ORDER : In C. C. No 284 of 1985, the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Ernakulam convicted the second respondent for offences punishable under S.279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code and he was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. As Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam, the petitioner acquitted him allowing Criminal Appeal No. 107 of 1987. In Criminal Appeal No. 476 of 1987, this Court reversed the acquittal and restored the conviction and sentence. This petition, filed under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is to expunge certain passages from the judgment of this Court. 2. Petitioner is aggrieved mainly for the following reasons: (1) The passages sought to be expunged received wide publicity in papers and affected her integrity and honesty as a judicial officer; (2) They are outside the scope of enquiry in the appeal and unnecessary for the decision as an integral part of it; and (3) They are not justified because they involve aspects of appreciation of evidence in which different views are possible and she did not get an opportunity of being heard to justify her views. 3. The following are the passages, which the petitioner wants expunctiori from the judgment: (1) “The reasons alleged by the Chief Judicial Magistrate for disbelieving PW 3 are (i) ‘He conceded that he did not check whether the brake was hydraulic or not’. This finding is a judicial dishonesty by the Chief Judicial Magistrate”. (2) “The stand taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate that he (PW 3) did not answer 11 (a) again is a judicial dishonesty”. (3) “The Chief Judicial Magistrate seems to have decided to disbelieve PW 3 in order to find that there was brake failure for acquitting the accused and then she was attempting to find out reasons for that”. (4) “If anybody goes under the impression that the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed these uncharitable, unnecessary and unjustified comments on account of personal motivations coupled with a desire to acquit the accused it may not be possible to blame them. Judicial pronouncements cannot be used as the media for giving vent to extraneous feelings or wreak personal vengeance”. (4) “If anybody goes under the impression that the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed these uncharitable, unnecessary and unjustified comments on account of personal motivations coupled with a desire to acquit the accused it may not be possible to blame them. Judicial pronouncements cannot be used as the media for giving vent to extraneous feelings or wreak personal vengeance”. (5) “Imagination of the Chief Judicial Magistrate was running riot probably for the sole purpose of impeaching the poor Magistrate and the Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector and garlanding the accused, forgetting the fact that except her imagination, even the hostile witnesses who were bent upon helping the accused or even the 313 statement of the accused did not support her fully”. (6) “Various items of experience, anticipation, prudence and bravery were showered on him on the basis of information from sources unknown. I can only sympathise with the Chief Judicial Magistrate for having written all these”. In order to understand the implications of the passages, a short resume of the facts of the case and evidence is given below. 4. Second respondent is a Chargeman in the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation. He was charge-sheeted for causing hurt by rash and negligent driving. On 26-6-1985 at 3 PM he was driving a Kerala State Road Transport Corporation bus on a trial run from north to south, after complete repairs in the workshop through the road in front of the St. Theresa’s Convent at Ernakulam. This and the following facts are not in serious dispute though all facts are not spoken to by all occurrence witnesses. A private bus was parked on the eastern side of the road alighting passengers (PWs 1, 2, 4 and 8). The remaining space was hardly sufficient for a vehicle to pass (PW 1 cross examination by accused). A car was coming from the opposite direction (PWs 1 and 8 and 313 statement of accused). Many students were coming out of the convent and several pedestrians were on the road (PW 1 and the 313 statement of the accused). In such a situation, the accused overtook the bus (PWs 4 and 8). In that attempt, in order to avoid collision with the car coming from the opposite direction, the accused had to swerve the bus to the right (PWs 1 and 8 and 313 statement of accused). In such a situation, the accused overtook the bus (PWs 4 and 8). In that attempt, in order to avoid collision with the car coming from the opposite direction, the accused had to swerve the bus to the right (PWs 1 and 8 and 313 statement of accused). In that attempt the bus knocked down PW7 (PWs 4 and 7). The bus then entered the foot-path and stopped hitting against a tree causing damages to the bus and injuries to the inmates (PWs 1, 2, 4, and 8). 