JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala 1. This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under section 21 (1-A) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The premises in dispute is a house bearing no. 63 (old no. 23), Raipur Road, Dehradun. C. K. Thakkar, respondent no. 2, is the landlord. The Colonel Brown Cambridge School is the tenant. Sri C. K. Thakkar was employed in the Indian Railways and at the time when the release application was made, he was an Additional Chief Electrical Engineer in the Western Railway residing in Bombay. He retired on 31st December, 1985. He moved the release application under section 21 of the Act on 31st December, 1984, one year before the date of his retirement, on the ground that he was entitled to the benefit of Section 21 (1-A) of the Act. In the application, it was further alleged that after retirement, he would settle down at Dehradun. His father had been residing at Dehradun. It was further stated that he did not own or possess any other property and, as such, needed the property genuinely and bona fidely for his own use and occupation on his retirement. 3. C. K. Thakkar further alleged in the application for release that he has got son and daughter. His son is a Marine Engineer and is of marriagable age and is employed in the Marchant Navy. Since he is in the Marchant Navy, the family of the son, when married, would not of the time, be residing with him. It was also stated that the daughter has passed her M. B. B. S. Examinations in the year 1982 and was pursuing her Post-graduate studies and that she was keen and desirous of starting her practice at Dehradun. 4. The release application was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the need set up by C. K. Thakkar, the landlord, was not a bona fide need. In fact, it was alleged that the application itself was not bona fide, as the application for release was made with an ulterior motive with a view to dispose of the property for making high profits. In fact, it was alleged that the application itself was not bona fide, as the application for release was made with an ulterior motive with a view to dispose of the property for making high profits. The petitioner further asserted that it is a most renowned educational institution of the country and students from all over the country and outside India come and study at the school which runs classes from class I to I. C. S. E. and the school is run on public school lines. It was further alleged that it admits residential students and there are about 460 students in different age groups of classes, who are getting modern education with the best staff in the school. It was alleged that the property in dispute was taken on rent about forty years back besides other buildings and that the building is used as a dormitory in which 35 students sleep in the night. The students sleep in the main building, which is known as the Patel House. In the annexe, teachers and members of the staff reside while the outhouses are being occupied by the Chowkidar and Mali etc. The Prescribed Authority by its judgment dated 21st March, 1986, dismissed the application for release holding that the application was not bona fide. Aggrieved by the said decision, C. K. Thakkar filed an appeal under section 22 of the Act. The appeal came up for hearing before the 2nd Additional District Judge, Dehradun and by judgment dated 2nd March, 1987, the appeal was allowed. The application of the landlord under section 21 (1-A) of the Act was allowed and the premises in dispute was released in favour of the landlord. 5. The appellate authority held that it is not disputed that C. K. Thakkar was holding a responsible post in the Indian Railways and that he has retired from service now. It is also not disputed that as the result of the cessation of his employment, he had to vacate the public premises provided to him by the railways. It is also not disputed that C. K. Thakkar has no other building belonging to him and available for his occupation except the premises in dispute. It has been found by the appellate court that the application moved by the landlord is bona fide. It is also not disputed that C. K. Thakkar has no other building belonging to him and available for his occupation except the premises in dispute. It has been found by the appellate court that the application moved by the landlord is bona fide. It has been held that the need set up by the landlord for his family, including his son and the daughter, is bona fide and that it cannot be taken to be purposive. It was also held that the property in dispute is used for residential purposes. The appellate authority recorded a categorical finding that the landlord was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment and, as such, the provisions of section 21 (1-A) of the Act were clearly applicable and he was entitled to the benefit of the same, as the application was bona fide and the need was genuine. Aggrieved by this decision of the appellate authority dated 2nd March, 1987, the petitioner has filed the present petition. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised various contentions to challenge the judgment given by the appellate authority. His first submission is that Section 21 (1-A) of the Act is ultra vires, as it is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution and, consequently, the benefit of Section 21 (1-A) of the Act cannot be given to the landlord. The second submission is that the appellate authority did not consider the extent of the accommodation available with the landlord before considering the bona fide need of the landlord and, as such, the finding given in regard to bona fide need is vitiated in law. The third submission is that the disputed premises consists of three buildings. Under section 21 (1-A) of the Act, only one building can be released and not more than one building. Since the release application has been allowed as a whole, the order of release is vitiated. The fourth submission is that the property in dispute is not a residential accommodation and, as such, Section 21 (1-A) of the Act does not apply. Since the release application has been allowed as a whole, the order of release is vitiated. The fourth submission is that the property in dispute is not a residential accommodation and, as such, Section 21 (1-A) of the Act does not apply. The fifth and the last submission is that C. K. Thakkar, the landlord, is only a co-owner of the property and, as such, he is not entitled to maintain the application under section 21 (1-A) of the Act. 7. In so far as the first contention is concerned, the question whether section 21 (1-A) of the Act is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India or not was considered in the case of Purshottam Saran v. 3rd Additional District Judge, Moradabad, 1981 ARC 524. In that case, Hon'ble N. D. Ojha, J. (as he then was) opined as under : "Counsel for the petitioner then urged that sub section (1-A) was discriminatory and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. Nothing, however, has been pointed out as to how the said sub section is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. Reasonable classification is not prohibited by Article 14 of the Constitution. All such Government servants who were in the occupation of public building in connection with their employments and who have to vacate the public buildings as a consequence of cessation of their employments constitute a class by themselves. Sub-section (1-A) has been made applicable to all the government servants falling in this category. It makes no distinction between one government servant and the other, so far as the conferment of benefit of sub section (1-A) is concerned. Therefore, it cannot be said that this sub section is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution." 8. I respectfully agree with the above decision. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged, relying upon the decision in the case of D. S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 = 1983 (1) SCC 305 , that the classification made out in section 21 (1-A) of the Act does not satisfy the twin tests of classification being founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that that differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Statute in question. The argument is that the classification is not founded on an intelligible differentia and does not have the rational nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by the Statute in question. It has, consequently, to be examined as to whether the above mentioned two tests laid down in the case of D. S. Nakara v. Union of India (supra) have been fulfilled in the present case or not. In Kalyan Rai Saxena v. The 2nd Additional District Judge, Buland- shahr, 1982 AWC 100 , a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to interpret Section 21 (1-A) of the Act. While interpreting the said 'Section, it laid down as to what was the object of the Act. It was held as under : "In our opinion, Section 21 (1-A) was enacted for providing an immediate shelter to a landlord who is left without any accommodation in consequence of having to vacate upon cessation of his employment, a public building. The Legislature appears to have made this provision to meet the exigency arising out of the landlord being confronted with the serious problem of finding an accommodation for his residence after being deprived of the use of public building which was allotted to him in consequence of his employment, so that the landlord might rehabilitate himself without going through the rigorous and time consuming process envisaged under section 21 (1-A)." 9. From the above opinion, given by the Division Bench in regard to the object for which section 21 (1-A) of the Act was enacted, it is clear that it was enacted for the purpose of giving benefit to such landlords only who have to vacate a public building upon cessation of their employment, This classification has been made to achieve the above object and, as such, it is clearly founded on an intelligible differentia. The Act created a separate class of such landlords who were in occupation of a public building and they had to vacate the said building on the cessation of their employment. The other class of landlords, who did not have to vacate the public building due to the cessation of their employment, therefore, stood in a different class by themselves. The landlords, who though ceased to be in service, but were not asked to vacate a public building, continued to remain in the said building and, therefore, they were not given this benefit. 10. The landlords, who though ceased to be in service, but were not asked to vacate a public building, continued to remain in the said building and, therefore, they were not given this benefit. 