J.S. VERMA, C.J.—A broad brush fundamental Constitutional backdrop will help delineate the pristinely forensic controversy, in the matter of scope of writ jurisdiction of this Court. One of the fundamental principles in regard to the issuing of writ of certiorari is that it can be availed of only to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts, which expression includes the exercise of quasi judicial functions by administrative bodies or other authorities or persons in contrast to purely ministerial acts. The second essential feature of this writ is that the control exercised through it is not appellate but supervisory. In granting writ of certiorari, the superior court does not review or reweight the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It merely demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction on polpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views or those of the inferior tribunal. 2. Mere formal or technical error, even though of law, will not however be sufficient to attract extra ordinary jurisdiction under Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. Where the errors cannot be said to be errors of law, apparent on the face of the record, but they are merely errors in appreciation of documentary evidence or affidavits, errors in drawing inferences or commission to draw inference, or in other words, errors which a court sitting as a court of appeal only could have examined, there is no case for the exercise of such jurisdiction. 3 It is a well established principle that a finding of fact cannot be challenged under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the evidence before the inferior court was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the finding as a writ court is not a court of appeal. The in reference is possible only when it is shown that in recording the said finding the inferior court had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which had influenced the impugned finding. The same can not be assailed in writ jurisdiction. 4. The in reference is possible only when it is shown that in recording the said finding the inferior court had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which had influenced the impugned finding. The same can not be assailed in writ jurisdiction. 4. In one like sentence, it can be said that the jursdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court, and this limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or question in writ proceedings. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior court, the points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. 5. The matter in hand relates to the proceedings which are pending since 1954 for resumption of the Jagir and the order of Jagir Commissioner of 1958. This matter came up before the Board of Revenue in 1960 and then the earlier writ petition was dismissed in 1961. Thus, the land reforms litigation is having a chequered pendency from 1954 to 1988. 6. A sketch of the primary facts will help resolve the pristinely controversy. 7. A relief is sought in this writ petition for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari to the effect that the order dated 29 10.1976 passed by the Board of Revenue so far as it adversely affects the petitioners properties being Khasra Nos. 368, 383, part of 384 & 386 be quashed and the judgment of the Jagir Commissioner dated 27.11.1958 be restored, in full. 8. The Jagir of Thikana Kotri in Ladpura Tehsil, District Kota, was resumed on 1st August. 1954 The then Jagirdar, Durga Dan, submitted a list of his private and personal property under Rule 22 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagirs Rules, 1954 (for brevity, the Jagir Rules) before the Deputy Collector (Jagirs), Kota on November 9, 1954. 8. The Jagir of Thikana Kotri in Ladpura Tehsil, District Kota, was resumed on 1st August. 1954 The then Jagirdar, Durga Dan, submitted a list of his private and personal property under Rule 22 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagirs Rules, 1954 (for brevity, the Jagir Rules) before the Deputy Collector (Jagirs), Kota on November 9, 1954. Before any decision about these properties mentioned in the aforesaid list, came out, Shri Durga Dan Jagirdar, dies on 24.7.1955, and on 6.5.1956 Kaviraj Mahipat Singh S/o Durga Dan was brought on record as heir of Shri Durga Dan, being representative. Madho Singh, real son of Jai Singh (brother of Shri Durga Dan) claiming to be adopted son of Shri Durga Dan, Jagirdar, and two widows of Jagirdar Durga Dan, also filed various objections claiming their shares in certain properties. 9. The Deputy Collector (Jagirs) Kota referred the matter to the Jagir Commissioner under Section 23(2) of the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (for brevity, the Act). The Jagir Commissioner vide his order dated 12.1 59 ordered that lands situated in village Vinod Kalan belonged to the objector, Madho Singh while the rest of the properties as claimed by the Jagirdar applicants belonged to them. Aggrieved by this order, both the parties, i.e. the applicants and the objectors went in appeal before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue on 25.6.59 rejected both the appeals to the extent that they related to the claims on property of Kavi Raja Durga Dan arising out of his death but partly accepted the appeal and remanded the case to the Jagir Commissioner for fresh decision under Section 23(2) of the Act. It was further directed by the Board of Revenue in its order dated 25.6.59, that while making fresh inquiries, the State Government may also be allowed to put in their objections. 