RAJENDRA BABU, J. ( 1 ) IN these two references we are concerned with the interpretation and application of the provisions relating to additional wealth tax on urban immoveable properties which were in force between the years 1971-72 and 1976-77. ( 2 ) ONE late M. Kasturi Ranga Setty was a partner of a firm M/s. Krishna Flour Mills, bangalore, representing his Hindu Undivided family. The said firm owned a fac:tory, land and buildings which had been leased out to a company. Assessee's share of interest in the immoveable properties of the firm in which the assessee was a partner was brought to additional wealth tax. The assessee contested the levy of additional wealth tax on these properties on the ground that these properties were used for the purpose of the business of the firm of which he was a partner and was therefore not liable. The revenue took the stand that since the firm was using the said assets for its business and not used by the assessee it was not entitled for exclusion from the operation of clause (2) of Schedule I to the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The said provisions of law which are ap:plicable to the matter reads :" (2) In addition, in the case of every individual and Hindu undivided family where the net wealth of the individual or hindu undivided family includes the value of any asset, being building or land (other than business premises) or any right in such building or lands situated in an urban area (such asset being hereafter in this part referred to as urban asset ). (i) Business premises' means any building or land or part of such building or land, or any right in building or land or part thereof owned by the assessee and used throughout the previous year for the purposes of his business or profession, and includes any building used for the purpose of residence of persons employed in the business or any building used for the welfare of such persons as a hospital, creche, school, canteen, library, recreational centre, chelter, rest-room or lunch-room but does not include any premises in the nature of a guest house : rule 3: Where the net wealth of the assessee includes the value of his interest as a partner in a firm or a member of an association of persons and the assets of such firm or association include any urban assets, then notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, or in any other law for the time being in force, the interest of the assessee in such firm or association, to the extent specified in the Explanation below, shall be deemed to be an urban asset and the provisions of item (2) of Paraph A shall apply accordingly. Explanation: The extent of the interest of the assessee in a firm or association deemed to be an urban asset as aforesaid shall be a sum which bears to the value of the whole of the interest of the assessee in the firm or association the same proportion which the net value of the urban assets of the firm or association (determined u/r 2 as if they were urban assets belonging to an individual or a hindu undivided family) bears to the net wealth of the firm or, as the case may be, the association, computed as if such firm or association were an individual. ( 3 ) ON appeal to the Appellate commissioner the assessee's contention was upheld on the ground that the business carried on by the firm is as well the business carried on by the assessee as a partner of the firm. On further appeal the Tribunal upheld the order of the Appellate Assistant commissioner. ( 3 ) ON appeal to the Appellate commissioner the assessee's contention was upheld on the ground that the business carried on by the firm is as well the business carried on by the assessee as a partner of the firm. On further appeal the Tribunal upheld the order of the Appellate Assistant commissioner. Aggrieved by the said orderx of the Tribunal, the Revenue sought for references and the Tribunal has referred the following question under Section 27 (3) of the act:"whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case ITAT is right in law in holding that the immoveable properties that belonged to M/s Krishna flour Mills (where the assessee is a partner) and used in the business of another concern Krishna Industries (P) ltd. , should be excluded for the purpose of levying additional wealth-tax ?" ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the Revenue relied on a decision of this Court in C. I. T. v k. N. Guruswamy. (146 ITR 34) The said decision was rendered in the context of Section 22 of the Income Tax Act. It was contended that notwithstanding the difference in the language between Section 22 of the Income Tax Act and the provisions with which we are concerned that the said decision governs this case. It was submitted that it is only the owner of the property who is in actual occupation for the purpose of his business who could claim exemption under the said provisions which have been set- forth earlier in the course of this order. The argument is that in order to claim the benefit of the exemption clause, the use of the premises must be by its actual occupation. It was con:tended on behalf of the assessee that the language of Section 22 of the Income Tax Act and the provisions with which we are con:cerned are entirely different. Under Section 22 of the Income-Tax Act, income from the house property is brought to tax in respect of the immoveable property other than such portions in the property as the assessee may occupy for the purpose of any business or profession carried on by him the profits of which are chargeable to him. Under Section 22 of the Income-Tax Act, income from the house property is brought to tax in respect of the immoveable property other than such portions in the property as the assessee may occupy for the purpose of any business or profession carried on by him the profits of which are chargeable to him. Whereas the charge under clause (2) of the schedule to the Act is not attracted to a "business premises" as defined therein, and the "business premises" means an immoveable property owned by the assessee and used throughout for the purpose of his business or profession. There is thus marked difference in the language used by Section 22 of the Income-tax