JUDGMENT R. S. Thakur, J.—The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as follows:— 2. The appellant, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, is Suraj Kund Temple deity at Sunder Nagar, which instituted a suit through its Managing Committee, known as temple committee consisting of two members S/Shri Basant Singh and Kali Dass and Thakur Dass, being its Secretary, was authorised to prosecute the suit on behalf of the deity though the plaint has been signed and verified by one of its members, i. e. Shri Kali Dass as well. One of the defendants in that suit was, amongst others, one Hari Krishan, defendant No. 1, and the averments in the plaint were that though the property belonged to the deity, which was the subject-matter of the suit but was improperly and illegally alienated in favour of defendant Hari Krishan by the State of Himachal Pradesh or its predecessor-in-interest and a declaratory decree was sought to the effect that this alienation was void and the possession in respect of the suit property was also claimed after ejectment of said Hari Krishan. 3. The suit has had a long chequered history. It was first instituted in the Court of the Sub-Judge at Sunder Nagar on April 5, 1967. Then it was transferred to the court of the Senior Sub-Judge at Mandi who on January 27, 1970, returned the plaint to the plaintiff to be presented in an appropriate court on the finding that the Court of Senior Sub-Judge had no jurisdiction as the value of the suit property was beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction. The suit was then ultimately filed in the High Court with an application under section 14 of the Limitation Act requesting that the period spent in prosecuting this suit in the lower courts from 5-4-1967 to 1-3-1970 may be excluded in computing the period of limitation on the grounds of bona fides. 4. The suit was ultimately registered in the High Court and the pro ceedings were taken up towards its disposal. 5. During the pendency of the suit, defendant No. 1 Shri Hari Krishan died on January 19, 1972. 4. The suit was ultimately registered in the High Court and the pro ceedings were taken up towards its disposal. 5. During the pendency of the suit, defendant No. 1 Shri Hari Krishan died on January 19, 1972. An application by the counsel for the plaintiff Shri Dharam Pal Sood, Advocate was then moved in the High Court which was registered as OMP No. 37 of 72, on April 18, 1972 for impleading the legal representatives of said Hari Krishan, as defendants, in his place. As this application was not supported by an affidavit, the same was returned to the counsel concerned with the instruction that the same be refiled along- with a supporting affidavit within a period of four days. The counsel for the plaintiff failed to file the same within four days but ultimately filed the same alongwith an affidavit on May 11, 1972. This application was opposed on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased defendant Hari Krishan on the ground that since on that date the suit had abated and there was no application under Order 22, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code and/ or section 5 of the Limitation Act, the same deserved dismissal., During the pendency of these proceedings, the counsel for the plaintiff moved another OMP No. 109/72 on September 5, 1972, under Order 22V Rules 4 and 9 and section 151, C. P. C. read with section 5 of the Limitation Act, wherein the counsel for the plaintiff Shri Dharam Pal Sood, averred that the plaintiff had sent the application under Order 22, Rule 4, C. P. C. duly supported by an affidavit to him through a registered post in March, 1972 but/that since the affidavit was misplaced, he filed the application unsupported by an affidavit on April 18, 1972 which was the last date of limitation for filing such an application. The Registry, however, returned the same to be filed within four days alongwith an affidavit. The Registry, however, returned the same to be filed within four days alongwith an affidavit. He then wrote a letter to the plaintiff at Sunder Nagar to send another affidavit and he himself also continued the search of the lost affidavit and which affidavit he was able to trace on May 11, 1972 and on the same day he filed the returned application alongwith the affidavit in the Registry and it was in these circumstances that the application for bringing the required legal representatives on record could not be made earlier and there being sufficient cause for condonation of delay in view of these facts and circumstances, the same be condoned. This application by the advocate for the plaintiff, Shri Dharam Pal Sood had been supported by an affidavit sworn by himself. This application was again opposed on behalf of the legal representatives of Shri Hari Krishan deceased defendant, and it was asserted that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay and the application deserved to be dismissed. 