MURLIDHER RAO, J. ,, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner had earlier filed Civil revision Petition No. 4136/83, which had been dismissed in view of the judgment of the Full Bench in M. M. Yaragatti v vasanth, 1987 (2) Kar L J. 9 : (I. L. R. 1987 karnataka, P. 1286 ). The said judgment is reversed by the Supreme Court in shamaraju v U. V. Bhat (A. I. R. 1987 s. C. P. 2323) and thereafter the dismissal order has been recalled. Therefore, Civil revision Petition No. 5734/88 is heard along with Civil Revision Petition No. 4136/83. ( 2 ) THIS is a tenant's petition challenging the concurrent findings of the courts below. The original respondent landlord-J M Nanjappa filed an eviction petition under clause (j) of Section 21 (1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (in short the 'act'), which has been allowed by both the Courts. The Courts below have found that the landlord bona fide and reasonably requires the premises for demolition and reconstruction. It is not necessary either to repeat the summary ofthe pleadings or the concurrentfindings of the Courts below. ( 3 ) IN this C. R P. Mr. Farooq, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that nanjappa, the original landlord, died during the pendency of the revision petition before the District Judge. The legal representatives are brought on record. In the Court below it was contended that with the death of the original landlord i the cause does not survive and the legal representatives brought on record cannot support the order passed in favour of the original landlord. This contention was over-ruled. ( 4 ) MR. Farooq referred to the judgment in C. R P. No. 2495/73, decided on 17th of January, 1975, wherein the learned Judge had to consider the rights of legatees under the will. The learned judged held that as the petitioners were only legatees "they cannot be understood as suing for the benefit of the estate of the deceased". The said ruling in myopinion does not help the petitioners who are the wife and children of deceased-Nanjappa. The learned Advocate placed reliance on the judgment in Bharat Petroleum corporation Ltd. v Revanappa Sangappa by LRs (1983 (2) Karnataka Law Journal p. 505 ). That was a case where the landlord had sought eviction under clause (e) of Section 21 (1) of the Act. The learned Advocate placed reliance on the judgment in Bharat Petroleum corporation Ltd. v Revanappa Sangappa by LRs (1983 (2) Karnataka Law Journal p. 505 ). That was a case where the landlord had sought eviction under clause (e) of Section 21 (1) of the Act. The learned Judge in allowing the petition of the tenant observed that :"it may be that the original petitioner was a rich man and he must have more than sufficient means. The richness of the father is not the same thing as the richness of the legal representatives of the father. It may be that the father had got sufficient means. But at the seme time it cannot be forgotten that some times the legacy of indebtedness is also left by the father. It is possible that after paying off the debts the riches left by the father may evaporate altogether. Therefore, merely because the petitioner landlord had got the capacity to construct, it does not mean that the legal representatives hove also got the capacity to construct. There is no material to show at present that the legal representatives cf the deceased landlord have got necessary means or capacity to put up the construction". ( 5 ) IT appears that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Phool Rini and Others v Sh. Naubhatral Ahluvalla (A. I. R. 1973 SC P. 2110) was not brought to his Lordship's notice Sub-sequently, the same learned Judge has rendered a judgment in Mohammed ghouse v Janab Haji Syed Ibrahim since Deceased By Lrs. (1984 (1) Karnataka Law Chronicle P. 482 ). The learned judge has specifically considered the question whether the legal representative of the deceased landlord is entitled to the benefit of the order of eviction passed in his favour where the death of the landlord has occurred after the order for possession was passed. That was a case arising out of eviction proceeoings initiated under Section 21 (1) (h) of the act. After considering the judgment of smt Phool Rani and Others v Sh. Naubhatral Ahluvalla (A. I R. 1973 S C. P. 2110 and the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Shantilal Thakordas and Others v Chimanlal Maganlal teiwala (A. I R. 1976 S. C. 2358) the learned Judge has observed thus :"he died while the proceedings have been pending in this Court. Naubhatral Ahluvalla (A. I R. 1973 S C. P. 2110 and the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Shantilal Thakordas and Others v Chimanlal Maganlal teiwala (A. I R. 1976 S. C. 2358) the learned Judge has observed thus :"he died while the proceedings have been pending in this Court. Therefore, his estate was already benefitted by an order of eviction passed by the District judge Therefore, in view of the principle laid down by the Supreme court in para-4 of its judgment in Phool rani's case, the legal representatives are entitled to the benefits of that order of eviction". With reference to Shantilal Thakordas and Others v Chimanlal Maganlal teiwala (A. I. R. 1976 S C. 2358), the learned Judge observed thus :"what the Supreme Court stated by saying "we do not accept the contention as sound or correct" is that the argument that the decree had already been passed in favour of the original plaintiff by the Trial Court and that could not be disturbed on his death either in