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1988 DIGILAW 477 (KER)

Kakkacherra v. Chiyyayi

1988-10-11

VARGHESE KALLIATH

body1988
Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are the brothers of defendants 1 and 2. They executed a gift deed along with another deceased Kannan in favour of defendants 1 and 2. Alleging that the gift deed has been executed under fraud and coercion, the plaintiffs approached the court for a declaration that the gift deed is invalid. The trial court found that there was no fraud and coercion, but held that the gift was not accepted by the donees and so, dismissed the suit. The defendants filed an appeal. The appellate court did not agree with the trial court. The appellate court found that the gift has been accepted and it was executed validly and the rights of the donees are secured by the gift deed. The suit was dismissed. Now the plaintiffs appeal. 2. At the time of admission of this second appeal, this court formulated the following question of law: "Whether there is a presumption in law of acceptance of gift is the question of law arising in this second appeal." Though the question is formulated as a question based on presumption, in fact that is not very material on the facts proved in the case. It is a gift which is not onerous. Moreover, there is a finding by the appellate court that the gift has been accepted by the donees. This is what the appellate court has said: "There is nothing to suggest that the gift was onerous. Not being an onerous gift there was no chance of the donees not accepting the gift. The presumption is that they had accepted it. That apart, it is seen that they had even applied and obtained purchase certificate in respect of the property as per Ext. B1. Ext. B1 is of the year 1977 that too in January." 3. In a decision reported in Bhanumathi v. Lalitha Bai (1973 KLT. 961), Subramonian Poti, J. as he then was, observed thus: "There may be cases where slightest evidence of such acceptance would be sufficient. There may be still cases where the circumstances themselves eloquently speak to such acceptance. Normally, when a person gifts properties to another and it is not an onerous gift, one may expect the other to accept such a gift when once it comes to his knowledge, since normally, any person would be only too willing to promote his own interests. There may be still cases where the circumstances themselves eloquently speak to such acceptance. Normally, when a person gifts properties to another and it is not an onerous gift, one may expect the other to accept such a gift when once it comes to his knowledge, since normally, any person would be only too willing to promote his own interests. May be in particular cases there may be peculiar circumstances which may show that the donee would not have accepted the gift. But these are rather the exceptions than the rule. It is only normal to assume that the donee would have accepted the gift deed. Mere silence may sometimes be indicative of acceptance provided it is shown that the donee knew about the gift." Though it cannot be said that there is a presumption of acceptance in a case of gift, which is not onerous, as observed in the decision, only a very little evidence is necessary to come to a conclusion that the gift has been accepted. Presumption plays an important role in the valuation of evidence. Jurisprudentially the law of evidence comprises two important parts. The first of these consists of norms and rules for the determination of the probative force of evidence. The second part deals with rules determining the modes and conditions of the production of evidence. Obviously, the first deals with the effect of evidence and the second with the mode of production of evidence. 4. The valuation of the evidence in judicial proceedings is the main function of the court in the process of the discovery of truth. "Rules and maxims, when recognised at all, are recognised as proper for the guidance of individual judgment, not for the exclusion of it. But, in this case, as in every other part of judicial procedure, law has been generated, and, insofar as it extends, has made the estimation of probative force in the weighing of evidence a matter of inflexible rules excluding judicial discretion " 5. In this context, presumptive proof is important. Presumptive proof, as opposed to conclusive proof, is basically different. Conclusive proof raises a conclusive presumption. Presumptive proof raises a conditional or rebuttable presumption. In this context, presumptive proof is important. Presumptive proof, as opposed to conclusive proof, is basically different. Conclusive proof raises a conclusive presumption. Presumptive proof raises a conditional or rebuttable presumption. It cannot be said that there is a conclusive presumption of acceptance in the case of gift which is not onerous because conclusive proof has to be understood as a fact possessing probative force of strength as not to admit of effective contradiction. In other words, that fact which amounts to proof irrespective of the existence or non-existence of any other facts whatsoever which may possess probative force in the contrary direction is conclusive presumption. By a conclusive presumption, the law accepts a fact as conclusive proof. 6. A presumptive or conditional proof is nothing but acceptance of certain facts, which on all probabilities, the law assumes that might have taken place and such a presumption is only a conditional proof and it will have value so long as there exists no other facts amounting to disproof. This is what is called a presumption which is liable to be rebutted. 7. In this case, even without a presumption, conditional or conclusive as to the acceptance of the non-onerous gift, it is possible to sustain the judgment on the fact that the gift has been accepted by the donees. The only question that has been formulated in the second appeal is the question relating to the acceptance of the gift. On the facts proved, I am certain that the gift has been accepted and so, the appeal is only to be dismissed. I do so. No order as to costs.