6. On these pleadings of the parties, the learned single Judge framed the following issues:— 1. Is there sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in making the application for setting aside the abatement ? OPA. 2. Whether OMP No. 109 of 1972 is within time ? OPA. 3. Whether the first application was a legal and a proper application ? OPA. 4. Relief. In proof of these issues the counsel for the plaintiff, Shri Dharam Pal Sood, himself stepped into the witness box and substantially supported the averments made in his affidavit. He was also supported by said Thakur Dass who also examined himself as witness on behalf of the plaintiff. 7. The learned Single Judge while giving finding on issue No. 3 took note of rules in Chapter IX of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967, (hereinafter called the Rules of 1967) and Rules 5, 6, 7 of Chapter I-C, Vol. 7. The learned Single Judge while giving finding on issue No. 3 took note of rules in Chapter IX of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967, (hereinafter called the Rules of 1967) and Rules 5, 6, 7 of Chapter I-C, Vol. V of the Punjab High Court Rules and Orders which require that the application of the type in hand, that is, under Order 22, Rule 4 or Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code "shall be supported by a duly sworn affidavit" and held that they were of mandatory nature and repelled the contention of the counsel for the plaintiff that they were merely directory in character the non-compliance whereof was a mere irregularity and found that in these circumstances it could not be said that there was any proper application filed by the plaintiff on April 18, 1972 when it was filed unsupported by an affidavit. The learned Judge also disagreed that the ratio in Wali Mohammad Khan v. lshok Ali Khan and others, AIR 1931 Ail 507 ; Bhalu Naik v. Hemo NaikanU AIR 1969 Orissa 236 and All India Reporters Ltd. Bombay with Branch Office at Nagpur and another v. Ram Chandra Dhondo Datar, AIR 1961 Bom 292, was applicable to the case in hand. While discussing issues No. 1 and 2 together, the learned Judge found that no sufficient ground was proved on record for condonation of abatement and thus dismissed the application of the plaintiff vide order dated December 26, 1973, which is being impugned in the instant appeal before us. 8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and also gone through the record of the case carefully and for reasons to be recorded presently, we feel that the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the appeal must succeed. 9. It is clear law that under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, the legal representatives of the deceased defendant Hari Krishan could be brought on record within a period of 90 days from the date of his death, that is, on January 19, 1972. 9. It is clear law that under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, the legal representatives of the deceased defendant Hari Krishan could be brought on record within a period of 90 days from the date of his death, that is, on January 19, 1972. Obviously, this application could be filed in this case upto April 18, 1972 and in case this was not done, the suit would automatically abate and this abatement could be set aside within a period of sixty days therefrom under Article 121 of the said Act, computable from the date of abatement that is, April 19, 1972 by moving an application under Order 22, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 5 of the Limitation Act by showing sufficient cause whereby he was prevented from getting this abatement set aside within a period of sixty days from the date of abatement. Thus apparently, there is no limitation for moving this type of application for condonation of delay on sufficient ground even beyond the period of sixty days of the abatement under Article 121 of the Limitation Act provided the applicant is able to show that he was prevented by sufficient cause in not filing an application within a period of sixty days from the date of abatement. Admittedly, such application was moved on behalf of the plaintiff on September 5, 1972. Thus in these circumstances the only question that arises for determination, is whether the plaintiff had shown sufficient cause which prevented him from moving an application within a period of sixty days of abatement which period expired on June 17, 1972. 10. Before we take note of the facts brought on the record in proof of this, it would be appropriate to observe at this stage that this type of interlocutory proceedings are merely procedural matters which are mere means to achieve certain end which is to do substantial justice on merits, between the parties and which in fact is the first and paramount duty of the courts of law and they are not meant to punish any party to the litigation by resoring to a strict and pedantic approach as appears to have been done in the case in hand. On the contrary the courts are required to approach such proceedings in a liberal manner and should not shut the door to substantial justice upon any party unless it is shown that that party had been grossly negligent in the prosecution of his case. 11. Now coming to the facts of the case, it is clear that the counsel for the plaintiff made an application on April 18, 1972 when the suit had not yet even abated. It is another matter that this application had not been supported by an affidavit. Then when the