10. In its order dated 25.6.1959, the Board of Revenue also made it clear that for deciding the question of personal property of the Jagirs under Section 23(2) of the Act, the claim of objectors, Madhosingh, Smt. Man Kanwar & Jaisingh and two widows of Late Shri Durga Dan could not be decided under the Jagir Act, and also held that the Jagir Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide inter se dispute. 11. 11. After remand of the case, the notice to the Revenue Secretary and the Deputy Collector, (Jagirs)were issued on 17.9.1959 by the Jagir Commissioner who disallowed the objections filed by the State. The State went in appeal against this order which was allowed on 18.11.1960, and the case again remanded directing that the State would be given opportunity to raise objections and thereafter the case should be tried and decided afresh in accordance with law. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order of remand, the petitioners had filed writ petition before this Court which was dismissed on 18.7.1961. On December 27, 1962, a compromise was entered into between Smt. Umadevi, Smt. Man Kanwar, Mahipat Singh and Jai Singh and then their interest became identical vis-a-vis the State. However, the Jagir Commissioner framed necessary issues. 12. During the course of the inquiry, a controversy with regard to Stridhan arose before the Jagir Commissioner which was finally decided by this Court in a separate proceedings with the following observations: — "The claim that the property should be treated as Stridhan property of the two widows has not been pressed by the two widows themselves. We are unable to see how State Government can still press a contention that we should reverse the finding of the trial court and record findings that the property is the stridhan property of the two widows. The plea of the State of this kind is frivolous and is in complete desre-gard of the principle of justice and fair play towards those persons whose property is sought to be in fact taken over by the State. When the land stood acquired and having vested in the State in the year 1949 there can be no question of the land having been subsequently resumed, in consequence of the resumption of the Jagir." It was in this background that Jagir Commissioner was called upon to take a decision regarding items contained in various lists submitted on various occasions by late Durga Dan, his two widows, adopted son, and real son. After considering the entire document, Jagir Commissioner held items of the property mentioned in the first list, and two items from the second list filed by the Jagir-dar to be their personal property. 13. After considering the entire document, Jagir Commissioner held items of the property mentioned in the first list, and two items from the second list filed by the Jagir-dar to be their personal property. 13. Before the Board of Revenue, the State, while challenging the finding of almost all the items has confined their appeal to only 5 items of properties, i.e. Khasra Nos, 368, 383, 384, 386 and 390 for which the Board of Revenue gave its finding under impugned order which is now being challenged by way of this Writ petition by the petitioner with regard to khasra Nos. 368, 383, part of 384 & 386. 14. Khasra No. 368 is a tank of 3 bighas & 11 biswas entered at item No.13(4) in the list dated 9.11.1954 filed by the Jagirdar. All pucca constructions have been described under this claim including a outlet for irrigation. 15. It was the case of the State before the Jagir Commissioner that, Durgadan did not claim in this list that when there was no water in the tank, the land cultivated was of his personal cultivation. The total area of Khasra No. 368 as given in khata "parat harkism" Jagir thikana Kotri for "samvat year 2001 to 2003 is 108 bighas & 4 biswas, and according to the State, Durga Dans personal khata was separate for these years and was known as "khata havala Raj" and did not contain khasra No. 368. It was also questioned on behalf of the State that the tank had been constructed by the Jagirdar prior to Samvat year 2001 because in that case, the entry for khasra No. 368 would have been made in khata Hawala Raj mutation in favour of the state with regard to khasra No. 368 which was attested in the year 1948 was also disputed by the State. It was the case of the State that in khasra girdawari charsala for Samvat years 2006 to 2009 (Ex. P. 1) there were entries about irrigation of khasra No. 95 & 99 and khasra No. 100 to 107, and these khasra numbers were irrigated in the years 2006, 2007 and 2009. Ex. P. 2 shows that Hira Bhoi was a tenant of these khasra numbers and irrigation charges were realised from him as a chahi rates. These Khasras were given to Badis of the Bhoi. The Jagirdar has his own Badis bearing Khasra Nos. Ex. P. 2 shows that Hira Bhoi was a tenant of these khasra numbers and irrigation charges were realised from him as a chahi rates. These Khasras were given to Badis of the Bhoi. The Jagirdar has his own Badis bearing Khasra Nos. 304 to 322 vide Ex. P. 1 which were irrigated by the tank. According to the State counsel, in khasra girdawaris for Smt. year 2006 to 2009 in column No. 9 there is an entry for these numbers as chahi. 16. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Board of Revenue fell in error in holding that the Jagir Commissioner was not right in holding that the tank Khasra No. 368 was never used for irrigating fields and was solely used for the fields of the Jagirdar. In support of his argument learned counsel for the petitioner made a reference to clause (d) of subsection (1) of Sec. 23 of the Act which funs as under:— "23. Private Lands, buildings, wells, house sites and enclosures. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the last preceding section (d) all tanks in the personal occupation of the Jagirdar and not used for irrigating the land of any tenant in the Jagir land; shall continue to belong to or be held by such jagirdar or other person; Provided that nothing contained in clause (d) shall affect the rights of the Jagirdar in any portion of a tank which may be in the personal cultivation of the Jagirdar." Learned counsel further submitted that the tank bearing khasra No. 368 has never been used by irrigating any land of the tenant of the Jagir land & if assuming that the tank in question is being used for irrigation purposes then too, this tank can be declared as personal property of Jagirdar because the land covered by this tank was of tenly cultivated by the Jagirdar and in view of this fact as per the provisions contained in proviso to Section 23 (i) (d) of the Act the tank in question should be declared as personal property. In this context, it was further argued that none of the tenants who claimed to have irrigated their fields from the tank have been produced and that the land which is said to have been irrigated by this tank is recorded as chahi which shows that the land was being irrigated by some well and not by tank. The land being irrigated by any tank is known as Talabi as per the settlement terminology. In the light of the orders passed by the. Collector, Settlement Officers and Additional Collector, learned counsel further contended that the tank was personally cultivated by the Thikana. A stress was also given on Jagir Commissioners order dated 27. 11. 1958 wherein the tank in question was recognised as personal property of the Jagirdar without any irrigational rights for the tenants. This finding of the Jagir Commissioner was not reversed by any of the higher authorities and the Jagir Commissioner declined to review this order even though the request was made on behalf of the Revenue Secretary. The learned counsel therefore contended that the Jagir Commissioner was justified in holding that the Tank Khasra No. 368 is a personal property of the Jagirdar. The Land Acquisition Officer was informed that the compensation of this tank bearing Khasra No. 368 be given to Jagirdar. 17. The aforesaid contentions were also raised before the Board of Revenue and after going through the entire evidence on record & the contentions raised, the Board of Revenue found that the Jagir Commissioner was not right in holding that the tank khasra No. 368 was never used for irrigating the fields of the tenants and was solely used for the fields of the Jagirdar. 18. As per the provisions contained in the Act, Jagir lands are to be resumed under Section 21 of the Act at the instance of the Government which after the commencement of this Act, may, by notification in the Rajasthan Gazette appoint a date for the resumption of any class of Jagir lands. Section 22 of the Act provides that as from the date of resumption of any Jagir lands notwithstanding anything contained in any existing Jagir law applicable thereto but save as otherwise provided in this Act, the right, title and interest of the Jagirdar and of every other person claiming through him in his Jagir, lands, including forests, trees, fisheries, wells, tanks, ponds, water channels, etc. shall stand resumed to the Government, free from all encumbrances. Section 23 of the Act, is therefore exception of Section 22. 19. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act relates to the tanks of Jagir and such tanks can be declared or can be held by the Jagirdar as personal property only when it is proved that it was in his personal cultivation and that, the tank is not used for irrigating the lands of any tenants in Jagir lands. 