5. PWs. 1, 2, 4, 7 and 8 are the occurrence witnesses. Among them, PW4 is a police constable on duty on the spot and PW 7 is the pedestrian who was knocked down. PW 7 was disinterested in giving evidence because of some financial help from the accused. But he said he was knocked down. PW 4 was also not very earnest in giving evidence though his evidence reveals rashness. The case of the accused is that brake failed and he was forced to stop the bus by hitting against a tree. PWs 1, 2 and 8 are the colleagues of the accused who were inside the bus. Though they had no basis to support the case of brake failure they were attempting to support the accused in that respect. All of them turned hostile and even refused to admit that PW 7 was knocked down even though he was also treated along with them in the hospital. PW 3 is the Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector who inspected the bus and submitted Ext.P1 inspection report stating that brake was efficient and there was no mechanical defect. 6. The trial Magistrate accepted the evidence of PW 3 in preference to PWs 1, 2 and 8 and rejected the plea of brake failure. The action of the accused in the above circumstances in overtaking the parked bus without waiting for the car to pass was held to be rashness and negligence which is the cause of the accident relying on the decision in Emperor v. Ramnarain (A.I.R. 1934 Nagpur 65), which held: “The law or usage of the road is not the criterion of negligence. The test is whether the accident could have been avoided by the accused if he had exercised that care and diligence which ordinarily cautious persons using the road in similar circumstances would have done”. The test is whether the accident could have been avoided by the accused if he had exercised that care and diligence which ordinarily cautious persons using the road in similar circumstances would have done”. But without adverting to any of these admitted and proved facts and circumstances and the legal position concerning rashness and negligence, the petitioner said in Para 15 of her judgment: “None of the ingredients of S.279 is attracted in this case. No independent occurrence witness had stated that the accused was either rash or negligent. If S.279 I. P. C. is not involved, S.337 I. P. C. will not stand”. This was in spite of her statement in Para 13 of her judgment that: “The K. S. R. T. C bus overtook the private bus when a car came from the opposite direction. Then the K. S. R. T. C bus swerved and went and hit the tree”. and the further statement in Para 15: “Otherwise the bus would have collided with the car which was coming from the opposite direction”. Finally she said: “On a thread bare scrutiny of the documentary and oral evidence available in this case, I have no hesitation to hold that the learned Magistrate went utterly wrong in finding the accused/appellant guilty. There is no iota of evidence in this case to prove the complicity of the accused in the commission of the crime. Hence the defence evidence need not be considered at all”. 7. These may be aspects concerning conclusions on rashness and negligence by appreciation of evidence in which there is the possibility of different views. But that must be after considering the relevant factors and stating how it will not amount to rashness or negligence. The above circumstance which necessitated braking and swerving to the west is the case of the accused also and that is also what the petitioner found. The only exception is that accused had a plea of brake failure which was accepted by the petitioner. In this case even if the plea of brake failure is accepted, there is rashness and negligence in overtaking in the above situation without allowing the car to pass. The question or applying the brake and its failing could only be in avoiding the collision which became possible only by overtaking. 8. At any rate, if brake failure is found against, undisputedly rashness and negligence are there. The question or applying the brake and its failing could only be in avoiding the collision which became possible only by overtaking. 8. At any rate, if brake failure is found against, undisputedly rashness and negligence are there. Defence evidence regarding brake failure was not considered by the petitioner as she felt that it “need not be considered at all” But this Court considered and rejected the defence evidence. The only evidence on the side of the prosecution suggesting brake failure is confined to the testimony of the hostile witnesses, PWs 1, 2 and 8, who were bent upon helping the accused at any cost. They have no basis to say that brake failed. The petitioner has not based her finding regarding brake failure, on their evidence. What prevailed with her in that respect was only the evidence of PW 3 including his inspection report Ext. P1. She consciously misread the evidence and came to conclusions. Items 1 to 3 of the passages sought to be expunged form integral parts of the reasonings to show that the conclusion of the petitioner in that respect is the result of a conscious misreading of the evidence. I shall now deal with those three passages in relation to Ext. P1, the evidence of PW 3 and the judgment of the petitioner. 