counsel for the plaintiff was able to trace out the affidavit as well which, according to him, had been misplaced, he again filed this application duly supported by an affidavit on May 11, 1972. Of course, by that time the suit had abated and the counsel did not file an application for setting aside this abatement by taking up any plea that he was prevented from making the application for bringing legal representatives on record, by sufficient cause. It is, however, clear that the counsel for the plaintiff at that time presumed that since he had presented the application on April 18, 1972, that is, prior to the abatement, though unsupported by an affidavit, the application in law shall be deemed to have been filed on April 18, 1972, since, as he even contended during the arguments before the learned single Judge, the filing of this application on April 18, 1972 unsupported by an affidavit was a mere irregularity and should not affect the date of its institution on that date as the irregularity was subsequently removed by filing it with a supporting affidavit on May 11, 1972. We also fail to appreciate as to how, as the learned Judge has held, the ratio in the cases cited (supra) which were taken note of in the impugned judgment, were not applicable to the proceedings of this nature. In the first case, in AIR 1931 All 507, there was omission to comply with the provisions regarding presentation of plaint, the presence of signature and verification and it was held that those provisions requiring verification etc. are not mandatory and if there was an omission to comply with those provisions, the same was an irregularity which could be cured. In the first case, in AIR 1931 All 507, there was omission to comply with the provisions regarding presentation of plaint, the presence of signature and verification and it was held that those provisions requiring verification etc. are not mandatory and if there was an omission to comply with those provisions, the same was an irregularity which could be cured. Similarly in the second case, AIR 1969 Orissa 236, an application for interim maintenance and litigation expenses was not supported by an affidavit as required by clause (b) of Rule 13 and it was held that this did not affect the initial jurisdiction of the court to entertain such an application. Similarly in the third case, AIR 1961 Bom 292, it was held that if the defects as to the signatures j verification or presentation of the plaint are cured on a day subsequent to the date of the filing of the suit, the date of institution of the plaint is not changed to the subsequent date. Now when the learned single Judge held that the rules concerning the interlocutory proceedings like the one in question under the 1967 Rules and the relevant Rules in Vol. V, Chapter I-C of the Punjab High Court Rules and Orders were mandatory in nature, he appeals to have been swayed by the words that such interlocutory application shall be supported by affidavit stating clearly the grounds and the facts on which the application is based or such applications, shall as to the allegations of fact contained in such applications, be verified by affidavit. But merely because the word shall had been used therein, cannot make them mandatory in view of the foregoing rulings. Apparently, under Order 6 of the Civil Procedure Code similar terms have been used with regard to the verification and signing of the plaint, for instance, under Order 6, Rule 15, it has been laid down: "(1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. (2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to the true. (3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed." 12. Now when these defects regarding presentation of complaint or absence of signature or verification are held as mere irregularity, which can be cured at a date subsequent to the date of filing the suit and date of institution of the plaint would not change, why should the same position not hold good even in respect of the applications like the one in hand which are of interlocutory nature? Rather this legal proposition should be more forcefully and conclusively apply in the latter case since they are merely rules framed by the High Court under its rule making power, whereas relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (supra) are admittedly the provisions under a substantive law framed by the Parliament. We, therefore, hold that these provisions in the 1967 Rules and the Punjab High Court Rules and Orders are merely directory in their nature and set aside the finding of the learned single Judge to the effect that they are of mandatory character. We are, therefore, of opinion that there will be no illegality in holding that this application under Order 22, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code (OMP No. 37 of 72) should be deemed to have been filed on April 18, 1972. 