20. It has been found by the Board of Revenue that in the present case, although Jagirdar claimed to have constructed the tank there is no evidence to support this claim. Moreover, even if the tank had been constructed during the period the land was granted in the Jagir, there is nothing to show that the money spent for the construction of the tank was from the pocket of the Jagirdar. It is on record that the land within the head of the tank was cultivated by the Jagirdar after the water dried up, but there is also evidence that other tenants like Bhois were availing of the irrigation facility from the tank. 21. The Board of Revenue by coming to the aforesaid conclusion took note of the statements of Krishna Gopal. Makhanlal and Dr. Mathura Lal and the revenue record maintained by the Jagirdar prior to resumption of Jagir. The entries in Vol. I of the register (Ex. 2) mention the tank as Boodha talab (old tank) and against the entry of field No. 368 there are entries of the fields cultivated by the vairous tenants. The Board of Revenue quoted the names of those persons used to irrigate their fields from the tank in question and paid irrigation charges to the Jagirdar. 22. On the basis of the aforesaid evidence we are of the opinion that the Board of Revenue was justified in holding that the tank bearing khasra No. 368 was used for irrigation purposes for the fields of the tenants and was not solely used for the fields of the Jagirdar. The Board of Revenue also considered the point raised on behalf of the petitioners to the effect that the land for which it is claimed that they are being irrigated from the land bearing khasra No. 368, are recorded as chahi in nature. The Board of Revenue also considered the point raised on behalf of the petitioners to the effect that the land for which it is claimed that they are being irrigated from the land bearing khasra No. 368, are recorded as chahi in nature. The Board of Revenue observed that as per the settlement terminology, chahi means land irrigated by well only and talabi means the land irrigated by a tank, but in the record maintained by the Jagirdar, himself, this distinction has not been scrupulously observed. The term Chahi talabi was ,considered to be a contradiction in terms by arguing that a land cannot be chahi and talabi both at the same time but in the register titled Khasra Teep Mauja Kotri there are entries which proved that no clearly understood distinction Was drawn between the words,chahi & talabi. There are entries from No. 100 to 105 in the khasra Teep. The name of the tenant is Hira Bhoi and the area for the various fields is different, and the class of soil-is recorded as chahi-2 and in column No. 5 of the register (Khasra Teep) the name of crop is given and the source of irrigation is entered as khasra No. 368. This entry has been repeated in clear words in respect of the numbers at serial No. 100 to 105 which has been cultivated by Hira Bhoi. Khasra Nos, 98 to 3-2 which are in occupation of the Jagirdar were also shown as chahi in the regis- ter but these fields were shown to have been irrigated not from any well chahi but by the tank bearing Khasra No. 368 In these circumstances, it cannot be said that because the land in question is recorded as chahi so it cannot be assumed that the land in question was never irrigated by the tank in question. In view of the aforesaid discussion it may be the part of the tank bed in question was in personal cultivation of Jagirdar but it cannot be said that this tank was not used for irrigating the land of any tenant in the Jagir land. In view of the aforesaid discussion it may be the part of the tank bed in question was in personal cultivation of Jagirdar but it cannot be said that this tank was not used for irrigating the land of any tenant in the Jagir land. In these circumstances, the Board of Revenue was justified in holding that the whole of the tank in question is not a personal property of the Jagirdar Attention was invited especially on the point that Jagir Commissioner in his order dated 27.11.1958 recorded that the tank in question is personal property of the Jagirdar without any irrigational right over it. This finding arrived at by the Jagir Commissioner was not reversed by the higher authorities. 23. We are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the document dated 27.11.1958 is an order under the Act This is merely an opinion of the Jagir Commissioner which was sent by him to the Land Acquisition Officer in acquisition proceedings Any property of the Jagirdar after resumption can be declared as personal property only under the Jagir Resumption Act. It cannot be disputed that the order dated 27.11.1958 was not passed in any proceedings initiated under Section 13 of the Act, In these circumstances, the Board of Revenue was justified in holding that the order dated 27.11.1958 is of Jagir Commissioner and the documents marked as Exhibits A A/2, AA/3 and AA/21 respectively are not admissible document in these proceedings because the observations in the aforesaid documents were not given in any legal proceedings. 24. The Board of Revenue came to the conclusion that the Jagirdar would no doubt get advantage of the proviso which says even if the tank provides irrigation to any other tenants the rights of the Jagirdar in any portion of the tank which was in his personal cultivation shall not be effected. 