9. PW. 3 is the Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector who discharged his official duty of testing the vehicle involved in the case and issued Ext. P1 report. There is nothing in Ext. P1 or his evidence as PW 3 to indicate any dishonesty on his part. In Column 10 of Ext. P1 he said that in accordance with R.270 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules he drove the vehicle at a speed of 24Kms. per hour on a straight, dry, hard, level road on top gear with clutch engaged and on application of the foot brake the vehicle stopped at a stopping distance of 5 metres. He, therefore, found that the brake is efficient. Other mechanical conditions were also examined by him and be found there was no mechanical defect. Only three types of brakes are contemplated in Columns 11 and 12 of the printed form in Ext. P1 dealing with causes of failure of brake due to various reasons mentioned in various sub clauses under each clause. Column 11 (a) deals with cause of failure of foot brake, if hydraulic. Only three types of brakes are contemplated in Columns 11 and 12 of the printed form in Ext. P1 dealing with causes of failure of brake due to various reasons mentioned in various sub clauses under each clause. Column 11 (a) deals with cause of failure of foot brake, if hydraulic. It has four sub clauses referring to four different causes of failure. As against them and in common to these four sub-clauses of clause (a) dealing with failure of hydraulic foot brake PW 1 recorded the answer “No failure of foot brake”. This is in addition to what is recorded in detail in Column 10. That means by the answers to Column 10 and 11 (a) PW 3 unambiguously indicated that hydraulic foot brake is efficient. That column need be answered and could be answered like that only if the foot brake is hydraulic. Otherwise the answer will only be “not applicable” or something like that. Over and above those answers nobody could expect an answer “yes hydraulic” because that is redundant and the mere answering as efficient indicates that it is hydraulic. 10. This is more clear from his answers in Ext. P1 to Column 11 (b) and 12. Against the entire sub-clauses of Column 11 (b) dialing with the three types of causes of failure of foot brake, if mechanical, he has answered “not applicable”. There is no difficulty in understanding from this that PW 3 meant to say that the vehicle is not having mechanical foot brake, and hence that column is not applicable. Column 12 and its four sub-clauses deal with cause of failure of hand brake. Against all the sub clauses he answered “disconnected”. Against hydraulic foot brake or mechanical foot brake or hand brake, he did not give an answer ‘yes’ because that is not necessary. It was not possible for the petitioner to think that the bus had no brake. From the above answer also, there is no difficulty in understanding that he meant to say that hand brake is” there but it is not in use and is disconnected. The counsel for the petitioner, who himself is experienced in driving (he said so), said that in transport buses, there will be no mechanical foot brake and hand brake will not be in use and the only brake in use is hydraulic foot brake. The counsel for the petitioner, who himself is experienced in driving (he said so), said that in transport buses, there will be no mechanical foot brake and hand brake will not be in use and the only brake in use is hydraulic foot brake. Unless PW 3 is disbelieved for some weighty reasons, his inspection report and evidence on efficiency of hydraulic brake has to be accepted by court. Even if he is disbelieved and rashness and negligence found against, the assertion that there are the concession and omission remain as misreading of evidence because the concession and omission are not there. 11. In the box, he gave evidence regarding these facts. He denied the suggestion that brake was tested without driving the bus. To a question put to him in cross examination whether he specifically noted the type of brake, his answer was in the negative. But in the next sentence he explained it saying that he has noted against the query “if hydraulic” in Column 11 that there is no brake failure. He also deposed that the vehicle has hydraulic brake. In my opinion, in the light of these facts, nobody could say that PW 3 did not answer Column 11 (a) or any other column in Ext. P1 or that he conceded that he did not check whether the brake is hydraulic or not, unless one is consciously interested in misreading the evidence for the purpose of disbelieving him in order to find brake failure. Believing or disbelieving what is contained in Ext. P1 or the evidence of PW 3 may involve appreciation of evidence on which two persons need not necessarily hold the same opinion. But disbelieving him solely for the reason that he conceded or omitted something essential is different. When the concession or omission are not there, such a statement could only be misreading and not appreciation. When that could be intentional, it is reasonable to notice judicial dishonesty in it. In order to support the ‘concession’ and ‘omission’ on the part of PW 3 attributed by the petitioner as unintentional her counsel could only say that she might have been misguided by the answer “no” to the question whether the type of brake was specifically mentioned in Ext. P1. In order to support the ‘concession’ and ‘omission’ on the part of PW 3 attributed by the petitioner as unintentional her counsel could only say that she might have been misguided by the answer “no” to the question whether the type of brake was specifically mentioned in Ext. P1. From the facts already discussed by me that explanation is not acceptable particularly when it concerns a senior and experienced judicial officer who claimed to have had a thread bare analysis of the documentary and oral evidence. 