JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - This appeal is listed today for admission. Learned Counsel for the parties, however, are ready to have the appeal finally decided at this stage itself. 2. This is an appeal against an order rejecting an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. It appears that the suit was being contested in the court below and 25-5-1984 was the date fixed. On that date the suit was dismissed for default of both the parties. On an application being moved by the plaintiff the suit was restored. Since the suit has been dismissed for default of both the parties admittedly it was not necessary to send notices to the defendant at that stage. Thereafter despite several efforts service could not be effected on the defendant-appellant after the suit had been restored. Ultimately on 19-9-1984 the court directed the plaintiff to take fresh steps and to inform defendants' counsel also about the next date fixed within ten days, fixing 29th October, 1984 for further orders. When this order was communicated to the counsel he refused to sign on the plea that the defendant was not in contact with him. The endorsement to this effect made on the order sheet bears the date 21-9-1984 On 14-11-1984 the court held this to be sufficient service on the defendant. After further proceedings the suit was decreed ex-parte on 17-4-1985. 3. On 30-5-1986 the defendant applied for recall of this order on the ground that he had no knowledge of any date after the dismissal of the suit on 25-5-1984. Even his counsel had never informed him about any date fixed in the suit. When he had come to the court in connection with some other case then he learned about the ex-parte decree where upon this application was moved. 4. The application was rejected as it was moved beyond the prescribed period of limitation and also because information to the counsel was deemed to be notice to the defendant also. 5. In appeal it is urged that information to counsel in this case did not amount to service on the defendant and the pleaders' appointment had ceased as soon as the suit was dismissed. 5. In appeal it is urged that information to counsel in this case did not amount to service on the defendant and the pleaders' appointment had ceased as soon as the suit was dismissed. Reference was made to Rule 4 Order 3 which deals with appointment of the pleader and the relevant portion there of reads as under: "Every such appointment shall be filed in Court and shall, for the purposes of sub-rule (1), be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed or until the client or the pleader dies or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client. Explanation : For the purposes of this Sub-rule, the following shall be deemed to be proceedings in the suit : (a) An application for the review of decree or order in the suit. (b) An application under Section 144 or under Section 152 of this Code, in relation to any decree or order made in the suit. (c) an appeal from any decree or order in the suit, and (d) any application or act for the purpose of obtaining copies of documents or return of documents produced or filed in the suit or of obtaining refund of moneys paid into the Court in connection with the suit. 6. From the above it would appear that appointment of the pleader lasts only as long as proceedings in the suit are not ended. The moment proceedings in the suit are terminated the authority of the counsel also shall come to an end. The counsel thereafter has no authority to accept service within the meaning of Rule 4. No advantage of Rule 5 of Order 3 can also be taken thereafter. 7. Admittedly in the case in hand no notice had been served on the defendant after restoration of the suit under Order 9 Rule 4 C.P.C. The court therefore, directed that the counsel may be informed about the date fixed. However, this too did not result in proper service on him firstly, because the counsel had not signed it and secondly, because the counsel had no surviving authority to accept notices. 8. However, this too did not result in proper service on him firstly, because the counsel had not signed it and secondly, because the counsel had no surviving authority to accept notices. 8. It is unfortunate that counsel should have thought it appropriate to refuse to sign the order when it was sent by the court. As an officer of the Court, counsel are expected to show utmost respect for the order of the court and as such it would not be too much to expect that the same should have been accepted the moment the order was received from the Court. It is thereafter that he should have taken necessary steps to apprise the court if he had any difficulty in the matter. This, however, is a matter of propriety. He could even obtain leave of the court to withdraw from the suit. However, must express my disapproval of the manner in which the defendants learned Counsel treated the Court's order in this case. But when we come to examine the legalities of the matter it must be held that the authority of the counsel had ceased once the suit had been dismissed. Thereafter service on defendant was necessary before the court could proceed to decide the suit on merits. In the circumstances the court was not legally justified in proceeding ex-parte. 9. My attention was drawn to the explanation to the rule and it was urged that if pleaders authority could remain alive in matters of review of decree or order or in relation to an application under Section 144 and 152 C.P.C. etc why should the same come to an end immediately on dismissal of the suit. There may be some substance in this but when the provision of law is clear and unambiguous its language cannot be stretched so as to include a case like the present one within its meaning. On the language of the provision it is quit clear that the pleaders authority shall cease when the suit is dismissed. The legislature may intervene in the matter but until then these provisions have to be given their natural meaning. 10. On the question of limitation only this much may be pointed out when the defendant had no information of the date fixed the period of limitation would be reckoned from the date of knowledge and not from the date of the decree. 10. On the question of limitation only this much may be pointed out when the defendant had no information of the date fixed the period of limitation would be reckoned from the date of knowledge and not from the date of the decree. Thus the application was also not barred by limitation. 11. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order under appeal is set aside and the application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. is allowed on payment of Rs. 300/- (three hundred) only as costs which shall be paid by the Appellant within a period of four weeks from today. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 12. Before parting with the matter must observe that since the suit is pending since 1982 it is hoped that the court below will dispose it of expeditiously. The appellant would appear before the court below on 18-7-1988. Parties will be at liberty to file a certified copy of this order before the court below on or before the date fixed.