JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the allotment order passed under the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 2. The property in dispute is a house no. 96 (Ward No. 8), Gandhi Nagar, Bhabhangawan, Basti. It was initially in occupation of the forest department. Respondent no. 3 got the knowledge of the fact that this property was likely to fall vacant and, as such, on 16th June, 1977, he made an application for allotment of the said accommodation to him before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Basti. This application was registered on 18th June, 1977. At the time when this application was made, the landlord Rameshwar Prasad also gave his consent for allotment of the accommodation in favour of respondent no. 3, Gajendra Nath Pandey. After this application was moved by the respondent no. 3, an enquiry was conducted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, as to whether the property was vacant or not. Ultimately, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared the vacancy on 3rd August, 1977. On 3rd August, 1977, Ram Milan Singh, the petitioner, who was then a Member of the Legislative Assembly, moved an application for allotment of the said accommodation. On 6th August, 1987, the property was allotted to two persons. A part of the property was allotted to the petitioner Ram Milan Singh and the other part was allotted to Sunder Lal Harijan, who was a Harijan Welfare Officer. It appears that though a part of the property was allotted to Sunder Lal also, but the petitioner took possession of the entire property, even the portion which was allotted in favour of Sunder Lal. The allotment order dated 6th August, 1977, was challenged in revision by the respondent no. 3. On 2nd August, 1978, the revision was allowed by the District Judge. The allotment order in favour of Ram Milan Singh, the petitioner, was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for considering the matter of allotment afresh. 3. After remand, on 6th April, 1979, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer again allotted the premises in dispute in favour of the petitioner Ram Milan Singh. This order dated 6th April, 1979, was again challenged by means of a revision before the District Judge. 3. After remand, on 6th April, 1979, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer again allotted the premises in dispute in favour of the petitioner Ram Milan Singh. This order dated 6th April, 1979, was again challenged by means of a revision before the District Judge. This revision was second time allowed on 20th December, 1979, and again the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was directed to re-consider the question of allotment in respect of the property in dispute. Thereafter, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer took up the matter and by order dated 30th May, 1981, allotted the property in dispute in favour of respondent no. 3. This order dated 30th May, 1981, was challenged by the petitioner by way of a revision before the District Judge. On 21st July, 1981, the revision filed by Ram Milan Singh, the petitioner, was rejected. It is this order dated 21st July, 1981, which has been challenged in the present revision. It has been stated here that after the order dated 21st July, 1981, the respondent no. 3 took possession of the property on 23rd July, 1981. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that the initial application for allotment, which was made by the respondent no. 3, was registered on 18th June, 1977. Since he did not renew the registration of his allotment application, as required by Rule 10 (4) of the Rules, consequently, he ceased to have any priority and, as such, the allotment order ceased in favour of the respondent no. 3 is wholly illegal. 5. The second contention raised by the learned counsel is that the application for allotment had been made by the respondent no. 3 even before the actual intimation of vacancy and, as such, his application for allotment cannot be treated as a valid application for allotment in the eye of law and, consequently, the allotment order in favour of the respondent no. 3 is invalid. 6. In paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent no. 3 in this petition, it has been categorically stated that after the application was moved by the respondent no. 3 for allotment which was registered on 18th June, 1977, an enquiry was conducted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as to whether the accommodation was vacant or not. 3 in this petition, it has been categorically stated that after the application was moved by the respondent no. 3 for allotment which was registered on 18th June, 1977, an enquiry was conducted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as to whether the accommodation was vacant or not. Ultimately, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared the vacancy. This fact has not been disputed. Only the date of declaration of the tenancy was disputed. For the purposes of this case, it may be taken that 3rd August, 1977, is the date when the vacancy was declared. It is, therefore, clear that in the year 1977, when the application was made by the petitioner for allotment of the accommodation in dispute, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer took cognizance of the said application and in pursuance of the said application conducted an enquiry as to whether the property fell vacant or not. Proceedings commenced with the application filed by the respondent no. 3 and they are still continuing. It is in the light of these facts that the question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is to be examined. In B. C. Jain v. Ilnd Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1979 ARC 231, this Court had an occasion to consider the effect of Rule 10 sub-rule (4) of the Rules framed under the Act. It was held in the said case that sub- rule (4) of Rule 10 does not apply to a case where proceedings have started. Neither there is anything in the language used in this sub-rule nor in the context which could impel the court to hold that the non-renewal resulted in the dismissal of the application for allotment. 7. In Brij Raj v. District Judge, Kanpur, 1985 ARC Vol. II 447, this Court held that where an application for allotment is such which has not been rejected as not maintainable and in respect whereof some proceedings have been taken before expiry of the year in which it was made no renewal was called for before treating it to be a subsisting application. 8. In M/s. Sangita Oswal Hosiery v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Faizabad, 1987 ARC Vol. II 8, again the question arose as to what is the effect of non-renewal of an allotment application as required by Rule 10 (4) of the Rules framed under the Act. 8. In M/s. Sangita Oswal Hosiery v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Faizabad, 1987 ARC Vol. II 8, again the question arose as to what is the effect of non-renewal of an allotment application as required by Rule 10 (4) of the Rules framed under the Act. Agreeing with the decision in the case of Brij Raj (supra), it was again held by this Court that if some proceedings were taken on the basis of an application for allotment before the expiry of the year in which the application for allotment was made, then no renewal would be required for treating it to be a subsisting application. In the instant case, as I have already found above an action had been taken on the application for allotment moved by the respondent no. 3 in that very year. Vacancy was declared on 3rd August, 1977 and the property was allotted in favour of the petitioner on 6th August, 1977. In the circumstances, in view of the principle laid down above, no renewal of the allotment application was required. The first submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, does not have substance. 9. In regard to the second submission made by learned counsel, this submission also, in my opinion, does not have substance. Section 16 of the Act itself provides that an allotment order can be made by the District Magistrate requiring the landlord to let any building which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. From this section, it is, therefore, clear that an allotment order can be passed in respect of a building which is about to fall vacant. If such is the power of the District Magistrate, it is obvious that an application for allotment can be made before actual declaration of vacancy and where the applicant feels that the building is about to fall vacant. Form A has been prescribed under the Rules in which an application for allotment of a building is to be made to the District Magistrate. Clause 15 (c) of the said form requires the applicant to state whether the building is 'vacant' or 'likely to fall vacant'. This also is indicative of the fact that an application for allotment can be made even where there is no actual vacancy but where the building is likely to fall vacant. Clause 15 (c) of the said form requires the applicant to state whether the building is 'vacant' or 'likely to fall vacant'. This also is indicative of the fact that an application for allotment can be made even where there is no actual vacancy but where the building is likely to fall vacant. In the circumstances, I am clearly of the opinion that the application made by the respondent no. 3 for the allotment of the property in dispute, which was likely to fall vacant, was a valid application in the eye of law. 10. La the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated 5th August, 1981 is, hereby, vacated. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.