JUDGMENT K.P. Singh 1. These two writ petitions have been directed against the judgment of the District Judge, Gorakhpur dated 21-12-82 in Misc. Case No. 423 of 1982, Ram Das Jalan v. State of U. P. and others. 2. Excess vacant land of the petitioner Ram Das Jalan under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was declared by the appellate court through its order dated 30-9-1982 as is evident from Annexure 1' attached with the writ petition. Aggrieved by the order in appeal the petitioner Ram Das Jalan had filed an application for reviewing the order dated 30th September, 1982 under section 45 of the above mentioned Act. The State of U. P. contested the application. The District Judge through the impugned judgment dated 20th December, 1982 allowed the review application and remanded case to the Competent Authority for determining the excess vacant land held by the petitioner Ram Das Jalan. Before me the learned counsel for the petitioner Ram Das Jalan has contended that the appellate court has failed to make an observation in its judgment about consideration of the effect of transfer executed by the petitioner and it has also been stressed that the ceiling authorities have erred in determining the existence of the vacant land, therefore, the competent authority should be asked to re-determine the effect of transfer executed by the petitioner and the extent of vacant land held by him. 3. The State of U. P. has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner Ram Das Jalan. The learned counsel for the State has contended before me regarding its Writ Petition No. 3693 of 1983 mentioned above that the appellate court has patently erred in allowing the review application filed by the petitioner Ram Das Jalan as the perusal of the impugned judgment indicates that there did not exist any ground mentioned under section 45 of the Act. According to the learned counsel the learned appellate court has exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing the review petition filed by the petitioner Ram Das Jalan. 4. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. In my opinion both the writ petitions have no legs to stand. As regards petition no. According to the learned counsel the learned appellate court has exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing the review petition filed by the petitioner Ram Das Jalan. 4. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. In my opinion both the writ petitions have no legs to stand. As regards petition no. 398 of 1983 Ram Das Jalan v. State of U. P. and others it is sufficient to observe that the effect of transfer executed by the petitioner had been considered by the appellate court in paragraph 7 of its judgment dated 30th September, 1982. In review petition the remand has not been made to consider the effect of the transfer of land by the petitioner, therefore, I think it would be too late in the day to permit the petitioner to re-agitate the question of transfer of land executed by the petitioner. 5. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner Ram Das Jalan for considering the extent of the vacant land again also does not appeal to me. In pursuance of the order of remand the competent authority is bound to redetermine the extent of the vacant land if the land claimed by the petitioner as agricultural land is excluded from the total area held by him. The re-determination of excess vacant land is bound to take place. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case it is not necessary to make any direction with regard to re-determination of vacant land held by the petitioner. If the petitioner wants to urge any other point indirectly under the cover of re-determination of vacant land I think the petitioner is not entitled to rake up any other point in this regard. 6. My attention has been drawn to paragraph 7 of the ruling reported in 1986 ALJ page 112 State of U. P. v. Mrs. Prakash Murthy and the following observation has been stressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner Ram Das Jalan : ".........This is, however, not a civil suit and we do not think it proper to rest the decision in a matter like this on the basis of technicalities as raised before us on both sides. We are dealing with a legislation designed to ensure social justice in pursuance of the directive principles laid down in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution. We are dealing with a legislation designed to ensure social justice in pursuance of the directive principles laid down in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution. From the point of view of the individual landowner it is an exproprietary legislation, while from the point of view of the general public it is a legislation meant to help the weaker sections. We have, however, to strike a golden mean and to see that nothing more is taken away from the individual citizen than is really required to be taken away and also that nothing less is taken away from him for re-distribution etc. than is required to be taken away. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it will not be proper to bind down either party to its pleadings or to its failure to raise objections in proper forum or at the appropriate stage as urged before us. The factual position is really far from clear. Even if the objector claimed less than she could have objected then she need not be denied the benefit of the law, nor the State be bound down to its failure to raise objections against the Commissioner's report or the appointment of the Commissioner." To m? it appears that the petitioner Ram Das Jalan cannot derive any benefit out of the above observation. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that when the case has been sent back to the competent authority by the appellate court, all the contentions should be reopened in the ends of justice according to the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the above quoted ruling. I think that the rule of finality of the decision is a golden rule and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be given go bye. When the petitioner has not succeeded in challenging the order of the District Judge disposing of his appeal on the contentions raised before him, he cannot be permitted to reopen the contentions. Acceding to the request of the petitioner would mean breaking the rule of finality equally emphasised by this Court as well as the higest court in various decisions, therefore, I am unable to permit the petitioner to rake up the points regarding transfer of land executed by the petitioner. Acceding to the request of the petitioner would mean breaking the rule of finality equally emphasised by this Court as well as the higest court in various decisions, therefore, I am unable to permit the petitioner to rake up the points regarding transfer of land executed by the petitioner. In view of the above discussions the writ petition filed by the petitioner Ram Das Jalan has no legs to stand and deserves dismissal. 7. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the State of U. P. in Writ Petition No. 3693 of 1983 it is necessary to quote the provisions of section 45 of the abovementioned Act which reads as below : "Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in any order passed by any officer or authority under this Act or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by such officer or authority either on his or its own motion or on an application received in this behalf from any of the parties." 8. The learned counsel for the State of U. P. has contended that there did not exist any ground mentioned under section 45 of the Act, yet the appellate court has allowed the review petition, therefore, the impugned judgment should be quashed. For the sake of arguments it may be assumed that the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing the review application, yet it has directed the competent authority to re-determine the excess vacant land held by the contesting opposite party in view of the relevant documents on record which had not been considered by the lower appellate court while disposing of the appeal. As right direction has been issued by the appellate court in the facts and circumstances of the present case I am not inclined to quash the impugned judgment at the instance of the State of U. P. on the ground that the appellate court has exceeded its jurisdiction. Even if the order is without jurisdiction, this Court can make same direction under its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is not a fit case where the contentions raised on behalf of the State of U. P. should be accepted. 9. Even if the order is without jurisdiction, this Court can make same direction under its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is not a fit case where the contentions raised on behalf of the State of U. P. should be accepted. 9. However, on merits I find that the appellate court through the impugned judgment dated 21-12-1982 has indicated that the Khasra for the material year 1383-F. was not considered by it while disposing of the owner's appeal. Therefore, the error in the judgment had crept in inadvertently. The wording of section 45 contemplates that errors arising in the order from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the authority concerned. To my mind in the facts and circumstances of this case the appellate court in rendering the impugned judgment has not exceeded its jurisdiction and has made correct and just direction to which no exception can be taken. I think that the writ petition on behalf of the State has also no legs to stand and deserves dismissal. 10. In the result, for the foregoing discussions it is evident that both the writ petitions mentioned above deserve dismissal. Accordingly I dismiss both the writ petitions mentioned above and direct the parties to bear their own costs. Petitions dismissed.