Ram Prakash Tripathi v. Sheela Dixit — 1988 DIGILAW 5 (ALL)

ORDER O.P. Mehrotra, J. - This is an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, by which petitioner Ram Prakash Tripathi has questioned the validity of the election of respondent Smt. Sheela Dixit from 67 Kannauj Lok Sabha Constituency. The main ground on which the election of the respondent has been challenged is that the petitioner's nomination paper was illegally and improperly rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that the petitioner had on that day held an office of profit under the State of Uttar Pradesh and as such was disqualified under Article 102(i)(a) of the Constitution of India. 2. There is no dispute that the election was for election of one member of the Lok Sabha from 67 Kannauj Lok Sabha Constituency was notified to be held in accordance with the following programme : Last date for filing nomination paper 27-11-1984 Date of Scrutiny 28-11-1984 Date for withdrawal of candidature 30-11-1984 Date for poll, if necessary 27-12-1984 Date of counting of votes 28-12-1984 The petitioner alleges that he is an elector of 67 Kannauj Lok Sabha Constituency and that his name is entered at S.No. 175 in the electoral roll of village Harivallabhapur, Polling Station No. 114, Tahsil Chhibramau, District Farrukhabad relating to 310 Chhibramau Assembly Constituency, which is a part of 67 Kannuaj Lok Sabha Constituency and respondent had filed their nomination papers in the said constituency. The petitioner had filed his nomination paper on 23-12-1984 (actually it should be 23-11-1984). 3. On the date of scrutiny, viz.. The petitioner had filed his nomination paper on 23-12-1984 (actually it should be 23-11-1984). 3. On the date of scrutiny, viz.. 28-11-1984 when the petitioner's nomination paper was taken up for scrutiny, one Shri Dharma Narain who had also filed nomination paper, raised an objection before the Returning Officer that the petitioner is disqualified for being chosen as member of Lok Sabha on the ground that he held an office of profit under the Government of Uttar Pradesh within the meaning of Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution inasmuch as he was a Lecturer in Hira Lal Vaish National Inter College on the date of filing his nomination paper and was still holding the said post, that he was in the pay of the Government of Uttar Pradesh and was paid from the State exchequer under the U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 and that the said College was an authority subject to the control of the State Government. The petitioner filed a reply to the aforesaid objection contending, inter alia, that he was not disqualified for being chosen and for being a member of the Lok Sabha either under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution of India or even otherwise as he did not hold any office of profit either in the Central Government or State Government, that he was not in the service of College from 16-11-1984 nor he received any pay from the said date, that the college was run by Society and not by the Government and as such his nomination paper was not liable to be rejected. The petitioner also filed before the Returning Officer a certificate from the Principal of the College showing that the petitioner was no more in the service from 16-11-1984 and that one Sri Pramod Kumar Tripathi had been appointed in the vacancy of the petitioner. 4. The Returning Officer, however, held that the petitioner was holding an office of profit in the State of Uttar Pradesh and as such was disqualifed under Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution. Accordingly he rejected the petitioner's nomination paper. The petitioner has challenged the validity of this order and has alleged that his nomination paper had been illegally and improperly rejected. The Returning Officer, however, held that the petitioner was holding an office of profit in the State of Uttar Pradesh and as such was disqualifed under Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution. Accordingly he rejected the petitioner's nomination paper. The petitioner has challenged the validity of this order and has alleged that his nomination paper had been illegally and improperly rejected. He further alleges that on account of the illegal rejection of the nomination paper of the petitioner, the election of the respondent was rendered void under S. 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act and was liable to be set aside. He, therefore, prayed that the election of the respondent as a Member of Lok Sabha should be declared void and set aside. 5. The respondent in her written statement pleaded that the petitioner being a teacher in an Intermediate College which was governed by a Committee of Management under a Scheme contemplated by S. 16-A of the Intermediate Education Act and being paid salary from Government funds, and being entitled to pension, family pension, gratuity, Group Insurance benefits, incentive and bonus to the same extent as Government servants, was in fact, a Civil Servant of the Government and in any case was a holder of the office under the Government and thus disqualified to be nominated a member of any legislative body under the Constitution of India, and as such his nomination paper was rightly rejected by the Returning Officer. In para 35 of the written statement, it was pointed out that in paragraph 3 of the petition the petitioner has stated that he had filed his nomination paper on 23-12-1984, which is much later than the date for the withdrawal of candidature. 