JUDGMENT - G.D. KAMAT, J.:---This petition challenges the communication bearing No. 28/17/84-ll-D of the Industries and Labour Department of Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, dated July 17, 1984, refusing to refer the dispute raised by the petitioner for adjudication under section 10(1)(d) r/w section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the point for consideration is whether the said communication dated July 17, 1984, can stand scrutiny having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions. 3. Shortly stated, the facts are that the petitioner was employed with the respondent No. 3 Bank as a Clerk as from 1st April, 1974. A charge-sheet dated 14th February, 1983, was served on the petitioner and that was in connection with some embezzlement of funds. An enquiry was conducted and as a result of what transpired in that enquiry, the petitioner was dismissed from service by an order dated November 30, 1983. The petitioner raised an Industrial Dispute before the Assistant Labour Commissioner by letter dated January 12, 1984, and as the parties in conciliation could not make any common ground, a failure report to the Government was submitted by the Assistant Labour Commissioner on April 10, 1983. By the impugned communication dated July 17, 1984, the Under Secretary, Industries and Labour Department informed the petitioner thus : “…..........that the Government does not agree to make reference of alleged Industrial Disputes for adjudication under section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as the matter of termination of services appears to be on sound footing and is not disputable. 4. Mr. Lawande, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, urges that the impugned communication is made in excess of jurisdiction of the Government inasmuch as it has adjudicated the dispute between the petitioner and the Bank on its merit which power the Government does not have. It is further his case that with this communication, the petitioner has been even stifled to seek his appropriate remedy under section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and having regard to the fact that the Industrial Tribunal is required to consider and decide this sort of matters, the Government has no authority to usurp the powers of that Tribunal. It is further his case that with this communication, the petitioner has been even stifled to seek his appropriate remedy under section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and having regard to the fact that the Industrial Tribunal is required to consider and decide this sort of matters, the Government has no authority to usurp the powers of that Tribunal. In ground No. 4 of the petition several decisions have been referred to and the latest authority mentioned is (V. Veerarajan and others v. Government of Tamil Nadu and others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 695. This authority in its turn also reiterated the principle laid down in (Ram Avtar Sharma and others v. State of Haryana and another)2, reported in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 915 and (The Workmen of Syndicate Bank, Madras v. Govt. of India and another)3, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. page 1667. 5. In the case of The Workmen of Syndicate Bank, Madras v. Government of India and another, reported to supra, it was a case of a Bank employee whose industrial dispute was refused to be referred to the Tribunal and that was on the ground that the Government had observed that the charges had been duly proved in a duly constituted inquiry and the penalty imposed was after following the required procedure laid down. The Supreme Court while quashing the order of not referring the dispute under section 10(1)(d) r/w section 12(5) held that it would not be right for the Government to refuse to make the reference on the ground that the charges of misconduct had been proved in a duly constituted departmental enquiry or that the penalty was imposed after following the required procedure. The Supreme Court further observed that if such ground was held to be permissible for the Government, then, it would be the easiest thing for the Management to avoid reference for adjudication and thereby deprive the workmen of the opportunity of having their dispute referred to for adjudication even when order holding the charges of misconduct was proved to be unreasonable or perverse or was actuated by mala fides and even when the penalty imposed on the workmen was totally disproportionate to the offence said to have been proved. In the case of Ram Avtar Sharma and others v. State of Haryana and another, the Supreme Court clearly laid down that there may be exceptional cases in which the State Government may, on a proper examination of the demands, come to a conclusion that the demands are either perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference and, therefore, the Government should be very slow to attempt an examination of the demands with a view to decline reference and further observed that the courts should always be vigilant whenever the Government attempts to usurp the powers of the Tribunal for adjudication of a valid dispute. 6. To the same effect is the latest decision of the Supreme Court in V. Veerarajan's case (supra referred to) where the same principles have been again reiterated. On a reference to the case of (M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, and another)4, reported in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 860, a passage whereof has been duly quoted in the judgment can be advantageously extracted in this judgment also. It reads thus :- “Therefore, while conceding a very limited jurisdiction to the State Government to examine patent frivolousness of the demands, it is to be understood as a rule, that adjudication of demands made by workmen should be left to the Tribunal to decide. Section 10 permits appropriate Government to determine whether dispute `exists or apprehended ' and then refer it for adjudication on merits. The demarcated functions are (1) reference, (2) adjudication. When a reference is rejected on the specious plea that the Government cannot bear the additional burden, it constitutes adjudication and thereby usurpation of the power of a quasi judicial Tribunal by an administrative authority namely the Appropriate Government .” There is no necessity of multiplying authorities and suffices for us to mention that the Government has dealt with the impugned communication as if it was deciding the dispute on its merit. Such course is not open to the Government and only in exceptional cases reference can be denied such as: (1) When Tribunal itself has adjudicated the dispute; (2) There is gross delay; and (3) When reference will lead to industrial unrest. 7. Such course is not open to the Government and only in exceptional cases reference can be denied such as: (1) When Tribunal itself has adjudicated the dispute; (2) There is gross delay; and (3) When reference will lead to industrial unrest. 7. It is indeed contended by Shri Ferdino Rebello, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3, that no relief should be granted in favour of the petitioner, firstly, on the ground that the communication was made as early as July 17, 1984 and the petition has been filed only some time in April, 1987, i.e. after a lapse of about 3 years. The fact remains that the petitioner is a workmen and despite the point of laches has been raised by the respondent, we do not think that any particular prejudice has been caused to the respondent Bank by the delay in filing present writ petition. We are fortified in taking this view because it is mentioned across the Bar by Shri Lawande, that, in fact, the petitioner had entrusted the file for filing appropriate petition in this Court but, in the meantime, the advocate to whom the matter was assigned was prevented from accepting briefs against the Government. This justification is not seriously disputed by the Counsel for the Bank. 8. It is further urged by Shri Rebello, that the petitioner had been at the relevant time, the accountant of Bank and the charge against him was with regard to embezzlement of funds and, what is more, is that the petitioner himself paid into the Bank a large sum of money after report of the Inquiry Officer had been made. Mr. Lawande, however, mentions that mere repayment of money to the Bank by the petitioner may not necessarily amount to admission of embezzlement and the bona fide action of the petitioner cannot be interpreted to mean the acceptance of the charge made against him. However, we do not desire to go into the controversy and, more particularly having regard to the view that we take in this matter. 9. However, we do not desire to go into the controversy and, more particularly having regard to the view that we take in this matter. 9. There is another factor which makes us to hold that the impugned communication cannot be allowed to sustain because all that it says is “………as the matter of termination of service appears to be on sound footing and is not disputed.” In other words though apart from the fact that the Government has finally adjudicated upon the matter, obviously, the above communication is non-speaking and even to that extent the order cannot bear scrutiny. In fact, no reasons are assigned by the Government and nothing can be made out either by the petitioner or by this Court as to how the Government has come to such conclusion. 10. The next question is as to whether we should grant the relief of Mandamus directing the Government to make the reference. Having regard to what is contended before us, we think that in the fitness of things, a remand to the Industries and Labour Department would be sufficient with a direction to the Government to re-examine the case of the petitioner and without adjudicating upon the merits of the dispute between the parties, to decide whether or not to make the reference to the Tribunal under section 10(1)(d) r/w section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, having regard to the decisions of the Supreme Court cited above, within three months from today. 11. Rule accordingly made. There shall be however no order as to costs. Order made accordingly. -----