JUDGMENT V. K. Mehrotra, J.—One G. L. Gulati was tenant of residential accommodation forming part of building known as Fir Wood, Kaithu in Simla. B. D. Sharma was its owner-landlord. On December 5,1972 a petition was made by B.D. Sharma under section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971. It was registered as case No. 196/2 of 1976. The landlord sought ejectment of tenant Gulati on various grounds. Subsequently, the petition was amended and the ground that the premises were required bona fide by the landlord for his use and occupation was also taken. The amended petition was dated August 18, 1976. That is how the case came to be registered in the year 1976 as case No. 196/2. The tenant resisted the petition. Parties led evidence. Ultimately by an order made on September 6, 1979 Rent Controller (II), Simla, allowed the petition. It was held that tenant Gulati was liable to be evicted on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent amounting in all to Rs. 783.89 paisa and also on the ground that the premises were required by the landlord bona fide for his personal needs. 2. Aggrieved by the order aforesaid, tenant Gulati filed an appeal under section 21 (1) (b) of the 1971 Act, which was then in force. The appeal was registered as Civil Misc. Appeal No. 126-S/14 of 1979. It came to be decided by the Appellate Authority on June 28, 1980. The appeal was dismissed. The finding that the landlord needed the premises bona fide for his own requirement was upheld. R. L. Gulati-the tenant-died on July 11, 1980. His widow Smt. Indra Vati and one of his sons, Rakesh Kumar, filed the present revision in this Court on July 28, 1980. In this revision, apart from impleading B. D. Sharma, the landlord, as respondent No. 1, the other sons and daughters of the tenant were impleaded as respondents 2 to 6 Smt. Indra Vati died on January 28, 1984. Landlord B. D. Sharma died on December 19, 1986. His widow and sons and daughters, who were his heirs, were brought on the record as respondents I (i) to 1 (v) under the orders of this Court dated July 23, 1987, passed on Misc. Application No. 27 of 1987 moved on behalf of the petitioners. Landlord B. D. Sharma died on December 19, 1986. His widow and sons and daughters, who were his heirs, were brought on the record as respondents I (i) to 1 (v) under the orders of this Court dated July 23, 1987, passed on Misc. Application No. 27 of 1987 moved on behalf of the petitioners. Ashok Kumar, the third respondent and one of the sons of the tenant, also died on May 13, 1987. On an application No. 169 of 1987 made in that behalf, and in terms of the orders of this Court dated September 23, 1987 thereon, his widow and a daughter were brought on the record as respondents 3 (i) and 3 (ii). 3. CM. P. No. 2916 of 1986 was filed on behalf of the applicants on September 18, 1986, with the prayer to bring certain subsequent events, that took place after the filing of the revision, on the record to be taken into consideration by this Court. Likewise, CMP No. 12 of 1987 was also made on behalf of the applicants-tenants on January 13, 1987, to take into account the fact that landlord B. D. Sharma having died, the personal need set up by him for getting the premises in dispute vacated could no longer survive for upholding the order of ejectment of the tenants from the premises. An application (CMP No. 119 of 1988) was also moved on July 13, 1988, on behalf of the landlords saying that original tenant Gulati having died on July 11, 1980, and his spouse also having died on January 28, 1984, the present revision could not survive for decision at the instance of Rakesh Kumar, a son of tenant G. L. Gulati, because neither he nor the other sons and daughters of tenant G. L. Gulati who had been brought on record or the heirs of one of the deceased sons of G. L. Gulati, namely, Ashok Kumar, were tenants within the meaning of that term in the definition clause of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereafter, "the 1987 Act"), which now governs the case. The revision should, therefore, be dismissed on this ground alone. 4. The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, replaced the 1971 Act with retrospective effect from November 17, 1971. The revision should, therefore, be dismissed on this ground alone. 4. The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, replaced the 1971 Act with retrospective effect from November 17, 1971. Section 34 (2) of 1987 Act provides that notwithstanding the repeal of the 1971 Act all suits, appeals and other proceedings, including execution proceedings under that Act pending before any court or appellate or revisional authority, on the appointed day shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Act as if the provisions contained in the 1987 Act were, at the relevant time, in force. The "appointed day", under section 2 (a) means the 18th day of August, 1987. The present revision will, therefore, have to be decided on the basis that the provisions of 1987 Act were in force at the relevant time. There is no dispute between the parties about it. Nor is there any dispute between them that Rakesh Kumar, one of the sons of the original tenant, late Shri G. L. Gulati, alone is the applicant in the present revision. 