6. By an amendment of the written statement allowed on 11-9-1987, the respondent added paragraph 34-A to the written statement which runs as follows : "34-A That the petitioner Ram Prakash Tripathi is neither recorded in the Electoral Roll or is the person whose name is entered in the Electoral Roll at Serial No. 175 from 67 Kannauj Lok Sabha Constituency. The petitioner is a different person. The election petition at the instance of the petitioner is, therefore, not maintainable and is liable to be rejected on this ground alone." 7. The petitioner is a different person. The election petition at the instance of the petitioner is, therefore, not maintainable and is liable to be rejected on this ground alone." 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed : (1) Whether the copy of election petition which has been served on the respondent is duly attested true copy of the petition? If so, whether it amounts to non-compliance of S. 81(3) of Representation of the People Act, 1951? If so, to what effect? (2) Whether the petitioner's nomination paper was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that the petitioner had on that day held an office of profit within the meaning of Article 102 of Constitution of India? If so, its effect? (3) Whether the election petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable and liable to be rejected as pleaded in para 34-A of the amended written statement? (4) To what relief, if any, is the petitioner entitled? 8. Parties counsel agreed that issue No. 1 was required to be decided as preliminary issue. Accordingly learned counsel for the parties were heard on preliminary issue No. 1 and I proceed to dispose of the same. 9. Before addressing on preliminary issue No. 1 Sri S.S. Bhatnagar learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent pointed out that in paragraph 3 of the petition a wrong date of filing nomination paper by the petitioner viz. 23-12-1984 has been mentioned, and the same has been made to read 23-11-1984 by writing 11' above the figure 12'. It was not disputed that the correct date was 23-11-1984, but a wrong date 23-12-1984 had been mentioned in the original petition as well as in the copy supplied to the respondent. However figure 11' has been mentioned above figure 12' in the original petition, without carrying out similar correction in the copy supplied to the respondent. It was contended that by furnishing incorrect copy, the petitioner has disregarded the mandate contained in S. 81(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the petition was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. 10. It was contended that by furnishing incorrect copy, the petitioner has disregarded the mandate contained in S. 81(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the petition was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. 10. Sri K.N. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner while conceding that though by inadvertence the date of filing nomination paper had been wrongly mentioned in para 3 of the petition as 23-12-1984 instead of 23-11-1984, contended that this was merely a clerical error, which was apparent on the face of it and was known to the respondent, and in any case no prejudice had been caused to her. He contended that despite the fact that this mistake had been pointed out by the respondent in para 35 of her written statement, he did not consider it necessary to get the date corrected by seeking amendment, because the error in the date was apparently a clerical one, and was not relevant to the matter at issue and there was no question of any prejudice having been caused to the respondent. 11. I find myself in agreement with the above contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. No doubt, a wrong date of filing nomination was mentioned in paragraph 3 of the petition as 23-12-1984 instead of 23-11-1984, yet this was only a clerical or typographical mistake, which did not cause any prejudice to the respondent nor the same had any material bearing on the matters at issue. Consequently, even though the petitioner did not take any step to get the mistake rectified by seeking amendment, despite the mistake having been pointed out in para 35 of the written statement, yet this was not such a mistake as would result in the dismissal of the election petition. 12. Consequently, even though the petitioner did not take any step to get the mistake rectified by seeking amendment, despite the mistake having been pointed out in para 35 of the written statement, yet this was not such a mistake as would result in the dismissal of the election petition. 12. However, as regards the so called correction by writing the figure 11' above the figure 'd2' in para 3 of the original petition, without carrying out a similar correction in the copy of the petition furnished to the respondent, Sri K.N. Tripathi contended that he has no idea as to when and by whom the figure 11' was inserted above the figure 12', and in any case this had neither been inserted by him or his client and it appears that this was done by some one after the petition had been filed in Court, so that it cannot be said that the copy of the petition furnished to the respondent was not correct or that it was not a "true copy" of the petition. It was also pointed out that all other corrections in the petition have been initialled by the petitioner, and if this correction by writing figure 11' was made before the filing of the petition in Court, the petitioner would have properly carried out the correction by scoring out the figure 12' and writing figure 11' and would have initialled the correction. It was also pointed out that the respondent had not raised this plea in writing either in her original written statement or be seeking amendment, and hence the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be permitted to raise this plea for the first time during arguments without any specific pleading to that effect. 13. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is also not without force. In the first place, the above point raised by the learned counsel for the respondent for the first time during arguments cannot be considered in the absence of any specific pleading to that effect. It also appears that the so called correction by writing the figure 11' above the figure 12' in para 3 of the original petition, was not, in fact, a correction made by the petitioner or his counsel before filing the petition in Court. It also appears that the so called correction by writing the figure 11' above the figure 12' in para 3 of the original petition, was not, in fact, a correction made by the petitioner or his counsel before filing the petition in Court. If that had been so, the figure 12' would have been properly cut or scored out, and the correction must have also been initialled by the petitioner. In all probability, the figure 11' was written above figure 12' inadvertently by some one perusing the petition and detecting the error. Moreover, even if this correction was there and the same was not incorporated in the copy furnished to the respondent, it was merely a clerical or typographical mistake which was of no consequence and the petition could not be dismissed on that ground. It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Kumar Pandey v. Baidyanath Yadav, AIR 1984 SC 305 that "a true copy means a copy which is wholly and substantially the same as the original and where there are insignificant or minimal mistakes, the Court may not take notice thereof", and that "when the copy of the election petition served on the returned candidate contains only clerical or typographical mistakes which are of no consequence, the petition cannot be dismissed straightway under S. 86 of the Act." 14. Now, coming to the preliminary issue No. 1, the respondent has filed the copy of the petition served on her, and the same having been admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, has been marked Ext. R-1. On each page of this copy there is an endorsement of "true copy" signed by the petitioner. It does not contain any endorsement to the effect "Attested to be True Copy" or "Attested True Copy". The preliminary objection raised by the respondent is that this copy has not been 'attested' to be true copy of the petition and that this amounts to non-compliance of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 81 of the Act, so that this Court was bound to dismiss the election petition as provided in Section 86(1) of the Act. 15. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent is that this copy has not been 'attested' to be true copy of the petition and that this amounts to non-compliance of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 81 of the Act, so that this Court was bound to dismiss the election petition as provided in Section 86(1) of the Act. 15. Sub-section (3) of S. 81 of the Act, provides as follows : "Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition." 16. The consequence of non-compliance of the above section has been mentioned in S. 86(1) which may be extracted thus "86. Trial of election petition : (1) The High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117." 17. It has not been disputed before me that the above provisions of S. 81(3) of the Act, corresponding to S. 89(3) of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act (4 of 1957) have been held to be mandatory and not merely directory by the Supreme Court in the case of Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani, AIR 1980 SC 303 . In para 20, the Supreme Court held thus :- "We are, therefore, of the view that the requirement that every copy of the election petition which is intended for service on the respondent should be attested by the petitioner under his own signature is a mandatory requirement and the non- compliance with that requirement should result in the dismissal of the petition as provided in Section 94 of the Act. The High Court was, therefore, right in dismissing the petition on the above ground." 18. In that case the copies had been duly attested as true copies, but the attestation was done by the advocate for the petitioner and not by the petitioner himself under his own signature. It was held that this was not sufficient compliance of the mandatory provisions of law and the election petition was dismissed on that ground. 19. In that case the copies had been duly attested as true copies, but the attestation was done by the advocate for the petitioner and not by the petitioner himself under his own signature. It was held that this was not sufficient compliance of the mandatory provisions of law and the election petition was dismissed on that ground. 