M. RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) 1. The petitioner has presented this petition questioning the legality of the order of the Managing Director and the Appellate authority of the Karnataka State Road transport Corporation by which the order imposing the penalty of dismissal from service against the petitioner was set-aside but without directing payment of any backwages for the period during which he was out of duty. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are as follow: The petitioner was a permanent conductor in the service of the Corporation. A Criminal case was filed against the petitioner for offences under Sections 341 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian penal Code. The petitioner was found guilty of the charge. Thereafter, on the basis of the conduct which had led to his conviction action was initiated under Regulation 28. The said Regulation provides that no inquiry is necessary when penalty is sought to be imposed on the Corporation servant on conduct which has led to his conviction. The disciplinary authority, after issuing a show cause notice to the petitioner on the basis of the conduct which had led to his conviction and after considering his reply, made an order on 8-3-1985 imposing penalty of dismissal from service against the petitioner. The petitioner however had preferred an appeal before the Court of the sessions Judge, Bangalore, in Criminal appeal No. 1/1985. By an order dated 26-3-987 made in the Criminal Appeal the conviction and sentence were set-aside and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 6-3-1987 to the Managing director against the order of the disciplinary authority imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. The Appeallate Authority entertained the appeal and disposed of the same on merits. The relevant portion of the order reads:"the impugned proceedings initiated by the Regional Manager as disclosed from the records were based solely and wholly on the ground of conviction of the appellant by the ITI Additional Chief metropolitan Magistrate (in c. C. No. 1900/82 ). The conviction and sentence has been set -aside by the sessions Court, and hence this appeal is allowed and in the circumstances, T pass the following order: in exercise of powers conferred by reg. The conviction and sentence has been set -aside by the sessions Court, and hence this appeal is allowed and in the circumstances, T pass the following order: in exercise of powers conferred by reg. 34 (2) read with Schedule to k. S. R. T. C. Servants (C and D) regulations - 1971, T, P. P. Prabhu, vice-Chairman and Managing Director, being the Appellate Authority do hereby order. 1. That the order of dismissal passed by the Regional Manager, BMTS Region vide No. KST/ BMR/rm/dfl/ 2936/84-85, dated 8-3-85 be and is set-aside and the appellant is reinstated in service, as Conductor. 2. The period from the date of his dismissal to that of his reinstatement is not treated as on duty and no backwages whatsoever are to be paid for the inactive period, which will be treated as continuous service for the purpose of gratuity only. "questioning tne legality of the aforesaid order, the petitioner presented this petition. ( 3 ) THE contention of the petitioner is that as he had been exonerated of the charges in the Criminal Appeal, the Appellate authority ought to have treated the entire period during which the petitioner was absent from duty as duty and should have also directed the payment of full emoluments. In support of the above contention, the petitioner relies on a decision of this Court in DEGANETTI C. B. Vs. K. S. R. T. C. , (1983 (2) Kar. L. J. 67 Short notes of Cases Page 28) as also the decision in Writ Petition No. 18388/84 (H. M. KAZI vs. Managing Director ). In both these cases, the Appellate Authority had allowed the appeal of the Corporation servant concerned, but had imposed the condition that he would not be entitled to the arrears of salary. That portion of the order of the appellate Authority was set-aside and liberty was given to the petitioner therein to initiate appropriate proceeding under the labour Law for recovery of the amount. ( 4 ) THIS case, in my opinion, stands on a different footing. This is not a case in which the finding recorded by the Disciplinary authority on certain charges against the corporation servant and the imposition of penalty by the Disciplinary Authority has been set-aside by the Appellate Authority on the ground that the charge levelled against the employee concerned was not proved and therefore he should be exonerated. This is not a case in which the finding recorded by the Disciplinary authority on certain charges against the corporation servant and the imposition of penalty by the Disciplinary Authority has been set-aside by the Appellate Authority on the ground that the charge levelled against the employee concerned was not proved and therefore he should be exonerated. This is a case covered by the special procedure prescribed under regulation 28. It reads:"special Procedure in certain cases-Notwithstanding anything contained in Regulations 22 to 27. i) Where any penalty is imposed on a corporation Servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or ii) Where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these regulations, the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit. " ( 5 ) IT is under this Regulation, the disciplinary authority took action against the petitioner as he had been convicted for an offence and the conduct which had led to such conviction was such as would call for imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service. After