K. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant has assailed the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhawanipatni, convicting him for offences under Sections 302, and 201, I. P. C. ( 2 ) FACTS P. W. 1 is the father of the appellant and deceased Swayamber Meher. According to his version, on a Friday the appellant and the deceased left home for the jungle to collect and bring wood. They spent the night in the house of P. W. 2 in another village and proceeded to the jungle on Saturday morning. The appellant returned home alone and without the deceased When P. W. 1 inquired, he gave out that deceased had gone to Langigarh for purchase of a bullock. As he did not return, P. W. 1 went to Langigarh in his search and returned home disappointed. He asked the appellant in the presence of P. Ws. 3, 4 and 6 about the whereabouts of the deceased, when the appellant made an extra judicial confession in the presence of these witnesses that by means of Tangia (MO. II) he killed the deceased and concealed the dead body. P. W. 1 thereupon lodged F. I. R. (Ext. 8 ). In course of investigation, the Tangia (M. O. II) was seized on production by the appellant and the dead body of the deceased was recovered from the place of concealment on being pointed out by the appellant. After close of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted. ( 3 ) THE appellant's plea was denial of the occurrence and his false implication in the case. ( 4 ) THE learned Sessions Judge believed the following facts :- (I) The appellant and the deceased went to the jungle together to collect and bring wood, but the appellant returned home alone and falsely stated that the deceased had gone to Lanjigarh; (ii) P. W. 2 was present when the murder was committed by the appellant who gave two strokes by means of the Tangia (M. O. II) on the neck of deceased causing his instantaneous death; (iii) The appellant made in extra-judicial confession in the presence of the witnesses to the effect that he had killed the deceased by means of the Tangia (M. O. II) inside the jungle and (iv) The appellant produced the Tangia (M. O. II) and identified the place where the had concealed the dead body of the deceased. Accordingly, the learned Judge recorded the order of conviction and sentence. ( 5 ) IT was not disputed before us that the death of the deceased was homicidal. The evidence of the Medicial Officer (P. W. 9), who conducted the post-mortem examination and found two ante-mortem incised wounds on the neck, and reported that death was due to the above injuries, was also not challenged. ( 6 ) THE main prosecution evidence on which the conviction was based is the following :- (I) The appellant and the deceased left home together to proceed to the jungle to collect and bring wood and spent the night together in the house of P. W. 2; (ii) P. W. 2 had accompanied the appellant and the deceased to the jungle and was are eye-witness to the murder; (iii) The appellant returned alone and declared falsely that the deceased had gone to Lanjigarh to purchase a bullock; and (iv) The appellant made an extra-judicial confession that he had killed the deceased inside the jungle. ( 7 ) IT will appear from the evidence of P. W. 1 father of the appellant and the deceased and P. W. 3, wife of the deceased that both the brothers left home on Friday on route to the jungle to collect and bring wood. There is nothing to disbelieve their evidence. P. W. 2, a friend of P. W. 1 stated that both the brothers spent the Friday night with him in his village. His evidence has been corroborated by P. W. 10, a neighbour of P. W. 2. It will appear from the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 10 that the appellant, the deceased and P. W. 2 together went to the jungle. It is, therefore, established by the evidence of these witnesses that on the fateful day the appellant, the deceased and P. W. 2 together went to the jungle to collect an d bring wood. ( 8 ) IT would appear from the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 3 that the appellant alone returned home and when enquired, declared that the deceased had gone to Lanjigarh to purchase a bullock. When the deceased did not return P. W. 1 went to Lanjigarh in search of him, but came back disappointed Neither the deceased was found in Lanjigarh, nor he ever returned home. 1 and 3 that the appellant alone returned home and when enquired, declared that the deceased had gone to Lanjigarh to purchase a bullock. When the deceased did not return P. W. 1 went to Lanjigarh in search of him, but came back disappointed Neither the deceased was found in Lanjigarh, nor he ever returned home. It was, therefore, manifest that the deceased did not return home and the appellant had made a false declaration that he had gone to Lanjigarh to purchase a bullock. This disclosed the incriminating conduct of the appellant. ( 9 ) P. W. 2 is the only eye-witness to the occurrence. He stated that the occurrence took place on a Saturday at 12 noon inside Suruguda Jungle. The deceased was preparing tea when the appellant gave two strokes by means of the Tangia (M. O. II) on his neck causing instantaneous death. Out of fear he left the place and saw from a distance that the appellant washed the Tangia in a Nala. Although he was cross-examined, no discrepancy or inaccuracy of any sort with regard to the assault was found out. But his evidence was challenged mainly on the ground that he kept quite after the incident and did not disclose the fact of murder to anyone much less P. W. 1 till he was examined by the I. O. on 4-1-1982, i. e. on the day the F. I. R. (Ext. 8) was lodged. There are a large number of authorities laying down the principle that if an eye-witness to a murder does not voluntarily disclose the fact for a long time and keeps mum until his statement is recorded by the police and he does not offer satisfactory explanation for his silence, his evidence should be viewed with suspicion. In view of this principle, in usual course the evidence of P. W. 2 cannot straightway be accepted without probing into the matter as to why he did not disclose the ghastly incident. It will appear from his own evidence that he had been threatened with dire consequences by the appellant. Seeing the ghastly incident of a brother committing the murder of his younger brother he lost his