Judgment :- 1. This revision petition is against the finding recorded on preliminary issue No.1 regarding jurisdiction of the court of the Munsiff at Ernakulam to entertain the suit of the respondent, the court below having recorded a finding to the effect that it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 2. The petitioners represent the management whereas the respondent-plaintiff is the workman. The respondent was transferred by the management from Ernakulam to its office at Madras. The respondent filed the suit challenging that transfer alleging that it is mala fide and is the result of victimisation and unfair labour practice and is therefore illegal and unjust. He has therefore prayed for a decree that the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides and amounts to victimisation and unfair labour practice and hence null and void. The petitioners-management filed a written statement, inter alia, contending that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, on the ground that the rights sought to be enforced by the respondent being a creature of the Industrial Disputes Act and not a common law right and as a remedy is provided under the said Act the suit is not maintainable. The court below came to the conclusion that the dispute brought before the court is not an industrial dispute as defined in S.2 (k) of the Act as it has not been espoused by the workmen. As there is no provision in the Act to entertain such an individual dispute it was held that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 3. The principal contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners in this revision petition is that the finding recorded by the court below on preliminary issue No.1 is erroneous and is the result of misconception of law. S.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the civil courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. It is not disputed that the cause is of a civil nature. There is no express provision barring the jurisdiction of the civil court. Therefore I have to examine if the jurisdiction of the civil court is impliedly barred. So far as the principles governing this aspect is concerned, the same are governed by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR. 1975 SC. There is no express provision barring the jurisdiction of the civil court. Therefore I have to examine if the jurisdiction of the civil court is impliedly barred. So far as the principles governing this aspect is concerned, the same are governed by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR. 1975 SC. 2238 between the Premier Automobiles Ltd. and Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and Others. After an exhaustive examination of all aspects, the Supreme Court has summarised the law in this behalf as follows: "The principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus: 1. If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil court. 2. If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. 3. If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of aright or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. 4. If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either S.33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." As the law has been clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court, all that I need do is to apply them to the present case. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court what is required to be examined is as to whether the right claimed by the respondent to enforce which he has filed the suit is a common law right or a right created by the Industrial Disputes Act. If the right claimed is not a common law right but a right created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the further question for examination is as to whether the statute which has created the right has itself provided for a forum for enforcement of such a right. If the right claimed is not a common law right but a right created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the further question for examination is as to whether the statute which has created the right has itself provided for a forum for enforcement of such a right. If the right sought to be enforced is the creature of the Industrial Disputes Act and the forum is also created by that Act for enforcing that right, the civil court will have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. If, however, the right sought to be enforced by the respondent is a common law right and the same is also recognised under the Industrial Disputes Act, then one can avail of the remedy either of approaching the civil court for relief or the remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act. If, however the right is only a common law right and is not recognised by the Industrial Disputes Act. the remedy would be only to approach the civil court. If, how ever, the right which the respondent seeks to enforce is a creature of the Industrial Disputes Act and the I. D. Act does not provide a remedy for enforcing that right, then also the respondent would be entitled to seek his remedy in the ordinary civil court. 4. So far as the frame of the suit is concerned, the order of transfer is challenged on the ground that transfer of the respondent by the petitioners is mala fide and result of victimisation and unfair labour practice and is therefore illegal and unjust. It is not pleaded that the respondent is claiming any right recognised by the common law as such. The learned counsel for the respondent was also not in a position to point out if the right claimed is recognised as a common law right. Common law does not recognise any limitation on the power of the master to transfer his employees on grounds of mala fides, victimisation or unfair labour practice. We must also bear in mind that contract of service is not specifically enforcible under the ordinary common law. If the master is not willing to employ the servant he cannot be compelled to employ him. But after the Industrial Disputes Act was enacted new rights and liabilities have been created restricting the unfettered common law rights of the master in dealing with the workmen in this behalf. If the master is not willing to employ the servant he cannot be compelled to employ him. But after the Industrial Disputes Act was enacted new rights and liabilities have been created restricting the unfettered common law rights of the master in dealing with the workmen in this behalf. Under the Industrial Disputes Act, notwithstanding the unwillingness of the master, he can be forced to continue the servant in his service. 5. So far as the question of transfer is concerned, the legislature has made express provision to safeguard the interests of workmen. S.25-T in Chapter V-C of the Industrial Disputes Act contains a prohibition against unfair labour practice and reads as follows: "25-T Prohibition of unfair labour practice. No employer or workman or a trade union, whether registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (16 of 1926), or not shall commit any unfair labour practice." The expression "unfair labour practice" has been defined in S.2(ra) of the Act to mean any of the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The Fifth Schedule enumerates the various unfair labour practices statutorily recognised. Item No. 7 of the Fifth Schedule which is relevant may be extracted as follows: 7. To transfer a workman mala fide from one place to another, under the guise of following management policy." Thus it becomes clear that there is a statutory prohibition engrafted in the Industrial Disputes Act prohibiting transfer of a workman mala fide from one place to another under the guise of following management policy. Thus a valued right has been created by statute in favour of the workman from being subjected to by his employer to transfers mala fide under the guise of following a management policy. This is a right which has been created by the Industrial Disputes Act in favour of the workman restricting the unfettered right of the management in the matter of effecting transfer of his employees. The obligation not to transfer a workman mala fide from one place to another under the guise of management policy was not recognised under the common law. That right is now created by the statute. The right which the petitioners claim to enforce in the suit flows from S.25-T of the Industrial Disputes Act read with item No. 7 of the Fifth Schedule. 