JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. 1. This is an appeal by a returned candidate against the decision of the court below allowing the Election Petition of respondent no. 1. 2. The election of pramukh of Block Hasanpur took place on 29-5-1983 in which there were three contesting candidates. The appellant was declared elected having secured 47 votes while the respondent no. 1 had secured 46 votes and respondent no. 2 had secured only one vote. The remaining 6 votes were declared invalid. An Election Petition was filed by the respondent no. 1 under rule 35 of the U. P. Kshetra Samiti (Election of Pramukh, Up Pramukh and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules of 1962 challenging the appellant's election on various grounds. The main grounds of attack were that the appellant was holding an office of profit under the Government at the time when the nomination paper was filed and that he was guilty of corrupt practice as he had canvassed on the ground of caste and community for securing votes in his favour. Both these grounds found favour with the Judge who heard the Election Petition and the appellant's election has been declared to be null and void and the petitioner was declared elected in his place as Block Pramukh. It is against this decision that the present appeal has been filed. The two questions which require determination by this Court are : (1) Whether the appellant was disqualified from seeking election for the reasons given in the Election Petition; and (2) Whether the appellant was guilty of corrupt practices having secured votes in his favour by canvassing on the ground of caste and community. 3. According to the allegations made in the petition the appellant was disqualified from seeking election since he was employed as a Cane Inspector in Ayodhya Sugar Mills which, at the relevant time, was under the management of the Central Government and in view of this be must be said to be holding "a place of profit in the gift disposal of the Government" and "holding an office under the Central Government. According to the provisions of the Kshettra Samiti and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam, 1961, the State Government by notiflcation shall divide the rural area of each district into various khands and for each such khand a Kshettra Samiti will be constituted in accordance with the provisions of Section 6. According to the provisions of the Kshettra Samiti and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam, 1961, the State Government by notiflcation shall divide the rural area of each district into various khands and for each such khand a Kshettra Samiti will be constituted in accordance with the provisions of Section 6. Section 7 provides for the election of Pramukh and Up Pramukh of a Kshettra Samiti who are to be elected by persons specified in section 6 of the Act. The election has to be held by secret ballot and in the manner provided by rules. 4. While section 7 lays down various qualifications possession of which is essential before one can offer himself as a candidate for election as Pramukh, Section 13 prescribes disqualification mentioned in clause (a) to (g) thereof and any of them is enough to render him disqualified for the office. In the instant case, the allegation against the appellant was confined to clause (c) on the basis of which it was urged that he was disqualified from seeking the election. Clause (c) reads as under : - "Holds any place of profit in the gift or disposal of the Government or any local authority including a Gaon Sabha or is an honorary Magistrate or an Honorary Assistant Collector or an Honorary Munsif." The stress in the present case is laid on the words "holds any place of profit in the gift or disposal of Government. It is urged that though the appellant was employed as a Cane Inspector in Ayodhya Sugar Mills, it was not an employment of the nature referred to in clause (c) even if at the relevant time the management of the aforesaid Mill had been taken over by the Central Government under the provisions of Sugar Undertakings (Taking over of Management) Act, 1978 (Act 49 of 1978), hereinafter referred to as 1978 Act. The twin questions which emerge for discussion are whether the appellant was holding a place of profit in the gift or disposal of the Government on the date of filing the nomination paper in view of the fact that management of Ayodhya Sugar Mills had been taken over by the Central Government under the 1978 Act or whether the appellant was holding a post under the Government. 5. 5. I must first address myself to the question as to what is meant by "holding any place of profit in the gift or disposal of Government." This is an unusual expression like of which I have been able to discover in U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam only. Even the learned counsel for the parties could not throw much light on this. No similar provision in any English Statute also could be pointed out to me. I will, therefore, proceed to examine it in accordance with its normal and natural meaning. Normally the expression used for laying down the disqualification for an elected office provide that the person should not hold any office of profit under the Government. This kind of expression is used in the Constitution in Article 58 in connection with election of the President, Article 66 for the election of Vice President, Article 102 in respect of members of either House of Parliament. The aforesaid expression, however, is quite different and couched in a different language than the one used while laying down disqualification for election as Pramukh or Up Pramukh of Kshettra Samiti. A number of cases were cited at the bar to explain the basic criteria for determining