19. In the present case although there is an endorsement of "true copy" on each page of the copy of the election petition furnished to the respondent and the same is also signed by the petitioner himself, yet the copies have not been "attested" by the petitioner to be true copies. In fact, there is no endorsement of any attestation having been done on the copy, and the petitioner has merely signed after writing the words "True Copy" without "attesting" or "authenticating" or "verifying" that the same was true copy. The learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent contended that as the copy furnished to the respondent had not been "attested to be true copy" of the petition, the mandatory requirement of S. 81(3) had not been complied with, and the non-compliance with that requirement should result in the dismissal of the petition as provided in S. 86(1) of the Act. Sri K.N. Tripathi, on the other hand, contended that mere endorsement of "True Copy" meant that it was attested to be "true copy" and nothing more was required to be done, and that there was sufficient compliance of the provisions of S. 81(3) of the Act. This leads us to a consideration of the scope and meaning of the words "shall be attested......to be true copy of the petition" as they appear in S. 81(3) of the Act. 20. My attention was drawn to Webster's (New International) Dictionary, Third Edition at page 141 where the meaning of word 'attest' has been given as "to be a witness, to bear witness to, affirm to be true or genuine, to witness and. authenticate by signing as a witness, to authenticate officially (as the truth of a writing)...... to call to witness............ My attention was drawn to Webster's (New International) Dictionary, Third Edition at page 141 where the meaning of word 'attest' has been given as "to be a witness, to bear witness to, affirm to be true or genuine, to witness and. authenticate by signing as a witness, to authenticate officially (as the truth of a writing)...... to call to witness............ In the same Dictionary the meaning of "authenticate" has been given as "to make authentic, to make authoritative, give authority to, to make valid and effective by the proof, attestation or formalities required by law, to make credible......., to establish convincingly as accurate, true, real or genuine........to verify the origin of, prove the authority of......" 21. In Encyclopaedia Britannica the meaning of "Attestation" has been given as "act of witnessing the execution of certain documents, such as deeds and will, by persons who themselves sign the document and who, if available, may be called to identify the document in subsequent proceedings concerning it or questioning its validity." 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that attestation of a will or deed as required by law is quite different than attestation of a petition to be true copy of the original petition. While this may be true, yet there is material difference between merely certifying a copy of a document to be true copy of the original and attesting it to be true copy. Attestation implies that the person executing or writing a document is present before the person attesting it. This is, however, not necessary when a person certified a document to be true copy of the original document. An illustration may be given. The Presiding Officer of a Court records a statement or delivers a judgment. Only the Presiding Officer himself or anyone in whose presence the statement is recorded or judgment is delivered and signed, such as the Reader of the Court, can attest a copy of that statement or judgment to be true copy. But the Head Copyist of the Court, or for that matter anyone else, can certify the copy as 'True Copy' after comparing it with the original, irrespective of the f act as to whether or not he was present at the time when the original statement was recorded or the judgment was signed and delivered. But the Head Copyist of the Court, or for that matter anyone else, can certify the copy as 'True Copy' after comparing it with the original, irrespective of the f act as to whether or not he was present at the time when the original statement was recorded or the judgment was signed and delivered. Merely mentioning 'True Copy means that the person merely certifies that the document was a true copy of the original, without taking any responsibility for the authenticity of the original. But when one attests a document, it further implies that the original was executed or written in the presence of the person attesting the document and by implication he further, certifies that the original was genuine and takes upon himself the responsibility for the authenticity of the original. This, in my opinion, is the basic difference between merely "certifying or endorsing a document to be 'true copy' " and "attesting it to be true copy". Attestation clearly signifies something more than merely endorsing 'true copy'. 23. Sub-section (3) of S. 81 does not merely require that every election petition shall be accompanied by a true copy of the petition, but further requires that such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be true copy of the petitioner'. In the present case, although the copy of the petition served on the respondent was a true copy of the petition and also contained an endorsement of "true copy" made by the petitioner himself, yet the said copy was not an attested one as required by law. It did not contain any endorsement of attestation such as "attested to be true copy" or "Attested True Copy". Non-compliance of this mandatory provision of law must result in the dismissal of the election petition, as provided in sub-s. (1) of S. 86 of the Act. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that placing such an interpretation would amount to giving a very technical and literal interpretation to the language used in the statute. To this I may merely observe that the law in this respect is technical and a strict and literal interpretation has to be given to the language used in the Statute. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that placing such an interpretation would amount to giving a very technical and literal interpretation to the language used in the statute. To this I may merely observe that the law in this respect is technical and a strict and literal interpretation has to be given to the language used in the Statute. Whenever a statute provides that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner, and also lays down that a failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it naturally follows that, if the act is not done in that particular manner, it must lead to the specified consequence. 25. Learned counsel for the parties cited certain decisions in support of their respective contentions. Unfortunately, there is no decision involving exactly the same matter viz. where "true copy" under the signature of the petitioner might have been furnished, but the same was not attested. We have, therefore, to look to the cases in which similar matter came up for decision, and consider the principles laid down in those cases and what bearing they have to the facts of the present case. 26. As already cited above, in Sharif-ud-Din's case, ( AIR 1980 SC 303 ) (supra) the copy served on the respondent was a true copy and it was duly attested by the Advocate for the petitioner, but not by the petitioner himself. It could be said that for all practical purposes there was hardly any difference whether the attestation was done by the petitioner or by his advocate. However, the Supreme Court gave a strict and technical interpretation to the provisions of the Statute original petition did not contain page i and and held that the attestation by the Advocate was sought to -be added only by way of for the petitioner could not be treated as approaching the Court for amendment of the equivalent of attestation by the petitioner petition, which was allowed by the High Court. under his own signature. The respondents, however, raised the 27. In the case of Ved Prakash Gaur v. Sukhan, AIR 1984 Delhi 276 the petitioner had supplied photostat copies of the petition without requisite attestation. Here too it could be said that photostat copies were as good as the original so that for-all practical purposes there was sufficient compliance of the provisions of the Statute. In the case of Ved Prakash Gaur v. Sukhan, AIR 1984 Delhi 276 the petitioner had supplied photostat copies of the petition without requisite attestation. Here too it could be said that photostat copies were as good as the original so that for-all practical purposes there was sufficient compliance of the provisions of the Statute. Here again a strict interpretation to the provisions of the Statute was given, and following the ratio in Sharif- ud-Din's case (supra) it was held by the Delhi High Court that since the provisions of Section 86 were mandatory, the letter and spirit of law both must be complied with in cases of election petitions. As the copy which had been filed along with the election petition was not attested by the petitioner under his own signatures to be a true copy of the petition, although it was a photostat copy and there was no allegation that it was not a true copy, the election petition was dismissed on the preliminary objection that there was non-compliance of sub-s. (3) of S. 81 of the Act. 28. In Rajendra Singh v. Smt. Usha Rani, AIR 1984 SC 956 incorrect and incomplete copies of the election petition hadbeen filed. It is, however, noteworthy that the Supreme, Court held that the requirements of S. 81(3) should be followed strictly and literally. In para 3 of the judgment Fazl Ali, J., observed thus : "An analysis of this sub-section would reveal that every election petition should be accompanied by as many copies as there are respondents and that every copy should be attested by the petitioner under his own signature. If these requirements are not followed strictly and literally, it would result in dismissal of the election petition without any trial as provided by Section 86 of the Act." 29. In J.P. Goyal's case, which was decided along with the abovementioned Rajendra Singh's case, the copies served on the respondents contained page 17, yet the objection that the copies served on them were not the correct and exact copies of the election petition. In J.P. Goyal's case, which was decided along with the abovementioned Rajendra Singh's case, the copies served on the respondents contained page 17, yet the objection that the copies served on them were not the correct and exact copies of the election petition. Upholding this objection and allowing the appeal and dismissing the election petition in limine under Section 86 of the Act, the Supreme Court observed in para 15 thus : "The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that this is a highly, technical objection and did not cause any prejudice to the appellants because so far as their copies were concerned they already contained page 17. Mr. Bhandare, counsel for the appellants, however, submitted that this is beside the point and does not. cure the invalidity of the election petition filed on 10-5-1982. The mandate contained in S. 81(3) enjoins that there should be no difference of any kind whatsoever barring some typographical or insignificant omissions between the petition filed and the copy served on the respondent. If an entire page is missing in the petition but it is there in the copy served on the respondent, then it is manifest that the copy served was not an exact and true copy of the petition. The consequences of the mandatory provisions of Section 81(3) could not be got over by praying for an amendment of the election petition because that would defeat the very object and purpose of S. 81(3). It is not disputed that this discrepancy between the election petition and the copies served on the appellants was undoubtedly there. In these circumstances, the