawful occupant' in sub-section (5) of section 16 would govern not only any other person but also the landlord. It was urged that since the instant case the landlord could not be said to be a person who was in lawful occupation of the building, sub-section (5) was not applicable. In my opinion, if this construction is put to sub-section (5), no landlord would be in position to make an application for setting aside an order of allotment passed under clause (a) of section 16 (1) of the Act. In those cases where the accommodation has actually fallen vacant and has been occupied by the landlord, his occupation would be lawful in his capacity of being the owner of the property only till an order of allotment has been passed in respect of the said accommodation. The moment an order of allotment is passed which has the effect of issuing a direction to the landlord to let out the accommodation to the allottee the landlord is bound to place the allottee in possession over the accommodation. If he fails to do so and continues to occupy the property, his continuance would become unlawful. Likewise, if it is a case falling under section 12 of the Act, viz. even though the accommodation has not actually been vacated by the sitting tenant but in respect of which a deemed vacancy can be presumed the landlord will not be in a position to make an application under sub-sec. (5) inasmuch as he is not actually occupying the house. The distinction between possession and occupation is well settled. When the Legislature specially conferred a right on the landlord to make an application for setting aside an order of allotment passed u/Sec. 16(1) (a) that right cannot be negatived by interpreting the said sub-section in a manner as suggested by counsel for the petitioner. The distinction between possession and occupation is well settled. When the Legislature specially conferred a right on the landlord to make an application for setting aside an order of allotment passed u/Sec. 16(1) (a) that right cannot be negatived by interpreting the said sub-section in a manner as suggested by counsel for the petitioner. In my opinion, the words ' claiming to be lawful occupant ' apply only to other persons. They do not apply to the landlord. The matter can be looked at from another angle. Had the intention of the Legislature, as has been submitted by counsel for the petitioner, the words' the landlord or any other ' would not have been used at all. In place of these words the word ' any ' could have served the purpose. In that event sub-section (5) would have started with the words ' where any person claiming to be lawful occupant '. I am, therefore, of opinion that the application which had been made by respondent no. 4 on January 4, 1972, would be an application of the nature contemplated by sub-section (5) of section 16 of the Act and the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated August 26, 1972, would in view of section 43 (2) (b) be one under section 16 (5) and would accordingly be appealable under section 18 of the Act. " We respectfully agree with the entire reasoning offered in support of the conclusion that the restriction arising from the words 'claiming to be a lawful occupant' cannot be read into section 16 (5) (a) where the person applying for review happens to be the landlord. We also agree with the opinion expressed in the case of Shyam Dass (supra) and the observations made by the learned Judge in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the report which are extracted here for convenience sake : "18. Section 16 (5) (a) has been quoted above. Clause (a) of subsection (5) of section 16 refers to category of persons who are competent to file an application, one is the landlord and the other is a person claiming to be a lawful occupant of the building. It cannot be urged that a landlord who is not in occupation of the building is excluded from the purview of the person competent to file an application under section 16 (5) of the Act. 19. It cannot be urged that a landlord who is not in occupation of the building is excluded from the purview of the person competent to file an application under section 16 (5) of the Act. 19. What is generally known as an order of allotment is made under section 16 (1) (a) and it requires a landlord to let a building. The landlord is vitally affected by the making of an order under section 16 (1) (a). The Legislature, therefore intended that he can file an application under section 16 (5) (a). Similarly, a person claiming to be a lawful occupant of a building can be vitally affected by both an order under section 16 (1) (a) and (b). Under section 16 (1) (a) an allotment order is made which would affect the person who is in occupation of the building possibly on being evicted. Similarly, when an order of release is made under section 16 (1) (b) releasing the whole or a part of a building in favour of the landlord, the person in occupation of the building is vitally affected. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken in the case of B. Solomon (supra) that unless the landlord is in physical occupation of the building, he cannot file an application under section 16 (5) of the Act. I would, therefore, hold that an application under section 16 (5) can be filed by a landlord even if he is not in physical occupation of the building in question." 