10. This Act was promulgated with the object of regulating the eviction of tenants from certain class of buildings in the interest of general public, situate in urban areas. Public interest requires that persons residing in public building should vacate the same on the cessation of their employment. The question then would arise that where would these persons go ? It was in these special circumstances that the Legislature made a provision for evicting tenants of these affected persons. The classification, consequently has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the classification, in the instant case, was not founded on an intelligible differentia and that it did not have rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Section 21 (1-A) of the Act is not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. In regard to the second submission, the clear case of the landlord, which was stated in para 5 of the release application, was that neither he nor any member of his family, owns or possesses any other property and, consequently, he needs the said property bona fidely and genuinely for his own use and occupation on his retirement. In the written statement filed in reply to the release application, this fact was not specifically denied. Paragraph 5 of the petition for release was replied as under : "5. Para 5 of the petition is not admitted, it is wrong to say that the applicant after retirement intends to settle at Dehradun or that he has a number of friends and acquaintences at Dehradun. The petitioner does not intend to settle at Dehradun and has hardly come to Dehradun till now." 12. The petitioner did not deny the fact that the landlord does not own or possess any other accommodation. The landlord further filed an affidavit, which is Annexure 3 to the petition. The petitioner does not intend to settle at Dehradun and has hardly come to Dehradun till now." 12. The petitioner did not deny the fact that the landlord does not own or possess any other accommodation. The landlord further filed an affidavit, which is Annexure 3 to the petition. In paragraph 6 of the said affidavit, it has been again reiterated that the landlord or any member of the family does not own or possess any other property anywhere in India. The Principal of the petitioner school Sri Abhai Singh filed a reply to this affidavit and, in reply, this fact was again not specifically denied. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out as to what accommodation is available with the landlord He has also failed to prove that there was any other accommodation available with the landlord. In the circumstances, the question of consideration of the extent of the accommodation with the landlord did not arise. This argument is wholly misconceived. In regard to the third submission, I have examined the written statement filed by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority as well as the affidavit filed by the Principal on behalf of the petitioner. Nowhere this question has been taken up by the petitioner. This question has been raised, for the first time, in this Court. The question whether three buildings are sought to be released or one is pure question of fact and unless it was raised before the Prescribed Authority, it cannot be permitted to be raised in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. In paragraph 15 of the written statement, it was only stated that more than forty years ago, property no. 43, Raipur Road, which is the property in dispute, was taken on rent for the school purpose and that the school had also taken other buildings on rent in connection with education purposes. It has been further stated that the Civil Judge in suit no. 206 of 1971, which was decided on 12th November, 1974, it was held that the building under tenancy included the lawn, orchard land etc. including the main house, known as Patel House, double storeyed cottage and the out houses in the south. The petitioner himself treated the Patel House along with the double storeyed cottage and out houses in the south as one single unit of tenancy. including the main house, known as Patel House, double storeyed cottage and the out houses in the south. The petitioner himself treated the Patel House along with the double storeyed cottage and out houses in the south as one single unit of tenancy. Similarly, in paragraph 3 of the Affidavit of Abhai Singh, who is the Principal of the School, which is attached as Annexure 4 to the writ petition, it has been stated that the premises no. 63, Raipur Road, consists of open lawn, main building Patel House and double storeyed annexe and in the southern, a number of out houses. In the circumstances, it is clear that the petitioner's own case was that the main building, namely, Patel House, as well as the annexe and out houses were treated as one building under tenancy. The case now set up that the main house, the annexe and the out houses should be treated as three buildings, is a case clearly an after thought. This does not bear out from the facts of the present case. In view of the above, the argument made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the property sought to be released consists of three buildings, is wholly misconceived. "Section 21 (1-A) of the Act reads as under : - 21 (1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 2, the prescribed authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purpose which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment: Provided that an application under this sub-section may also be given by a landlord in occupation of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employment, but the order of eviction on such application shall take effect only on the date of his actual cessation." 