25. Other plot claimed by the Jagirdar as pergonal property is khasra No. 383 which is known as Balajiwala plot where Balajika Chabutrs is situated and this plot was not entered into list filed by Ex-Jagirdar, Durga Dan dated 9.11.54, but it was claimed by Mahipat Singh (present petitioner) in the suppli-mentary list No. 1 filed in 1957. In this regard, the Board of Revenue held that this land is part in nature and is not shown as fenced by anything like barbed wires. In this regard, the Board of Revenue held that this land is part in nature and is not shown as fenced by anything like barbed wires. Other plots claimed by the Jagirdar are stated to be enclosed and fenced. No mutation in respect of these plots have been produced. It has not been shown that this plot was ever cultivated or was used for domestic purposes by the ex-jagirdar for six years immediately preceding to the resumption of jagir. This plot is claimed as being personal property on the basis of the following grounds that, this plot was pertaining to Chabutra of Balaji which is a place of worship and is exempted* from resumption by virtue of clause (iii) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 23 of the Act, secondly that, the patta of this land had been granted by Durga Dan to Jai Singh; and lastly that it was an open enclosure and was enclosed by barbed wires. 26. The Board of Revenue found that none of the grounds alleged by the claimant to support that the claims have been proved from any evidence. After going through the revenue record maintained by the Jagirdar, it has been observed by the Board of Revenue that from these documents on record, it can be said that the plot in question is Balaji wala plot. The Board of Revenue further has not inspected the site but are inclined to believe that there might be existing somewhere on this plot a chabutra on which the idol or image of Balaji might have been installed. But only on this basis the entire plot cannot be considered as pertaining to a place of religious worship unless it could feel satisfied that its exemption from resumption is essential for proper maintenance of the chabutra or proper observance of religious worship of the diety, Moreover, Ex jagirdar Durgadan had not included this plot in the list of personal property. We fail to understand as to why this plot of land was left by Durga Dan in mentioning in the list of personal property. Moreover, the plot in question is claimed by Jai Singh as transferee of Durgadan. This could be a circumstance to exclude this land from the list of personal property given by ex-jagirdar because under Section 23 of the Act only that property can be declared as personal one which has been claimed by Jagjrdar. Moreover, the plot in question is claimed by Jai Singh as transferee of Durgadan. This could be a circumstance to exclude this land from the list of personal property given by ex-jagirdar because under Section 23 of the Act only that property can be declared as personal one which has been claimed by Jagjrdar. Khasra No. 383 has also been claimed by the jagirdar on the basis of certain transfers. In these circumstances, this plot cannot be exempted from resumption and must be deemed to have been resumed on the date of resumption of the Jagir. This was a finding of the Board of Revenue also and in these circumstances, we do not find any reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the Board of Revenue with regard to Khasra No. 383. 27. With regard to khasra No. 384, the Board of Revenue held that this Khasra number was an open enclosure. Their domestic use has been proved by oral evidence but since Smt Uma Devi & Smt. Man Kanwar were not entitled to submit lists of personal property, the portion claimed by them to be their property cannot be allowed to be retained by them as personal property of the Jagirdar. The Jagir Commissioner has thus evidently fallen into an error in entertaining the claim as he has no jurisdiction to decide interse disputes between the jagirdar and the third parties. The portions of the plot claimed by Durga Dan in the list submitted by him was thus allowed to be personal property of the Jagirdar. However, rest of the field bearing Khasra No. 384 stood resumed from 1.8.1954. 28. Under Section 23 (b) (i) all open enclosures should be used for agricultural or domestic purposes and in his Jagir Jagirdar continuous possession (including possession of any predecessors in-interest) for six years immediately before the date of resumption. "We have gone through the findings of the Board of Revenue and do not find any reason to interfere with the finding that the plot in question i.e. Khasra No. 384 is claimed by persons other than Jagirdar and there is inter-se dispute between Jagirdar and third parties. The Jagir Commissioner was not competent to decide inter se dispute. "We have gone through the findings of the Board of Revenue and do not find any reason to interfere with the finding that the plot in question i.e. Khasra No. 384 is claimed by persons other than Jagirdar and there is inter-se dispute between Jagirdar and third parties. The Jagir Commissioner was not competent to decide inter se dispute. The Board of Revenue was also justified in holding that the property if possessed and owned by the third party cannot be declared as personal property under Section 23 of the Act. In view of the findings recorded by the Board of Revenue, we are fully satisfied that part of khasra No. 384 which is not declared as personal property, has rightly been found by the Board of Revenue, and there is no room to interfere with these findings while exercising writ jurisdiction because the findings arrived at by the Board of Revenue which are questioned before us are of fact and such findings cannot be questioned in writ petition. Much can be. said about the findings with regard to the portion of Khasra No. 384 which has been declared personal property of Jagirdar but no state appeal has been filed against the order of the Board of Revenue which ought to have been filed because there were reasons to do so. In these circumstances, we have no option except to maintain the findings of the Board of Revenue with regard to that portion of Khasra No. 384 which has been declared as personal property of Jagirdar. 