12. On a reading of Ext. P1 and the evidence of PW 3, there is no reason for anybody to doubt that out of the three types of brakes the only one in use in the bus was hydraulic foot brake and it was found to be efficient and there was no mechanical defect. It is not now in dispute that there is no ‘concession’ or ‘omission’ by PW3 as claimed by the petitioner. Anyhow, that is the finding of this court. The further question now is only whether the passages are justified or not. The petitioner says in Para 8 of her judgment that PW 3 conceded in cross examination that he did not check whether the brake was hydraulic or not and he did not answer question 11 (a) in Ext. P1 regarding cause of failure of foot brake, if hydraulic. This was after noticing the answers in Ext. P1 against 11 (b) as “not applicable” and his evidence that “foot brake system was efficient and no mechanical defects”. She says this is unreasonable. Why she said so is not stated. Solely on the ground that he did not ascertain the foot brake to be hydraulic or not -the petitioner damned him by saying in Para 8: “Therefore his opinion about the so-called efficiency has locus standi. Such a manipulated or inflated opinion is unbecoming of an A. M. V. I; So I am of opinion that the report of the A.M.V.I. is based on guess work or on surmises, and not on realities”. If the misreading is not intentional it is not known why she used the terms “manipulated” or “inflated” and said “opinion is unbecoming of an A.M. V.I”. If the misreading is not intentional it is not known why she used the terms “manipulated” or “inflated” and said “opinion is unbecoming of an A.M. V.I”. In order to negative the offence she was also attempting to find fault with PW7 towards the close of Para 12 for walking through the road when foot-paths were available on either side. Finally she said in Para 15: “The A. M.V. I did not take care to check up the “Hydraulic brake system”. On that solitary ground, the inspection report of the A. M. V. I has to be negated”. She also proceeded to offer various encomiums to the accused which were not warranted by the evidence and damned the trial Magistrate for having convicted the accused by observing that the trial Magistrate was provoked to convict the accused out of “personal vendetta”. All these unusual trends appeared to this Court to be a conscious deviation from the normal and impartial way ia which a judicial officer has to shape his judicial pronouncement. The integrity and impartiality of the judiciary is necessary to imbibe confidence and faith in the people for the purpose of preserving its image which is necessary for maintaining an orderly society in a democratic setup. Justice should not only be done but it should appear so to others as well. Any feeling that courts are doing things arbitrarily against the weight of materials could only undermine the image of the judiciary. High sounding words or strong and emphatic language or disparaging remarks not justified by the evidence even if repeated many times may not be accepted as substitutes for sound and good reasons supporting the conclusions in the judgment. When such instances of the officers going astray comes to its notice, it is the duty of the High Court to give a note of caution in order to warn the officers about the danger atleast for future guidance. In a democratic set up interest of the individual is only subordinate to that of the State and society. It naturally follows that the impugned passages 1 to 3 are justified by the evidence and they are integral parts of the reasonings in order to come to the conclusion that the reasonings and findings of the petitioner are unreasonable and unjustified. 13. It naturally follows that the impugned passages 1 to 3 are justified by the evidence and they are integral parts of the reasonings in order to come to the conclusion that the reasonings and findings of the petitioner are unreasonable and unjustified. 13. I can understand the petitioner being worried about damage to her reputation in spite of the consciousness of her wrongs. Then why she was unmindful of the reputation of the trial Magistrate and PW 3 and the consequences they may have to face on account of the disparaging remarks made by her without any justification and against facts. Remarks made by her against the trial Magistrate that his provocation for conviction is “nothing but a personal vendetta” were wholly unjustified and she was not the least worried about it. She appears to take it very casually. Conviction “provoked” by “personal vendetta” does not behove well for a judicial exercise. In this petition she is completely silent about it and she does not want to expunge the remark in the judgment of this court that her conduct is unbecoming of a judicial officer. Her silence could only be because she has no justification or explanation to offer. 