5. The basic question which was debated before the Court by the learned Counsel for the parties was whether the present revision survived for decision at the instance of one of the sons of the tenant late G. L. Gulati or not. In other words, could he be treated to be included in the definition of tenant contained in section 2 (j) of the 1987 Act. In other words, could he be treated to be included in the definition of tenant contained in section 2 (j) of the 1987 Act. In this provision a tenant is defined thus;— "2 (j).”Tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy and in the event of the death of such person such of his heirs as are mentioned in Schedule 1 to this Act and who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, except with the written consent of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a municipal corporation or a municipal committee or a notified area committee or a cantonment board ; Explanation 1.—The order of succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows:— (a) firstly, his surviving spouse ; (b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as a member of his family upto the date of his death ; (c) thirdly, his parent(s), if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death ; and (d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his predeceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter orparent(s) of the deceased person or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s), or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death; Explanation II.—The right of every successor, referred to in Explanation I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve on any of his heirs. 6. The definition of tenant in the 1971 Act was different. Therein, tenant was defined in section 2 (i) which read thus:— "2(i). "Tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, unless with the consent in writing of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a municipal, town or notified area committee, or municipal corporation, or cantonment board". 7. Section 4 of the 1971 Act (as amended by H, P. Act 1974) had provided for right of tenancy to the widow, widower or minors thus:— "4. Right of tenancy to the widow, widower or minors.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, it shall be lawful after the death of a tenant for his widow and if the tenant is the wife, the widower, to retain possession of the building or rented land as tenant of a landlord till she dies or remarries, and in the case of the widower till he dies, on the same terms and conditions on which the tenancy was held by her husband and in the case of widower, the wife and all the provisions of this Act shall apply to such a case." 8. An analysis of section 2 (j) of the 1987 Act would show that (a) "tenant", for purposes of the Act, is a person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of his tenancy ; (b) in the event of the death of such a person, such of his heirs as are mentioned in Schedule I to the Act who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death will be included in the definition of tenant ; (c) they would be included subject to the order of succession specified in Explanation I, and (d) subject to the condition specified in Explanation II. 9. 9. The question of heritability of tenancy rights was considered at some length by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gian Devi Anandv. Jeevan Kumar and others, AIR 1985 SC 796. The Supreme Court said (in paragraph 23 of the report) that: "…………It is not in dispute that so long as the contractual tenancy remains subsisting, the contractual tenancy creates heritable rights ; and, on the death of a contractual tenant, the heirs and legal representatives step into the position of the contractual tenant; and, in the same way on the death of a landlord the heirs and legal representatives of a landlord become entitled to all the rights and privileges of the contractual tenancy and also come under all the obligations under the contractual tenancy. A valid termination of the contractual tenancy puts an end to the contractual relationship. On the determination of the contractual tenancy, the landlord becomes entitled under the law of the land to recover possession of the premises from the tenant in due process of law and the tenant under the general law of the land is hardly in a position to resist eviction, once the contractual tenancy has been duly determined " And (in paragraph 25) that: "This Court has very aptly observed in Damadila’s case, AIR 1976 SC 2229 (supra) that it cannot be assumed that with the determination of the tenancy, the estate must necessarily disappear and the statute can only preserve the status of irremovability and not the estate he has in the premises in his occupation; and it is not possible to claim that the sanctity of contract cannot be touched by legislation. As already noticed, this Court in Damadila’s case (supra) after referring mainly to the definition of tenant in section 2 (i) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 came to the conclusion that the so called statutory tenant had an interest in the premises occupied by him and the heirs of the statutory tenant "had a heritable interest in the premises"…………" 10. Section 2 (i) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, defined “tenant”, unless the context otherwise required, as; "a person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any accommodation is, or, but for a contract express or implied would be payable for any accommodation and includes ……………any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy , ………………..but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made." 11. The inference which the Supreme Court drew in Damadila’s case from the aforesaid definition was stated in these words:— "The definition makes a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy a tenant unless a decree or order for eviction has been made against him, thus putting him on par with a person whose contractual tenancy still subsists. The incidents of such tenancy and a contractual tenancy must there fore be the same unless any provision of the Act conveyed a contrary intention…………….." 