the Criminal Appeal presented by the petitioner was allowed, he presented an Appeal. The appellate authority entertained this time barred appeal after nearly 2 years having due regard to the fact that the petitioner had been exonerated of the charges in the criminal Appeal. The provision which regulates the passing of the consequential orders as to how the period of absence should be treated and what amount of backwages should be paid for the said period is found in regulation 21 (6) which reads:21. The provision which regulates the passing of the consequential orders as to how the period of absence should be treated and what amount of backwages should be paid for the said period is found in regulation 21 (6) which reads:21. Suspension pending inquiry- (1) The disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Corporation by general or special order, may place a corporation servant under suspension- 6 (a) When a Corporation servant who has been dismissed, removed, or suspended is reinstated or would have been reinstated but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension, the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make order as to- (i) the wages or pay and allowances which shall be paid to the Corporation servant for the period of his absence from duty or for the period of suspension ending with the date of his retirement on super-annuation, as the case may be; and (ii) whether or not the said period shall be treated as period spent on duty. (b) (i) where such competent authority holds that the Corporation servant has been exonerated or, in the case of suspension under this regulation that it was unjustifiable, the Corporation servant shall be granted the full wages or pay to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended, as the case may be together with any allowances of which he was in receipt immediately prior to his dismissal, removal or suspension or may have been sanctioned subsequently and made applicable to corporation servant of his class. (ii) in all other cases, the Corporation servant shall be granted such proportion of such wages or pay and allowances as such competent authority may direct. Provided that the payment of allowances under this clause shall be subject to all other conditions subject to which such allowances are admissible. Provided further that the wages or pay and allowances granted under this sub-clause shall not be less than subsistance and other allowances admissible under sub-regulation (5 ). "as can be seen from clause (a) of Rule 21 (6) it requires the authority ordering reinstatement to pass order regarding wages and allowances for the period of his absence from duty and also on the question whether or not the said period should be treated as period spent on duty. "as can be seen from clause (a) of Rule 21 (6) it requires the authority ordering reinstatement to pass order regarding wages and allowances for the period of his absence from duty and also on the question whether or not the said period should be treated as period spent on duty. Clause (b) (i) of: regulation 21 (6) governs cases where the competent authority-Corporation exonerates the servant concerned. This is not a case in which the appellate authority exonerated the petitioner in appeal. It was the jurisdictional Magistrate who found the petitioner guilty of offences under the indian Penal Code and passed an order of conviction and sentence and the disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of dismissal from service on the basis of the conduct which had led to his conviction and it is the Criminal Appellate Court which set aside the conviction. Therefore, it is clause (ii) of Regulation 21 (6) (b) which gets attracted to this case. According to that provision the competent authority has to decide as to what proportion of wages should be granted to the employee concerned. The second proviso to the said clause however makes it clear that the wages and allowances granted under the said Rule shall not be less than the subsistance allowance as is admissible under the regulation. Therefore, the appellate authority was required to make an order for payment of an amount not less than the subsistance allowance. Therefore, the order of the appellate authority directing that no wages be paid during the period of absence, is unsupportable. However, as regards the direction given by the appellate authority that the period of absence shall not be treated as duty but shall count only for gratuity is well within the competence of the authority and therefore, there is no ground to interfere with that part of the order. In the circumstances, I make the following: - order writ Petition partly allowed. (I) Writ Petition is allowed; (II)THE impugned order of the Appellate authority to the extent it directed that no backwages whatsoever should be paid for the period of absence of the petitioner, is set aside. (III) A direction shall issue to the appellate authority to pass order regarding the amount to be paid to the petitioner for the period of absence in accordance with Regulation 21 (6) (b) (ii) and in the light of this order. (III) A direction shall issue to the appellate authority to pass order regarding the amount to be paid to the petitioner for the period of absence in accordance with Regulation 21 (6) (b) (ii) and in the light of this order. IV) The respondents shall, however, be at liberty to hold an inquiry as to whether the petitioner was gainfully employed during the said period and if so what amount should be deducted out of the amount payable for the period of absence. Time for compliance six months. --- *** --- .