9. Section 16 (5) (a) provides for review on the ground that the allotment order has not been made in accordance with clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be, of sub-section (1). By an order made under clause (a) the landlord is directly and vitally affected, whether he is in actual physical occupation or not, as we will presently demonstrate. By an order of release under clause (b) as well as an allotment order under clause (a) it is the person claiming to be a lawful occupant who is hit. The Legislature has, therefore, conferred the right of review on these two : the landlord and the person claiming to be a lawful occupant. Let us now examine how the landlord is affected by an order made under section 16 (1) (a). The Legislature has, therefore, conferred the right of review on these two : the landlord and the person claiming to be a lawful occupant. Let us now examine how the landlord is affected by an order made under section 16 (1) (a). Upon a building falling vacant, the landlord may apply for its release under clause (b) on the ground that he requires it for his personal use and occupation. If he happens to be occupying a part of the building the remaining part of which has fallen vacant, be has right to nominate a tenant of his choice (section 17). If, as in the present case, it is a case of first allotment, he has again been invested with the right to nominate (?) Rule 10 (9). 10. It will thus he seen that in each of these situations even though the landlord is not in actual physical occupation of the building can there be the slightest doubt that he is not any the less directly and vitally hit by an illegal order of allotment than the landlord who is in actual physical occupation of the building ? The answer must, in our considered view, be in the negative as we have been able to discern to valid reason in the language of the provision of the scheme of the Act making any such distinction between the two classes of the landlords. Having conferred these and other important rights on the landlord the Legislature seems to have felt that in addition to the remedy by way of revision the landlord should also enjoy a simple and quicker remedy by way of review before the very authority which made the order of allotment. Such a remedy being undentably far more convenient and expeditious than a regular revision under section 18 for effecting such a purpose, there seems no warrant whatever either upon the plain terms of section 16 (5) or the statutory scheme in which it is set which may justify restricting the remedy only to those landlords who are in actual physical occupation. It should not be forgotten that the landlords who are not in actual physical occupation are deemed to be in juridical possession and, therefore, directly affected by any direction issued to them under clause (a) to let the building. 11. It should not be forgotten that the landlords who are not in actual physical occupation are deemed to be in juridical possession and, therefore, directly affected by any direction issued to them under clause (a) to let the building. 11. Let us now examine the dissenting view expressed by S. C. Mathur, J. in the case of B. Solomon (supra). After quoting section 16 (5) (a) and the proviso thereto, the learned Judge observed as follows in paragraph 7 of the judgment : " A plain reading of the above provision makes it apparent that an application for review can be maintained only by the person who claims to be the occupant of the building. In the present case landlord may claim to be in possession of the property through opposite party No. 1, but the landlord cannot be said to be in occupation of the building. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that the petitioner is justified in saying that the review application at the instance of the landlord who did not claim to be in occupation of the property in dispute, was not maintainable. Since the review application itself was not maintainable the revision also could not be maintained. In my opinion, therefore, the learned District Judge committed manifest error in allowing the revision of the landlord." 12. The learned Judge seems to have assumed that in sub-section (5) (a) the words 'claiming to be lawful occupant of the building' apply to the words 'the landlord' also. With great respect, we do not think that either the language of section 16 (5) (a) and its plain grammatical construction or the legislative scheme of the enactment justified that conclusion. There is no discussion in the judgment in support of the learned Judge's assumption that an application for review at the instance of the landlord can be maintained only by that landlord who is in actual physical occupation of the building. We have already demonstrated that such an assumption is not warranted. In any case, for the reasons given above we would prefer to adopt the line of reasoning in Niren Kumar Das's case as well as in Shyam Das's (supra). We have already demonstrated that such an assumption is not warranted. In any case, for the reasons given above we would prefer to adopt the line of reasoning in Niren Kumar Das's case as well as in Shyam Das's (supra). Supporting the view of S. C. Mathur, J. Sri S. P. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, vehemently contended that the fact under the proviso an application for review cannot be maintained after seven days from the eviction of the person applying for review necessarily implies that the person must be in actual physical occupation. 13. We regret our inability to accept the submission. The proviso to sub-section 5 (a) merely lays down a rule of limitation and states that no application shall be maintainable later than seven days after the eviction. The proviso simply means that where either the landlord or the person claiming to be lawful occupant has been evicted in pursuance of an order made under clause (a) or clause (b) his application for review shall not be entertained later than seven days. It does not imply that the person applying under clause 5 (a) of Section 16 must have been in actual physical occupation and has thereupon been evicted. 14. Sri S. P. Gupta then placed strong reliance on clause (b) of sub- section (5) of Section 16 which reads as follows : " (5) (b) where the District Magistrate on review under this sub section sets aside or modifies his order of allotment or release, he shall put or cause to be put the applicant, if already evicted, back into possession of the building, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary. " (emphasis added). Learned counsel contended that the question of being put into possession of the building would not arise if the person making the application for review were not in actual physical possession. The submission ignores the words ' if already evicted ' occurring in clause (b). This clause merely confers a power on the District Magistrate where a person at whose instance the order of allotment is modified is found to have been evicted, to put him back in possession of the building. It goes no further. 15. The submission ignores the words ' if already evicted ' occurring in clause (b). This clause merely confers a power on the District Magistrate where a person at whose instance the order of allotment is modified is found to have been evicted, to put him back in possession of the building. It goes no further. 15. We, therefore, hold that an application for review under section 16 (5) (a) of the Act by the landlord is maintainable even if he is not in actual physical occupation. The words ' claiming to be a lawful occupant of the building ' in sub section (5) (a) refer only to the words ' any other person ' and not the landlord. With respect, we endorse the opinion of Hon'ble N. D. Ojha, J. (as he then was) in the case of Niren Kumar Das (supra) as well as of Brother Sapru in the case of Shyam Dass (supra). WE think that the decision in the case of B. Solomon (supra) in so far as it is only that landlord who is in actual physical occupation of the building, who can maintain an application under section 16 (5) (a) does not lay down the correct law. 16. The other ground on which the maintainability of the application for review was challenged was that the same was barred by limitation in view of the first proviso to sub section 5 (a). This objection is equally untenable. The Additional City Magistrate has recorded a finding that the petitioner took possession of the disputed shop in pursuance of the impugned allotment order only after 25-2-78. It is only after this date that the eviction of Dr. Saxena could be said to have taken place. The application for review having been filed on 25-2-78 it is apparent that the same was well within time the limitation prescribed under the proviso the sub section 5 (a) being seven days. Sri S. P. Gupta, however, made an attempt to challenge this finding by taking us through the various annexures filed with the petition which, according to him, indicated that the petitioner had taken possession of the shop on 4-2-78. We were, however, not convinced that the finding recorded by the Additional City Magistrate warrants any interference in these proceedings. Sri S. P. Gupta, however, made an attempt to challenge this finding by taking us through the various annexures filed with the petition which, according to him, indicated that the petitioner had taken possession of the shop on 4-2-78. We were, however, not convinced that the finding recorded by the Additional City Magistrate warrants any interference in these proceedings. Further learned counsel for the respondent invited our attention to a very categorical admission made by the petitioner in the course of his statement before the court of first instance in which he clearly stated that he had not taken possession of the shop before 25-2-78. This statement puts the controversy beyond any doubt. Before we pass on to the second contention urged in support of the petition we may mention that in somewhat similar context in the case of Dr. (Smt.) Keshav Devi v. Girdhari Lal Pahwa, AIR 1987 SC 22 = 1986 AWC 1229 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that if the order of allotment is demonstrated to have been made in contravention of clause (a) and (b) of Sec. 16 (1) of the Act and if that defect is rectified upon an application for review filed under section 16 (5) of the Act, it would not be a sound exercise of discretion to interfere with that order even if there was some procedural defect in maintaining the review application. The position obtaining in the present case is substantially similar. In any case, we have already found that the review application filed by Dr. Saxena was maintainable and was rightly entertained by the respondent nos. 1 and 2. 