6. That right is now created by the statute. The right which the petitioners claim to enforce in the suit flows from S.25-T of the Industrial Disputes Act read with item No. 7 of the Fifth Schedule. 6. The next question for examination is as to whether the I. D. Act has created a forum for enforcing this statutory right in the matter of transfer created by S.25-T read with item No. 7 of the Fifth Schedule. If the Industrial Disputes Act does not contain any provision for enforcement of that right, the answer on the first issue has to be recorded in favour of the respondent. If, however, I come to the conclusion that the Industrial Disputes Act which has created this right in favour of the workman has also created a forum for its enforcement, then I have to answer issue No.1 in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners' case is that the forum has also been provided under the Act by S.10 (1) which read as follows: "10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. The petitioners' case is that the forum has also been provided under the Act by S.10 (1) which read as follows: "10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute, to a court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under clause (c): Provided further that where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under S.22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make reference under this sub-section notwithstanding that any other proceeding under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced: Provided also that where the dispute in relation to which the Central Government is the appropriate Government, it shall be competent for that Government to refer the dispute to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, as the case, may be, constituted by the State Government". The second Schedule enumerates matters which are within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the Third Schedule enumerates matters which are within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that S.10 cannot be invoked as disputes pertaining to transfer are not specifically enumerated either in the Second or in the Third Schedule. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that S.10 cannot be invoked as disputes pertaining to transfer are not specifically enumerated either in the Second or in the Third Schedule. But it has to be pointed out that there is a residuary clause in the Second Schedule pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts which includes "all matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule". Hence it follows that any dispute regarding transfers effected in contravention of S.25-T read with item No. 7 of the Fifth Schedule can be resolved under S.10 of the Act. But it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the dispute brought by him is an individual dispute, which will not come within the definition of industrial dispute, as defined in S.2 (k) of the Act. It was therefore contended that so far as individual problems regarding transfer which are not espoused by a class of workmen, 'there is no remedy under the Act to enforce the right created by the statute. That being the position, it was contended that the respondent is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil court. Merely because the respondent is not in a position to satisfy all the conditions prescribed by the statute for the purpose of enforcing the rights created by the statute, it cannot be said that the statute does not provide for a remedy for enforcing the rights created by the statute. It cannot be disputed that if the dispute regarding transfer is espoused by the workmen, it would be an industrial dispute as defined in S.2 (k) of the Act. As the definition of the expression "Industrial Dispute" in S.2 (k) includes within its ambit disputes connected with the terms of the employment or conditions of labour of any person. The terms of employment or the conditions of employment are governed by the Industrial Disputes Act. One term of employment is that the workman is not liable for transfer in contravention of S.25-T read with item No. 7 of the Fifth Schedule. That an individual cannot seek relief against transfer under S.10 does not mean that the statute does not provide a remedy for enforcing the right created by S.25-T read with item No. 7 of the Fifth Schedule. The remedy has been provided in S.10 of the Act. That an individual cannot seek relief against transfer under S.10 does not mean that the statute does not provide a remedy for enforcing the right created by S.25-T read with item No. 7 of the Fifth Schedule. The remedy has been provided in S.10 of the Act. There are several conditions which are to be satisfied for invoking the remedy provided under S.10 of the Act. When the statute prescribes a remedy and also prescribes the conditions for availing of that remedy, if the conditions for invoking the remedy cannot be complied with, it does not mean that the statute has not provided the remedy. One of the conditions to be satisfied in such cases is that the dispute can be raised by a class of workmen. If the statute prescribes for a period of limitation for availing of a remedy, can it be said that no remedy is provided merely because the period of limitation has expired? Remedy has been provided but the person concerned is not in a position to avail of that remedy as one of the conditions for availing of that remedy cannot be satisfied by him. The legislature obviously intended that certain types of rights which have been created by the statute must be resolved before the forum only if such disputes are espoused by a class of workmen. Therefore the respondent cannot contend that because he has brought this dispute as an individual dispute, he cannot invoke S.10 of the Act and that therefore no remedy is provided by the Act. It is for the respondent to invoke that remedy by satisfying all the conditions for enforcement of the right created under S.25-T read with item No. 7 of the Fifth Schedule. I have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that this is a case in which the right as well as the remedy have been provided by the Industrial Disputes Act in the matter of transfers by the management. Therefore the jurisdiction of the civil court is by necessary implication barred. I have therefore no hesitation in reversing the finding of the court of first instance on issue No. 1. For the reasons stated above this revision petition is allowed and the finding of the court below on issue No.1 is set aside. In its place I record a finding that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. I have therefore no hesitation in reversing the finding of the court of first instance on issue No. 1. For the reasons stated above this revision petition is allowed and the finding of the court below on issue No.1 is set aside. In its place I record a finding that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The court of first instance is therefore directed to dispose of the suit in the light of the finding which I have recorded on issue No. 1. I make it clear that this does not preclude the petitioners from availing of other remedies under the statute. No costs.