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1988 DIGILAW 475 (KER)

RAVINDRAN v. CANNANORE CO-OP. S. M. LTD.

1988-10-10

SUKUMARAN

body1988
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner-workman had a grievance about his dismissal from service, which had been imposed by the management, according to him, unjustifiably. He had invoked the right of appeal provided under standing orders. There is a complaint that despite Exts. P3, P6, P7, and P8 followed by Exts. P12 and P13, the appeal has not been disposed of. Ordinarily, there would have been substance in that complaint. However, the pendency of I. D. 14/85 before the Industrial Tribunal, Kozhikode has introduced some procedural aspects. The industrial dispute was pending, before the Tribunal in relation to the norms for promotion and other matters referred to in the order of reference. In view of the pendency of the dispute, Ext. P2 application had been filed under S.33 (2) (b) of the Act for approval of the order of dismissal of the petitioner. It was later realised by the management that in that petition, the workman, whose dismissal was sought to be got approved of by the Tribunal, was not made a party. C.M.P. 61/86 was filed for amending the application for incorporating the name of the workman in the cause title. That application was opposed by the petitioner on the ground that the Industrial Disputes Act did not visualise an amendment of that nature. This contention was rejected by the Tribunal by its order dated 17-5-1988 under Ext. P18. R.10B of the Industrial Disputes Rules deals with proceedings with which the Labour court is governed for that purpose. Emphasis is made about the provision in Clause (e) of Sub-rule (2) which speaks about the amendment of rejoinder. Impliedly, there is no power for the Tribunal for amending the pleadings, it is argued. It is difficult to accept that contention. The functions discharged by the Tribunal in modern times have been dealt with in academic works and judicial decisions, particularly noting the fast pace of development in the industrial and societal set up. In many areas, Tribunals have pushed aside regular courts, for advantages, sometimes assumed, sometimes actual. The characteristics of the Tribunals had been given due recognition in judicial decisions. In relation to procedural working, the Tribunal should necessarily have the necessary flexibility at the points and the capacity to move within the area of their functioning. In relation to procedural matters, quite often, it is quarried whether something is specifically tabooed. The characteristics of the Tribunals had been given due recognition in judicial decisions. In relation to procedural working, the Tribunal should necessarily have the necessary flexibility at the points and the capacity to move within the area of their functioning. In relation to procedural matters, quite often, it is quarried whether something is specifically tabooed. In relation to such step or action or procedure intended to facilitate the main business of the Tribunal, it could not be thought of as lacking in jurisdiction or as an improper exercise on the part of the Tribunal. A different interpretation will stultify the working of the Tribunal itself. In the case of Industrial Tribunal, more often, such rigidity in its functioning could affect the workman bitterly by postponing the fruits which they have been claiming for. This basic aspect has necessarily to be borne in mind while considering the scope and ambit of R.10B. If the rule making authority has been unimaginative in relation to the wider aspects of the functioning of the Tribunal courts should not, for that reason alone, attempt to constrict the functioning of the Tribunals, which may have, at times, the effect of suffocating it. That subverts the very purpose for which a Tribunal is created under a socially well meaning legislation. Looked that way, i am disinclined to accept that in matters like amendment of the pleadings, the Tribunal must necessarily be conferred such a power by specific and specified provision. The purpose is the resolution of a controversy between the management and the workmen or the settlement of an issue in relation to even an employee as in the case of approval. The Tribunal must have the necessary facilities for expediting the process of the dispute resolving controversy. Viewed from that angle, the power to permit an amendment of the pleading, in circumstances where such amendment is justified, should be a recognised power of such a Tribunal. Looked that way the larger contention about the absence of jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal has to be repelled. 2. A further question may arise as to the manner in which that jurisdiction had been exercised. Looked that way the larger contention about the absence of jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal has to be repelled. 2. A further question may arise as to the manner in which that jurisdiction had been exercised. The facts narrated in the order of the Tribunal, namely an application by the management, a contention about an overlooking of the impleadment of the affected workman, and the situation about the amendment being allowed, all would give adequate materials to sustain the order of the Tribunal. The workman may not have any grievance, when, by the attempted amendment he is brought on the party array. 3. Counsel further contended that the petition under S.33(2) (b), itself was not maintainable. It is not possible for this Court to say any thing on that aspect at this stage and in these proceedings. It is for the workman to urge that contention before the Tribunal. The Tribunal will have necessarily to adjudicate that controversy as well. 4. In view of the above discussion, I dismiss the main prayer for quashing Ext. P18. As stated earlier, the Tribunal will have to pass final orders on the application under S.33 (2) (b), evaluating and pronouncing upon the contention about the non-maintainable character of the petition itself. This will be expedited as the workman had been out of service for a fairly long time. I direct the Tribunal to dispose of the matter within a period of three months from today. 5. The complaint about the disposal of the appeal under the standing orders, would not arise for consideration at this stage, in view of the fact that the Tribunal is in seisin of the matter. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the pendency of the application under S.33 (2) (b) before the Tribunal is no bar for the appellate authority to deal with and dispose of the appeal. It is unnecessary to decide that issue now. Assuming that it will be competent for the appellate authority to do so, it may not be desirable for this Court to issue a directive to do so, at a time when a statutory Tribunal-Industrial Tribunal-is in seisin of the very same issue before it. Circumstances may be different if there is a culmination of those proceedings before the Tribunal. Assuming that it will be competent for the appellate authority to do so, it may not be desirable for this Court to issue a directive to do so, at a time when a statutory Tribunal-Industrial Tribunal-is in seisin of the very same issue before it. Circumstances may be different if there is a culmination of those proceedings before the Tribunal. In that view of the matter, despite the hardship that could be caused by the workman, the delay in the pendency of the appeal under the Standing Orders Act, I am disinclined to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus for a final disposal of the appeal. The writ petition is disposed of as above.