14. But during the course of arguments, petitioner’s counsel said: “PW 2 is a relation of the trial Magistrate. When he was examined as a prosecution witness, the accused requested him not to try the case fearing prejudice. Still he tried and convicted. This complaint was raised before the petitioner while arguing the appeal against conviction. But she omitted to make a reference of it in the judgment. That is why nothing is mentioned about it in the petition”. The remarks were made by the counsel probably to give atleast a colour of justification to the remarks made against the trial Magistrate. Second respondent (accused) entered appearance through another Advocate (not the Advocate who appeared for him in the appeal before this Court) solely to support the above representation and another submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the word “vendetta” used against the trial Magistrate was without intending its full connotation. He had no other submission to make and no interest of his to be protected in this proceeding. Entering appearance in a proceeding before the High Court or Supreme Court through a lawyer will involve some amount of energy and expenditure. He had no other submission to make and no interest of his to be protected in this proceeding. Entering appearance in a proceeding before the High Court or Supreme Court through a lawyer will involve some amount of energy and expenditure. A party who has nothing to do for himself in the proceeding cannot normally be expected to take that trouble left 19 himself. He was not a necessary party to this proceeding and as requested by the petitioner’s counsel at the time of admission, notice was not issued to the second respondent. His appearance was, therefore, without notice also. 15. At the time of argument of the appeal before this Court, the accused had no complaint against the trial Magistrate. Even when the comment of “personal vendetta” was put to him and remarks sought, the then counsel only said that, without prejudice to the interest of his client, he cannot support that remark and the accused has no case that the Magistrate had any prejudice. When arguments continued the next day, the counsel, probably under further instructions, only said that there is something personal between the petitioner and the trial Magistrate and his client is not in any way responsible for the remarks. This Court did not make a note of it only because that was unnecessary and not covered by the materials on record. Then why is the present change of attitude through another Advocate. Ordinary human conduct persuades me to think that if such a ground was available to the petitioner, who was prepared to make the disparaging remark against the trial Magistrate without any attempt to justify the same, she would have definitely mentioned it in the judgment and this petition. My legitimate inference is that the appearance of the second respondent through another counsel solely for the purpose of supporting the petitioner in her two representations was at her behest alone. 16. There is nothing to show that the trial Magistrate and PW 2 are relations. PW 2 is a colleague and subordinate of the accused. He is a hostile witness who was all out to help the accused. His examination would not have in any way prompted the accused to suspect prejudice from the Magistrate to make a request for transfer for which also there is no evidence. PW 2 is a colleague and subordinate of the accused. He is a hostile witness who was all out to help the accused. His examination would not have in any way prompted the accused to suspect prejudice from the Magistrate to make a request for transfer for which also there is no evidence. Then why the petitioner has resorted to all these methods which would only strengthen the justification of the remarks sought to be expunged. 17. Leaving the impugned passage No. 4, I now pass on to Passages 5 and 6. They relate to the encomiums given by the petitioner to the accused. For the purpose of an acquittal, they were unnecessary. Still if they were justified one cannot take objection. I have discussed the evidence and it shows that whether there was brake failure or not the accident happened only because the accused overtook the parked bus without waiting for the car coming from the opposite direction to pass when the space for overtaking was narrow and many people were on the road. Even the statement of the accused, recorded under S.313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was that there was a parked bus, cars on either side and a big crowd and when brake failed he had to swerve and hit against a tree. The plea that hitting against the tree was a calculated act to avert collision “with a car coming from the opposite direction was supported only by a stray answer elicited by him in the cross examination of PW 1, a hostile witness, who was bent upon helping him at any cost. 18. Normally no presiding officer will accept the unconvincing evidence of such a hostile witness alone (it is true that the other two hostile witnesses, PWs 2 and 8, also mentioned about brake failure without any basis) to find brake failure ignoring the evidence to the contra from Ext. P1 and the evidence of PW3, by a conscious misreading of the evidence unless he is so inclined particularly. The accused has not claimed that he is an experienced driver or by his experience or prudence he knew about the brake failure. Nobody else said so. Various other