14. The above sub-section (1-A) of section 21 of the Act clearly provides that the landlord, who is in occupation of a public building, can seek eviction of a tenant from 'any building under tenancy'. Under this sub-section, consequently, a building under tenancy can be got released. The above sub-section (1-A) of section 21 of the Act clearly provides that the landlord, who is in occupation of a public building, can seek eviction of a tenant from 'any building under tenancy'. Under this sub-section, consequently, a building under tenancy can be got released. In law, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is correct that by virtue of the provisions of section 21 (1-A) of the Act, the landlord cannot get more than one building under tenancy released under this sub-section. The Legislature contemplated that the landlord can take benefit of section 21 (1-A) of the Act in respect of one building under tenancy. In view of the above, though the submission, in law, made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is correct, but there is no factual foundation to the effect that the premises in dispute are more than one building under tenancy. Here the premises in dispute was given on rent as a single building under tenancy which included the main house, the annexe as well as the out houses and, as such, it cannot be said that the premises in dispute constituted three buildings under tenancy. In regard to the fourth submission, on a perusal of section 21 (1-A) of the Act, which has already been quoted above, it is clear that the relevance of residential purpose is in respect of a public building, which is occupied by the landlord. The Legislature did not contemplate that the building sought to be released under sub-section (1-A) should also be a building used for residential purpose. It has been clearly stated in the above sub-section that the landlord of a building, who is in occupation of a public building for residential purpose was entitled to move an application under this sub-section and, as such, the question of the building in dispute being used for residential purpose or not is not relevant for the purposes of the decision of an application under section 21 (1-A) of the Act. 15. In any case, I have examined the findings recorded by the appellate authority. The appellate authority has clearly recorded a finding that the building sought to be released is a residential building. I do not find any infirmity in this finding. In the circumstances, this submission also, in my opinion, made by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not have substance. 16. The appellate authority has clearly recorded a finding that the building sought to be released is a residential building. I do not find any infirmity in this finding. In the circumstances, this submission also, in my opinion, made by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not have substance. 16. In regard to the last submission made by the learned counsel, it may be stated that in para 1 of the release application, specific averment was made that C. K. Thakkar was the landlord of the premises in dispute and the petitioner was the tenant in the said premises. This paragraph 1 was admitted by the petitioner in the written statement. Consequently, it is the admitted case of the parties that C. K. Thakkar is the sole landlord of the premises in dispute. In para 30 of the petition, it has been stated that C. K. Thakkar is not the exclusive owner, but he is also acting on behalf of his son R. Thakkar who had one fourth share and, consequently, the landlord has no right to move an application under section 21 (1-A) of the Act. This argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, is fallacious. There is a difference between a landlord and a co-owner. It is admitted that the sole landlord is C. K. Thakkar. Even if there are other co-owners of the property, the fact remains that C. K. Thakkar is the sole landlord. In the circumstances, the application under section 21 (1-A) of the Act by a sole landlord is clearly maintainable. 17. Even if it is taken that R Thakkar, the son of C. K. Thakkar, is also a co-owner of the property then too, the question whether an application by a co-owner landlord is maintainable or not, has already been decided by this Court in J. C. Gupta v. District Judge, Dehradun, 1978 ALJ 1306. Hon. K- C. Agarwal, J. relying upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak, AIR 1977 SC 1599 held that even if the building belonged to several persons, that will not disentitle one of the co-owners from claiming benefit of sub section (1-A) of section 21 of the Act. I respectfully agree with this decision. I respectfully agree with this decision. In the circumstances, the last submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner also, in my opinion, does not have substance. 18. In the instant case, the petitioner has argued on the basis as if by eviction from the building in dispute, the entire working of the petitioner school is likely to be affected. It is not so. The petitioner has got many buildings in its possession and it is a private school run on public school lines and the final examinations are conducted by the Council for the Indian School Certificate Examinations, New Delhi. In view of the above, the petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. The ex parte interim order dated 26th March, 1987, is hereby vacated. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.