13. In any case even if the learned Counsel for the plaintiff wrongly assumed when he refiled the application under Order 22, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code supported by an affidavit on May 11, 1972, it was a bona fide mistake of a lawyer practising in the High Court and this circumstance could not have been pressed into service by the learned single Judge to penalise the plaintiff who had done all that he could in the matter by engaging a competent Advocate to plead his case. 14. Even otherwise in the circumstances of this case, it is difficult to hold that the plaintiff was at any time negligent in the conduct of the suit. 14. Even otherwise in the circumstances of this case, it is difficult to hold that the plaintiff was at any time negligent in the conduct of the suit. His counsel Shri Dharam Pal Sood has not only filed the affidavit that he had received this application under Order 22, Rule 4, C. P. C. supported by an affidavit prior to April 18, 1972 but has even pledged his oath by stepping into the witness box to say that it was so and that it was in his office that the affidavit was misplaced or got mixed up with other briefs when it was detached from the main application as the application was given to the typist for preparation of copies. Shri Thakur Dass who was prosecuting the suit on behalf of the plaintiff has also gone into the witness box and supported the averments of his counsel Shri Dharam Pal Sood, not only with regard to the signing and verifying of this application which is dated March 23, 1972 but that he remained out of Sunder Nagar for some time in the month of April and that he did come and contact his counsel on May 12, 1972. The learned single Judge has taken this as a negligent act on the part of this, Thakur Dass that he failed to file an application under Order 22, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code read with section 5 of the Limitation Act on that date, that is, on May 12, 1972 when he met his counsel at Simla. The learned Judge, however, appears to have lost sight of the fact that if his counsel himself was labouring under the impression that the application under Order 22. Rule 4, C. P. C. which he filed alongwith affidavit on May 11, 1972 would under law be deemed to have been filed on April 18, 1972 how could he have advised said Thakur Dass to file an application for setting aside the abatement on that date as apparently he received no such legal advice from his counsel. Rule 4, C. P. C. which he filed alongwith affidavit on May 11, 1972 would under law be deemed to have been filed on April 18, 1972 how could he have advised said Thakur Dass to file an application for setting aside the abatement on that date as apparently he received no such legal advice from his counsel. It is thus apparent that the learned single Judge has looked at the entire issue from an oblique angle which was not permissible in law and in fact there was sufficient material on the record to show that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause from instituting such an application within the prescribed period of limitation and the matter merited condonation of delay and setting aside of abatement. 15. At this stage it would be appropriate to cite in extenso the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353, as follows: "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:— 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied m a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. 3. “Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied m a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence, of on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." Our own High Court in a Division Bench judgment in Bish Ram and others v. Smt. Kalawati and others, 1LR 1980 (HP) 49, has held : "that a bonafide mistake on the part of a counsel in instituting proceedings in a wrong court was a sufficient cause for condonation of delay under section 14 of the Limitation Act". In the instant case, the bonafide mistake on the part of the" counsel was that he was earlier labouring under the impression that he application under Order 22, Rule 4 which he filed on April 18, 1972 would be considered under law as having been filed on that date even when the irregularity was removed subsequently on May 11, 1972 by refiling it along with the supporting affidavit and under that impression he did not advise Thakur Dass, the mukhtair of the plaintiff, when the latter contacted him at Simla on May 12, 1972 to file an application under Order 22 Rule 9 C P C read with section 5 of the Limitation Act but did so himself on September 5, 1972 when he realised that his impression may legally be held as wrong. Under these circumstances it would be highly improper and inequitable if the plaintiff is penalised for this notion entertained by his counsel even if a mistaken one. 16. Under these circumstances it would be highly improper and inequitable if the plaintiff is penalised for this notion entertained by his counsel even if a mistaken one. 16. In view of the above discussion, we accept the appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge dated December 26, 1973 and allow the applications, that is, O. M. P. Nos. 37 and 109 of 1972 and while condoning the delay in filing these applications, set aside the abatement. It is further ordered that the legal representatives of Hari Krishan, the deceased defendant, shall be brought on record as defendants in his place and the suit shall proceed in accordance with law. Appeal allowed.