attributes showered on the accused also could not be supported by the evidence on record. So also, nobody said that but for the brave deeds of the accused, inunrable lives would have been lost. Nobody else said so. Various other attributes showered on the accused also could not be supported by the evidence on record. So also, nobody said that but for the brave deeds of the accused, inunrable lives would have been lost. In showering encomium on the accused, the petitioner has assumed many things which ought to be proved by evidence or drawn by inference therefrom. These items of unusual and unjustified conduct namely, (i) disparaging and unjustified remarks against the Magistrate; (ii) similar remarks against PW3; (iii) refusal to advert to items of rashness and negligence brought out in evidence and found by the trial court; (iv) unjustified rejection of Ext.Pl and the evidence of. PW3 by conscious misreading of evidence for finding brake failure without any acceptable evidence; and (v) the unmerited encomium to the accused without any materials led this Court to think that the wrong conclusions are deliberate and intentional and not mere mistakes. These deliberate acts may be on account of the feeling expressed by her that the conviction was without even an iota of evidence or it may be due to some other reason also. It is not necessary to go into that aspect except saying that there was a conscious out of the way tendency. As part of the reasoning in that respect the impugned observations were made, which it is believed, are justified by the evidence and necessary for the disposal of the appeal. 19. Now I shall revert back to Passage No. 4 That was intended to give a caution to all concerned about the danger of the possible public opinion. From the above discussion, I feel that it is fully justified. But an argument came that it is not absolutely necessary for the decision of the appeal, as an integral part thereof and it could be expunged without emasculating the judgment and robbing it of its very rationale. That argument appears to be correct. Hence I feel that the said passages could be expunged. 20. Now I shall pass on to the legal aspects. This Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. Even though the powers of the appellate court are the same in appeals against acquittals and convictions, a line of distinction is drawn in the approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals. 21. 20. Now I shall pass on to the legal aspects. This Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. Even though the powers of the appellate court are the same in appeals against acquittals and convictions, a line of distinction is drawn in the approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals. 21. In Chandra Kanta v. State of Tripura (A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 606) j quoting with approval various decisions including Bhava Haji v. State of f Kerala (A.I.R. 1974 SC 902), Bhim Singh v. State of Maharashtra (A.I. R.1974 S.C. 286) and Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 715), it was held that while dealing with an order of acquittal, the appellate court should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the question of fact and the reasons given by the court I below in support of the order of acquittal, but it must also express its I reasons in its judgment which led.it to hold that the acquittal is not justified. Following Ramabhupala Reddy v. State of A. P. (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 460) it was held that to the tests laid down in Sanwat Singh’s case (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 715) may be added another ground that the appellate court must bear in mind the fact that the trial court had the benefit of seeing the witnesses in the witness box and the presumption of innocence is not weakened by the acquittal and therefore if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial court. Sanwat Singh’s case (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 715) said that the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor (A.I.R. 1934 P. C. 227 (2) afford a correct guide for the appellate court’s approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal and the different phraseologies, such as substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficiently cogent reasons, and strong reasons are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court to review the entire evidence and come to its own conclusions. But in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the courts below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion in these facts, but should also express those reasons in ‘its judgment, which led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified. Babu v. State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1683 S.C. 308) said that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court should not interfere unless the conclusions of the court below are not possible or it could be said to be unreasonable even if a different conclusion is possible. Some decisions even said that a mere wrong conclusion will not justify interference and that the conclusion must be so perverse that no reasonable tribunal conversant with law and legal procedure will arrive at. That shows the necessity of considering and meeting all the grounds and reasons in an order of acquittal. Therefore, I do not think that the petitioner is justified in her objection that the passages are beyond the scope of enquiry or unnecessary as integral part of the reasonings in the judgment. 