A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE suit giving rise to this appeal has been instituted by the plaintiff-respondents for the eviction of the defendants-appellants on the allegations that the plaintiffs are the Shebaits and Trustees in respect of the lease-hold property and that the lease in favour of the defendants for 99 years in respect of the suit property has expired by efflux of time. The expiration of the period limited by the lease by effluxion has not been disputed by the defendants and, as noted by the trial Judge, the only plea urged by the defendants in resisting ejectment is that the plaintiffs are not the only Shebaits and Trustees of the Devatra owning the lease-hold property and have, therefore, no right to prosecute the suit. ( 2 ) THIS plea has been repelled by the trial Judge on a detailed consideration of the materials on record and the trial Court has held that the plaintiff No. 1 alone is entitled to represent the whole of the Shebaiti interest of the Devatra property of which the suit-property forms part. The suit of eviction has accordingly been decreed by the trial Court which has been impugned in this appeal and in assailing the decree before us in this Court, only that very same plea has been urged by the defendants-appellants, namely, that the two plaintiffs do not represent the entire Shebaiti interest and, therefore, the suit could not proceed without the other co-Shebaits on record. ( 3 ) THERE exists some amount of obfuscation as to who owns the Devatra property and who has the right to sue in respect thereof and the Judges and the Sages of law have not always spoken in clear or one voice. A reference to Dr. Bijan Kumar Mukherjee's classical treatise (Tagore Law Lectures) on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts would demonstrate that even such an erudite scholar and the later illustrious Editors of the Book had also to accept the position not to be free from obscurity. If a Devatra must be preceded with a dedication in favour of a Deity and that Deity is a juristic person, then the Deity alone should be the owner of the Devatra and only the Deity should be entitled to sue in respect thereof. If a Devatra must be preceded with a dedication in favour of a Deity and that Deity is a juristic person, then the Deity alone should be the owner of the Devatra and only the Deity should be entitled to sue in respect thereof. In Pramatha v. Pradyumna, 52 Ind App 245 decided in 1925, the Privy Council no doubt observed that the Deity has a "juridical status with the power of suing and being sued", but in Jagadra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari, (1904) 31 Ind App 203 (PC), decided two decades before, the same Board observed that since the possession and management of the dedicated property belong to the Shebait, that would carry with it the right to bring whatever suits are necessary for the protection of a property and that "every such right of suit is vested in theshebait and not in the idol". A somewhat synthesized note was sought to be struck by Sir George Rankin in a later decision of the Board in Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara, AIR 1940 PC 116 to the effect that the Deity being, at least in theory, the owner, should also, in accordance with that theory, be entitled to sue or to be sued, "though the right of suit is really in the Shebait". The upshot appears to be that it is not so much a matter of substance but rather of form as to whether the suit is brought in the name of Deity as the plaintiff represented by the Shebait, or in the name or in the name of the Shebait as the plaintiff representing the Deity. ( 4 ) THE ordinary rule is, as it should be, that when the Shebaitship vests in more persons than one, all the Shebaits or co- Shebaits must join or be joined in the lis. But to this there is, however, this exception in respect of a de facto Shebait, that is, a person who, though not a de jure Shebait, is in effective possession and control of the Devatra property and exercises all functions of a Shebait and such a de facto Shebait can institute suits for the benefit or protection of the Dewatra, even though dejure he is not the Shebait, or does not legally represent the entire Shebaiti interest. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Vikram Das v. Daulat Ram, AIR 1956 SC 382 and also to the decision of the Privy Council in Mahadeo Prasad v. Karia Bharti, AIR 1935 PC 44 relied on therein, as authorities for this view. ( 5 ) AS already noted, the plea of the defendants is not that the plaintiffs are not the de jure Shebaits at all, but that they are not the only Shebaits. The case of the plaintiffs is that they are the only Shebaits and are in possession and control of the Devatra. There is no plea on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiffs not only do not represent the entire Shebaiti interest, but also are not in exclusive possession, control and management of the Devatra. That being so, on the principle noted above, as endorsed by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs, even if they are only some of the de jure co-Shebaits, can surely maintain the suit as the de facto Shebaits, particularly when there is no challenge to their action for and on behalf of other co-Shebaits, if any. ( 6 ) THERE is also another reason as to why the defendants should not be allowed to challenge the right of the plaintiffs to prosecute this suit. In para 2 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have averred that "the defendants had attorned their tenancy in respect