Judgment :- 1. As early as 16-3-1970, an order was passed by a Munsiff directing the respondents to pay to the petitioner arrears of rent claimed in the suit. Such an order falls within the purview of S.73 (2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (for short 'the Act'). The operative portion of the order reads thus: "It is decreed and ordered that in case the defendants fail to pay the said amount and costs within six months from today, plaintiff may move the court as provided in S.73 of Act for realisation of the sum". As late as 15-9-1982, the petitioner in whose favour the order was passed, filed an application in the same Munsiff's court for sending a requisition to the District Collector to realise the amount. The application was dismissed by the learned Munsiff on the ground that the application is barred by limitation. This Civil Revision Petition is in challenge of the said order. 2. The reasoning of the learned Munsiff for dismissing the application is the following: "Only after 12 years period the petitioner has resorted to necessary steps for executing the decree. The time for executing of a decree being three (sic) years and there being no prior petition so far filed in respect of the decree for execution, the petition filed in 1983 is hopelessly time barred". Learned counsel contended that the period for execution of a decree is twelve years as per Art.136 of the Limitation Act and that the time would begin to run only on the expiry of six months from the date of the order, and if that period of six months is excluded the application would be within time This contention need not be considered in this case because the application was not filed in execution court, nor can it be treated as an execution petition. The application was filed on the trial side itself where it was numbered as an interlocutory application. Be that as it may, the petitioner must succeed on another ground. 3. S.73 (8) of the Act is a special provision for realisation of the amount covered by any one of the three sub-sections. There can be no doubt that the order sought to be enforced by the petitioner was one passed under sub-section (2). Be that as it may, the petitioner must succeed on another ground. 3. S.73 (8) of the Act is a special provision for realisation of the amount covered by any one of the three sub-sections. There can be no doubt that the order sought to be enforced by the petitioner was one passed under sub-section (2). The special provision contained in sub-section (8) reads like this: "If the tenant fails to deposit any amount as required by sub-section (7), such amount shall, on a written requisition from the Court or the Land Tribunal, as the case may be. to the District Collector, be recovered under the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 together with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of the order under sub-section (2) or sub-section (4) or sub-section (6), as the case may be". It is worthy of notice that no application as such is envisaged in the subsection to be filed by the person entitled to get the amount, to enable the court to send the requisition to the District Collector for recovering the amount. Any application fixed need only be treated as a reminder to the court of its duty to send the requisition which is envisaged in the sub-section. When a court does not discharge its duties, it is open to the concerned party to inform the court of the need to take action without further delay Any such step resorted to by the party is not to be treated as an application falling within any of the articles of the third division of the schedule of the Limitation Act. 4. A parallel or atleast similar situation is when application is filed for passing final decree in a suit for partition. It is well settled that such an application is not governed by either the residuary article or any other articles of the Limitation Act. (Vide Bhusan Chandra v. Chabimoni Dasi AIR (35) 1948 Calcutta 363, Abdul Kareem v. S. Silar Saheb AIR 1957 AP. 40 and K. S. Doraiswami Nadar v. Vinayaka Ratnaswami Nadar (1969) I MLJ. 392). When the court has power to act suo mote an application filed for exercising such power is not controlled by any period of limitation, unless there is specific provision in that behalf. (Vide Shyam Sunder v. Nilakantha Das-1956 Orissa 165). The position here is not different. 40 and K. S. Doraiswami Nadar v. Vinayaka Ratnaswami Nadar (1969) I MLJ. 392). When the court has power to act suo mote an application filed for exercising such power is not controlled by any period of limitation, unless there is specific provision in that behalf. (Vide Shyam Sunder v. Nilakantha Das-1956 Orissa 165). The position here is not different. Sub-section (8) of the Act imposes a duty on the court to send a written requisition to the District Collector on failure of the tenant to deposit the amount within six months from the date of the order. The party can expect that the court would discharge its duty at any time. When the party notices that the court has omitted to discharge its duty, it is upto that party to remind the court of its duty. For that purpose the only known mode which can be adopted is to put it in writing and file the same in court. That is not liable to be rejected as affected by any period of limitation. 5. The court below went wrong in dismissing the application as barred by limitation. Hence I allow this Civil Revision Petition and set aside the impugned order. I direct the learned Munsiff to resort to the step enjoined on the court by sub-section (8) of the Act without further delay.