JUDGMENT R.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Agra, dated 12.11.1987 dismissing the appeal and upholding the order passed by the Addl. Munsif, Agra, dismissing an application filed by the petitioner for an ad interim injunction. 2. The facts of the case briefly are that one Raj Bahadur Jain was originally the owner of the property in dispute i.e. 1/122, Kinari Bazar, Agra, who let out the same to one Pyare Lal. Pyare Lal in his turn sublet the first floor of the said house to the petitioner and the second floor to Gopal Das Rathi, the brother of the petitioner, in the year 1948 with the permission of Raj Bahadur Jain, the then landlord. Subsequently, in the year 1963, Raj Bahadur Jain sold the aforesaid premises in favour of the respondent Nos. 3 4 and 5, who are now the landlords. Thereafter, the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 filed Case No. 95 of 1964 under Section 3 of the U.P. Act No. III of 1947 for permission to sue Pyare Lal as well as the petitioner and his brother Gopal Das Rathi for ejectment and it was stated in the said application by the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 that the petitioner was a sub-tenant in the premises in dispute. The said case was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the premises was sub-let by Pyare Lal with the permission of Raj Bahadur Jain, who was the landlord and hence the petitioner was legal sub-tenant and in possession as such. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Agra, vide his order, dated 9.8.1966 dismissed the application moved by the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 holding that the petitioner and his brother Gopal Das Rathi were legal sub-tenants with the permission of the then landlord and the need of the landlord was not bonafide. The respondent Nos. 3 to 5 then went up in revision before the Commissioner, who also dismissed the same, vide his order, dated 13.10.1966. The revision filed under Section 7-F of the U.P. Act No. III of 1947 was also dismissed. Thereafter, on coming into force of the U.P. Act No. III of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 then went up in revision before the Commissioner, who also dismissed the same, vide his order, dated 13.10.1966. The revision filed under Section 7-F of the U.P. Act No. III of 1947 was also dismissed. Thereafter, on coming into force of the U.P. Act No. III of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 filed an application for release under Section 16 of the Act against the heir of Pyare Lal as also against the petitioner which application was also dismissed on 6.11.1973. The appeal preferred against the same was also dismissed on 13.12.1975. 3. The respondent Nos. 3 to 5 having failed in their attempt to eject the petitioner twice then filed an application for release under Section 21 of the Act on 30.6.1978 against Ram Das alone (heir of Pyare Lal) without impleading the petitioner, who was in occupation as sub-tenant. According to the case of the petitioner, Ram Das colluded with the respondents No. 3 to 5 as a result of which Ram Das filed a compromise surrendering his rights on the basis of which the release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority on 31.7.1978 in favor of respondent Nos 3 to 5. Since the petitioner was not impleaded as a party nor was he aware of the proceedings for release initiated by the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 against Ram Das, on coming to know of the order of release passed on 31.7.1978, he filed an application for impleadment in Case No. 46 of 1978 on the ground that the petitioner was a legal sub-tenant and the order of release could not be passed without considering the need of the petitioner also. The impleadment application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on the ground that after the order of release was passed, he had become functus officio. The petitioner, thereafter, filed a writ petition before this Court which was dismissed on 20.10.1978 with the observation that whether the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act were collusive or not is a matter which could be determined after taking evidence for which the proper remedy would be a regular suit. The petitioner, thereafter, filed a writ petition before this Court which was dismissed on 20.10.1978 with the observation that whether the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act were collusive or not is a matter which could be determined after taking evidence for which the proper remedy would be a regular suit. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a regular suit No. 7140 of 1978 claiming that the order of release, dated 31.7.1978 is nullity and passed behind the back of the petitioner and hence the petitioner could not be evicted in pursuance of the said order. During the pendency of the suit petitioner also prayed for an ad interim injunction restraining the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 from dispossessing the petitioner in pursuance of the order of release, dated 31.7.1978 which was rejected by the Addl. Munsif, Agra, vide his order, dated 7.10.1982 on the ground that the sub-lease in favour of the petitioner was invalid as there was no prior permission of the District Magistrate as required under the old U.P. Act No. III of 1947 and further that the sub-tenant had no right to be heard in proceedings for release of the accommodation under Section 21 of the Act. The petitioner went up in appeal before the Addl. District Judge, Agra who also, vide his order dated 12.11.1987 dismissed the appeal. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition before this Court. 4. Heard Shri Prakash Gupta on behalf of the petitioner and Shri Subodh Kumar for the respondent Nos. 3 to 5. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the petitioner was lawful sub-tenant with the permission of the landlord and hence no order for the release of the premises in dispute could be passed without impleading the petitioner in those proceedings and considering the comparative hardship of the petitioner vis-a-vis the landlord. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even though there was no permission of the District Magistrate obtained under the U.P. Act No. III of 1947 when the sub-tenancy was created in favour of the petitioner but in view of the fact that the sub-tenancy was created with the consent of the landlord, the lease would still be a valid lease and binding between the petitioner and the landlord and it would not be a void lease. The lease between the landlord and the petitioner would still survive and, hence, the possession of the petitioner would not be illegal and the petitioner would also be entitled to the protection of the fourth proviso to Section 21 of the Act. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that after the tenant surrendered his rights and the release application was allowed against him, the sub-tenant also goes with the tenant and hence the petitioner was not entitled to any hearing in the proceedings for release for the accommodation under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act against Ram Das. The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that since there was no permission of the District Magistrate when the petitioner was inducted as sub-tenant there was no valid sub-tenancy created in favour of the petitioner and hence also the petitioner has no subsisting right and as such has no right to be heard in the proceedings for release under Section 21 of the Act. 7. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is a legal sub-tenant, the subs-tenancy having been created with the permission of the then landlord and hence the petitioner was also entitled to the protection of the fourth proviso to Section 21 of the Act, I find force in this submission. The petitioner is coming down as a sub-tenant since 1948 and as such the possession of the petitioner had been long continued. The sub-tenancy was created in favour of the petitioner with the consent of then landlord. The Transfer of Property Act expressly recognises the right of a lessee to sub-let. The Rent Control Act that was enforced in the State of Uttar Pradesh merely placed some fetters on that right to sub-let but neither under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (under Act No. II of 1947) nor under U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, there is any absolute prohibition against the sub-letting. The only requirement under U.P. Act No. III of 1947 was that a written permission of the District Magistrate was necessary and hence under the present Act XIII of 1972, the legislature enacted Section 14 seeking to protect all such tenants who were continuing in possession with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976. Thus, once it is established that the petitioner was sub-tenant with the consent of the landlord, his possession cannot be said to be illegal. In the case of Shyam Babu v. District Judge, Moradabad and others, reported in 1984(1) ARC 248 , the Supreme Court observed thus :- "If once it is accepted that the sub-tenancy created by the tenant-in-chief in favour of the appellant was with the consent of the landlord his possession cannot be said to be illegal. In this view of the matter we see no reason why he should be deprived of the protection of the fourth proviso to Section 21 of the new Act. It is true that the new Act was intended to give relief to the tenant 'Landlord' and 'tenant' are defined terms in the Act. Clause (j) of Section 3 defines 'landlord' thus :- (j) "landlord" in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let would be, payable, and includes except in Clause (g), the agent or attorney, of such person." Section 3(a) defines tenant as :- (a) "Tenant" in relation to a building, means a person by whom its rent is payable.............." The appellant who is a sub-tenant pays rent to the tenant-in-chief and the tenant-in-chief in his turn pays rent to the landlord. Between the appellant & the tenant-in-chief, the tenant-in-chief would be the landlord and the appellant, the sub-tenant, would be the tenant. All that the relevant proviso to Section 21 requires is that the comparative hardship of the tenant as also that of the landlord shall be taken into account before passing any order of release or refusal to release. If the sub-tenancy had been created without the consent of the landlord the possession might have been different. The sub-tenant for the purposes of the Fourth proviso to Section 21 would virtually be a tenant inasmuch as rent is payable by him to the tenant-in-chief, who to all intents and purposes will be a landlord qua the sub-tenant. To interpret the section in the way as the High Court has interpreted would be defeating the very salutary purposes of the new Act. ................................................ ................................................ To interpret the section in the way as the High Court has interpreted would be defeating the very salutary purposes of the new Act. ................................................ ................................................ Having considered the argument of the counsel for the parties we are of the firm view that the appellant was entitled to the protection of the fourth proviso to Section 21 and the comparative hardship of the appellant as well as that of the landlords should have been taken into account before disposing of an application under Section 21 of the new Act. The Courts below, in our opinion, have failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them in not considering the likely hardship of the appellant." 8. In the case of Ghulam Rasul v. Pushpa Devi and others, reported in 1987(2) ARC 294, it was held by this Court that where a sub-tenant was found to be in occupation since about 35 years with the implied consent of the landlord, such sub-tenant is a proper party in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act and his hardship has also to be weighed and considered while passing order in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. Hence in view of what has been stated above, I hold that the petitioner was a necessary party in the proceeding for the release of the accommodation filed by the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 and he was also entitled to the protection of the fourth proviso to Section 21 of the Act. 9. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even though there was no consent of the District Magistrate obtained while creating sub-tenancy in favour of the petitioner with the consent of the landlord, the petitioner would still be legal sub-tenant and the lease would be binding as between the petitioner and the landlord even though the same may not be binding on the District Magistrate. I find force in this submission also. In the case of Nanakram v. Kundalrai, reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1194, the Supreme Court observed thus :- "Now, in deciding Murlidhar Agarwal, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1924 (supra) this Court approved of the proposition of law laid down by the Allahabad High Court in Udhao Das, AIR 1964 Allahabad 1 (FB) (supra). The High Court had the provisions of Section 7 and Section 7-A of the U.P. Rent Act before it. The High Court had the provisions of Section 7 and Section 7-A of the U.P. Rent Act before it. Section 7 required the landlord to report to the District Magistrate if his house had fallen vacant or was about to fall vacant, and thereupon the District Magistrate was empowered to direct the landlord to let the premises to a person specified in the order. The High Court dealt with the question whether a lease between the landlord and another person in violation of the order of District Magistrate would be a valid lease as between the parties thereto. It held that such a lease would be valid between the parties. It would not, however, be binding on the District Magistrate was evidenced by the power conferred upon him under Section 7-A(1)(a) of the U.P. Rent Act to take proceedings for the eviction of such tenant. Section 7-A(1) provided that if the vacancy of an accommodation was not reported or a person occupied an accommodation on an order issued under Section 7(2) the District Magistrate could require him to show cause why he should not be evicted from it. If he failed to show cause the District Magistrate could direct him to vacate the accommodation and if failed to vacate the District Magistrate could use force to evict him. The power conferred on the District Magistrate to take proceedings for the eviction of such tenant was discretionary. It was open to the District Magistrate not to exercise the power if there was undue delay or if for other good reason he found it inexpedient to do so. If he did not exercise the power conferred by Section 7-A(1), the lease between the landlord and the other person would continue to subsist and that other person would continue to enjoy the status of a tenant. It would be a valid lease. It could not be regarded as a void lease." It was thus held by the Supreme Court that there was no reason why the lease between the landlord and tenant although it may be inconsistent with Clause 22 of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, should not be binding as between the parties thereto and if the lease is not void, it is not open to either party to avoid the lease. The parties are thus bound as between them to observe the conditions of the lease and it cannot be assailed by either party in a proceeding between them. In the case of Kirpa Ram v. Addl. District Judge, Meerut, reported in 1976 AWC 528 , the relevant facts were that the landlord Rameshwar Dayal let out the premises to one Manohar Lal who in his turn let out the premises to Kripa Ram. Manohar Lal died and after his death Rameshwar Dayal, the landlord, sold the premises. Upon the death of Manohar Lal, Rameshwar dayal filed an application for release of the premises under Section 16(1) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 on the ground that the sole tenant having died, the occupation of Kripa Ram after the death of Manohar Lal became unauthorised. The learned Judge overruled the contention of Rameshwar Dayal holding that on the death of tenant-in-chief, Kripa Ram, the sub-tenant acquired the rights to continue in possession so long as the original lease continued, as a lessee directly from the owner and landlord. He was entitled to hold the building under the tenancy on the same terms and conditions as the original lessee or the tenant-in-chief. The learned Judge also held that sub-tenant in occupation of the premises being with the consent of the landlord would be entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Act and the occupation of the sub-tenant was liable to be regularised. In the present case also, after the tenant-in-chief surrendered his rights in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a), the petitioner who is sub-tenant acquired the right to continue in possession so long as the original lease continued, as a lessee directly from the owner and landlord and petitioner was entitled to hold the buildings under tenancy on the same terms and conditions as the original lessee or tenant-in-chief. Thus after the tenant-in-chief surrendered his rights, the petitioner stepped into his shoes and being a tenant with the consent of the landlord, would be entitled to continue in possession and could not be evicted in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act without considering his hardship vis-a-vis the landlord. The same view was expressed in the case of Rajendra Nath Tiwari and another v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, reported in 1981 ARC 271. The same view was expressed in the case of Rajendra Nath Tiwari and another v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, reported in 1981 ARC 271. In view of the discussion made above, it is clear that the petitioner could not be evicted from the accommodation in dispute without impleading him as a party in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act and considering his hardship also while passing the order. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents then contended that the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) having become final against the tenant-in-chief, the petitioner is not entitled to seek any injunction restraining the landlord from enforcing the order passed in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) and 21.7.1978 and in support of his contention placed reliance on the case of Ram Chandra v. Mahesh Chandra Gupta, reported in 1985(2) ARC 283. The case cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, however, does not support his contention. In that case, the landlord had obtained a decree for eviction of a tenant and the decree has become final having been affirmed upto the state of the Supreme Court. Thereafter the tenant applied for an injunction restraining the landlord from executing the decree and in that context, it was observed that the decree having become final against the tenant, the tenant was not entitled to relief for injunction. In the present case, no order or decree has been passed against the petitioner. In fact the order affecting the petitioner's rights and interest has been passed behind his back and without considering his comparative hardship. Thus the facts of the present case are quite different than the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents which lends no support to his contention. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents then relied on the case of Suresh Chand Tandon and another v. M/s. Transtel Electronics Ltd., Kanpur and another, reported in 1985(2) ARC 112. The facts of that case also are quite different and do not apply to the present case. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents then relied on the case of Suresh Chand Tandon and another v. M/s. Transtel Electronics Ltd., Kanpur and another, reported in 1985(2) ARC 112. The facts of that case also are quite different and do not apply to the present case. In the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents it was held that the eviction decree if it had been confirmed by the High Court as well as by the Supreme Court, it was not open to the executing Court to go behind the decree and to re-open the evidence, and it was further held that where the executing Court had declared the decree to be null and void, in such circumstances, it was very shocking, callous and arbitrary of the executing Court to have usurped the power to wholly disregard the decision of the High Court and the Supreme Court. Therefore, facts of this case also do not at all apply to the facts of the present case and lend no help to the respondent's case. 12. In the result of the discussion made above, it is clear that the order of release in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) was passed on 31.7.1978 behind the back of the petitioner who was a legal sub-tenant and after the tenant-in-chief had surrendered his rights on the basis of the compromise with the landlord, the sub-tenant, i.e., the petitioner was entitled to continue in possession on the same terms and conditions as the original tenant-in-chief and it was incumbent on the Prescribed Authority to have considered his comparative hardship also while passing the order of release in favour of the landlord. The same having not been done and the hardship of the petitioner having not been considered, the petitioner could not be evicted from the accommodation in dispute. The petitioner having continued in possession since the year 1948 till the present date, his possession over the premises in dispute is for considerably a long period and in view of his subsisting right as a subs-tenant therein, he was entitled and in view of his subsisting right as a sub-tenant therein, he was entitled to an injunction restraining the landlord from evicting him from the premises in dispute. The learned counsel for the respondents then contended that the petitioner had not paid any rent of the accommodation since the passing of the order of release in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act on 31.7.1978 and hence is not entitled to an ad interim injunction as the tenant has been defined under the Act as a person by whom the rent of the building is payable. The learned counsel for the petitioner is always prepared to pay the entire dues within the shortest possible time and in fact this question of non-payment of rent was never raised by the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 and in case the petitioner is called upon to pay the same or to deposit the same, he is prepared to deposit the entire amount due within the time allowed by the Court. However, it is also open to the landlord respondent Nos. 3 to 5 to make appropriate remedy permissible under law to recover the arrears of rent that may be found due against the petitioner. 13. In the result of the discussion made above, it is clear that there is clear prima facie case made out in favour of the grant of an ad interim injunction as the petitioner is a legal sub-tenant and entitled to continue as such specially in view of the fact the sub-tenancy in favour of the petitioner was created with the consent of the then landlord. The balance of convenience also lies in favour of the petitioner who had been in continued possession for a considerably long period since 1948 and an irreparable injury may be caused if the long continued possession of the petitioner is disturbed. In the result the writ petition is allowed, the orders by the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Agra and the XVII Additional Munsif, Agra, dated 12.11.1987 and 7.10.1982, respectively rejecting the prayer made by the petitioner for an ad interim injunction are quashed and the case is sent back to the Additional Munsif, Agra, respondent No. 2, to decided the application of the petitioner for ad interim injunction afresh, if possible within four months of presentation of a copy of this order before him, keeping in view the observations made above. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.