JUDGMENT V.K. Khanna, J. - At the very outset it may be mentioned that the present writ petition along with several other connected writ petitions were heard by a Bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. R. M. Sahai and Hon'ble Mr. Om Prakash, JJ. who allowed the writ petitions, on 16-10-1987 (reported in .1987 All LJ 1504). Thereafter, a review application was filed by the State Government which was allowed and the earlier judgment was set aside. On 6th April,1988 the petitions were listed before the Bench of Hon'ble R: M. Sahai and Hon'ble Mr. D. S. Sinha, JJ. and the following order was passed by the Bench : "These petitions were heard at admission stage and decided by bench consisting of one of us as a member. Later on orders were recalled on application of respondent. It appears to us that it would be in the interest of justice if these petitions are heard by a Bench of which Hon'ble R. M. Sahai is not a member. Papers of the ,petitions may, therefore, be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for directing them to be listed before appropriate Bench." 2. Our bench was thereafter nominated by the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice and it is in these circumstances that the present writ petition and the other connected writ petitions have been finally heard by us. 3. In all these cases Sri R. A. Sharma, L.P. Naithani and C. P. Ghildiyal Advocates are appearing as counsel for the petitioners. Sri A. P. Singh has appeared as counsel for the respondents in all the cases. Counsel for the parties made a statement that writ petition No. 810 of 82 will be argued by them as the leading case inasmuch as the essential facts and questions of law involved in all the writ petitions were common. In view of the aforesaid statement, to obviate the repetition of the facts only facts of the leading writ petition No. 810 of 82 are briefly stated. 4. The petitioner is the owner of Bus No. UTY 2737. The Indian Farmers Fertilizers Co-operative Limited (hereinafter referred to as the 'IFFCO') has got a fertilizer factory at Phulpur in the district of Allahabad. According to the petitioner, many of its employees live in the city of Allahabad and go to Phulpur for working in the factory every day. 4. The petitioner is the owner of Bus No. UTY 2737. The Indian Farmers Fertilizers Co-operative Limited (hereinafter referred to as the 'IFFCO') has got a fertilizer factory at Phulpur in the district of Allahabad. According to the petitioner, many of its employees live in the city of Allahabad and go to Phulpur for working in the factory every day. On account of want of adequate means of transportation the employees of the 'IFFCO' were facing great difficulty to attend their duties at Phulpur from Allahabad city and vice versa. The 'IFFCO' invited applications from the bus owners for hiring private buses for the purposes of transportation of its employees from Allahabad to Phulpur and back every day. The petitioner offered his bus and the 'IFFCO' accepted the offer vide its letter dated 7-3-1979 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition). The important terms and conditions which were laid down in the aforesaid letter were that the es the petitioner are that the employees of the maintenance costs including diesel oil charges, payment of salary and overtime to drivers will be borne by the petitioner. It was also agreed between the parties that the petitioner will also be liable to meet all the statutory requirements and payment of taxes, insurance etc. at his own costs. The payment for hiring of the bus was to be made on monthly basis within 15 days of the presentation of the bill to 'IFFCO' by the petitioner. Another offer for the subsequent year practically on the same terms and conditions was accepted by the 'IFFCO' vide an agreement dated 26-4- .1980 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition). It has also not been disputed that the petitioner in respect of his Bus No. UTY 2737 had obtained a "contract carriage" permit under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") which stipulated that the bus of the petitioner will be used for carrying the employees of the 'IFFCO' from Phulpur to Allahabad and from Allahabad to Phulpur. 5. A show cause notice was given to the petitioner by the Passenger Tax Officer, Allahabad (respondent 1) asking him to show cause as to why passenger tax, additional passenger tax, etc, be not recovered from the petitioner and further that the petitioner should show cause as to why penalty be also not levied for not filing the returns in time. A show cause notice was given to the petitioner by the Passenger Tax Officer, Allahabad (respondent 1) asking him to show cause as to why passenger tax, additional passenger tax, etc, be not recovered from the petitioner and further that the petitioner should show cause as to why penalty be also not levied for not filing the returns in time. According to the petitioner, the Passenger Tax Officer sent a recovery certificate dated 13-7-1982 to the District Magistrate for recovering an amount of Rs. 41,636/- as arrears o f land revenue. The petitioner made a representation on 22-10-1982 to the Passenger Tax Officer on the ground that the assessment of the passenger tax has been done without affording him any opportunity of being heard. It was stated that in case an opportunity was given the petitioner would have proved that he was not liable to pay any passenger tax. It is at this stage that the present writ petition has been filed