Saran Kumari Gaur v. State of U. P — 1988 DIGILAW 489 (ALL)

JUDGMENT K.K. Birla, J. - This writ petition has been preferred by Smt. Saran Kumari Gaur and 9 others against State of U. P. and 17 others for issuing a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 15-8-85 passed by the District Inspectress of Girls School, Agra and for commanding the opposite parties Nos. Ito 6 to disburse their dues and salaries. 2. The necessary background leading to this writ petition may be given. Smt Saran Kumari Gaur, Km. Asifa Rizvi, K. Jahida Khan, Km. Sayyada Rizwani, Smt Khaliq Jahan, Smt Aziz Akhtar, Smt Kamla Mehra, Smt Sudha Dixit, Km. Swaliha Begam and Smt Shafiqa Begam, petitioners (hereinafter referred as to the old teachers) were teachers in Sagir Fatima Mohammadia Girls Intermediate College, Agra (hereinafter referred as to college). This college is being run by a registered society named Anjuman-e-Mohammadiya Agra. According to the management of the college Smt Sudha Dixit, petitioner No. 8 was appointed on probation and her probation was terminated as she left without obtaining leave. According to the petitioners she had gone on leave but was not permitted to enter the college premises afterwards. There was a pen down strike by 17 teachers including the petitioners in August, 1982. According to the management in spite of efforts the striking teachers did not attend to their duties and by resolution dated 22-10-82 their services, including those of the petitioners, were terminated. There was later on talks of compromise and six teachers (non- petitioners) only took leave for the period of absence and they continued in service. According to the petitioners' case they were not permitted to enter the premises and, therefore, they were marking their attendance in the office of the District Inspectress of Girls Schools, Agra. In place of the old teachers the management of the college selected 11 teachers including opposite parties Nos. 7 to 16 (hereinafter referred as the new teachers). They joined on 20-10-83 and are said to be teaching in the college. It appears that the salary was not being paid to the old teachers. They filed writ petn. No. 3982 of 1984* in March, 1984 in which by an order dated 2-4-85 the direction to pay the salaries to the old teachers in accordance with the rules and regulations was given. Being aggrieved the management committee filed writ petn. No. 2496 of 1985. They filed writ petn. No. 3982 of 1984* in March, 1984 in which by an order dated 2-4-85 the direction to pay the salaries to the old teachers in accordance with the rules and regulations was given. Being aggrieved the management committee filed writ petn. No. 2496 of 1985. It appears that on account of the dispute regarding the services of teachers, the salary was not being paid to the new teachers also. Smt Anita Solanki, one of the new teachers, filed writ petn. No. 12109 of 1984 as her representation made to the District Inspectress of School had not been decided. In that writ petition by order dated 12-2-85 the District Inspectress of Girls School was directed to decide the representation, and also to find out whether they (new teachers) were entitled to get salary in accordance with their appointment letters. As pointed earlier by order D/- 2-4-85 in writ petn. No. 3982 of 1984 direction to pay the salary of old teachers was already given to the District Inspectress of Girls School. While deciding the writ petition No. 2496 of 1985, the Division Bench of this Court passed the order to the effect that "in order to finally adjudicate upon the dispute between these two sets of teachers, it appears appropriate that the question involved in the present writ petition No. 2496. of 1985 be also directed to be decided by the District Inspectress of Girls School. Upon the matter going back the District Inspectress of Girls School will hear both sets of teachers after issuing the notices to them and find whether termination of old teachers was valid and if so whether the newly appointed teachers could get the salaries of the post on which they were appointed. The committee of management will also be heard", (vide Annexure-A). In pursuance of the above direction the District Inspectress of Girls School passed the impugned order dated 15- 8-85. She was of the opinion that the college is a minority institution and provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred as the Act) were not applicable to it. She was of the opinion that new teachers have been made permanent, special grant should be obtained to pay the salary of the old teachers. One of the old teachers Km. Noorjahan Afjal had died. Smt. Manorama Dwivedi has been absorbed in another institution. She was of the opinion that new teachers have been made permanent, special grant should be obtained to pay the salary of the old teachers. One of the old teachers Km. Noorjahan Afjal had died. Smt. Manorama Dwivedi has been absorbed in another institution. The District Inspectress of Girls School was further of the opinion that these old teachers may also be absorbed in some other institutions. Being aggrieved by this order the old teachers have preferred this writ petition. 3. New teachers had preferred a writ petition No. 13036 of 1985 against the order dated 29-8-85 by the Regional Inspectress of Girls School. By order dated 12-12-86 a Division Bench of this Court directed the Regional Inspectress of Girls School for considering the matter. The Regional Inspectress of Girls School has passed order dated 7-5-87. She was of the opinion that the decision regarding the termination or otherwise of the old teachers should in all propriety be taken by the Hon'ble High Court. The decision regarding the new teachers could be taken after the decision regarding the old teachers. 