22. The tests to be applied in considering expunction of disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes in for considerations before courts of law in cases to be decided by them were neatly summed up by the Honourable Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Mohammed Naim (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 703) thus: (1) Whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (2) Whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (3) Whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve. 23. In that case, there were many serious remarks against the Magistrate which even described his action as constituting grave misuse of his power and also flagrant abuse of the process of his court. These remarks were held by the Honourable Supreme Court to be integral part of the reasoning of the High Court and they were not irrelevant or foreign to the matter in issue. These remarks were held by the Honourable Supreme Court to be integral part of the reasoning of the High Court and they were not irrelevant or foreign to the matter in issue. They were held to be inextricably intertwined with the finding and order recorded by the High “Court in that case. Excision of these remarks, it was held, would emasculate the order of the High Court robbing it of its very rationale. 24. Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi (A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 294) was a case in which there was no direct evidence justifying the remarks of the High Court but there were only some circumstances. The Honourable Supreme Court said: “This Court cannot be oblivious that there has been a steady decline of public standards or public morals and public morale. It is necessary to cleanse public life in this country along with or even before cleaning the physical atmospheres. The pollution in our values and standards is an equally grave menace as the pollution of the environment. Where such situations cry out the courts should not and cannot remain mute and dumb”. 25. Trends of decline of standards or morals in judicial pronouncements and conduct of judicial officers also will have to be viewed with the same concern and sense of duty. It is necessary for that purpose that the judicial officers will have to be warned against the danger of public confidence being lost if judicial pronouncements are not based on sound and judicial reasons alone. 26. When an appeal is being heard and disposed of reasons will have to be assigned for agreeing or disagreeing with the lower court. Sometimes the views and reasonings of the lower courts may have to be criticised and opinions expressed as an integral part of the reasonings for coming to a different conclusion. That will be after fully hearing the parties who are interested in supporting and opposing the orders or judgments challenged. There is no question of the judicial officer being given an opportunity of being heard in such cases. He need not be a party and he is not personally interested in supporting the judgment or its reasons. That will be after fully hearing the parties who are interested in supporting and opposing the orders or judgments challenged. There is no question of the judicial officer being given an opportunity of being heard in such cases. He need not be a party and he is not personally interested in supporting the judgment or its reasons. As held in Mohammed Nairn’s case (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 703) and other decisions such a question of the officer or authority being before court or getting an opportunity of explaining or defending will arise only when his or her personal conduct is in question and remarks are to be made on such personal conduct. Reasons assigned or opinions expressed or conclusions arrived at in the judgment are not part of personal conduct. They are only part of the judicial function. When the correctness, legality or propriety of these aspects are considered and opinion expressed by an appellate court what is involved is only consideration of the judicial aspect. In considering that aspect if personal conduct is involved and action becomes necessary on that conduct, then alone the question of the officer being given an opportunity for personal hearing will arise. Such a contingency has not arisen in this case. Further, in this proceeding the petitioner had the full opportunity of justifying herself against the impugned passages. 