praying that the orders of the Passenger Tax Officer dated Mar. 6, 1982 and Oct. 22, 1982 (Annexures "6" and "7" to the writ petition) be quashed and for seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to realise any amount towards passenger tax. 6. The contentions raised on behalf of IFFCO formed a separate class in contradistinction to public passengers and a vehicle being used by employees of the IFFCO cannot be characterised as a public service vehicle. It has been contended that the charging S. 3 of the Act, 1962 attracts only to public service vehicles and not to the private service vehicles and since the vehicle belonging to the petitioner remained under the absolute control of the IFFCO for the exclusive use of their employees and wards and since no fare was charged from the 'customers, it was contended that the petitioner could not be subjected to charging S. 3 of the Act, 1962. It has also been urged that there is no contract between the petitioner and the passengers who travel by the petitioner's vehicle. Reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. The Sales-tax Officer and Regional Transport Officer, Poona, AIR 1979 SC 343 . 7. It has also been urged that there is no contract between the petitioner and the passengers who travel by the petitioner's vehicle. Reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. The Sales-tax Officer and Regional Transport Officer, Poona, AIR 1979 SC 343 . 7. Shri A.P. Singh, learned counsel for the State has, however, urged that petitioner is engaged in the business of carrying staff and employees of the 'IFFCO' for hire and reward under an agreement executed between the petitioner and the 'IFFCO' in this behalf. The consideration being received under the agreement is hire for carrying the employees for whom the petitioner has offered his bus. According to the learned counsel the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the case of M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (supra) there was no agreement between the owners of the stage carriages and the Company to whom the said carriages were given on hire for carrying passengers (employees of the said "Company") to and fro the factory. Moreover, the law laid down by the Supreme Court was on the basis that no payment was made by way of hire and reward for carrying the passengers inasmuch as there was no evidence that there was any consideration for carrying the passengers which is wholly unlike the present case as petitioner is charging the 'IFFCO' for carrying its employees to and fro the factory premises. 8. For the purposes of deciding the controversy raised in the present writ petition it will be first useful to notice the relevant provisions of the Adhiniyam, 1962 having a bearing on this case. 8. For the purposes of deciding the controversy raised in the present writ petition it will be first useful to notice the relevant provisions of the Adhiniyam, 1962 having a bearing on this case. S. 2(a) defines "passenger" as follows : "Passenger" means any person travelling in a stage carriage, but shall not include the (operator, the driver) or the conductor or an employee of the operator of the stage carriage travelling in the bona fide discharge of his duties in connection with the stage carriage." S. 2(g) define "stage carriage" as follows : "Stage carriage" means a motor vehicle carrying or adapted to carry more than six passengers (excluding the driver), and which carries passengers for hire or reward, at separate fares paid by or for individual, passengers, either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey and includes any minibus when used as a contract carriage." S. 2(k) lays down that : "the words and expressions "contract carriage", "fare", "motor vehicle", "omnibus", "permit" and "State transport undertaking" shall have the meaning assigned to them in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939." The relevant part of the charging S. 3 runs as follows : "3. Levy of tax on passengers carried by stage carriages : (i) From and after the coming into force of this section there shall be levied and paid to the State Government a tax on every passenger carried by a stage carriage at a rate equivalent to five per cent. of faro payable by such passenger to the operator of the stage carriage in respect of his journey in the State : Provided that the amount of tax shall, whenever necessary : (a) & (b) xxx xxx xxx Explanation I: When a passenger is carried by stage carriage at a concessional rate or without being charged any fare, the fare normally payable for the journey shall, for the purposes of this section be deemed to be the fare payable by such passenger. Explanation II: In the case of a contract carriage the fare payable for the carriage divided by the number of passengers therein shall be deemed to be the fare payable by each such passenger, provided that when the fare payable for the carriage is less than seventy five per cent of that worked out at the minimum rates, if any, fixed for contract carriage in pursuance of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, such seventy five per cent, shall be deemed to be the fare payable for the carriage." It will also be useful to have certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act having bearing on the controversy raised in this petition : 9. S. 2(3) defines "contract carriage" as follows : "Contract carriage" means a motor vehicle which carries a passenger or passengers for hire or reward under a contract expressed or implied