4. It is in this manner that the matter has come up for consideration by this Court. The short point for consideration in this writ petition is whether the services of the petitioners (old teachers) have not been validly terminated aid whether they are entitled to the salaries. 5. In support of the petition several contentions have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. As pointed earlier the college is being run by Anjuman-e- Mohammadiya, Agra. The institution has been accepted by the authorities as a minority institution as envisaged under Article 30 of the Constitution. Under Section 16G(3)(a) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred as the Act) the services of any teachers cannot be terminated except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. It is not in dispute that before terminating the services of the old teachers prior approval in writing of the Inspectress had not been taken. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the college is not a minority institution, the termination order is bad on account of the non-compliance of the Section 16G(3) of the Act. It is not in dispute that before terminating the services of the old teachers prior approval in writing of the Inspectress had not been taken. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the college is not a minority institution, the termination order is bad on account of the non-compliance of the Section 16G(3) of the Act. It is further contended on behalf of the petitioners that even if it be a minority institution, the provision of Section 16G(3)(a) is regulatory measure and does not infringe Article 30 of the Constitution, therefore, the termination order was bad. The further contention is that the order of termination was never communicated to the petitioners and as such it had not taken effect against them. 6. These contentions have been repelled by the learned counsel for the new teachers and the learned counsel for the management of the college. Their contention is that the college is a minority institution, Section 16G(3)(a) of the Act violates the safeguards provided to the minority institutions under Article 30 of the Constitution and is not applicable in the present case. It is contended that the prior approval of the Inspectress was not necessary. It is also contended that the termination order was duly published and communicated to the petitioners. 7. Learned counsel for the parties have argued at length in support of their respective contentions. 8. As regards first contention it has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in order to get benefit of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India the institution should not be only administered by minority community but it should also be established by it, that it has not been proved that the college had been established by minority and, therefore, it is not a minority institution. Reliance is placed on the case of Azeez Basha v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 662 . In this case it has been held that words "establish" and "administer" in Article 30(1) must be read conjunctively and so read it clearly shows that the minority will have the right to administer educational institutions of their choice provided they have established them, but not otherwise. The principle laid down in this is not applicable to the present case. The matter in the recited case relates to the Aligarh Muslim University. The principle laid down in this is not applicable to the present case. The matter in the recited case relates to the Aligarh Muslim University. This University was created not by Muslim minority but by Central Act. Therefore, it was clearly shown that it was not a minority institution. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, in sufficient material has been placed on behalf the impugned order this college has been of the opposite parties to show otherwise. accepted as a minority institution by the Therefore, we find that the college is minority Educational Authority. Annexure-XVII to the institution . writ petition is a letter sent by the Regional Inspectress of Girls School, Agra to the Manager of the college in which it has been mentioned that this college is administered by Anjuman-e-Mohammadiya, an institution of followers of Muslim Religion and is accepted as minority institution. 9. Anjuman-e-Mohammadiya runs an- other college named Shuaib Mohammadiya Anglo Oriental Inter College, Agra. In June, 1973 the Director of Education had served a notice on the President of this institution for 10A. Section follows : 16G(3)(a) of the Act is as 'No principal, headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulation." submitting explanation regarding some 11. It provides that termination of service irregularities. Writ Petition No. 1465 of 1976 was preferred by Haji Islam Qureshi, Manager of this institution (Anjuman-e-Mohammadiya Agra). The case is reported in Haji Islam Qureshi v. Director of Education, 1978 AIl LJ 255. In that case it was accepted on behalf of the respondent that Shuaib Mohammadiya Anglo Oriental Inter College, Agra was a muslim minority institution. This goes a long way to support that Sagir Fatima Mohammadia Girls Intermediate College, Agra run by the same institution is also a muslim minority institution. Apart from this, in amended scheme of administration, it is mentioned that it is a muslim minority institution and that it is being run by Anjuman- e-Mohammadiya, Agra which would act in accordance with Article 30(1) of the Constitution. 