Act and the provisions with which we are concerned under the Act. However Sri Srinivasan relied upon a passage in Guruswamy's (1) case which is to the following effect:"the wordings of the section are very significant and it can be seen therefrom that it is only the owner of the property who can claim deduction and that owner must be an assessee and the property concerned must have been used or occupied for the assessee's business. . " (emphasis supplied) and contended that there is hardly any difference in the matter of 'occupation' and 'use' and therefore both the expressions must be interpreted as one and the same and as held in the said decision, this court should hold that the assessee was not entitled to an exemption. But, in our view, this observation was made in the context of the contention raised in that case on behalf of the assessee. On behalf of the assessee in that case the contention raised was that the assessee was a partner of the firm during the relevant previous year and premises in question was used by the said firm for its business during the year and the assessee as a partner should be held to have occupied the said premises for the purpose of the business carried on by him and, therefore, he would be entitled to the benefit of Section 22 of the Income Tax act. This court held that the said provision of the Income Tax Act must be examined in two facets: (i) Whether the property is occupied by the assessee for the purpose of his business and (ii) whether the profits of such business are assessable to tax in his assessment. This court held that the said provision of the Income Tax Act must be examined in two facets: (i) Whether the property is occupied by the assessee for the purpose of his business and (ii) whether the profits of such business are assessable to tax in his assessment. On the first aspect, this court held that the general law of partnership that a firm is nothing but a compendious expression for all the partners and, therefore, the business carried on by the firm is a business carried on by the partners. However, the court took the view that the occupation of the property in the context must mean "occupation as owner or his own occupation". The fact of occupation, therefore, must go with the owner of the building which means actual occupation for the purpose of his business or profession. But in the present context the expression used in the exclusional clause is a business premises which is used for the purpose of his business or profession, and it further states that any building used for the purpose of residence of the employees or used for the welfare of any such persons as a hospital, creche, school, canteen, library, recreational centre, rest-room or lunch-room are all included in the definition as being entitled to the exclusion from the tax. Therefore, the expression "occupation" used in Section 22 of the I. T. Act has a narrower meaning that it must be occupied by a owner and therefore in that context this High Court in Guruswamy's case (146 I. T. R. 34) held that the premises was not occupied by the assessee and was not entitled to the benefit under the exclusionary portion in the said section with which their lordships were concerned. The portion of the judgment on which strong reliance has been placed by Sri Srinivasan, extract of which has been quoted above, therefore, cannot be of any assistance to him in this case. Thus the ratio of the decision in guruswamy's case (146 I. T. R. 34) is distinguishable and is not applicable to the instant case. The portion of the judgment on which strong reliance has been placed by Sri Srinivasan, extract of which has been quoted above, therefore, cannot be of any assistance to him in this case. Thus the ratio of the decision in guruswamy's case (146 I. T. R. 34) is distinguishable and is not applicable to the instant case. It is settled law as was noticed by this court and as held by the Supreme Court in the case of C. I. T. v Ramniklal Kothari (75 i. T. R. 57.) that the share of a partner in the taxable profit of a registered firm in his total income is still received as income from business carried on by him. That the share of the assessee from the profits of the firms was income from business carried on by the partner. Business carried on by a firm is business carried on by all the partners. Profits of the firm are profits earned by all the partners in carrying on the business. In the individual assessment of the partner, his share from the business income is liable to be taken into account under Section 10 (1 ). This is exactly what was held by this court in guruswamy's case (146 I. T. R.) when it agreed with the view of the Gujrat High court that under the general law of partner:ship, 'firm' is a compendious expression of all the partners put together and therefore the business carried on by the firm is the business carried on by the partners. Therefore the conclusion is irresistible that the premises was certainly used for the purpose of the business of the firm. This interpretation further gets strengthened by the fact that under Rule 3 where the extent of a property is involved in the computation of the net- wealth, the same should be his set up and therefore if really the interest of a partner of the firm in respect of the immoveable property was not to be taken into account at all, as contended by the Revenue, then there is no necessity to exclude Rule 3 and explanation to the Rule. Learned counsel for the Revenue, however, wanted us to refer to the valuation rules under the Wealth Tax act. Learned counsel for the Revenue, however, wanted us to refer to the valuation rules under the Wealth Tax act. When the Schedule to the Act itself prescribes a special mode of valuation in regard to the partners' interest, reference to any other mode is permissible and such rules cannot prevail over the provisions of law under the Act. Therefore, we are of the view that the same have no relevance for the present purpose. Hence the argument of the learned counsel for the Revenue has got to be rejected and the view of the AAC and the tribunal has got to be upheld. Hence we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. --- *** --- .