as to what is an office of profit. These cases may not be very apt for the purpose of determining the scope of the expression that confronts us here. 6. Sri Goswami for the appellant has urged that the term "in the gift or disposal of Government" should mean such place of profit which lies in utter discretion of the Government and can be given as a favour to the person concerned with full discretion to withdraw it also at will, that it should be unfettered by any rules etc. It it urged that it should apply to only a very limited class of cases. What he wanted to contend was that the election of a Block Pramukh or Up Pramukh is not as important an office as some other elected offices such as MP and MLA and, therefore, the legislature has deliberately relaxed the rigor by prescribing disqualification only to a very limited class of persons enjoying a sort of largesse from the Government. Sri A. Kumar for the respondent, on the contrary, submitted that the expression in pith and substance means almost the same thing as an office of profit under the Government. Sri A. Kumar for the respondent, on the contrary, submitted that the expression in pith and substance means almost the same thing as an office of profit under the Government. According to him in a democracy like ours there can be no scope for the Government to distribute largesse or grant benefits at its sweet will or utter discretion. All appointment under the Government and all its actions are to be guided by rules and prescribed regulations. In these circumstances there could hardly be any instance in which a person could be said to be holding a 'place of profit in the gift or disposal of the Government' if any limited meaning has to be given to it He further submitted that in this expression the word office has not been used and instead it speaks of a 'place of profit'. This should be taken as enlarging the scope and not limiting it. The expression may cover even those persons who may not be holding any office but may be occupying a place or position only. If this meaning could be given to the expression then it will enlarge its scope rather than limit it as suggested by the appellant. In my opinion, though the term is somewhat lax and loose, it infact conveys almost the same meaning as an 'office of profit' under the Government. Sri Kumar appears to be right when he contends that in the present set up it is very difficult to think of an office which could be entirely left to the discretion of the Government uncontrolled by any rules and regulations in that behalf. Sri Kumar agrees that for the purpose of this appeal, it would be just and proper to treat this term as somewhat equivalent to an office of profit under the Government. In view of this, it would be needless to probe further to find the true meaning of the expression used. 7. The cases cited at the bar lay down the relevant criteria for determining the extent and parameters which may help in determining as to whether a particular office was an office of profit under the Government or not. In Guru Govinda Basu v. Sankari Prasad Ghosal, AIR 1964 SC 254 their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the provisions of Article 102 of the Constitution. In Guru Govinda Basu v. Sankari Prasad Ghosal, AIR 1964 SC 254 their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the provisions of Article 102 of the Constitution. The elected person was an Auditor in Durgapur Projects Limited and Hindustan Steel Limited. The question arose if this was an office of profit under the Government ? It was pointed out that for holding an office of profit under the Government there need be no relationship of master and servant between him and the Government. The decisive test being the test of appointment. The Supreme Court in this connection observed : "It is not correct to say that the several factors which enter into determination of this question the appointing authority, the authority vested with power to terminate the appointment, the authority which determines the remuneration, the source from which the remuneration is paid, and the authority vested with power to control the manner in which the duties of the office are discharged and to give directions in that behalf must all co-exist and each must show subordination to Government and that if one of the elements is absent, the test of a person holding an office under the Government Central or State, is not satisfied. The circumstance that the source from which is a natural factor-not decisive of the question." 8. It would, however, be significant to note that the Hindustan Steel Limited and Durgapur Projects Limited where the appellant was working as an Auditor were both Government of India Undertakings and, as such, came within the meaning of the term 'State' as its instrumentality. After examining the various provisions, the Supreme Court concluded that in the performance of his functions, the appellant was controlled by the Comptroller and Auditor General who was himself holding an office of profit under the Government of India as he was appointed by the President whose administrative powers were controlled by rules as prescribed by him. Looking at the matter from the point of view of substance rather than of form, the Supreme Court held that he was holding an office of profit in the two Government Companies. This was so because he was appointed and could also be removed by the Government of India and he performed his functions for two Government Companies under the Comptroller and Auditor General who was under administrative control of the President. 9. This was so because he was appointed and could also be removed by the Government of India and he performed his functions for two Government Companies under the Comptroller and Auditor General who was under administrative control of the President. 