10-11. Apart from this, in amended scheme of administration, it is mentioned that it is a muslim minority institution and that it is being run by Anjuman- e-Mohammadiya, Agra which would act in accordance with Article 30(1) of the Constitution. 10-11. In the case of Khalsa Girls School v. Regional Inspectress, 1982 UPLBEC 504 the nature of girls school was under consideration. Khalsa Girls School had been recognised as minority institution by the Regional Inspectress. It was observed that she was the concerned authority to grant recognition and, therefore, it was to be recognised as such. In case this was seriously challenged on behalf of the petitioners it was not enough to allege that it is not a minority institution but sufficient material should have been brought on record to show that it was not established and administered by minority. No such material has been brought on record by the petitioners and as discussed above of the teachers cannot be made except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. Admittedly this approval had not been given by the Regional Inspectress. It also does not appear that it was sought for by the Management Committee. The contention on behalf of the opposite party is that being a minority institution management has a right to administer and this restriction of approval by the Regional Inspectress cannot be imposed on the management because it runs counter to Article 30(1). On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that regulatory measures for ensuring efficient and sound administration may be taken, that the approval of the Regional Inspectress is such a regulatory measure against the arbitrariness of the management against the teachers and as such does not run counter to the provisions of Article 30(1). 12. This point has arisen in a number of cases which have considered the scope of the restrictions which may be imposed on the management of the minority institution for the smooth and efficient administration. It is well established that the power given under Article 30(1) is the power to administer and not to maladminister. The leading case on the point is St. Xaviers College Socy. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389 which had been decided by the Constitutional Bench of 9 Judges of Hon. Supreme Court. It is well established that the power given under Article 30(1) is the power to administer and not to maladminister. The leading case on the point is St. Xaviers College Socy. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389 which had been decided by the Constitutional Bench of 9 Judges of Hon. Supreme Court. It has been held that the right conferred on the religious and linguistic minorities to administer the educational institution of their choice is not an absolute right. This right is not free from regulation. Just as regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character and content of minority institution similarly regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration. The right of administration is not the right to maladminister ...............In the right of administration checks and balances in the shape of regulatory measures are required to ensure the appointment of good teachers and their conditions of service. In this case the Constitutionality of Gujarat University Act as amended by Act 6 of 1973 were challenged as being violative of Article 30. 13. Section 51-A is relevant for our purposes. It provided that no member of the teaching, other academic and non-teaching staff of an affiliated college shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Clause (b) provided that the penalty to be inflicted on him was to be approved by the Vice- Chancellor or any other officer of the University authorised by the Vice-Chancellor in this behalf. The provision contained in clause (b) was held not to be permissive regulatory measure because it confers arbitrary power on the Vice-Chancellor to take away the right of administration of the minority institutions. Such power on the Vice- Chancellor was found to be unlimited and undefined. Therefore, this clause was held to be inapplicable to minority institution. The principle laid down in this case has been followed in many subsequent case by Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courts. 14. The scope and ambit of a right of minority to establish and administer educational institution came also under consideration in the case of Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewine, AIR 1979 SC 52 . In that case vires of ordinance 33(4) framed under Kerala University Act was under consideration. 14. The scope and ambit of a right of minority to establish and administer educational institution came also under consideration in the case of Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewine, AIR 1979 SC 52 . In that case vires of ordinance 33(4) framed under Kerala University Act was under consideration. Under this Ordinance the teacher was given right to appeal to the Vice Chancellor against any order passed by the management in respect of certain penalties like censor, reduction to a lower rank, dismissal from service etc. It has been held that "right under Article 30(1) of the management of the affairs of the institution is subject to the regulatory power of the State. Article 30(1) is not charter for mal-administration; regulation is permissible so that right to administer may be better exercised for the benefit of the institution." It was held that "conferral of powers on the Vice Chancellor amounts to in reality fetter on the right of the administration under Article 30(1). This, it seems to us, would so affect the disciplinary control of the minority educational institution as to be subversive of its constitutional rights and can hardly be regarded as "regulation" or "restriction" in the interest of the institution." Therefore; such power was found to be violative of Article 30(1). 