JUDGMENT B. L. Yadav, J. 1. Whether the authorities of Allahabad University (for short the University), can be permitted to go back from the promise made by them to the petitioner, a student of B. A. Part I with the subjects English, Geography and Arabic, by accepting his fee and permitting him to pursue his studies for the Degree of B. A. and the said student has pursued his study and thereby changed his position. In other words whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel is applicable to the facts of the present case, is the short point for our consideration in the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner against the Vice-Chancellor, Allahabad University and others seeking relief for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the studies of petitioner in English, Geography and Arabic as his subjects in B. A. Part I and permitting him to fill up the form of B. A. Part I Examination 1988, and to appear in the ensuing examination of B. A. Part I with the aforesaid subjects. The petitioner has further prayed for a writ of Certiorari quashing the order, if any, passed or proposed to be passed in the case of petitioner. 2. A portrayal of essential facts are these. The petitioner having passed his Intermediate Examination securing 246 out of 500 marks, appeared at the combined entrance test held by the University and C. M. P. Degree College for admission in B. A. and B. Sc. Part 1 and scored 224 out of 500 marks. In this way the total marks obtained by the petitioner were 470 out of 1000. The petitioner also appeared at the entrance test held by the Ewing Christian College, Allahabad and secured 151 out of 300 marks. He was offered admission in B. A. Part 1 in Ewing Christian College. Part 1 and scored 224 out of 500 marks. In this way the total marks obtained by the petitioner were 470 out of 1000. The petitioner also appeared at the entrance test held by the Ewing Christian College, Allahabad and secured 151 out of 300 marks. He was offered admission in B. A. Part 1 in Ewing Christian College. The petitioner came to know that he can be admitted in the University with Arabic as one of the subjects in B. A. Part I. Consequently he applied in Allahabad University for admission in B. A. Part I with Arabic, Geography and English as subjects and made application to University giving correct details without concealing any fact about the entrance test and his application was forwarded to the Chairman, Admission Committee for B. A. Part I. After looking into details furnished by the petitioner, the Chairman of the Admission Committee passed an order admitting the petitioner in B. A. Part I in the University with the aforesaid subjects. The petitioner deposited total fee of Rs. 245.50 on 27-1-88 and took admission on the same day in B. A. Part I in the University. True copy of the fee receipt has been filed as Annexure-2 to the petition. The University authorities being satisfied in all respects, issued Identity Card bearing No ABI/1904 to the petitioner on 5-2- 88 as also the Library Card No. 2135 (Annexures 3 and 4 to the petition). Similarly he deposited Cycle Stand fee and received Plate No. 1353 (Annexure-5 to the petition). However, subject allotment card was not issued to petitioner even though he approached the Vice-Chancellor and the Chairman Admission Committee. Even though the petitioner is regularly attending the theory classes of Arabic, English and Geography since the date of his admission, i. e. 27-1-88 and the attendance register of Arabic Department indicates his regular attendance, but on account of inactivity on the part of University authorities, the subject allotment card was not issued to the petitioner and the petitioner is suffering a lot. Consequently he has preferred this petition seeking the aforesaid relief. In para 4 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the University it has been stated that the petitioner made application for admission in Science Faculty in B. Sc. Consequently he has preferred this petition seeking the aforesaid relief. In para 4 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the University it has been stated that the petitioner made application for admission in Science Faculty in B. Sc. Part I, but he obtained admission in B. A. Part I. In the same paragraph it has been admitted that even if it is assumed that there was an error on the part of officials of the University to issue the intimation card for admission to Arts Faculty to the petitioner on the basis of mark sheet that related to the Science Faculty and the petitioner does not get any right for admission. All that he is entitled to is refund of the fee deposited by him. The petitioner did not make application for admission test for Arts Faculty, hence he was not entitled to admission in B. A. Part I. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that once the petitioner was successful in the entrance test for admission and the fee deposited by him was accepted, his application for admission in B. A. Part I with aforesaid subjects having been forwarded to the Admission Committee, Identity Card, Library Card and Cycle Stand fee receipt having been issued to him and in view of the fact that he continued his studies which was evident by the attendance registers of Arabic and other subjects, the petitioner matured a legal right and the University authorities were stopped from denying the admission to petitioner in B. A. Part I as they have made a promise by accepting the tuition fee etc. by the petitioner and the petitioner having changed his position on that promise continued his studies and was pursuing his studies in the aforesaid subjects. The principle of equitable estoppel or promissory estoppel were applicable and the University authorities now could not decline to permit the petitioner to pursue his studies with the aforesaid subjects and the petitioner could not be refused admit card for examination nor he could be deprived of other formalities so as to appear at the ensuing examination of B. A. Part I of 1988. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that the petitioner having appeared in the entrance test for B. Sc. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that the petitioner having appeared in the entrance test for B. Sc. could not get admission in B. A. with the aforesaid subjects and the University authorities were not estopped from declining to permit the petitioner to appear at 1988 Examination of B. A. Part I, nor the aforesaid principle was applicable. As the counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged and the parties have been heard at considerable length, as suggested by the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the petition itself may be disposed of on merits. 5. The short question for our determination is as to whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of doctrine of promissory or equitable estoppel. There is no doubt nor the respondents have denied that the petitioner appeared in the combined entrance test held by the University and C. M. P. Degree College, Allahabad for admission and was declared successful. When the petitioner filled up his form with English, Arabic and Geography as the subjects, the same was forwarded to the Admission Committee and when the tuition fee etc. was being accepted a greater scrutiny was required on the part of the University authorities as to whether the petitioner could be permitted to offer the aforesaid subjects in B. A. Part I. There is no denying the fact that the petitioner has passed his entrance test, may be for B. Sc. Part I, but he, in fact, obtained admission and deposited tuition fee etc. for B. A. Part I. In case a student qualifies entrance test for admission in B. Sc. Part I and manages to obtain admission in B. A. Part I, it could not be said that he concealed some facts or managed to obtain admission for Science subjects in B. Sc. Part I, when in fact, he was qualified in the entrance test only for Arts. The petitioner, in fact, appeared in the entrance test for B. Sc. Part I and filled up his form with the arts subjects, which was prima facie accepted and forwarded to the Admission Committee. No scrutiny appears to have been done at that stage nor any scrutiny was made at the time when the tuition fee etc. was being accepted nor at the time when the Identity Card, Library Card etc. were issued to him. No scrutiny appears to have been done at that stage nor any scrutiny was made at the time when the tuition fee etc. was being accepted nor at the time when the Identity Card, Library Card etc. were issued to him. The only irresistible conclusion is that with open eyes the University authorities forwarded the admission form of the petitioner with the aforesaid subjects to the Admission Committee accepting his fee etc. Under these circumstances, there could be no two opinions that the University authorities were prima facie satisfied and they declined to go in detail, when in fact greater scrutiny was required. What the respondents have stated in the counter affidavit could have been detected, but the same was not done. Under the circumstances the only legally deducible inference is that a promise was made by the University authorities and the petitioner changed his position by pursuing his study and attending his classes as was evident from the attendance register of Arabic and other classes. There would certainly be a detriment and great prejudice to promisee (the petitioner) by not acting on the promise, the petitioner would suffer immensely. In such situation keeping in view the kind of detriment and prejudice contemplated by permitting the promisor to go back on the promise, a new principle of equitable estoppel or promissory estoppel has been evolved and made applicable as it would be totally inequitable to allow the promisor to go back upon his promise In this country not only the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been adopted in its fulness and apart from using it as a weapon for defence, it has been adopted as a weapon of attack or a cause of action to the promisee (the petitioner). There could not be any distinction in applicability of this doctrine either promisor appears to be a private individual or a State Government or an instrumentality of the State Government or a local body or an educational institution. In the present case there is no justification to deprive the petitioner from benefits of this doctrine emanating principally from equitable consideration. The University authorities could not be kept separately from private individuals so far as the applicability of this doctrine is concerned in this country. In the present case there is no justification to deprive the petitioner from benefits of this doctrine emanating principally from equitable consideration. The University authorities could not be kept separately from private individuals so far as the applicability of this doctrine is concerned in this country. It is better to quote an observation from their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U. P., AIR 1979 SC 621 at 629 para 7 as follows :- "This doctrine has been variously called 'promissory estoppel', 'equitable estoppel', 'quasi estoppel' and 'new estoppel'. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly named 'promissory estoppel', it is as we shall presently point out, neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. It is interesting to trace the evolution of this doctrine in England and to refer to some of the English decisions in order to appreciate the true scope and ambit of the doctrine particularly because it has been the subject of considerable recent development and is steadily expanding. The basis of this doctrine is the interposition of equity. Equity has always, true to form, stepped in to mitigate the rigors of strict law." In para 16 of the aforesaid case it was observed as follows : "The courts in America for a long time took the view that the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply to Government but more recently the Courts have started retreating from that position to a sounder one, namely, that the doctrine of promissory estoppel may apply to the Government when justice so requires.........Devis on Administrative Law (3rd Edn.) pages 344-345 it was observed : Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government. It is bard to see why the Government should not be held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens." In para 19 of the aforesaid case it was observed as follows : "The doctrine of estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived." It is better to quote some observations from English decisions as follows : "Lord Denning has extra judicially suggested that where there is a deliberate promise which is intended to affect legal relations, it would be inequitable to hold that the promiser is not bound when the promisee has acted on the promise. Sometimes it is plaintiff who is not allowed to act on his legal rights. It is also implicit in modern cases where principle has been developed. Thus a creditor is not allowed to enforce a debt which he has deliberately agreed to waive, if the debtor has carried on business or in some other way changed his position in reliance on the waiver. A Government department was also bound by promissory estoppel". See 1947 KB 130 Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees and House Ltd., (1948) 2 All ER 767 Robertson v. Ministry of Pensions ; (1951) AC 837, Howell v. Eals Mouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd. 6. Keeping in view the aforesaid observations and under the circumstances of the case we are of the view that as the University authorities accepted the fee of the petitioner and his application form was forwarded to the Admission Committee to permit him to study with aforesaid subjects in B. A. Part I and it is also a fact that he appeared at the entrance test and was successful, there would be on concealment of material facts. The University authorities were required to be more vigilant at the stage when the tuition fee etc. was being accepted or when his application form with the aforesaid subjects was forwarded to the Admission Committee. Once that was done it cannot be said that the petitioner has made any material concealment. The petitioner has been pursuing his studies with the aforesaid subjects. was being accepted or when his application form with the aforesaid subjects was forwarded to the Admission Committee. Once that was done it cannot be said that the petitioner has made any material concealment. The petitioner has been pursuing his studies with the aforesaid subjects. As the petitioner has acted upon the promise made by the University authorities by appearing at the entrance test, by filling up the form with the aforesaid subjects and that being forwarded to the Admission Committee, it would be totally inequitable and would create a great immeasurable detriment and considerable prejudice to petitioner in case the petitioner was not permitted to appear at the ensuing B. A. Part I Examination with the aforesaid subjects. The principle of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel was applicable and the petitioner was entitled to its benefit. The University authorities were estopped room denying the petitioner the admission or to refuse the aforesaid subjects offered by him. We are, however, conscious about the limitation of our jurisdiction that ordinarily the Courts should feel hesitant to dislodge the decisions of academic bodies. Even though there is no ban on the power of the Court, but it has been a rule of prudence on the basis of catena of decisions that if some decision has been taken by the Vice-Chancellor of the University or some academic body, the Court may ordinarily keep its hands off where it is a education question. But where question is about particular principle of law being made applicable or to understand it in the context or to permit the particular principle to be carried out and give effect to, consequently it would not be fair for the Court to allow to keep its hands off from the decision of the University authorities or academic bodies. See Or. J. P. Kulshreshtha v. The Chancellor, 1980 SC 2141. As in the present case the point was about the applicability of the principle of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel and its legal effect, it is better that this Court may pass an appropriate order. The impugned decision of the University authorities cannot be said to be within the realm of educational matter. 7. Applying the Priorari and Posteriori reasonings we are of the view that the petitioner is entitled to a writ of Mandamus prayed for. 8. The impugned decision of the University authorities cannot be said to be within the realm of educational matter. 7. Applying the Priorari and Posteriori reasonings we are of the view that the petitioner is entitled to a writ of Mandamus prayed for. 8. We, therefore, direct the respondents to permit the petitioner to pursue his studies in B. A. Part I with English, Arabic and Geography as subjects in the University and to permit him to appear in the ensuing examination of B. A. Part I of 1988 with the aforesaid subjects. It is further directed that any order to the contrary creating impediment in the petitioner's study with the aforesaid subjects in B. A. Part I or Part II is hereby quashed. Under the circumstances, however, we make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.