12. In Gian Devi the Supreme Court noticed the definition of a tenant in section 2 (i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (as amended by the Delhi Rent Control Amendment Act, 18 of 1976) and said (in paragraph 31) that; "……………..The termination of the contractual tenancy in view of the definition of tenant in the Act does not bring about any change in the status and legal position of the tenant, unless there are contrary provisions in the Act; and, the tenant notwithstanding the termination of tenancy does enjoy an estate or interest in the tenanted premises. This interest or estate which the tenant under this Act despite termination of the contractual tenancy continues to enjoy creates a heritable interest in the absence of any provision to the contrary. We have earlier noticed the decision of this Court in Damadila’s case, AIR 1976 SC 2229 (supra). This view has been taken by this Court in Damadila’s case and in our opinion this decision represents the correct position in law. The observations of this Court in the decision of the Seven Judge Bench in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammaly AIR 1979 SC 1745 (supra) which we have earlier quoted appear to conclude the question. The observations of this Court in the decision of the Seven Judge Bench in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammaly AIR 1979 SC 1745 (supra) which we have earlier quoted appear to conclude the question. The amendment of the definition of tenant by the Act 18 of 1976 introducing particularly section 2 (1) (Hi) does not in any way mitigate against this view. The said sub-section (iii) with all the three Explanations thereto is not in any way inconsistent with or contrary to sub-section (ii) of section 2 (1) which unequivocally states that tenant includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. In the absence of the provision contained in sub-section 2 (1) (iii), the heritable interest of the heirs of the statutory tenant would devolve on all the heirs of the so called statutory tenant on his death and the heirs of such tenant would in law step into his position. This sub-section (iii) of section 2 (I) seeks to restrict this right in so far as the residential premises are concerned. The heritability of the statutory tenancy which otherwise flows from the Act is restricted in case of residential premises only to the heirs mentioned in section 2 (1) (iii) and the heirs therein are entitled to remain in possession and to enjoy the protection under the Act in the manner and to the extent indicated in sub-section 2(1) (iii). The Legislature which under the Rent Act affords protection against eviction to tenants whose tenancies have been terminated and who continue to remain in possession and who are generally termed as statutory tenants, is perfectly competent to lay down the manner and extent of the protection and the rights and obligations of such tenants and their heirs. Section 2 (1) (iii) of the Act does not create any additional or special right in favour of the heirs of the so called statutory tenant on his death, but seeks to restrict the right of the heirs of such tenant in respect of residential premises. Section 2 (1) (iii) of the Act does not create any additional or special right in favour of the heirs of the so called statutory tenant on his death, but seeks to restrict the right of the heirs of such tenant in respect of residential premises. As the status and rights of a contractual tenant even after determination of his tenancy when the tenant is at times described as the statutory tenant, are fully protected by the Act and the heirs of such tenants become entitled by virtue of the provisions of the Act to inherit the status and position of the statutory tenant on his death, the Legislature which has created the right has thought it fit in the case of residential premises to limit the rights of the heirs in the manner and to the extent provided in section 2 (1) (iii)……………." 13. In its relevant part the definition of tenant in the Delhi Rent Control Act says that: "2(1).’Tenant means any person …………………………………………. and includes ……………………… (i) ……………………… (ii) any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy ; and (iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified respectively, in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause, such of the aforesaid persons : (a) spouse, (b) son or daughter, or, where there are both son and daughter, both of them, (c) parents, (d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of his predeceased son, as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family up to the date of his death, but does not include,— (A) …………………………. (B) …………………………. (B) …………………………. Explanation I.