15. In the case of All Saints High School v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1980 SC 1042 the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Institution Control Act (11 of 1975) vis-a-vis minority institutions were under consideration. The principles and propositions governing such institutions have also been summarised in this case. According to it State can take regulatory measures to promote the efficiency and excellance of educational standards and issue guidelines for the purpose of ensuring the security of the services of the teachers or other employees of the institution, but it cannot under the garb of adopting regulatory measures tend to destroy the administrative autonomy of the institution so as to render right of administration of the management of the institution concerned nugatory or illusory. In that case under section 3(1) of that Act, the dismissal and termination of service etc. could not be done except with the prior approval of the competent authority. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 is as follows. In that case under section 3(1) of that Act, the dismissal and termination of service etc. could not be done except with the prior approval of the competent authority. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 is as follows. "Where the proposal to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher employed in any private educational institutions is communicated to the competent authority, that authority, shall, if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal, approve such dismissal, removal reduction in rank or termination of appointment." These provisions were held to be violative of Article 30(1) as they conferred powers to grant or to refuse sanction to any action taken by the Managing Committee. S. 3(3) of the Act 11 of 1975 is as follows : "(3) (a) No teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be placed under suspension, except when no inquiry into the gross misconduct of such teacher is contemplated. (h) No such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such inquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher : Provided that the competent authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the said period of two months, for a further period not exceeding two months, if, in the opinion of such competent authority, the inquiry could not be completed within the said period of two months for reasons directly attributable to such teacher." This provision was held to be of regulatory nature and intended to safeguard the teachers from being suspended for unduly long period without there being any enquiry into gross misconduct. 16. Therefore, we find that when any provision gives a blanket and unbridled power to an outside authority, such provision will substantially affect the right of administration guaranteed under Article 30(1) and will be violative of the same. But if such provision does not affect the administration of the institution by the management substantially and simply that measure is to promote the efficiency and excellence of educational standards or to ensure the security of the services of the teachers, it shall be merely a regulatory measure not violative Article 30(1). 17. But if such provision does not affect the administration of the institution by the management substantially and simply that measure is to promote the efficiency and excellence of educational standards or to ensure the security of the services of the teachers, it shall be merely a regulatory measure not violative Article 30(1). 17. The provisions of S. 16-G(3)(a) of the Act came for consideration by this court as well. In the case of St. J.H.S. School v. R.S. Sharma, 1976 All LJ 527: AIR 1976 All 390 it has been held that S. 16-G(3)(a) of the Act is violative of Act. 30(1) of the Constitution and accordingly is not applicable to educational institution established by a religious or linguistic minority. The same view is taken in the case of J.S. Maha Sabha U.P. v. District Inspector of Schools Meerut, (1979) All LJ 1070. 18. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of the principles' laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the recent cases the obtaining of approval by the competent authority is a regulatory measure to afford some protection to a teacher against the arbitrariness of the management and as such is not violative of Art.,30(1). It is, therefore, contended that in view of the proposition laid down in such cases, the earlier referred cases are distinguishable. 19. Reliance has been placed on the case of Y. Theclamma v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1210 . In this case the case of Frank Anthony P. S. E. Association v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 311 has been referred. The other case relied on is All Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 305 . 20. In the above cited case of Y. Theclamma v. Union of India, ( AIR 1987 SC 1210 ) (supra) S. 8(4) of Delhi Education Act was under consideration. The other case relied on is All Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 305 . 