9. Some other cases, apart from Guru Govinda Basu v. Sankari Prasad Ghosal (supra) to which reference has been made, are Bihari Lal Dobray v. Roshan Lal Dobray, AIR 1984 SC 385 , Ashok Kumar Bhattacharya v. Ajoy Bishwas, AIR 1985 SC 211 , Smt. Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana, AIR 1970 SC 69. However, all these cases and many others have been taken note of by a very elaborate decision of this court in Sarnam Singh v. Smt. Purshra Devi, 1986 ALJ 507 by Hon'ble B. D. Agarwal, J. wherein the principles laid down in all earlier decisions have been thoroughly discussed. There is no point, therefore, in reiterating the same in detail. That was a case of a teacher who was serving in a Higher Secondary School in U. P. and his employment was controlled by Intermediate Education Act. The questions raised were that on account of expanding control of the Government over the management of Intermediate Colleges, it should be held that a teacher employed therein was holding a post of profit under the Government and his position as such was also likely to come in conflict with his functions as a member of legislature. On a review of the various provisions of the Act to which the teacher was subject, this contention was rejected despite the fact that in the matter of appointment, termination and payment of salary, Government had considerable control. For taking this view the learned Judge followed the following observations of the Supreme Court in Agartala Municipality case (supra): "But to Judge whether the employee of any authority or local authority under the control of the Government become Government employee or not or holder of office of profit under Government, the measure and nature of control exercised by the Government over the employee must be judged in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case so as to avoid any possible conflict between personal interests and duties." 10. An attempt was made to argue that after the sugar undertaking is notified under Act 49 of 1978, it becomes a Government undertaking and as such an instrumentality of the State. An attempt was made to argue that after the sugar undertaking is notified under Act 49 of 1978, it becomes a Government undertaking and as such an instrumentality of the State. The submission further was that the appellant's employment with the undertaking after the notification assumes the character of an office of profit under the State. In Ajai Hasia's case AIR 1981 SC 487 it was observed that various criteria laid down to determine whether a particular undertaking or Corporation was an instrumentality of the State are neither exhaustive nor conclusive of the matter. They are merely indicative indicia and can not be stretched too far so as to include within its charge all autonomous bodies whether or not they have any nexus with the Government. Under Act 49 of 1978, the management of a Notified Undertaking can be taken over for a maximum period of three years only. The Government neither contributes any thing nor the notified undertaking enjoys monopoly status. Its functions are not of public importance or relating to Government functions nor has the Government any control in its day to day functioning apart from the fact that the Custodian is appointed by the Central Government who manages the undertaking in place of the erstwhile management. Thus from the scheme of the Act, it is no where indicated that the notified undertaking would acquire the character of State or its instrumentality. 11. We may now proceed to examine the scheme of Act 49 of 1978 in greater detail, but before doing that it may be mentioned that the appellant was undisputedly in service of Ayodhya Sugar Factory as Cane Inspector even from before it became a notified undertaking under the Act. 12. According to the preamble of the Act the need to enact it arose only for maintaining the continuity and level of production of sugar and to avoid undue hardship to the canegrowers by ensuring prompt payment of cane price due to them. To achieve this objective, the Act empowers the Central Government to take over the management of any sugar undertaking if it fails to satisfy the Government even after notice, of reasons for its failure to commence the manufacture of sugar or its failure to pay cane price for the previous years to the growers. If not satisfied in this behalf, the Central Government may. If not satisfied in this behalf, the Central Government may. by notification, declare that from a specified date its management shall vests in the Central Government. The consequences of vesting of assets of the notified sugar undertaking that follow as a result of the notification are provided in section 4. According to sub-section (2) thereof, even contracts and other arrangements relating to the management of its business and other affairs shall also stand terminated, while the management is divested of its rights under sub-clause (3). According to sub-clause (4), the Custodian appointed by the Government is empowered to take over possession of the undertaking Section 5 deals with the appointment of Custodian. Once the Custodian takes charge, the management of the notified undertaking thenceforth vests in him. The Central Government retaining such control over him under section 5 (4) has to issue directions in matters regarding legal proceedings, assignment of powers and duties etc. The Custodian also can seek Government instructions in matters concerning management to guide him. 13. The Central Government can, by notification, declare that any scheduled enactment shall cease to apply to a notified undertaking or that it shall apply with certain adaptations, modification etc. Even the operation of any contract or agreement etc. entered into by the previous management can be suspended. A contract of employment by the outgoing management can also be terminated by the Custodian in exercise of powers under section 11 if, in his opinion, it was unduly onerous. 14. Above resume of the provisions of the Act shows that the Custodian merely takes over the functions of the management of the notified undertaking for a period not exceeding three years but the terms and conditions of employment of its employees remain the same except that in some cases covered by Section 11 the contract of employment can be cancelled. Although under the general powers of management the employees can be dealt with in the ordinary and normal way but they are in no way governed or controlled by the Central Government in this respect. In Abdul Shakoor v. Rikhab Chand, AIR 1958 SC 52 the elected person was manager of a School having been appointed by the Administrator of the Dargah whose Management Committee was controlled by statutory provisions. The Government had the power to appoint the Administrator and also the members of the Managing Committee. In Abdul Shakoor v. Rikhab Chand, AIR 1958 SC 52 the elected person was manager of a School having been appointed by the Administrator of the Dargah whose Management Committee was controlled by statutory provisions. The Government had the power to appoint the Administrator and also the members of the Managing Committee. It was argued that since the Manager was holding an office under the Government, he was disqualified. The argument was repelled holding that the Committee was a corporate body and just because of limited Government control the Manager could not become holder of office of profit under the Government. The court observed that he was neither appointed nor removed by the Government nor was he paid from out of Government revenues. The mere fact that the Government exercised some control in the matter of appointment of the Administrator, Director or Managing Director of a company to whom directions could also be issued by the Government can not necessarily lead to the inference that as the employees under such authority was serving under them was also under the control of the Government. 15. In the instant case, all existing employees continue to enjoy the same benefits and rights as before and their service conditions remain unaltered. The Central Government may have the power to appoint and remove the Custodian, yet this power does not extend so as to exercise control over the employees or their service conditions. The custodian is invested with the powers as were enjoyed by the erstwhile management and only to that extent he can also exercise control over the work and conduct of the existing employees. It can not be said that the Government exercise any control over the functions and duties of the petitioner or in the matter of his appointment, removal or payment of his salary or other emoluments. In fact the petitioner continues to be the Cane Inspector as hitherto before and just because of take over of management of the notified undertaking no chance in his employment or conditions of service takes place. 16. Sri Kumar then submitted that at least for so long as an undertaking remains notified, its employees would become Government employees and when its management reverts to its erstwhile owners, the employees will again become employees of the sugar factory. It is very difficult to accept this argument. 16. Sri Kumar then submitted that at least for so long as an undertaking remains notified, its employees would become Government employees and when its management reverts to its erstwhile owners, the employees will again become employees of the sugar factory. It is very difficult to accept this argument. An employee who was under private employment can not by mere taking over of the management becomes an employee of the Central Government where every employment is governed by certain rules and regulations. The Central Government employees enjoy certain status, benefits and facilities of pension, gratuity and the like. Can these benefits also become available to a factory employee ? If so, any employee who retires when the undertaking is still notified should also be entitled to all these benefits. It would also be anamolous that any person employed by the Custodian of a notified Undertaking though initially he would be a Government employee should cease to be so the moment it denotified and its management is handed back to its owners. What is necessary, therefore, to look into is whether any qualitative change in the employment had taken place; does a private employee of a sugar factory acquire status of a Government servant just because its management has been taken by the Central Government ? The answer must be emphatic ' no '. The argument on the face of it is fallacious and can only be rejected. It is true that some degree of control is exercised by the Custodian on the working of the petitioner as a Cane Inspector but his service conditions, functions and duties all remained unchanged. It would, therefore, be erroneous to say that the petitioner was occupying a place of profit in the gift or disposal of the Government or an office of profit under it. The cases pertaining to certain other enactments have also been cited but they have been decided on the facts of their own. In some cases, there was a qualitative change in the employment which came directly under the Government or a State instrumentality. That principle will not apply here. 17. In my opinion, therefore, the petitioner was not disqualified to hold the post of a Pramukh and the view taken by the court below is erroneous. 