Judgment :- 1. The person who resisted execution of the decree in O.S.333/66, is the. revision petitioner. 2. The application of the first respondent for removal of resistance under 0.21 R.97 was dismissed by the execution court. The first respondent thereupon filed an appeal A. S.56/80 challenging the said order before the District Court, Kozhikode. The appeal was filed out of time and therefore I.A.396/80 was filed to condone the delay. This petition has been allowed by the order under challenge. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the period prescribed for filing the appeal cannot be extended because this is an appeal filed against an order passed in a proceeding initiated under 0.21 C. P.C., excluded from the purview of S.5 of The Limitation Act, which reads: "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases:-Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period". It can be seen from this Section that the applications that are excluded from the purview of the Section are applications falling under any of the provisions of O.21 C.P.C.1908. The appeal in question, no doubt is one filed against an order dismissing an application under O.21 R.98 C.P.C. 4. Since the appeal is a continuation of the application, the learned counsel argues, the appeal also must be treated as having the trappings of an application under 0.21 R.97 C. P. C. I am not impressed by this argument. An appeal however, is an independent proceeding. The application under 0.21, the moment it is disposed of, comes to an end. The appeal therefrom is just like any other appeal contemplated under S.5. The section starts off with the words "any appeal or any application". These expressions are significant and meaningful. They do reflect the intention of the Legislature. This section thus maintains the distinction between the appeal and the application, usually filed in a court. The above argument of the learned counsel therefore is rejected. 5. The short delay of twenty days according to the court below, has satisfactorily been explained by the first respondent. There is no scope to interfere with that finding. This section thus maintains the distinction between the appeal and the application, usually filed in a court. The above argument of the learned counsel therefore is rejected. 5. The short delay of twenty days according to the court below, has satisfactorily been explained by the first respondent. There is no scope to interfere with that finding. The C.R.P. is without merits. Accordingly the same is dismissed. No costs.