appeal or revision, is heither sound or correct. This opinion of the Supreme Court, in my opinion, does not go to indicate that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in phool Rani's case was disapproved by that larger Bench. As already shown above, by the time, (in Shdntilal's case), the parties approached the supreme Court, there was no order of eviction in favour of the legal representatives of the landlord at all. Therefore, the argument of Sri. Holla that by the Shantilal case the Supreme Court has overruled the principle laid down in Phool Rani s case does not appear to be correct. The Supreme Court, in in view of the wordings in the Act and the plea in the petition that the landlord required the premises for himself and the members of his family, held that the cause of action survives even for the legal representatives". ( 6 ) IN Palthur Raja Saheb v Noor mohammed and Others (1978 (1) Rent control journal P. 489) G N. Sabhahit J. observed thus :"the decree was confirmed by the learned District Judge. It is the tenant who has came up in revision before the high Court and it is during the pendency of this revision petition, that the landlord died. It is the tenant who has came up in revision before the high Court and it is during the pendency of this revision petition, that the landlord died. That being so, it becomes obvious that the Legal representatives, who are none else than the widow and sons of the deceased are entitled to defend the benefit that has accrued to the estate and the present revision petition which constituted a challenge to the benefit, can be resisted by the legal representatives. The question of survival of cause of action, as such, does not arise in cases like the present one". The learned Judge also observed that the observations in Phool Rani's case are left undisturbed in Shantilal thakordas's case. ( 7 ) IN Shankarappa v Puttamma (I. L R. 1987 Karnataka P 1145) I had an occasion to consider this aspect. Following the judgment of P A Kulkarnij. In md. Chouse's case and the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Melepurath sankunni v T. Gopalan Kutty (A I R. 1986 SC P-411) I have held that a distinction has to be drawn between cases where the death occurs before the decree and cases where death occurs after decree. In the former cases the cause pleaded is in a fluid stage and has not aystallised, while in the latter cases cause has crystallised in the decree and in the hands of legal representatives it is in the crystallised form. This being the consistent view of this Court, it is not possible to accept the contention of mr. Farooq that with the death of nanjappa the eviction order passed by the Munsiff does not survive and it becomes unenforceable. This contention has been rightly rejected by the Court below and I have no reason to differ from the same. ( 8 ) IT was then contended that there are two other tenants by name Usman and Khader Haji, who still continue to be in the occupation of the premises. There is no specific plea in the statement of objections filed by the tenant. Merely because it has been stated so in the evidence without furnishing any more details in that regard it is not possible to hold that Usman and Khader Haji are occupying the premises as tenants in the schedule premises. There is no specific plea in the statement of objections filed by the tenant. Merely because it has been stated so in the evidence without furnishing any more details in that regard it is not possible to hold that Usman and Khader Haji are occupying the premises as tenants in the schedule premises. Such a contention was not raised before the District Judge and being a doubtful question of fact, which cannot be investigated in this revision petition it has to be rejected. Therefore, these petitions deserve to be dismissed. ( 9 ) THE proceedings are initiated on 25th of January, 1979 and they have been pending for more than 91/2 years and would be completing 10 years in another two months. It these circumstances, I am constrained to mention that in respect of relief claimed under clause (j) of section 21 (1) of the Act, the Courts must bear in mind the effect of galloping inflation in this Country and the escalation charges that would be required to be spent in taking steps to fulfil the terms of the order. In these 10 years the cost of construction has considerably gone up and the landlord who was ready and anxious to put up the construction may find himself in financial difficulty after these 10 years. Therefore, in matters like this, the Courts below should take up such matters expeditiously and dispose of the same. An order of the court, without being an ornamental display, must be purposeful and should enable the landlord to achieve the object for which he initiated the proceedings. The process must be objective and not obstructive. ( 10 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I make the following order : (1) Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. No costs. (2) The tenant shall vacate the premises and hand over vacant possession of the same to the landlord or or before 31st of May, 1989 subject to payment of rents. Within a month thereafter the landlord shall undertake demolition and complete the work of demolition in three months. The landlord shall commence reconstruction on 15th of September, 1989 and complete the same in two years. (3) The parties shall be bound by the provisions contained in Sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Act. Petition dismissed. --- *** --- .