—The order of succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows,— (a) firstly, his surviving spouse ; (b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as a member of his family up to the date of his death ; (c) thirdly, his parents, if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son or daughter or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person up to the date of his death ; and (d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-deceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parents of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse son, daughter or parents, or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person up to the date of his death. Explanation II.—If the person, who acquires, by succession, the right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, was not financially dependent on the deceased person on the date of his death, such successor shall acquire such right for a limited period of one year; and, on the expiry of that period, or on his death, whichever is earlier, the right of such successor to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy shall become extinguished. Explanation III.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that,— (a) where, by reason of Explanation II, the right of any successor to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy becomes extinguished, such extinguishment shall not affect the right of any other successor of the same category to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy ; but if there is no other successor of the same category, the right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy shall not, on such extinguishment, pass on to any other successor, specified in any lower category or categories, as the case may be ; (b) the right of every successor, referred to in Explanation I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve on any of his heirs." 14. The definition is almost the same as that of a tenant in the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, except for the fact that Explanation III is not to be found in the Himachal Act. 15. What was urged with some emphasis on behalf of the landlord was that the definition of a tenant in the Himachal Pradesh Act clearly indicates that after the death of a tenant whose tenancy had been terminated earlier, the tenancy rights shall be restricted to only one of the heirs, from amongst those mentioned in Schedule I, in the order of succession provided in Explanation I and to no others and, thereafter, the heirs of such one successor will not be able to inherit the tenancy rights due to the provisions made in Explanation II. Consequentially, after the death of that one heir, who, out of may mentioned in Schedule I, succeeds to the tenancy under Explanation I, no other heir, even though mentioned in Schedule I, can claim to be a tenant of the residential premises in question. The right to continue any legal proceedings as a tenant will come to an end with his death. 16. The right to continue any legal proceedings as a tenant will come to an end with his death. 16. The submission was attempted to be supported by reference to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Gian Devi that the provisions of a nature contained in Schedule I and the Explanations were restrictive in character as the Legislature, which had created the right under the Rent Control Act in favour of the heirs of statutory tenants, was perfectly competent to lay down the manner and extent of the protection and to limit the rights of the heirs in that respect. The actual observations have been re produced earlier. The submission further was that Schedule I read with the two Explanations in the Himachal Pradesh Act could not be interpreted consistently with the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court by taking the view that the heirs who were entitled to be treated as tenants, one after the other, were those mentioned in the various clauses mentioned in Explanation I or by taking the view that each one of the heirs mentioned in Schedule I was entitled to be treated as a tenant, though in the order in which he was to succeed under these clauses. 17. The provisions of an Act are to be interpreted in the context of the objects thereof. Generally speaking, the object of the Rent Control Legislation in this country is, to borrow the words of the Supreme Court in Gian Devi (in paragraph 23), this:— " Because of scarcity of accommodation and gradual high rise in the rents due to various factors, the landlords were in a position to exploit the situation for unjustified personal gains to the serious detriment of the helpless tenants. Under the circumstances it became imperative for the legislature to intervene to protect the tenants against harassment and exploitation by a vicarious landlords and appropriate legislation came to be passed in all the States and Union Territories where the situation required an interference by the legislature in this regard. It is no doubt true that the Rent Acts are essentially meant for the benefit of the tenants. It is, however, to be noticed that the Rent Acts at the same time also