20. In the above cited case of Y. Theclamma v. Union of India, ( AIR 1987 SC 1210 ) (supra) S. 8(4) of Delhi Education Act was under consideration. It is as follows : "(4) Where the managing committee of a recognised private school intends to suspend any of its employees, such intention shall be communicated to the Director and no such suspension shall be made except with the prior approval of the Director : Provided that the managing committee may suspend an employee with immediate effect and without the prior approval of the Director if it is satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reason of the gross misconduct, within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under S. 9, of the employee. Provided further that no such immediate suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of fifteen days from the date of suspension unless it has been communicated to the Director and approved by him before the expiry of the said period." 20A. Section 8(2) of this.Act provides that no employee of a recognised private school was to be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor his services be terminated except with the prior approval of the Director. Section 8(3) provided for the right of an appeal to the Tribunal by such employee. Sub- section (5) provides that where the intention to suspend was communicated to the Director, he may, if he is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension accord approval of such suspension. Y. Teheclamma preferred the writ petition before the Hon'ble Supreme. Court. These provisions of this Act were considered in the case of Frank Anthony P.E.S. Association v. Union of India, ( AIR 1987 SC 311 ) (supra). Frank Anthony Public School is an unaided minority institution. The scale of pay and allowances etc. of this School were less than what was given to their counter part of the Delhi Administration of schools. The writ petition was filed by Employees' Association to enforce the provision of the Delhi Administration Act other than Sections 12 and 21 and to fix pay allowances benefits etc. The scale of pay and allowances etc. of this School were less than what was given to their counter part of the Delhi Administration of schools. The writ petition was filed by Employees' Association to enforce the provision of the Delhi Administration Act other than Sections 12 and 21 and to fix pay allowances benefits etc. to the persons employed in the schools governed by the Act in relation to unaided minority school at par with the person employed other than that. Section 12 of this Act which is relevant provides that the provisions relating to the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the recognised private schools were not to apply to an unaided minority school. The vires of S. 12 of this Act in relation to S. 10 of the Act was challenged. Section 10 of this Act required that the scales of pay and allowances and other prescribed benefits etc. of the employees of a recognised private schools shall not be less than those of the employees of the corresponding status in Schools run by the appropriate authority. Therefore, the employees' Association demanded parity and contended that S. 12 was void and discriminatory. 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that S. 10 was a permissible regulation aimed at attracting competent staff and consequently at the excellence of the educational institution and it, in no way, detracts from the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) to the minority institution to administer their educational institutions. Therefore, to this extent that S. 12 was held to be discriminatory. Section 8(4) was also held to be valid as it did not confer blanket power on the Director. The right providing for appeal under S. 8(3) was also held to be reasonable and not offending Article 30(1). It has therefore been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the provision of approval before terminating of the service of the teacher as contained in S. 16G(a) of the Intermediate Education Act is reasonable and not violative of S. 30(1). 22. In the case of All Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1988 SC 305 ) (supra) provision of Bihar Non- Government Secondary Schools (Taking over of Management and Control) Act (Act 33 of 1982) were considered. 22. In the case of All Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1988 SC 305 ) (supra) provision of Bihar Non- Government Secondary Schools (Taking over of Management and Control) Act (Act 33 of 1982) were considered. Section 3(2) confers power on the State Government to take over the management and control of recognised minority schools, proprietary or autonomous secondary schools by issuing a notification in the official Gazette provided the managing committee etc. which may have been maintaining such schools makes an unconditional offer to the State Government to take over the School with all assets and properties. This was not held to be violative of S. 30(1). The provisions of S. 18(3) Cls. (a) to (k) were also held to be regulatory in nature. Under Cl. (b) that management committee was required to make appointment of a teacher with the concurrence of the schools Service Board. Under proviso to cl. (b), schools Service Board while considering the question of granting approval to the appointment of a teacher was to ascertain if the appointment was in accordance with the rules laying down qualifications and manners of making appointment framed by the State Government. Under Cl. (d) the Managing Committee of the minority institution shall have the power to remove, terminate, dismiss or discharge teacher with the approval of School Service Board. Both these provisions have been held by the Supreme Court to be .regulatory and not violative of Section 30(1). On the basis of this decision it has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the provision of approval contained in above mentioned S. 16G(3) is also regulatory and not violative of Article 30(1). 