of the suit-premises to the plaintiffs and have paid rent to them in respect of the suit-premises as per terms of the lease". And to this, the contesting defendants in their two sets of written statements (para 9) have admitted the fact of such attornment and have further stated that "the plaintiffs in their personal capacities and as representatives of all the heirs and legal representatives accepted the rent". It is true that according to the defendants, such attornment was in respect of the suit-land and not the suit-premises. But no evidence has been adduced by the defendants, oral or documentary, to show that what was leased to them was land only and not land with premises. The deed of lease - Ext. 1 - unmistakably shows that the demised property was not land only but was land with premises and tenements thereon. It should also be noted that while P. W. 1 categorically stated with reference to Ext. The deed of lease - Ext. 1 - unmistakably shows that the demised property was not land only but was land with premises and tenements thereon. It should also be noted that while P. W. 1 categorically stated with reference to Ext. 1 that the predecessors of the plaintiffs "granted lease of the suit-premises", he was not at all cross-examined on the Joint and no suggestion was put to him that no premises, but land only, was demised. Be that as it may, we are afraid that in view of this admission on the part of the defendants that they attorned to the present plaintiffs in respect of the leasehold, it would be difficult for the defendants to challenge the right of the plaintiffs to sue in respect of the lease-hold, which, as we have already indicated, comprised not land only but land and premises. ( 7 ) THIS may not be a case of estoppel within the meaning of S. 116, Evidence Act, which operates only in favour of a landlord who has inducted or has "let the tenant in". But as pointed out by the Privy Council in Krishna Prosad v. Baraboni Coal Concern, 64 Ind App 311, S. 116 does not enact the whole law of estoppel as between the landlord and the tenant. It is well settled that there may be cases of estoppel outside the ambit of that Section and principle of estoppel is also applicable to cases not strictly coming within the provisions of S. 116. There are indications in the Privy Council decision in Krishna Prosad (supra) that there may be estoppel, though outside the provisions of S. 116, Evidence Act, as a result of attornment and payment of rent to a landlord who has only a derivative title. But we do not, as we need not, rest our decision in this case on any such estoppel, but propose to proceed on the general principles dehors any such estoppel. For even if no such estoppel operates against a tenant who has attorned to a successor landlord, "the tenant", as observed in Foa on Landlord and Tenant, "is not allowed to impeach the title of a person to whom he has paid rent or whose title he has otherwise recognised without showing a better title". For even if no such estoppel operates against a tenant who has attorned to a successor landlord, "the tenant", as observed in Foa on Landlord and Tenant, "is not allowed to impeach the title of a person to whom he has paid rent or whose title he has otherwise recognised without showing a better title". But as pointed out by the Division Bench of this Court, speaking through K. C. Dasgupta, J. (as his Lordship then was), in Gobinda Bhusan v. Jnan Chandra, 1958 Cal LJ 265 at p. 268, even though it is open to the tenant to show that no title was derived by the landlord suing in ejectment, "if there has been payment of rent and no case of fraud or misrepresentation is made out, the very fact that by payment of rent the defendant has admitted and acknowledged the person now claiming to be landlord to have actually obtained the title, is prima facie evidence to show that the title was actually derived and when that is the position, the onus shifts to the defendants to prove that, in fact, title has not been derived". Where S. 116 of the Evidence Act would not apply in terms because the landlord who has sued for ejectment is not the original landlord who let in the tenant, but is one who has derived his title from such landlord, the tenant may not be estopped from disputing his title. But where there has been attornment to such a landlord, the tenant's right to dispute his title would be subject to his proving that such attornment was due to mistake, misrepresentation, fraud or ignorance. The Division Bench of this Court in Santilal v. Ramesh Chandra, AIR 1981 Cal 413 , to which, however, our attention has been drawn by the learned Counsel for the appellants-defendants, has also taken a similar view and has held that' mere attornment by a tenant to one who claims to have derived title from the original landlord may not estop a tenant from repudiating his title, but the tenant would be entitled to do so only if he can explain away the attornment by showing that it was done due to mistake, misrepresentation or bona fide ignorance. And if the tenants cannot so prove, the title of the landlord to whom he has attorned would prevail. And if the tenants cannot so prove, the title of the landlord to whom he has attorned would prevail. The defendants in this case not having pleaded or proved any such mistake, misrepresentation, fraud or ignorance, we must hold that the trial Court was right in decreeing the suit at the instance of the plaintiffs. ( 8 ) THIS appeal accordingly fails and we would dismiss the same with costs. ( 9 ) SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed.