This petition under section 115 C. P.C. is directed against the order dated 17-2-1987 passed by the learned Sadar Munsiff, Guwahati, in respect of a petition dated 28-6-1986 filed by the defendants in Title Suit No. 108 of 1984 raising the question of pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court. By the aforesaid order passed in Misc. (J) 110 of 1984 the learned trial Court rejected the petition. A copy of the impugned order hat Annexure-VII. 2. There is no dispute that the land in question belongs to Ugratara Temple and that by virtue of the provisions of the Assam State Acquisition of Land Belonging to Religious or Charitable Institution of Public Nature Act, 1959 (Assam Act IX of 1961) the land in question has vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. 3. The main contention of Mr. Deka, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is that in the plaint the plaintiffs have prayed for declaration of title, such a declaration is not maintainable as the land vested in the State Government. Mr. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioners relying on the decision of the Apex Court urged that from a reading of the plaint of the suit it is clear that the suit is actually for possession of the property and not for declaration and as such the suit will come under section 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act and not under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the said Act. Mr. Deka has also urged that payment of five times of the revenue as court fee cannot arise as no revenue in respect of the land is being paid by the plaintiffs. 4. In Shamsher Singh vs. Rajinder Prashad and others, AIR 1973 SC 2384 , it was held that the Court in deciding the question of court fee should look into the allegations in the plaint to see what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for. 5. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for. 5. From the reading of the plaint, copy of which is available as Annexure-1 to the petition, it appears that the plaintiff, along with prayer for declaration of title also prayed for consequential relief, namely, recovery of possession, permanent injunction, direction to the Revenue Authority to correct the Revenue record and also direction to the Sub-Registrar for cancellation of the Deed in question. It is true that the land has vested in the State Government but there is no dispute that both the parties are in possession of the land. After such vesting, the State Government has to allot the land in accordance with the principles laid down in the Act. Thus, it appears to me that the plaintiff can ask for declaration of the title which, of course will be subject to the provisions of the Act under which the land has vested in the State. Regarding non-payment of land revenue, at the time of hearing some receipts were produced and I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Deka that the plaintiffs have not paid any land revenue. 6. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the present suit is covered under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act and not under section 7 (v), as pleaded by the petitioner. Mr. Deka has placed reliance on a decision of the Nagpur High Court in Pundlik vs. Ramsukhibai, AIR 1951, Nagpur 218, in support of his contention that the present suit being a suit covered by section 7 (v) the plaint is to be returned under Order 7, Rule 10, for presenting it to the proper Court. As I have held that the aforesaid Section is not applicable to the present suit, the above decision is not relevant for the present purpose. 7. Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs-Opposite Parties stated that in the present suit the written statements were filed in the year 1984 and issues were framed on 3-3-1986 and the present petition raising the question of pecuniary jurisdiction was filed on 28-6-1986. The said petition is available at Annexure-III to the present petition. Mr. 7. Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs-Opposite Parties stated that in the present suit the written statements were filed in the year 1984 and issues were framed on 3-3-1986 and the present petition raising the question of pecuniary jurisdiction was filed on 28-6-1986. The said petition is available at Annexure-III to the present petition. Mr. Sarma has drawn my attention to sub-section (1) and (2) of section 21 C.P.C. and has urged that the present objection was not taken at the earliest possible opportunity and at or before settlement of issues and as there is no failure of justice, the present objection is liable to be thrown out. Mr. Sarma has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Pathnmma and others vs. Koopilas Kutty, AIR 1981 SC 1683 , wherein their lordships considered Sub-section (1) of Section 21 C.P.C. and held that in order to attract the provision of the said section three conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) the objection is to be taken in the Court of first instance; (ii) it must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in case where issues are settled at or before such settlement and (iii) there has been a consequent failure of justice. According to Mr. Sarma, the language of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 being same for getting the relief under sub-section (2) the same three conditions must be fulfilled. The contention of Sri Sarma has considerable force. 8. In the case in hand, it is apparent that objection was not taken by the Defendant-Opposite Parties at the earliest opportunity or at the time of settlement of issues. On the other band, in the petition under which the present objection has been taken there is not a whisper regarding failure of justice. I am, therefore of the opinion that the present petition is liable to be rejected on the above two grounds, namely, the objection was not taken at the earliest possible opportunity and at or before settlement of issue and that there is nothing on record to show that there was any failure of justice. 9. In Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 SC 340 . 9. In Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 SC 340 . it was held that the policy underlying under sections 21 and 99 C. P. C. and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, is the same,, namely, that when a case bad been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by Appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. Mr. Sarma, learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties urged that the present question being a technical one and as there was no failure of justice, the present petition is liable to be rejected. On the other band, Mr. Deka relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Athmanathaswari vs. R. Gopalswami, AIR 1965 SC 338 , has submitted that if the Civil Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, it cannot decide any question on merit and it can simply decide the question on jurisdiction and order return of plaint for presentation to the proper Court if it comes to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction. From the above decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the plaint can be returned only if the Court is of opinion that it has no jurisdiction. In the present case no such decision bad been rendered by the trial court and as such the contention of Mr. Deka has no force. 10. In view of my finding that the present suit is covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, I am of the opinion that the Plaintiffs have absolute right or option to put any valuation of relief. This view was expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Ayekpam Singh vs. State Bank of India and others, AIR 1979 Gauhati 27. This view was expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Ayekpam Singh vs. State Bank of India and others, AIR 1979 Gauhati 27. In Smt. Prativa Rani Das and others vs. Hamida Khatun Choudhury and others, (1982) 1 G. L. R. 436, the learned Single Judge of this Court held that when the suit attracts Section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act, the valuation as put by the plaintiff is normally to be accepted and Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the same even if the same be some what arbitrary. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in Smt. Tara Debi vs. Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, AIR 1987 SC 2085 . it was held as follows : - "In a suit for declaration with consequential relief falling under Sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 the plaintiff is free to make his own estimation of the reliefs sought in the plaint and such valuation both for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction has to be ordinarily accepted. It is only in cases where it appears to the Court on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case that the valuation is arbitrary, unreasonable and the plaint has been demonstratively undervalued the Court can examine the valuation and can revise the same. " 11. From what has been stated above, I hold that the petitioner did not take the plea regarding pecumiary jurisdiction at the earliest possible opportunity and at or before the settlement of the issue and has also failed to show that there was failure of justice. Such objection which is of the technical nature, cannot be taken at this stage in view of the provisions contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 21 C. P. C. I further hold that as the present suit is covered by the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-Fees Act, the plaintiffs are free to make their estimation of the reliefs and such valuation for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction has to be accepted, as there is nothing on record to show that the said valuation is arbitrary, unreasonable or demonstratively under-valued. Hence the present petition is liable to be dismissed, which I herby do. In the result, the petition is dismissed. No costs.