23. After giving our careful consideration to the facts of the these cases and the principles laid down in this case we are of the opinion that the petitioners' contention cannot be accepted and S. 16G(3) as it stands today gives a blanket power to the Inspector of Schools either to give or to refuse approval and as such is hit by Article 30(1). 24. Section 8(4) of the Delhi Education Act provides that immediate suspension by the Management was not to remain in force for more than 15 days unless it was communicated to the Director and approved by him before the expiry of the said period. Sub-sec. 24. Section 8(4) of the Delhi Education Act provides that immediate suspension by the Management was not to remain in force for more than 15 days unless it was communicated to the Director and approved by him before the expiry of the said period. Sub-sec. (5) specifically provides that the Director was to be satisfied himself about the adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension and then he was to accord approval. It was, therefore, held that the Management had the right to order immediate suspension of an employee in case of gross misconduct but in order to prevent an abuse of power by the Management a safeguard is provided to the employee that approval should be obtained within 15 days. The director was also bound to accord his approval if there were adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension. The test was whether blanket power to grant or withhold approval was conferred to Director or not and it was found in negative by the Hon. Supreme Court. The decision in the case of all Saints High Schools v. A.P. (supra) was followed. S. 16G(3) does not contain any provision similar to sub- sec. (5) of S. 8 of Delhi Schools Education Act. 25. Apart from this S. 8(2) of the Delhi Schools Education Act provides for the prior approval of the Director for dismissal etc. No guidelines to the Director were provided in the sub-section. It has been held in para 18 by the Supreme Court : "Keeping in mind the views of the several learned Judges, it becomes clear that S. 8(2) must be held to be objectionable." It may be pointed out here that S. 51 A, Cl. (b) of Gujarat Education Act considered in the above cited case of St Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat, ( AIR 1974 SC 1389 ) (supra) is analogus to S. 16G(3) of the Act and was held not to be permissive regulatory measure and hence inapplicable to minority institution as already pointed out earlier. Therefore the principle laid down in the case of Y. Theclamma, ( AIR 1987 SC 1210 ) will be of no help to the petitioners. Rather the principles laid down in Frank Anthony P.E.S. Association, ( AIR 1987 SC 311 ) (supra), while considering the provisions of S. 8(2) of Delhi Education Act, will go against the contention of the petitioners. 26. Rather the principles laid down in Frank Anthony P.E.S. Association, ( AIR 1987 SC 311 ) (supra), while considering the provisions of S. 8(2) of Delhi Education Act, will go against the contention of the petitioners. 26. In the case of all Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1988 SC 305 ) (supra) as well as regards the appointment of the teachers, the power of the School Service Board while considering the question of granting approval to the appointment of a teacher was limited to ascertain if the appointment was in accordance with the rules laying down qualifications, and manner of making appointment framed by the State Government. Similarly the contingency where the removal etc. of a teacher is concerned had been considered by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court specifically laid down that while considering the question of granting an approval of the disciplinary action taken by the Management of a minority institution the School Service Board shall scrutinise whether disciplinary proceedings have been taken in accordance with the rules and no more. Therefore in substance in this case too the power of the School Service Board was not held to be blanket or uncontrolled. Therefore they were held not to be violative of Article 30(1). As already discussed above no such guidelines have been provided under S. 16G(3) of the Intermediate Education Act 1971 and as such power conferred in this provision is blanket and uncontrolled power and therefore will have to be held to be violative of Article 30(l). Therefore we are of the opinion that in the present case the approval of the Inspector was not necessary. If the legislature intends to have some safeguards for the protections of the interest of the teacher, play of fairness and a check on the arbitrariness against the teachers for orderly, efficient and sound administration some limited power as a regulatory measure but without affecting basic right of administration by the management of the minority institution will have to be specifically provided in the Act, may be on the lines given in some of the above cited cases. But in its absence the present provisions of prior approval contained in S. 16G(3) of the Act is clearly violative of Article 30(1) in our opinion and therefore this provision is not applicable to the present case of the petitioners. But in its absence the present provisions of prior approval contained in S. 16G(3) of the Act is clearly violative of Article 30(1) in our opinion and therefore this provision is not applicable to the present case of the petitioners. Therefore the petitioners' contention in this regard has no force. 