Judgment :- 1. Petitioner seeks to revise the concurrent findings, entered by courts below, finding him guilty of offences under S.376 and 450 IPC. Charge against petitioner was, that he trespassed into the house of PWI (a 14 year old girl) at or about 1.30 p.m. on 23-9-86 when she was alone and committed rape, against her will and without her consent, putting her in fear of death. PWI was attending to household chores, when petitioner (on the wrong side of 70), accosted her, closed the door, showed a sickle and threatened to kill her, if she raised her voice. He then pressed her down to sit, undressed her and effected penetration. Meanwhile, PW2 mother of PWI returned home, and seeing the door ajar called out her daughter. Walking in she saw, what any mother would wish, she had not seen. PW2 flew into a rage and pushed the petitioner down, asking him why he had ruined her child. Then she started sobbing. Petitioner sustained a knee injury in the process. This, is the version of PWI. 2. PW2 stated that she saw PW1 and petitioner in coitus. There is no reason to disbelieve her, for, no mother in a convential society is likely to foist a case tarnishing the reputation of her daughter of such tender years. That, PW2 came rushing and reported what had happened, is spoken to by PW5, a neighbour. PW5 also saw PWI sitting and crying. PW6 another neighbour heard the cry of PW2 around 1.30 p.m. and went to her house. Then he saw PWI, in tears. PWI told him of the happenings. The evidence of these disinterested witnesses, contemporaneous and unimpeachable, corroborate the version of PWI, chapter and verse. Further corroboration is available-if it be needed. MO 2 rag with which PWI wiped herself, and M03 underwear worn by her, recovered under Ext. P5 mahazar attested by PW8 contained 'semenal plasma' and 'traces of blood' as seen from Ext. P19 certificate, issued by the Director of Forensic Science Laboratory. The cloth worn by petitioner also contained traces of semen. Yet, another corroborative and confirmatory link, is the evidence of PW9 Doctor who examined petitioner, and noticed a knee injury, corresponding to that indicated by PWs.1 and 2. PW9 would further say that petitioner told him that the injury was caused by Thankamani (PW2). The cloth worn by petitioner also contained traces of semen. Yet, another corroborative and confirmatory link, is the evidence of PW9 Doctor who examined petitioner, and noticed a knee injury, corresponding to that indicated by PWs.1 and 2. PW9 would further say that petitioner told him that the injury was caused by Thankamani (PW2). The evidence of PW9, would also show that petitioner was quite virile. The evidence aforementioned, clearly proves the charge. 3. Main contention raised by counsel for petitioner is that medical evidence negative the charge of rape. The. contention is fallacious. Medical evidence can hardly ever, negative a charge of rape. It may not support the charge. It cannot negative. PW12 and PW13 Gynaecologist and Professor in the Medical College respectively, who examined PW2 per vagina, clearly state that PW1 had an elastic hymen, which can survive sexual intercourse. These witnesses further state that rupture of hymen is not necessary, in cases of such elastic hymen. If medical evidence is neutral, oral evidence and Ext. P19 certificate conclusively prove the charge. 4. Counsel then submitted that the act was with the consent of PWI, also submitting that PW1 had attained the age of 16. The courts below relying on the evidence of PWs 2,3,10 and 11, found that PW1 was below 16 at the material time, her date of birth being 8-5-72. Besides, it was elicited in the cross-examination of PW2, leaving nothing to doubt, that she was married to PW3 in December, 1969. The question of consent is therefore immaterial and alien to the context. 5. The trial judge negatived consent (para 18). The Sessions Judge found that the act, was with the consent of PW1 (para 7). Inspired by this, counsel for petitioner argued, and vehemently too, that no offence was made out. What appears to have persuaded the Sessions Judge to this view, is the coital posture, graphically described in para 7 of her judgment. It was noticed that petitioner seated PW1 on his lap and pulled her to him abducting her legs, and effected penetration, sliding her forth and back cupping her buttocks, with his hands. P.W1 did not remonstrate against the proceedings. This, suggested consent, to the court below. Mellower consideration, would have led to a different conclusion. It was noticed that petitioner seated PW1 on his lap and pulled her to him abducting her legs, and effected penetration, sliding her forth and back cupping her buttocks, with his hands. P.W1 did not remonstrate against the proceedings. This, suggested consent, to the court below. Mellower consideration, would have led to a different conclusion. For all one knows, PW1 might have been too dazed to react, or her reflexes would have been benumbed by the strange and the swift, turn of events. The responses of PWI, a young village girl unaccustomed to sex, cannot be equated to those of a woman to whom sex is familiar. Even otherwise, in the case of a woman going through her first sexual experience, responses could be tremulous. PW1 was caught unawares in a situation she did not anticipate, and to which she could not easily reconcile herself to. This must explain lack of resistance. Patterned responses cannot be predicated. Application of set behavioural patterns in these regions would spell hazards. Evaluation of evidence, must be made with a sense of reality and sensitivity not with a wooden thumb rule. The law of life and the law of evidence, cannot be far apart. The judicial antenna must register feeling and judgment. The observations of the Supreme Court in Rafiq v. State (AIR 1981 SC. 569) serve fruitful repetition. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the court stated the perspective elegantly: "We cannot accept the argument that regardless of specific circumstances of a crime and criminal mileu, some strands of probative reasoning ... must be mechanically extended, Indeed, from place to place, from age to age, from varying lifestyles and behavioural complexes, inferences from a given set of facts, oral and circumstantial, may have to be drawn not with dead uniformity but realistic diversity lest rigidity in the shape of rule of law in this' area be introduced through a new type of precedential tyranny Judicial response to human rights cannot be blunted by legal bigotry" It is indeed, difficult to see why the Sessions Judge considered the question of consent at all, in the case of a girl whom she found to be below 16. As observed by the Supreme Court in Harpal Singh & others v. State of H. P. (AIR 1981 S. C. 361) the question of consent does not arise, in the case of a girl below 16. As observed by the Supreme Court in Harpal Singh & others v. State of H. P. (AIR 1981 S. C. 361) the question of consent does not arise, in the case of a girl below 16. It must be held, as rightly held by the trial judge that there was no consent. Conviction is therefore proper. 6. The sentence of imprisonment for three years awarded by the trial court was reduced to six months by the appellate court on account of the age of petitioner. What was an aggravating factor was reckoned as a mitigating factor. Petitioner well past 70, and a neighbour of PW1, indulged himself in vile lechery. Petitioner carried the flame of desire to the sunset shores of life. This is no mitigation, or reason to be merciful. That apart, the court below misdirected itself in thinking that precedent, persuaded such a course. Relying on the decision in R. K. Agarwal v. State (AIR 1976 S. C. 1774), the Sessions Judge reduced the sentence, observing, "while, considering the age of the accused, sentence was reduced by the Supreme Court". No, far from it. The Supreme Court observed: "Having regard to the beastliness of crime and the short term of imprisonment, we are in no mood to attenuate reduce) the Punishment". (emphasis supplied) The sentence of three years imposed by the trial court was considered "condign" (well = deserved). Misreading the decision, the court below, thought that its discretion was cabined, confined and cribbed by precedent. However, in the absence of an appeal by the State for enhancement, I do not propose to issue notice for enhancement. Conviction and sentence are confirmed and revision petition is dismissed.