for the use of the vehicle as a whole or of a (fixed or agreed rate or sum - (i) on a time basis whether or not with reference to any route or distance; or (ii) from one point to another, and in either case without stopping to pick up), or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract, and includes a motor cab notwithstanding that the passengers may pay separate fares;" S. 2(6) defines "fares" as follows "Fares" includes sums payable for a season ticket or in respect of the hire of a contract carriage;" S. 2(25) defines "public service vehicles" as follows : "Public service vehicle" means any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for,the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a motor cab, contract carriage and stage carriage." Sections 49, 50 and 51 of the Act prescribe for' application for a permit to use a motor vehicle as a contract carriage, the procedure for considering such applications and granting of contract carriage permits. It is pertinent to mention at this stage that S. 49(c) of the Act prescribes that in the application for permit it will have to be stated; the manner in which it is claimed that the public convenience will be served by the vehicle. 10. It is pertinent to mention at this stage that S. 49(c) of the Act prescribes that in the application for permit it will have to be stated; the manner in which it is claimed that the public convenience will be served by the vehicle. 10. S. 50 of the Act lays down a mandate on the Regional Transport Authority that while considering the applications for contract carriage permits he will have regard to the extent to which additional contract carriages may be necessary or desirable in the public interest and under S. 51 while granting contract carriage permits may attach certain conditions regarding the user of the vehicle and the charging of the fare etc. 11. There is no depute in this case that' the petitioner has been granted a "contract carriage permit" and there is a condition attached to that permit that the petitioner will ply its vehicle on Allahabad-Phulpur route for carrying the employees of 'IFFCO'. From the agreement filed in this writ petition it is clear that the petitioner is receiving hire for the performance of this job of carrying the employees of the 'IFFCO' on the Allahabad- Phulpur route. S. 2(g) of the Adhiniyam 1962 defining the "stage carriage" specifically provides that it will include any omnibus when used as a 'contract carriage'. The petitioner's vehicle will, therefore, be treated as a "stage carriage" within the definition given in the Adhiniyam, 1962. The other thing which has to be seen is as to whether the petitioner's vehicle is carrying "passengers" in the stage carriage. According to the definition of "passenger" given in the Adhiniyam, 1962 and quoted above it will mean 'any person travelling in a stage carriage (except the operator, the driver) or the conductor or an employee of the operator of the stage carriage travelling in the bona fide discharge of his duties in connection with the stage carriage. "Admittedly, the employees of the 'IFFCO' who are travelling in the petitioner's stage carriage are not excepted from the definition of "passenger" as given in the Adhiniyam, 1962. It is, therefore, clear that when the petitioner's bus carries employees of the 'IFFCO' it is carrying "passenger by a stage carriage". As far as the fare is concerned, the definition-of "fare" as given in the Act means sums payable in respect of hire of a "contract carriage". It is, therefore, clear that when the petitioner's bus carries employees of the 'IFFCO' it is carrying "passenger by a stage carriage". As far as the fare is concerned, the definition-of "fare" as given in the Act means sums payable in respect of hire of a "contract carriage". The petitioner according to the agreements executed between him and the 'IF CO' is receiving hire charges in respect of a "contract carriage". The petitioner is thus receiving "fare" for carrying the employees of the 'IFFCO' on his stage carriage. 12. As far as the application of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (supra) is concerned, we are of the opinion that the facts of the present case are different from the facts of the case dealt with by the Supreme Court. In the case dealt with by the Supreme Court the vehicles' were owned by the Company itself. They were registered as private service vehicles and the vehicles were reserved for the employees and public could not use it. In these circumstances-the vehicle could not be termed as "public service vehicle". It has also been stated that in view of the undertaking given by the learned counsel for the petitioner no charges were to be taken from the ,employees and thus it could not be stated that the vehicles were being run for hire or reward. In our case the petitioner has admittedly got a contract carriage permit and the petitioner's vehicle is not registered as private service vehicle and the vehicle is owned by the petitioner and not by the 'IFFCO', whose employees are being carried by the petitioner. In our opinion, the employees of the 'IFFCO' will fall in the category of "public" for whose convenience the contract carriage permit has been granted by the Regional Transport Authority as contemplated under Sections 49, 50 and 51 of the Act. The petitioner is admittedly receiving hire from the 'IFFCO'. It is therefore, clear that on the facts of the present case the petitioners can derive no help from the case of Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd (supra). 