27. It has been further contended on behalf of the petitioners that according to the case of the Management there was an agreement on 20-2-1983 in pursuance of which six teachers had already joined and are serving. It is contended that the termination order, if any, had come to an end on account of that agreement/compromise. According to this agreement teachers who had gone on strike were to take leave from 1-9-1982 to 28-2-1983. In our opinion this offer will not ipso facto put an end to the termination order. The strike by teachers was going on in the College. The Management and the Educational authorities were concerned with that. Para 3(a)(ix) of the counter-affidavit shows that on 20-2-1983 a meeting was held where RISS, DIGS, DDR, Principal of S.M. A.O. College, Management and two principals of other Colleges, had met and the via media was taken out to put an end to the matter. It was with a view to find out an amicable solution for the stalemate and to give the teachers, whose services were terminated, last opportunity, to again join the institution. It was to bury the hatchet and did not vacate the termination order unequivocally. It may be pointed that there were many participants in the meeting. It has not been shown that there was any resolution of the Management Committee revoking or undoing the termination resolution. On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the Manager of the College that the termination order was sent and communicated to the petitioners and that they had knowledge of the same. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the old teachers there is a general averment that the termination order was not served on them. In para 3(A)(viii) of the counter affidavit is averred that notices of the termination of their services (old teachers) were sent by the Management to them on 23-10-1982 and they were again sent on 25-10-1982 and under postal certificates and a news. Item was published in Janta Yug of 26-10-1982 about the termination of these teachers. In para 3(A)(viii) of the counter affidavit is averred that notices of the termination of their services (old teachers) were sent by the Management to them on 23-10-1982 and they were again sent on 25-10-1982 and under postal certificates and a news. Item was published in Janta Yug of 26-10-1982 about the termination of these teachers. In the reply of this in para 11 of the Rejoinder affidavit it is mentioned that no notice was received by them. The allegation regarding publication of the termination order in the newspaper has not been denied. If the letter had been posted ordinarily it should reach the addressee. Under S. 114 of the Evidence Act there is such presumption. Therefore the contention that the averments about the service or publication of the termination order in the newspaper are suspicious does not have much force. Apart from this the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the case of State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, AIR 1966 SC 1313 . In that case the order of dismissal was passed against the officer on 3rd June, 1949 and he came to know about it on 28th May, 1951. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the order of dismissal passed against the officer dated 3rd June, 1949 could not be said to have taken effect until he came to know about it on 28th May, 1951. In the cited case the dismissal order remained on the file only and as a matter of fact it was found that the officer came to know about it on 28th May, 1951. The principle laid down in this case will be of no help to the petitioners. As pointed out earlier the averments regarding publication of the termination of the services in the news paper on 26-10-1982 will have to be accepted as being unrebutted. Therefore, the knowledge may be inferred at least from that date. Apart from this as pointed earlier six of the striking teachers whose services had also been terminated had joined. It is difficult to believe that in the circumstances given in the earlier part of the order the petitioners would have not come to know about the termination order. From the record it is also clear that the old teachers had filed suit No. 962 of 1983. It is difficult to believe that in the circumstances given in the earlier part of the order the petitioners would have not come to know about the termination order. From the record it is also clear that the old teachers had filed suit No. 962 of 1983. It clearly shows that they had notice of the termination order before the institution of the suit. Even though the termination order is held to be effective from that date it will not help the petitioner as admittedly they have been paid salary till Oct. 1983. In view of the above discussion we find that the petitioner had notice of the termination order. 28. In view of the above discussion we find that there is no illegality in the termination of the service of the petitioners. 29. It was brought to our notice that three of the teachers whose services were terminated were absorbed in other institutions and in any case the same should be done in the case of the petitioners. We feel that no direction can be given in this writ petition. However, the order dated 16-8-1985 passed by the District Inspectress of Schools Agra Annexure 12 to the Writ Petition shows that the District Inspectress of Schools has recommended for such absorption. We also find that the petitioners have been serving as teachers for about 25 or 30 years (para 5 of the order).'In these circumstances their case in this regard may be sympathetically considered. 30. In the result the Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.