seek to safeguard legitimate interests of the landlords. It is no doubt true that the Rent Acts are essentially meant for the benefit of the tenants. It is, however, to be noticed that the Rent Acts at the same time also seek to safeguard legitimate interests of the landlords. The Rent Acts which are indeed in the nature of social welfare legislation are intended to protect tenants against harassment and exploitation by landlords, safeguarding at the same time the legitimate interests of the landlords.. The Rent Acts seek to preserve social harmony and promote social justice by safeguarding the interests of the tenants mainly and at the same time protecting the legitimate interests of the landlords. Though the purpose of the various Rent Acts appear to be the same, namely, to promote social justice by affording protection to tenants against undue harassment and exploitation by landlords, providing at the same time for adequate safeguards of the legitimate interests of the landlords, the Rent Acts undoubtedly lean more in favour of the tenants for whose benefit the Rent Acts are essentially passed. (Emphasis supplied). It may also be noted that various amendments have been introduced to the various Rent Acts from time to time as and when situation so required for the purpose of mitigating the hardship of tenants." 18. Acceptance of the submission made on behalf of the landlord would clearly be destructive of the object of the Rent Act. As it is, by enacting the provision for limiting the heritability of tenancy rights in the event of the death of a tenant, whose tenancy had been terminated earlier, to only those of the heirs mentioned in Schedule I who were ordinarily residing with the tenant at the time of his death, the Legislature has placed restriction on the rights of the heirs of such a tenant. Limiting the heritability further to only one of such heirs, in accordance with the order of succession contemplated by Explanation I, would, as it were, be defeating the principal object of the Rent Act. If the Legislature had so desired it could clearly have provided for it in the Act itself. Explanation III (a) in the definition of tenant in the Delhi Rent Control Act is a provision indicating such further limitation. The Himachal enactment, later in point of time, could very well have contained a similar provision. 19. If the Legislature had so desired it could clearly have provided for it in the Act itself. Explanation III (a) in the definition of tenant in the Delhi Rent Control Act is a provision indicating such further limitation. The Himachal enactment, later in point of time, could very well have contained a similar provision. 19. The indications implicit in the definition of a tenant in the Himachal Act are contrary to the contention made on behalf of the land lord. Explanation I, on its plain language, provides for an order of succession. This phrase would indicate that from amongst the heirs of a person, continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, entitled to succeed, the succession will be in the order indicated in the various clauses ((a) to (d)u in other words, the persons mentioned in the various clauses will take one after the other in the order provided. Explanation II refers to the right of every successor, mentioned in Explanation I. Obviously, each of the successors mentioned in Explanation I has a right to succeed. Explanation II only prohibits further succession to the heirs of each successor mentioned in Explanation I. 20. The opening part of the definition of tenant in section 2 (j) refers to Schedule 1 to the Act. That Schedule confines the heritability of the tenancy rights to the following 8 categories:— 1. Spouse; 2. Son ; 3. Daughter ; 4. Mother ; 5. Father ; 6. Widow of pre-deceased son ; 7. Son of pre-deceased son ; 8. Daughter of pre-deceased son. 21. From amongst these persons, only those are entitled to succeed to the tenancy rights who were ordinarily residing with the original tenant, whose tenancy had been terminated earlier, at the time of his death. Such of the persons mentioned in the Schedule who were not doing so are excluded in the opening part itself. Quite clearly, therefore, a very few, from amongst the heirs of a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy, are envisaged to be tenants within the meaning of the definition, for purposes of the Act. Bringing in any further dimunition, by confining the number of successors of such a tenant to only one from amongst those mentioned in Explanation I, would amount to frustrating the object of the legislature in giving protection to the heirs of what is called a "statutory tenant". Bringing in any further dimunition, by confining the number of successors of such a tenant to only one from amongst those mentioned in Explanation I, would amount to frustrating the object of the legislature in giving protection to the heirs of what is called a "statutory tenant". Such an interpretation is not fair. Nor, countenanced by law. 22. The fear expressed by the learned counsel, appearing for the land lord, that the interpretation that the various heirs mentioned in the several clauses of Explanation I become tenant one after the other, would perpetuate the presence of the heirs in the demised premises, is more fanciful than real. The restriction which the definition itself contains