27. High Court can, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, expunge remarks made by it or by a lower court if it becomes necessary to do so either to prevent abuse of the process of court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The remark need not necessarily be an abuse of the process of court. Even the expunction of a remark justified by the evidence could be said to be “otherwise to secure the ends of justice” if it is unnecessary for a fair, proper and full disposal of the matter and does not form an integral part of the reasonings or conclusions and could be separated without emasculating the judgment or depriving it of its rationale. But the jurisdiction is of an exceptional nature and has to be exercised in exceptional cases only. But the jurisdiction is of an exceptional nature and has to be exercised in exceptional cases only. It is a principle of cardinal jurisprudence in the administration of justice, that proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by the Honourable Supreme Court. At the same time, it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions, Judges and Magistrates must be guided by consideration of justice, fair play and restraint Mohammed Nairn’s case-(A.I.R. 1904 S.C. 703). It was the transgression of these limits by the petitioner and the arbitrary way in which she rejected the evidence and came to conclusions that necessitated the passages forming an integral part of the reasoning. Mohammed Naim’s case (AIR 1964 S C. 703) was an exceptional case where the inherent jurisdiction was exercised to expunge sweeping and general observations which were neither justified on the facts nor necessary for the disposal of the case. 28. Power to expunge remarks is an extra ordinary power and can be exercised only when a clear case is made out. That another Judge would not have made those comments is not the right criterion. The question is whether the Judge can be said to have acted with impropriety. A feeling that the remarks need not have been made is no justification to say that in making them the Judge acted with impropriety (State of Assam v. Ranga Muhammed - A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 903) 29. Passage No. 4 is being ordered to be expunged not because it is not justified by the evidence or unnecessary. It is fully justified by the evidence and necessary also. But even without that the judgment is complete. Its expunction will not emasculate the judgment or deprive it of its rationale. So also it is not absolutely necessary for a fair and full disposal of the appeal as an integral part of the reasoning and it is separable also. 30. Petitioner and second respondent argued the case on 21-10-1988. Public Prosecutor wanted time on behalf of the first respondent and after hearing him, arguments were closed on 25-10-1988 and orders reserved. So also it is not absolutely necessary for a fair and full disposal of the appeal as an integral part of the reasoning and it is separable also. 30. Petitioner and second respondent argued the case on 21-10-1988. Public Prosecutor wanted time on behalf of the first respondent and after hearing him, arguments were closed on 25-10-1988 and orders reserved. Probably under the impression that she is not going to succeed fully and that the new argument connecting the trial Magistrate and PW 2 may have adverse reactions, the petitioner’s counsel filed Crl. M. P. No. 1844 of 1988 on 26-10-88 praying that the Crl. M. C. may be dismissed as withdrawn. The only reason alleged is that the petitioner is now advised to withdraw the Crl. M.C. in order to move the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India for expunging the remarks. That petition was heard. Except saying that she wants to move the Supreme Court, no other reason was argued. If that is the only reason, she could have done so after waiting for this court to pronounce its order, in case of necessity. Petition appears to be in bad taste. This Court is having jurisdiction and she has chosen to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court. If she did not want this Court to give its verdict, she could have avoided it and moved the Supreme Court direct. After having submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court and at a time when the matter was heard and orders reserved, I feel that the request for withdrawal solely for moving the Supreme Court was not a proper course. That is so especially because even if the verdict of this Court is against her, the opportunity to challenge the same before the Supreme Court is there. Then why did she want to avoid a verdict from this Court. I can understand if the withdrawal is because the remedy is given up. A party can choose alternate forums if that right is there. When one of the two competent forums is chosen, the present procedure does not appear to be correct since she wants to pursue the remedy. The prayer for withdrawal is, therefore, disallowed. I can understand if the withdrawal is because the remedy is given up. A party can choose alternate forums if that right is there. When one of the two competent forums is chosen, the present procedure does not appear to be correct since she wants to pursue the remedy. The prayer for withdrawal is, therefore, disallowed. Petition is allowed in part and the passage: “If anybody goes under the impression that the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed these uncharitable, unnecessary and unjustified comments on account of personal motivations coupled with a desire to acquit the accused it may not be possible to blame them. Judicial pronouncements cannot be used as the media for giving vent to extraneous feelings or wreak personal vengeance”. from the judgment of this Court is expunged. In other respects, the petition is dismissed. Dismissed.