29. Khasra No. 386 has also been claimed by the petitioner as their property. It is a very large plot and its area is 27 bighas and 6 biswas. It was the case of the State before the Board of Revenue that this Khasra number has not been claimed by Durgadan or Mahipat Singh but Smt. Man Kanwar and Smt. Uma Devi have claimed it jointly. It was the case of the Jagirdar that the aforesaid khasra No. 386 has become personal property of Thikana by virtue of mutation dated 1 1.8.48. It was the case of the Jagirdar that the aforesaid khasra No. 386 has become personal property of Thikana by virtue of mutation dated 1 1.8.48. It was also pleaded that in some other proceedings, the District Judge and this Court have upheld the transfers dated 29.6.47 which was made by the jagirdar not only in favour of the widows, of Durgadan but in favour of the family as a whole headed by the Jagirdar whose claim for compensation was upheld by these courts. 30. The Board of Revenue held that since Jagirdar has not included this plot in the list of personal property submitted by him, the Jagir Commissioner was not justified in declaring this plot as personal property. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid findings of the Board of Revenue are based on cogent reasons and no interference is called for with these findings. 31. As we have discussed above, the Board of Revenue rejected the claim of Jagirdar with regard to Khasra Nos. 383 & 386, in addition to Khasra No. 368 subject to the proviso to section 23 (1)(d) of the Act. The Board of Revenue in its order nowhere defined the portion which was held to be in occupation or persona! cultivation of Jagirdar still that portion is declared in personal property of Jagirdar. While-exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction. We are not prepared to go into the question as which and how much portion of Khasra No. 368 is in personal cultivation of Jagirdar and this could only be done by the Board of Revenue after going through relevant facts brought on record in any other legal proceedings under law and not by writ court, because there is no section enabling this Court to reappraise the evidence without sufficient reason in law or reaching findings of the fact contrary to those rendered by the Board of Revenue or subordinate court, and if writ court proceeds to do so, it acts in excess of its powers, as has been laid down by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions, similar is the case khasra No. 384. 32. 32. We may reinterate that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is fettered to see that the inferior court or tribunal functioned within the limits of its authority, and not to correct an error apparent on the face of record, much less an error of law. And, writ of certiorari can be issued only if the order of the inferior court suffers from error of jurisdiction or from a breach of principles of natural justice or is vitiated by a manifest or apparent error of law. In the instant case, in our opinion, in view of the foregoing discussions, we find that in rejecting the claim with regard to the declaration of the personal proporty of Jagirdar under Section 23 of the Act relating to Khasra Nos. 368, 383, 384 and 386 to that extent this writ petition is limited, there was no error of law muchless an error apparent on the face of record. There is no failure on the part of the Board of Revenue to exercise its jurisdiction nor did it act in disregard of principles of natural justice nor was the procedure adopted by it not in consonance with the procedure established by law of resumption of Jagir. 33. We do not find any infirmity in the findings of the Board of Revenue which would justify interference by this Court under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution. Even otherwise, as discussed and held earlier, howsoever they may be erroneous they are of facts which can only be corrected by a court of appeal. But this Court in this petition under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution cannot act as an appellate court and reappraise the relevant facts and circumstances which led to the making of the orders of supersession as if the matter before had been brought by way of appeal. We satisfied that there is no justification for interference in the order passed by the Board of Revenue. 34. In the result, this writ petition fails and is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.