JUDGMENT P. D. Desai, C. J.—The appellant is the workman and the respondents are his employers within the meaning of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The appellant claims to have sustained personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment at about 5 p. m. on January 3, 1987. The injury, according to the medical opinion, has resulted in the partial traumatic amputation of his left hand. The percentage of disability, as per the medical certificate, is 50% but this is not admitted by and on behalf of the appellant who claims that the amputation has resulted in permanent total disablement and consequential loss of earning capacity to the extent of 100%. 2. It appears that when the parties appeared for the first time before the Commissioner under the Workmens Compensation Act, Dalhousie (hereinafter referred to as "the Commissioner"), their statements were recorded. The respondents at that time admitted all the material facts giving rise to (he claim and stated that they were ready to pay the compensation due in accordance with law. Subsequently, however, the matter appears to have gone into contest since they seem to have resiled from their stand and the appellant too appears to have asked for a decision of the case on merits. The Commissioner, therefore, framed issues and fixed the case for hearing. On the day fixed for hearing, the counsel for the parties were not present. The case was, therefore, adjourned and "last opportunity" appears to have been given to the parties to secure the presence of their counsel and to lead evidence on February 27, 1988. 3. On the day to which the case stood adjourned, the appellant put in his appearance but his counsel was not present. The respondents appeared alongwith their counsel. The gist of the proceedings which took place on that day and the final order which came to be passed are extracted from the impugned decision and reproduced herein below: "2. The onus of proof whether the applicant was actually employed on the job of opposite party and the injury has been caused due to accident arising in and out of the employment lies upon the applicant. 3. The onus of proof whether the applicant was actually employed on the job of opposite party and the injury has been caused due to accident arising in and out of the employment lies upon the applicant. 3. Since the opposite party has to pay huge amount of bringing the counsel from Chamba and it is not possible for them to defer the hearing of case to another date. 4. Since the last opportunity was given to the applicant to bring his counsel on 27-2-1988 and he had failed to do so it means that he deliberately wants to prolong the proceedings. In view of all this the opposite party is not bound to pay any amount of compensation to the applicant. However, keeping in view of the financial position of the applicant court feels that a sum of Rs. 10,000.00 be given to the applicant and the opposite party agreed to pay Rs. 10,000.00 (Ten thousand only) to the applicant, but the applicant did not agree to receive the amount and remained adamant and wanted to take his undue advantage. He was advised time and again to agree with this decision to avoid further litigation, but the applicant neither agreed to the decision of the court nor brought his counsel to defend the case even after affording last opportunity to him. Hence the case is dismissed in default. File be consigned into the general record room after due completion." 4. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 5. Now, before a proceeding to consider the validity of the impugned decision, it is necessary to make a few general observations about the social purpose of the legislation and the approach which the Commissioners are required to make while trying the cases arising under the Act. This has become essential in the context of the facts of this case since a number of such or similar cases are coming up in appeal before this Court which disclose a total lack of perception and of the purposive approach which the Commissioners are required to make to these cases. 6. The Act has been enacted to provide for the payment of compensation by certain classes of employees to their workmen or their dependants for the injury or death, as the case may be, caused by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. 6. The Act has been enacted to provide for the payment of compensation by certain classes of employees to their workmen or their dependants for the injury or death, as the case may be, caused by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Although a pre-Constitution law, it is a beneficient piece of legislation reflecting the Constitutional goal of socio-economic justice and the mandate contained in the Directive Principles of State Policy embodied in Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Constitution. A case arising under the Act has to be tried and decided bearing in mind the injunction of Article 39-A of the Constitution which directs, inter alia, that the State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity. Such a case cannot be treated by the quasi-judicial authority, entrusted with its trial, as a run-of-the-mill case (like a revenue case or a case under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In the course of the trial of the case, the authority has to be informed of and guided by the object and purpose underlying the statute and its substantive provisions should not be allowed to be frustrated by the procedural rules or technical approach. 7. The provisions of this law enact safeguards to ensure that the benefit thereby conferred upon the workmen or their dependants reaches them and that it is not defeated on account of reasons such as their illiteracy, ignorance or indigence or the intransigence or innovations of the employers. The provisions of sections 8, 10, 10-A, 10-B, 12, 14, 14-A, 17, 22, 22-A and 28 are all pointers in this direction. The inability to engage a counsel or procure his presence on account of poverty, ignorance or any other disability is not to be allowed to defeat a legitimate claim. Under such circumstances, the Commissioner should render such assistance to the workman as he may legitimately provide, including guidance which he can give in prosecuting the claim. The provisions of section 20 (3) and section 22 (3) indicate that the Commissioner is not to sit with folded hands or take a stand-offish attitude in such proceedings. The power to grant adjournment vests in the Commissioner. It is a discretionary power which has to be exercised with vigilance and circumspection, according to justice, common sense and sound judgment. The provisions of section 20 (3) and section 22 (3) indicate that the Commissioner is not to sit with folded hands or take a stand-offish attitude in such proceedings. The power to grant adjournment vests in the Commissioner. It is a discretionary power which has to be exercised with vigilance and circumspection, according to justice, common sense and sound judgment. Even if, therefore, the Commissioner finds in a given case that the claim cannot be processed further in the absence of the counsel for the workman, the discretion has ordinarily to be exercised in his favour by adjourning the case to enable him to secure the services of a counsel, unless the grant of adjournment is likely to result in grave miscarriage of justice or is occasioned on account of utter lack of bona fides or diligence on the part of the workman. In the present case, all these salient principles and guiding factors have been thrown to the wind. The case has been decided in a most perfunctory manner without the slightest application of mind to the requirement of law. The Commissioners must conscientiously avaid this. 8. There is no manner of doubt that to dismiss the case for default when the appellant was present tantamounts to gross breach of the procedural law. It is surprising to find an authority conferred with quasi-judicial powers blissfully ignorant of this elementary rule of procedure. Besides, the failure to exercise the discretionary power to adjourn the case on account of the default, if any, of the appellant to procure the presence of his counsel is based on totally untenable and manifestly unreasonable grounds. The circumstances, if any, that the respondents had to pay "huge amount" by way of fees to their counsel who was brought from Chamba (such assumption without evidence is unwarranted) and that, therefore, it was not possible for them to agree to the deferment of the case to another date, should not and ought not to have deterred the Commissioner from considering whether, against the background of the beneficient legislation and its object and purpose and the duty cast upon him to ensure the due enforcement of the provisions thereof in accordance with law, the grant of an adjournment would have been more in consonance with the interest of justice and a sound exercise of discretion. If a litigant affords and, therefore, engages a counsel whom he has to pay a substantial amount by way of fees, he has to be ready also to incur the risk of the case being adjourned on a good and sufficient ground. Such a ground could not, therefore, have had an overbearing effect on the consideration of the issue of adjournment. The inference drawn from the fact of "last opportunity" having been given to the appellant to bring his counsel and from his failure so to do that he deliberately wanted to prolong the proceedings is equally untenable and unreasonable. An injured workman, in the ordinary course of events and taking a practical view of the matter, is always interested in the expeditious disposal of his compensation case. The design or desire to prolong the proceedings can, if at all, be attributed to the employer and not to him. The fact that the appellant himself was present also militates against such an inference being drawn in the present case. It should have been appreciated further that on the previous day of hearing the appellant was present with his counsel, which means that he had engaged a counsel to represent him during the proceedings and was equally, if not more, keen to ensure smooth and early disposal of the case. What is his fault, if he having done everything in his power and expected of him, failed to secure the presence of his counsel before the Commissioner on the given day? Why should he suffer because of the default, if any, on the part of his counsel? Is it just, proper and equitable that he should suffer for the inaction, omission, negligence or misdemeanour, if any, of his counsel in not remaining present on the given day? If only the Commissioner had paused to take into account and weigh these relevant considerations and appreciated the predicament of the appellant in the correct factual perspective, in all probability, he would not have drawn such an inference and allowed an innocent party to suffer injustice for his counsels default and/or inaction, if any. If only the Commissioner had paused to take into account and weigh these relevant considerations and appreciated the predicament of the appellant in the correct factual perspective, in all probability, he would not have drawn such an inference and allowed an innocent party to suffer injustice for his counsels default and/or inaction, if any. Be it realised that our laws of procedure are grounded on a fundamental principle which ensures, inter alia, that proceedings that affect the lives of litigants and their property should not continue or be decided without affording to them a reasonable opportunity of presenting and proving their case and that they should not be precluded from participating in them, unless it is manifestly apparent that their persistent conduct is wilful or contumacious or betrays lack of bonafides or gross negligence. This apparently is not so in the present case for the reasons already mentioned. The Commissioner, therefore, committed a serious error of law resulting in grave miscarriage of justice in failing to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law to adjourn the case under the circumstances which were present herein. 