about tenancy rights accruing only to those, from amongst the heirs mentioned in the First Schedule and Explanation I, who were ordinarily residing with the tenant at the time of his death is a potent protection in this respect as far as the landlord is concerned. The Legislature has emphasised it again and again in the various clauses of Explanation I. By Explanation II it has confined the right of every successor referred to in Explanation I to continue in possession, on the death of a tenant after the termination of his tenancy, to his life-time. There is no devolution of the right to continue in possession to any of the heirs of the successor mentioned in Explanation I. 23. Even after limiting the number of heirs who would be treated to be tenants, after the death of a tenant whose tenancy had been terminated earlier, to those mentioned in Schedule I it was necessary, from a practical point of view, to provide for a person with whom the landlord may be in a position to deal at a time. The order of succession appears to have been provided in Explanation I with this end in view. In its ordinary meaning the order of succession would mean the sequence in which, from amongst the various heirs, the landlord shall treat a particular heir to be the tenant for the purpose of his dealings with those whose irremovability is provided for by the Legislature even after the death of a tenant whose tenancy had been terminated earlier. Of the various heirs, a landlord has to deal with those mentioned in Explanation I as tenants, one after the other, in the sequence mentioned therein. 24. Of the various heirs, a landlord has to deal with those mentioned in Explanation I as tenants, one after the other, in the sequence mentioned therein. 24. The various provisions of the 1987 Act, like the other Rent Acts, contemplate mutual dealings between a landlord and a tenant. For example, every tenant is required to pay rent regularly. A tenant is entitled to obtain from the landlord receipt for the rent paid by him. The landlord is under an obligation to keep the building in good and tenantable repairs. Where he fails to do so, the tenant may make repairs himself, after notice to the land lord, and deduct the expenses for the repairs from the rent or recover them from the landlord. The landlord may proceed against the tenant for his eviction in case the tenant fails to pay rent or commits any one of the lapses on which his eviction can be sought under section 14. The tenant or the landlord may move the Controller for fixation of fair rent. Both of them are under an obligation to furnish the particulars to the Controller in respect of the building as have been prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act. Failure to do so may result in penalty being imposed upon him. These are some of the instances. 25. In Nanu Mai Raijumal v. Lila Ram Vensee Mai and another, (1978) 2 All India Rent Control Journal 136, a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court had occasion to consider a case where the tenant was defined to mean any person by whom or on whose account rent was payable and included, in relation to premises let for residence, any member of the tenants family residing with the tenant at the time of or within three months pre ceding the death of the tenant, as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court. This was provided in section 5 (II) (c) (i) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. This was provided in section 5 (II) (c) (i) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Speaking through D. A. Desai, J, the Bench, inter alia, said that; "……………Once a tenant in possession dies and the transmission of tenancy is claimed, before the landlord can take any action against one or more of them as tenant alleging that default is committed by them all as tenant, it is absolutely necessary that either by agreement amongst qualified persons or in default of agreement by a determination of the Court, it should be first decided as to who is that person, or who is that member, from amongst the various members of the tenants family, in whose favour the transmission of tenancy has taken place………………………….It was said that if such members who did not get the status of irremoveability because only one could acquire that status, they would be either at the mercy of the person who acquires the status or at the mercy of the landlord. The second apprehension is not justified. The landlord would not be able to proceed against them if they are staying with that member of the tenants family in whose favour the transmission of tenancy has taken place, because the landlord must proceed against the tenant. The landlord cannot keep aside the tenant and proceed against the rest because he would have no cause of action against them…………………….." 26. What was thus emphasised was that for purpose of dealing with those who are left behind as heirs by a tenant, whose tenancy had been terminated prior to his death, the landlord has to be told about a particular person who is to be treated as a tenant by him in regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant. The observations aforesaid, though made in a definite context, appear to suggest such a practical course of thinking while interpreting the provisions of the Rent Act. 27. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, provides for order of succession in the matter of devolution of interest in the property of a male Hindu dying intestate in sections 8 and 9 and for devolution of property of a female Hindu dying intestate in sections 15 and 16. Apart from mentioning the heirs who shall succeed to it, these provisions also give out the order of succession. Apart from mentioning the heirs who shall succeed to it, these provisions also give out the order of succession. The manner of regulating a right to succession by providing for those who shall do so and the order in which they will do so was, thus, before the State Legislature when it was enacting the definition of a tenant in the 1987 Act. It also had before it a pattern of alike nature in the form of the definition of a tenant in the Delhi Rent Control Act. While enacting its own definition of a tenant, the Himachal Pradesh Legislature did not enact, like what was provided in Explanation III of the definition in the Delhi Act, that if there was no successor of the same category, the right to continue in possession after the termination of tenancy was not to passion to any other successor specified in any lower category or categories. The legislative intent of not excluding successors, mentioned in the various categories under Explanation I, from being treated to be tenants, after the right of a successor of an earlier category to irremovability came to an end, is thus evident beyond doubt. Subject, therefore, to the conditions mentioned in. the definition, all the persons enumerated in Explanation 1 in the definition of a tenant in the Himachal Act of 1987 will have to be treated as tenants in the sequence in which their mention is made in that explanation. It cannot be confined to only one category out of them, as canvassed. 28. As observed by Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) at page 45: "If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. Where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating……………" 29. Where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating……………" 29. The purpose of the various Rent Acts being promotion of social justice by affording protection to tenants against undue harassment and exploitation by landlords though, at the same time, providing for adequate safeguards of the legitimate interests of the landlords and Rent Acts leaning more in favour of the tenants for whose benefit the Rent Acts are essentially passed, it would not be legitimate to restrict the meaning of the word tenant to only one of the categories of persons mentioned in Explanation I and thus restricting it beyond what was already done by the Legislature by confining it to those mentioned in Schedule I and subject to other restrictions envisaged in the definition of a tenant. 30. The plea that the revision does not survive for decision at the instance of Rakesh Kumar, one of the sons of tenant G. L. Gulati, cannot be upheld. 31. The three miscellaneous petitions which were made during the pendency of the present revision in this Court, namely, C. M. P. No. 2916 of 1986 ; C. M. P. No. 12 of 1987; both filed on behalf of the tenants, and C. M. P. No. 119 of 1988, filed on behalf of the landlords, involve determination of questions of fact on the answer to which will depend the ultimate decision whether the successors of tenant G. L. Gulati deserve to be ejected from the premises in dispute. Going into these facts will necessitate reception of further evidence of the parties and its consideration. This can more appropriately be done by the Controller, namely, the first fact-finding authority. The case deserves to be sent back to him on this account. 32. The revision succeeds in the circumstances aforesaid. The orders dated June 28, 1980 and September 6, 1979, passed by the Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller (II) Simla, are set-aside. The Rent Controller is directed to hear the matter afresh, after affording the parties opportunity of leading such further evidence as they like in the light of the plea raised in the aforesaid three Misc. Applications. The record of the courts below shall be sent back to the Rent Controller along with the three C.M.Ps. The Rent Controller is directed to hear the matter afresh, after affording the parties opportunity of leading such further evidence as they like in the light of the plea raised in the aforesaid three Misc. Applications. The record of the courts below shall be sent back to the Rent Controller along with the three C.M.Ps. No. 2916 of 1^86 ; 12 of 1987 and 119 of 1988 made in this Court, together with affidavits exchanged therein by the parties, with the direction to dispose of the case expeditiously. 33. Parties shall appear before the Rent Controller on October 25, 1988, who shall, after registering the case at its original number, proceed to dispose it of in accordance with law, in the light of the observations made in this judgment. The Rent Controller shall try to dispose of the matter, as far as possible, within two months of the date when the parties appear be fore him in pursuance of this order. 34. The Registry will ensure that the records aforesaid of the case are received by the Rent Controller by that date. 35. The petition stands, allowed in these terms. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of this Court. Petition allowed.