balance of mind. It will appear from his own evidence that he had been threatened with dire consequences by the appellant. Seeing the ghastly incident of a brother committing the murder of his younger brother he lost his balance of mind. It was but natural that he was dazed on seeing the murder and the instinct of self preservation for not exposing himself to the danger of being killed by the appellant by announcing the murder immediately after its commission must have been aroused in him. The above apart, the status of P. W. 2, the society in which he lived and the remoteness of the place he comes from have to be considered. He was an illiterate or semi-literate wage earner belonging to a small village in a hill area of al backward district of Orissa. It was, therefore, not unnatural on his part to keep quiet and lie low for some time. But he did not keep quiet for long. The occurrence took place on 26-12-1981 and he disclosed the incident on 4-1-1982 only when he found that even if he disclosed the incident to the I. O. there was no danger to his life. If the area was enlightened, P. W. 2 educated and belonged to the same village as P. W. 1, some doubt would have been entertained on the aforesaid fact of his evidence. But here, it seems to be a genuine case of fear on account of which it was not possible for P. W. 2 to disclose the incident for about eight days. On account of these factors, it would not be legal to view the evidence of P. W. 2 with suspicion and discard it. Conviction can be based on the sole testimony of a witness if it appears to be truthful The evidence of P. W. 2 has a ring of truth. He was a friend of P. W. 1 and well known to the appellant and the deceased who were his guests in the night before the date of occurrence. He could have no reason to bear grudge against the appellant so as to implicate him in the murder of his younger brother unless the fact was true and he had actually seen the incident. Moreover, he was an independent witness belonging to another village. For all these reasons, his evidence cannot but be relied upon. He could have no reason to bear grudge against the appellant so as to implicate him in the murder of his younger brother unless the fact was true and he had actually seen the incident. Moreover, he was an independent witness belonging to another village. For all these reasons, his evidence cannot but be relied upon. ( 10 ) THE witnesses who were present when the appellant made extra-judicial confession were P. Ws. 1, 3, 4 and 6. As already stated, P. W. 1 is the father of the appellant and the deceased and P. W. 3 is the widow. The rest are independent witnesses of the village P. W. 1 suspected that the appellant had not disclosed the truth when he said that the deceased had gone to Lanjigarh, because actually on search he was not found at that place. Therefore, some sort of insistence or pressure was brought on the appellant to speak the truth. Thereupon, the appellant made an extra-judicial confession to the effect that he had committed the murder of the deceased. The widow of the deceased might have some reasons to support the evidence of extra-judicial confession. But P. W. 1 being the father of the appellant and P. Ws. 4 and 6 could have no reasons to support the evidence of extra-judicial confession if the same was not voluntary and true. It was not unnatural that in the presence of his own father and some co-villagers the appellant made the extra-judicial confession, because he found that there was no way out for him but to disclose the truth. The evidence of extra-judicial confession was challenged on the ground that P. W. 1 stated that he threatened the appellant, where after the extra-judicial confession was made. The learned Sessions Judge noticed this aspect of the statement of P. W. 1 and opined that he might have developed a soft corner for the appellant due to changed circumstances. Whether it was a fact or not it is difficult to say. But even if some sort of pressure was brought down on the appellant to disclose the truth, it cannot be said that the extra-judicial concession was not voluntary, because the pressure or threat was not held out by a 'person in authority' as envisaged in Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. But even if some sort of pressure was brought down on the appellant to disclose the truth, it cannot be said that the extra-judicial concession was not voluntary, because the pressure or threat was not held out by a 'person in authority' as envisaged in Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. The expression "person in authority" occurring in the Section has not been defined No illustration of the expression has been appended to the Section. Generally speaking, "person in authority" is one who is engaged in the apprehension, detention or prosecution of the accused, or one who is empowered to examine him. If a father finds that his son has committed a crime and puts pressure on him by using strong language to disclose the truth and the son thereafter makes a statement incriminating himself, it cannot be said that a confession was extorted. Therefore, considering the evidence of the witness as a whole, it is difficult to hold that the extra judicial confession was not voluntary. It can at best be said that ii the extra-judicial confession was the sole basis for conviction, then the Court would have exercised appropriate caution before its acceptance. But in this case the evidence of extra-judicial confession only corroborates the ocular evidence of P. W. 2 and, is, therefore, acceptable as a piece of corroborative evidence. ( 11 ) LASTLY, the evidence of P. W. 5 is material to the extent that while in police custody the appellant pointed out the place where he had concealed the dead body of the deceased and the dead body was discovered. This was only a piece of conduct corroborative of other facts. ( 12 ) IN the ultimate analysis, the prosecution proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt through the evidence of an eye-witness, extra-judicial confession, circumstantial evidence and the conduct of the appellant. Therefore, there are no reasons to differ from the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge. ( 13 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed. ( 14 ) D. P. MOHAPATRA, J. : -. I agree. Order accordingly. .