17. That takes us to the question whether the order of allotment was made in accordance with law. Both the courts below have concurrently found that Veeresh Saxena was not the sole owner or landlord of the shop. He was only one of the several persons who were the co-owners of the shop. They have further found that the shop had never been let out before i.e., it was a case of first letting to which Rule 10 (9) was clearly attracted. Lastly they have found, and, indeed, it was not disputed before us, that notices neither under Rule 9 (3) nor under Rule 10 (9) were served on the other co-owners. 18. The concurrent finding recorded by both the courts below that Dr. Lastly they have found, and, indeed, it was not disputed before us, that notices neither under Rule 9 (3) nor under Rule 10 (9) were served on the other co-owners. 18. The concurrent finding recorded by both the courts below that Dr. Saxena and his other brothers were also co-owners of the shop in dispute in which business was being carried on under the name of Messers Devi Prasad and Sons, is supported by ample evidence on the record and we see no ground for interfering with the same. It was not disputed before us that prior to the present allotment order, the shop had never been let out before. The question, therefore, as to who was or were the landlords of the shop for the purpose of application of Rule 9 (3) or 10 (9) would hence necessarily depend on the ownership rights of the claimants. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not seriously challenge the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below that Veeresh Saxena, Dr. Saxena and their brothers, all sons of Devi Prasad, were co-owners of the shop in dispute. Consequently each of them was entitled to be treated as a co- landlord in a case where the building is being allotted for the first time for the purpose of Rule 10 (9). The courts below have, in addition to this, referred to other pieces of evidence on record indicating that Veeresh Saxena was not the sole owner/landlord of the shop in dispute and that his other brothers were also co-owners/landlords of the shop in question. It is another matter that one of the several co-owners of a building may let out a building acting on behalf of the other brothers or co-owners in which case the person letting out may claim to be the sole landlords. But that is not the case here. There is no such evidence. Relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2335 at 2339 Sri S. P. Gupta submitted that as a co-owner Veeresh Saxena would be deemed to be owner of every bit of the property in question and consequently notice: to him under Rule 9 (3) and Rule 10 (9) was sufficient compliance with those provisions. We are unable to agree. We are unable to agree. Like Veeresh Saxena his other brothers would also be co- owners of the entire property and, therefore, on the same reasoning, the landlord entitled to have their say in the matter covered by Rule 10 (9), if not also Rule 9 (J). Where a building is being let out for the first time, every co- landlord ought, in our opinion, be entitled to a notice under Rule 10 (9) and to express his willingness whether or not to throw open the building for letting and, in case he is willing to throw open the building for letting, to nominate a tenant. It is for this reason the District Magistrate is enjoined to serve notice on the landlords to ascertain whether he is willing to throw the building open for allotment and, if so, to nominate a person in whose favour the allotment may be made. He may also intimate the District Magistrate that he does not want to let out the building in which case it shall not be allotted. If he makes a nomination the building has to be allotted only in favour of that nominee. 19. It will, therefore, be seen that the Legislature has jealously safeguarded the interest of the landlords in a case where the building has not been let out before by enacting Rule 10 (9). Viewed from this angle we have no manner of doubt that all the brothers of Veeresh Saxena were entitled to express their options such as are contemplated under Rule 10 (9). The courts below were hence clearly right in holding that their was a breach of Rule 10 (9) if the notices were not issued to other co-landlords. 20. There was considerable debate at the Bar on the issue whether Rule 9 (3) was attracted to the facts of the present case which provides that immediately after the receipt of intimation of vacancy the District Magistrate shall issue a notice to the landlord intimating him the date fixed for considering the allotment applications. For the petitioner it was urged that such a notice is required to be sent only to that landlord who sends an intimation of vacancy under Section 15 (1) of the Act and not to the others. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, placed strong reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, placed strong reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Smt. Keshav Devi (supra) as well as Yogendra Tewari v. District Judge, Gorakhpur, 1984 ALJ 498 in support of his contention that notice under Rule 9 (3) is mandatory in every case before order of allotment can be made. We do not, however, consider it necessary to dilate on this issue as, in our opinion, the allotment order was liable to be struck down in any case for non-compliance with Rule 10 (9). The upshot is that the court below were right in allowing the review petition. The question is whether the courts below were right in just setting aside the allotment order ? We think that while the order setting aside the allotment order was right, the courts below should have proceeded further and issued notices to the remaining co-landlords under Rule 10 (9). Before the courts below there was no serious challenge on behalf of Dr. Saxena that the shop had fallen vacant with Veeresh Saxena, the person who was doing business in the shop, intimating the District Magistrate that he was closing down the business. That being so, couples with the fact that the building had not been let out before, the Rent Controller should have issued notices to the remaining landlords under Rule 10 (9) and then passed orders in accordance therewith. He has failed to perform that duty. 21. What do we find in the present case ? Veeresh Saxena clearly intimated that he was willing to throw the building open for allotment and nominated the petitioner for that purpose. Dr. Saxena, on the other hand, stated that he was not willing to let out the building. The remaining co-landlords were equally entitled to give their options under sub-rule (9) of Rule 10. The courts below have made no effort to ascertain their wishes. It is apparent that action can be taken under sub-rule (9) of Rule 10 by the District Magistrate only after he has served notices on all the landlords and ascertained their wishes with regard to the vacancy and the matters dealt with under that provision. If a body of co-landlords speak with one voice there will be no problem. Difficulty would arise where they do not do so. If a body of co-landlords speak with one voice there will be no problem. Difficulty would arise where they do not do so. We think that in a case where there is divergence of opinion amongst the landlords the District Magistrate should act according to the consensus i.e. the opinion of the majority. It is apparent that as the record stood before the courts below it as not possible to act on the opinion expressed only by Dr. Saxena and ignore that of Veeresh Saxena. 22. In the circumstances we think that a fair solution of the problem will be to issue notices to all the landlords under Rule 10 (9) and thereafter to make order in accordance with the wishes of the majority of them. There are, according to the contesting respondents, five co-landlords, namely, R. C. Saxena, D. C. Saxena, B. S. Saxena (respondent no. 3), Veeresn Saxena (respondent no. 4) and Smt. Shanti Saxena. Dr. B. S. Saxena shall give the addresses of the other co-owners to the authority exercising powers of the District Magistrate under Rule 10 (9) who would immediately issue notice to them fixing a date for passing appropriate orders. We think that in the interest of justice till his matter is finally decided in pursuance of the order of this Court the possession of the petitioner over the disputed shop should not be disturbed as the opinion of the remaining co- landlords is not available as yet. 23. Our conclusions finally are that the courts below were competent to entertain the application for review. They were further right in reviewing the order of allotment and setting aside the same. They, however, did not carry the enquiry to its logical conclusion by issuing notices to other landlords and ascertaining their wishes before taking a final decision in the matter of allotment. To that limited extent the petition is entitled to succeed. 24. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. They, however, did not carry the enquiry to its logical conclusion by issuing notices to other landlords and ascertaining their wishes before taking a final decision in the matter of allotment. To that limited extent the petition is entitled to succeed. 24. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The orders passed by the courts below setting aside the order of allotment made in favour of the petitioner on 1-2-78 are affirmed subject to the following directions- The Additional City Magistrate or the Officer at present exercising the powers of the District Magistrate under Rule 10 (9) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 shall issue notices to all the five landlords mentioned above within a week of the filing of a certified copy of this order and the names and addresses of the landlords to be supplied by Dr. B. S. Saxena. Thereafter he will make an order in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. The petitioner shall, however, not be dispossessed from the shop in dispute until orders have been passed in pursuance of these directions by the competent authority. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs. Petition allowed.