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, laid emphasis on what has been held by the Supreme Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (supra) in para 8. It is therefore, clear that on the facts of the present case the petitioners can derive no help from the case of Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd (supra). 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, laid emphasis on what has been held by the Supreme Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (supra) in para 8. It would be convenient to quote para 8 of the aforesaid case : "8. A combined reading, therefore, of R. 2(i) and S. 2(7) of the Act clearly indicates that the tax would be leviable only if the passengers are carried on a public service vehicle. It is true that the term 'public service vehicle' has not been defined either by the Act or by the Rules, but that however, does not create any difficulty, because having regard to the preamble of the Act we are of the opinion that the tax can be levied only on passengers who are carried by a stage carriage which is of the nature of a public service vehicle. The word 'public' has got a well known connotation and means a carriage to which any member of the public can have free access on payment of the usual charges. It cannot by any process of reasoning or stretch of imagination be deemed to include employees of a private company who are given facilities not as members of the public but as holding special status namely, the employees of that Company. Thus, qua public the employees form a separate class and cannot be said to be public as contemplated by R. 2(i)." From a close reading of para 8 it is clear that the definition of 'passenger' under R. 2(i) of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 is different from the definition of "passengers" given in S. 2(e) of the Adhiniyam, 1962 applicable to our case. According to the decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (supra) "passenger" means any person travelling in a public service vehicles while in our case "passenger" means a person who is travelling in .a stage carriage. It has not been disputed that the petitioner's vehicle comes within the definition of "stage carriage". According to the decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (supra) "passenger" means any person travelling in a public service vehicles while in our case "passenger" means a person who is travelling in .a stage carriage. It has not been disputed that the petitioner's vehicle comes within the definition of "stage carriage". In the aforesaid paragraph in our opinion it has been held that it could not be held by any process of reasoning or stretch of imagination that the employees of a private company who are given facilities not as members of the public but as holding a special status, namely, the employees of that company could be termed as "public" and the vehicle as "public service vehicle". If we look to the facts of our case here we will see that the levy of passenger tax is not on 'IFFCO' as admittedly 'IFFCO' is not the owner of the vehicle. The question which is arising before us is regarding the vehicle owned by the petitioner who has got a-contract carriage permit and who is receiving hire from the 'IFFCO' for carrying its employees, on Allahabad-Phulpur route. Qua the employer, the employees due to special relationship may not be the members of the public but the employees of the IFFCO have no such relationship with the petitioner and qua the petitioner the employees of the IFFCO who travelled in the petitioner's vehicle would be nothing but public. The petitioner's stage carriage being used by the employees of the IFFCO cannot be treated to be a private service vehicle but that has to be regarded nothing else but a public service vehicle. In our opinion, the employees of the 'IFFCO' would be treated to be the members of the public in our case. It is precisely for this reason that a contract carriage permit has been granted in favour of the petitioner in view of the provisions of Sections 49, 50 and 51 of the Act for carrying the employees of the 'IFFCO'. From Phulpur to Allahabad to provide public conveyance. In case such vehicles were not hired by the 'IFFCO', the employees of the 'IFFCO' as public would have to board buses plying on Allahabad- Phulpur route. From Phulpur to Allahabad to provide public conveyance. In case such vehicles were not hired by the 'IFFCO', the employees of the 'IFFCO' as public would have to board buses plying on Allahabad- Phulpur route. In fact the material filed by the petitioner himself in the writ petition indicates that the employees of the 'IFFCO' who were thousands in number were facing great difficulty in reaching the factory in time. 14. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that so far as the petitioner is concerned, charging S. 3 of the Act, 1962 is clearly attracted inasmuch as the petitioner's contract carriage, which is a stage carriage by virtue of the definition given in S. 2(g) of the Act, 1962 was being used for carrying passengers for hire. It may also be noticed that under the Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules 1959 private service vehicles' were defined to mean any omnibus constructed or adapted to carry more than nine persons excluding the driver and ordinarily used by or on behalf of the owner of such vehicle for purposes of carrying persons or in connection with his trade or business or otherwise than for hire or reward but does not include a motor vehicle used solely for public purposes. Since the appellants before the Supreme Court used their own vehicles only for carrying its employees from their respective places to the factory premises and vice versa without hire or reward, the Supreme Court took the view that the vehicle was a private service vehicle and was registered as such and was not in the nature of a public service vehicle which could be subjected to charging section i.e. S. 3 of the Act, 1958. The petitioners, in our opinion, cannot thus derive any help from the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court. The provisions of the Adhiniyam, 1962 are clearly applicable and all the petitioners are liable to pay passenger tax. 15. Petitioners in these writ petitions have come at different stages. Some writ petitions have been filed when show cause notices had been issued and the other writ petitions have been filed when either ex parte assessment orders or assessment orders after hearing the petitioners have been passed. It would thus be necessary to deal the aforesaid facts pertaining to each writ petition separately so as to effectively dispose of these writ petitions. 16. It would thus be necessary to deal the aforesaid facts pertaining to each writ petition separately so as to effectively dispose of these writ petitions. 16. In writ petition No. 810 of 1982 the petitioner has also raised a point that the orders dated Mar. 6, 1982 and Oct. 22, 1982 (Annexures 6 and 7 to the writ petition) have been passed without affording any opportunity to the petitioner. If that be so, the petitioner will be entitled to file an application for setting aside the ex parte assessment orders. In case such an application is moved, the same will be disposed of in accordance with law by the assessing authority. The petitioner thus for redressal of this grievance has got an alternative remedy and is not entitled to any relief in this writ petition. Similar is the position in writ petitions Nos. 539 of 1987, 1343 of 1987, 1342 of 1987, 344 of 1987 and 1340 of 1987 and the aforesaid observations will also apply to these writ petitions. 17. In writ petitions Nos. 356 of 1985, 799 of 1986, 797 of 1986, 913 of 1986, 939 of 1986, 184 of 1987, 185 of 1987, 224 of 1987, 232 of 1987, 223 of 1987, 699 of 1988, 1163 of 1987, 1338 of 1987 and 1339 of 1987 only notices have been issued by the Passenger Tax Officer for assessing passenger tax and the penalty. Further. proceedings were stayed by this Court. In view of our decision the stay order is vacated. The Passenger Tax Officer will be entitled to make assessment against the petitioners after affording them an opportunity of hearing. 18. In writ petition No. 755 of 1987 the petitioner has challenged the assessment orders dated 1-12-1986, 6-3-1987, two assessment orders dated 22-7-1987 and also notices dated 13-3-86, 9-9-1987, 14-3-86, 4-6-86, 20-3-87 and three notices dated 9-9-1987. In this writ petition the assessment orders have not been challenged on the ground that before passing the. assessment orders no opportunity had been given. The assessment orders dated 1-12-86, 6-3-1987, 22-7-87 (UGC 238) and 22-7-87 (UGB 531) are not liable to be quashed in view of what we have held above. As far as the notices which have been given by the passenger tax officer for assessing the tax and penalty, proceedings will now go on and the stay order granted by this Court is vacated. As far as the notices which have been given by the passenger tax officer for assessing the tax and penalty, proceedings will now go on and the stay order granted by this Court is vacated. Similar is the position in writ petitions Nos. 756 of 1987, 696 of 1988 and 705 of 1988, and the aforesaid observations will apply to these writ petitions also. 19. In writ petition No. Nil of 1988 Mohd. Asad v. Passenger Tax Officer filed on 5-4-88 two assessment orders dated 7-3-88, 9-3-88 have been challenged. The assessment order dated 7-3-1988 is an ex parte order against which the petitioner has got an alternative remedy of filing an application for setting aside the ex parte order. As far as the assessment order clt. 9-3-1988 is concerned that has been passed after hearing the petitioner. In view of what has been observed above, the petitioner is liable to pay the passenger tax and it is on that ground that the order is not liable to be quashed. Similar is the position in writ No. 617 of 88 as the assessment order dated 3-12-87 is on merits. 20. In writ petition No. Nil of 1988 Mohd. Aslam Khan v. Passenger Tax Officer filed on 5-4-1988, two assessment orders dated 12-1-1987 and 6-1-1988 have been challenged. The order dated 12-1-1987 is an ex parte order against which the petitioner has got an alternative remedy of filing an application for setting aside the same in so far as the quantum of tax is concerned. So far as the order dated 6-1-1988 is concerned, no grievance has been raised that the same has been passed without affording any opportunity to the petitioners. In view of what has been observed above, the petitioner is legally liable to pay passenger tax and it is on that ground that the order is liable to be upheld. 21. For the reasons stated above, the petitioners in all the writ petitions are not entitled to any relief from this Court as they are clearly liable to pay passenger tax under the Adhiniyam, 1962. The interim orders granted in all the writ petitions arb vacated. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed, . , with costs.