High Court was wrong and committed a serious error of law in allowing the amendment of the petition. The High Court should have tried to appreciation the tenor and spirit of the mandate contained in S. 81(3) of the Act. In the case of Sharif-ud- Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, (1980) 1 SCR 1177 : AIR 1980 SC 303 this Court dismissed the election petition only on the ground that the words "attested to be a true copy" were not signed by the election petitioner and held that this was not a sufficient compliance with the provisions of S. 89(3) of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act, which is the same as S. 81(3) of the Act. In the instant case, the inconsistency is much greater than in the Sharif-ud-Din's case." 30. In paragraphs 17 and 18 of the judgment, Fazl Ali, J. further went on to observe : 17. "This view has been consistently taken all through in all the decided cases of this Court so far, reliance was, however, placed by the counsel for the respondents on the following observations of Dwivedi, J. in Satya Narain's case, AIR 1974 SC 1185 (Para 4) : "Our decision restores that primacy of procedure over justice. It makes S. 86(1) a tyrannical master. The rigidity of the rule of precedent ties me to its chains. My only hope now is that Parliament would make a just choice between the social interest in the supply of copies by the election petitioner along with his election petition and the social interest in the purity of election by excluding S. 81(3) from the purview of S. 86(1) of the Act." 18. The aforesaid observations express a pious wish but do not at all detract from what has been decided in this case and with which the learned Judge also agreed. Despite these observations, the Parliament in its wisdom has not made any attempt to interfere with the peremptive and mandatory provisions of S. 81(3) resulting in the consequence of dismissal of the petition under S. 86 of the Act." 31. On the other hand, Shri K.N. Tripathi relied upon the following decisions : (1) Ch. Subbarao v. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad, AIR 1964 SC 1027 , (2) Dr. Anup Singh v. Abdul Ghani, AIR 1963 Punjab 429 (FB), as affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1966 DEC 60 : AIR 1965 SC 815 , (3) M. Kamalam v. Dr. V.A. Syed Mohammed, AIR 1978 SC 840 , (4) Dr. K.K. Mohammad Koya v. P.M. Sayeed, AIR 1977 Kerala 160, and (5) Jameel v. Gul Mohammad, AIR 1980 Raj 166 . 32. The above decisions were based on the assumption that the provisions of S. 81(3) were merely directory and not obligatory and that substantial compliance with the provisions of S. 81(3) was sufficient. In Ch. Subbarao's case (supra) type written and copies which accompanied the petition were carbon copies of the type script. The copies bore two signatures in original of the Election ,Petitioner authenticating both the contents of the petition as well as verification thereof. In Ch. Subbarao's case (supra) type written and copies which accompanied the petition were carbon copies of the type script. The copies bore two signatures in original of the Election ,Petitioner authenticating both the contents of the petition as well as verification thereof. The petitioner did not, however, insert the work "true copy" before or above his signatures. This was held to be substantial compliance with the requirement of S. 81(3) and it was held that the election petition could not be dismissed by the Tribunal. At the same time it was observed in paragraph 14 thus : "When S. 81(3) requires an election petition to be accompanied by the requisite number of copies, it becomes a requirement for the presentation of the election petition to the Commission, and therefore, a condition precedent for the proper presentation of an election petition. If that is a requirement of S. 81, -3 distinction can be drawn between the requirements of sub-ss. (1) and (2) and of sub-s. (3). We might add that if there is a total and complete non-compliance with the provisions of S. 81(3), the election petition might not be an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this part within S. 80 of the Act. We are, therefore, inclined to consider that if there had been such a non-compliance with the requirement of sub-section (3) not merely the Election Commission under S. 85 but the Election Tribunal under Section 90(3) would prima facie not merely be justified but would be required to dismiss the election petition." 32A. In Dr. Anup Singh's case (supra) it was held that mandatory provisions of a Statute must be complied with exactly, whereas in the case of a directory provision substantial compliance is enough. A Full Bench of the Punjab High Court had held in this case that where election petitioners have complied with all the provisions of S. 81(3) but each copy of the petition was not attested by the petitioner to be a true copy of the petition, but it was mentioned to be a true copy with the signatures of the petitioner, the petition would not be dismissed.-. The requirement that every copy of the petition shall be attested to be a true copy of the petition was not mandatory but was directory and substantial compliance with it will meet the object of the provision. The requirement that every copy of the petition shall be attested to be a true copy of the petition was not mandatory but was directory and substantial compliance with it will meet the object of the provision. This decision was thus based on the assumption that the provisions of Section 81(3) were only directory and not mandatory. 33. Similarly in M. Kamalam's case, ( AIR 1978 SC 840 ) (supra), the election petition and the affidavit were typed together as one document and two copies of this document were filed for service on the respondent. The signature of the petitioner by way of authentication appeared at the foot of the copy of the affidavit but there was no such signature separately appended at the foot of the copy of the election petition. It was held that the petition could not be dismissed for non-compliance with sub-s. (3) of Section 81 on the ground that the copy of the election petition was not attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy. It was observed that even if no signature was appended by the petitioner on the copy of the election petition proper and the signature is placed only at the foot of the copy of the affidavit, that is sufficient compliance with the requirement of the last part of sub-sec. (3) of Section 81. This decision is also based on the assumption that the provisions of Section 81(3) were not mandatory and consequently the Court did not insist on strict and literal compliance of the provisions but held that there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of the last part of Section 81(3). 34. In Dr. K.K. Mohammad Koya's case, (AIR 1972 Kerala 160) (supra) the copies were signed by the petitioner but they were not attested as "true copy". It was held that there was sufficient compliance with Section 81(3) of the Act. This case again was based on assumption that the provisions of Section 81(3) were merely directory and hence substantial compliance was held to be sufficient. 35. Similar was the position in Jameel's case, ( AIR 1980 Raj 166 ) (supra) in which omission to write true copy was held to be mere irregularity which did not vitiate election petition. This case again was based on assumption that the provisions of Section 81(3) were merely directory and hence substantial compliance was held to be sufficient. 35. Similar was the position in Jameel's case, ( AIR 1980 Raj 166 ) (supra) in which omission to write true copy was held to be mere irregularity which did not vitiate election petition. This also pre-supposed that the provision contained in second part of Section 81(3) was not mandatory and hence was not required to be strictly complied with. 36. It would thus appear that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are based on the assumption that the provisions of the second part of S. 81(3) were not mandatory but were merely directory so that substantial compliance with the provisions was sufficient and it was not necessary that there should be strict and literal compliance. However, it appears that in the later decisions the Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the first part as well as second part of S. 81(3) of the act are mandatory in nature and have to be strictly and literally complied with, otherwise election petition was liable to be dismissed under S. 86(1) of the Act. The provisions of first part of Section 81(3) had been held to be mandatory in the case of Satya Narain (supra), in which it was laid down as under : "We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the first part of S. 81(3) with which we are mainly concerned in this appeal is peremptory provision and total non- compliance with the same will entail dismissal of the election pet Act." Thereafter, as already second part of Section 81(3) has also been held to be mandatory in nature in the case of Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani, AIR 1980 SC 303 in which the Supreme Court observed as under: "It is true that Section 81(3) of the Act is purely procedural in character and that ordinarily procedural law should not be given that primacy by Courts as would defeat the ends of justice. But if a law even though it may be procedural in character insists that an act must be done in a particular manner and further provides that certain consequence should follow if the act is not done in that manner, Courts have no option but to enforce the law as it is." 37. But if a law even though it may be procedural in character insists that an act must be done in a particular manner and further provides that certain consequence should follow if the act is not done in that manner, Courts have no option but to enforce the law as it is." 37. In Sharif-ud-Din's case the Supreme Court after discussing its earlier decision laid down the tests for determining whether provision of Statute was directory or mandatory and after applying those tests definitely held that the provisions of Section 89(3) of Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act, corresponding to S. 81(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, requiring that copy of election petition for the respondent should be attested by the petitioner, was a mandatory requirement and that its non-compliance should result in the dismissal of the petition. In my opinion, I am bound to follow the law laid down in these decisions. 38. In view of the above, it would appear that as the copy of the petition furnished to the respondent had not been attested by the petitioner, there was non-compliance with the second part of S. 81(3) of the Act and, consequently, the petition is liable to be dismissed as provided under S. 86(1) of the Act. Preliminary issue No. 1 is answered in favour of the respondent and the election petition is liable to be dismissed on this preliminary ground. 39. In the result, the election petition is dismissed under S. 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 81(3) of the said Act. 40. As the petition is being dismissed on the preliminary objection raised by the respondent, .the respondent will get half of her costs from the petitioner.