9. The further and the consequential conclusion of the Commissioner that in view of the circumstances of the case, the respondents were not bound to pay any sum by way of compensation to the appellant, must obviously fall to the ground in light of the discussion aforesaid. Apart, however, from what has been highlighted hereinabove, the said conclusion is even otherwise not well-founded. The Commissioner, in due discharge of his functions and duties, ought to have proceeded to record the statements of the parties afresh, even if he was not inclined to adjourn the case and intended to uphold the objection of the respondents that the statements recorded on the previous dates of hearing were not valid since oath was not administered to the parties when those statements were recorded. He ought to have then proceeded to determine the issue whether the appellant was entitled to receive any compensation in accordance with law on the proved facts and circumstances of the case and, if so, to determine the precise amount of compensation to which he was entitled under the law having regard to the medical opinion as to the nature and extent of disablement. To hold that the respondents were not bound to pay any compensation to the appellant, without holding any inquiry whatever, tantamount to abdication of the power, authority and jurisdiction to decide a case in accordance with law. 10. Still more unjustified and unsustainable in law is the attitude of the Commissioner reflected in the observations that keeping in view the financial position of the appellant, he felt that a sum of Rs. 10,000 be given to the appellant and his persistent "advice" to him "to agree with this decision" and to accept the said amount as compensation. The Commissioner had to determine the compensation, if any, payable to the appellant in accordance with law. He was not making any ex-gratia grant; he was not offering a dole or donation to the appellant from the funds at his disposal or placed at his discretion by the respondents. These observations of the Commissioner, to say the least, are wholly untenable in law. The further observations made by the Commissioner tend to disclose a total lack of conception and perception on his part as to the true nature of the proceedings before him and the functions entrusted to him and the rights of the parties therein. If the appellant rejected the arbitrary "decision" to award compensation in the sum of Rs. 10,000, he was perfectly within his rights to do so. To characterise such stand of the appellant as "adamant" and to infer therefrom that he "wanted to take undue advantage", is wholly unreasonable and unjustified, besides unfortunate. If the order dismissing the case in default, although the appellant was present, is read contextually, an impression is left on the mind that the Commissioner passed such an extremely untenable order, as he regarded the above conduct on the part of the appellant as an affront to his authority, if not to his benevolence. Such an approach, to say the least, is most injudicious. This, however, is not all that can be said about the so-called "decision" to offer compensation in the sum of Rs. 10,000. Such an approach, to say the least, is most injudicious. This, however, is not all that can be said about the so-called "decision" to offer compensation in the sum of Rs. 10,000. Not only no sum can be arbitrarily awarded by way of compensation in a proceeding under the Act, but no contract or agreement also is valid under the Act, which has the effect of a workman relinquishing his any right of compensation from the employer for personal injury arising out of or in the course of his employment, so far as it pur ports to remove or reduce the liability of any person to pay compensation under the Act. The Commissioner ought to have been aware of this salient provision of law, which finds place in section 17 of the Act, before he proceeded to make an arbitrary "decision" to offer compensation to the appellant in the sum of Rs. 10,000, which apparently had the concurrence of the respondents. 11. The Court expects the Commissioner to bear all the foregoing observations in mind which are intended not only to operate as the reasons for the setting aside of the decision impugned in the present case but also as the guidelines which he shall bear in mind while discharging his functions and duties under the Act in future. 12. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned decision is quashed and set aside. The case is remanded to the Commissioner with a direction to re-admit the application on his file and to proceed to decide the same in accordance with law and in light of the observations made in the course of this judgment. The Commissioner, while deciding the case afresh, will also take into consideration the decision of this Court in Ram Dulari Kalia v. H. P S. E. B. and another, ILR 1986 HP 842: 1987 ACJ 258, concerning the principles governing the award of interest and penalty, if any, in case the respondents are ultimately found to be in default in paying the compensation, if any, due under the Act, within one month from the date it fell due. The appellant will be granted the just relief, in light of the principles enunciated in the said decision, if the facts and the circumstances of the case duly established warrant the grant of such relief in accordance with law. 13. The appellant will be granted the just relief, in light of the principles enunciated in the said decision, if the facts and the circumstances of the case duly established warrant the grant of such relief in accordance with law. 13. The respondents will pay to the appellant the costs of this appeal, which are quantified at Rs. 350. The costs shall be deposited with the Commissioner within a period of four weeks from today as a condition precedent to their right to participate further in the proceedings before him. The sum so deposited shall be paid by the Commissioner to the appellant immediately thereafter. Order accordingly.