ORDER B.M. Lal, J. 1. Ratanlal brought an action against Smt. Ramkumari and others for declaration of title. possession and for permanent injunction. The suit property involved an area admeasuring 42'Xll 1/2'. The suit was decreed by the judgment and decree dated 4-9-1971 against which an appeal was filed by one Battulal son of Deobaux which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 57-A/71; the number was subsequently changed to Civil Appeal No. 35-A/79. Battulal died in the month of August, 1978 during the pen-dency of the appeal. Therefore an application was made on behalf of the appellant Ramnarayan son of Battulal (who was Respondent No. 7) in Civil Appeal No. 35-A/79for being transposed in the arrary of appellant as after his father's death he was the aggrieved party. This application appears to have been kept in abeyance and for want of prosecution the appeal was dismissed on 28-1-1981. 2. Ramnarayan son of Battulal filed an application for restoration of the appeal to the file. He stated therein that after the death of his father he met with an accident for which he had to remain in hospital as indoor patient and as soon as he recouped from the alleged illness, he filed the application immediately. 3. This application was dismissed by the impugned order dated 25-3-1983 on the ground, inter alia(sic) that the appellant Ramnarayan being respon-dent in the appeal had no right to file the application for restoration; agai-nst this order the instant appeal has been filed. 4. The only point requiring decision in this appeal is: Whether the respondent Ramnarayan can file the application for restoration of the appeal? 5. This fact is not disputed that after the death of Battulal his son Ramnarayan had applied for transposition and in between the appeal was dismissed in default of prosecution. Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code does not enumerate as to the person who can file an appeal. However, in order to sustain an appeal it is necessary to show that the party desirous to appeal has a right to apeal and the general principle that no one can appeal from the decree unless he is a paity to the action, is not a rule of law, as even a person who is not a party to the action may be allowed to appeal if adversely affected by the decision subject to the appellate Court's leave of appeal. The words "person aggrieved" are of wide import and incl-ude a person who has a genuine grievance because an order or decree has been passed which prejudicially affects his interest. 6. In Stale of Punjab and others v. Amar Singh and another A.I.R. 1974 S. C. 994 (para 29) it has been held that a party may prefer an appeal with the leave of the Court if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment and if it would be binding on him as res judicata under Explanation 6 to Section 11 of Civil Procedure Code. This being so, the said principle applies where the interest of the co-plaintiff or co-defendant is involved. Therefore, any decision adversely affecting a party to the action is entitled to appeal against his co-defendant or co-plaintiff in respect of the same cause of action. 7. Further, the question of limitation does not arise in a case where a party is transposed from the array of the defendant to that of the plaintiff or vice versa. See Krishnabai wlo Bapuji Bari and others v. Mt. Parvati Bai w/o Dr. Shankar Pandurang Gogte & Ors. A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 298. 8. Under such circumstances, in the instant case the son of the appe-llant who was arrayed as respondent and the application for his transposi-tion being on record, he was an aggrieved person by the judgment and decree under appeal, and therefore, certainly he is entitled to move an application under Order XLI, Rule 19 of Civil Procedure Code for restoration of the appeal dismissed in default. 9. However, the question again remains to be decided about the suffi-ciency of good cause for condoning delay. 10. This aspect depends upon the satisfaction of the Court as to how the appellant was prevented from filing the application well within prescri-bed period of limitation. 11. The appellant, in the instant case, has shown sufficient cause and good cause of illness that he met with an accident and he had to remain in the hospital as indoor patient for which he could not file the application well in time. This stand of the appellant is also supported by an affidavit. 12. Hospitalisation is sufficient cause and good cause, therefore, the Trial Court in the circumstances should have allowed the application there by restoring the appeal to its original file, for hearing on merits. 13. This stand of the appellant is also supported by an affidavit. 12. Hospitalisation is sufficient cause and good cause, therefore, the Trial Court in the circumstances should have allowed the application there by restoring the appeal to its original file, for hearing on merits. 13. From the discussions aforesaid the appeal deserves to be allowed. 14. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs throughout, setting aside the order impugned. The lower appellate Court is directed to pass an appropriate order on the application for transposition and decide the appeal on merits. Countel's fee Rs. 350/- if certified.