18. In some cases, there was a qualitative change in the employment which came directly under the Government or a State instrumentality. That principle will not apply here. 17. In my opinion, therefore, the petitioner was not disqualified to hold the post of a Pramukh and the view taken by the court below is erroneous. 18. The second ground on which the election of the appellant was challenged was that he was guilty of corrupt practice as he had canvassed for votes on the ground of caste and community. The only allegation in this respect is to be found in paragraphs 4-C and 4-D of the petition which are quoted below ; (C) That opposite party no. 1 canvassed on the ground of caste, community and religion in his own Chauhan caste aswell as amongst other Hindu voters and secured their votes on caste and religion basis. The act of opposite party no. 1 also comes within the definition of corrupt practice as laid down in the aforesaid Act. (D) That opposite party no. 2 is 'Jat pachuada' by caste and his Biradri votes are 12 in number in Hasan pur Block, opposite party no. 2 filed his nomination paper on his biradri strength but he was not successful in convincing other voters. In the meantime opposite party no. 1 on 28-5-83 approached him and offered Rs. 25000/- to get his Biradri votes polled in favour of opposite party no. 1. As such opposite party no. 2 agreed to the offer and inducement of opposite party no. 1 and sent his voters with opposite party no. 1 and all of them casted their votes in favour of opposite -party no. 1 which materially affected the result of the election. This act of opposite party no. 1 also comes within the purview of the definition of corrupt practice as laid down in the aforesaid Act. The U. P. Zila Parishad (Election of Adhyaksh and Up Adhyakash and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1963 provides for the manner in which an election can be challenged. Rule 36 thereof prescribes the form of petition in the following manner : "36. Form etc. of petition (1) An election petition shall specify the ground or grounds on which the election of the returned candidate is questioned and shall contain a summary of the circumstances alleged to justify the election being questioned on such grounds. Rule 36 thereof prescribes the form of petition in the following manner : "36. Form etc. of petition (1) An election petition shall specify the ground or grounds on which the election of the returned candidate is questioned and shall contain a summary of the circumstances alleged to justify the election being questioned on such grounds. (2) The person whose election is questioned and where the petitioner claims that any other candidate shall be declared elected in the place of such person, every un-successful candidate shall be made a respondent to the petition." 19. Sub-rule (1) therefore, lays down that the petition must contain a summary of circumstances which will justify the questioning of the election. It was, therefore, necessary that the allegations must set out in fair detail the particulars of corrupt practice alleged to have been committed by the elected representative. The nature of allegations and the particulars should be such that if they are established, a charge of corrupt practice would stand proved. It is true that the petitioner is not required to lead evidence but only such fact as would indicate what he intends to prove. It must also be kept in mind that the allegations should be clear enough so as to forewarn the respondent about the nature of evidence that was likely to be adduced in support of the allegations. 20. On going through the allegations made in paragraphs 4-C and 4-D, however, one finds that no particulars at all have been given and the allegations are quite vague and indefinite. Further it is well established that the allegation of corrupt practice ought to be proved like a criminal charge which may, if established, result in serious consequences apart from the election being set aside. In view of this the pleadings have to be reasonably commensurate with the nature of the charge. If the date, time, place, name of persons involved and the manner in which the corrupt practice was indulged in are set out in sufficient detail, the pleadings can be said to be proper and sufficient. These would forewarn the respondent about the nature of evidence likely to be adduced against him. If, however, the averments made in the petition lack in these particulars, then the pleadings must be held to be improper and at least insufficient to bring home the charge. 21. These would forewarn the respondent about the nature of evidence likely to be adduced against him. If, however, the averments made in the petition lack in these particulars, then the pleadings must be held to be improper and at least insufficient to bring home the charge. 21. Apart from the pleadings, the evidence also has to be specific about the charge of corrupt practice. In the instant case although quite a number of witnesses have been examined, yet either their testimony is hearsay or it is the testimony of the persons who are not even voters. In any case there is no evidence that the appellant had canvassed votes for him on the basis of caste and community. On the basis of the evidence led and in the face of improper pleadings, it is not possible to hold that the appellant was guilty of corrupt practice alleged. The respondents' learned counsel in a lukewarm manner tried to support the finding of the trial court but I find it totally insufficient to bring home the charge of corrupt practice against the appellant. 22. In view of the above the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed and the election petition is hereby dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.