A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who was serving as Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal challenges the legality and validity of the Departmental Inquiry initiated against him in the Departmental Inquiry against the petitioner it is alleged that while he was discharging his duties as Mamlatdar and Agricultural Land Tribunal at Una he had decided a case under Sec. 21 of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) contrary to the provisions of the Act. The case was that of the Jakunvarji alias Devkunvar Prabhudas of village Bhacha. The same case was decided as per order dated 24 198t against the provisions of the Act and it was held the Khatedar was not holding the land in excess of the Ceiling Limit. By deciding the case in this fashion he benefited the Khatedar and adversely affected the public interest. This conduct of the petitioner exhibited lack of sincerity in performance of duties ands therefore petitioner was liable for misconduct as per the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1971 The petitioner has been served with the charge-sheet dated: 31/05/1986 sometime in the first week of June 1986 The petitioner was required to submit the reply to the aforesaid charge-sheet within 21 days from the date of receipt of the same. However instead of giving reply the petitioner has filed this petition on 23/06/1986 and has challenged the legality and validity of the initiation of inquiry itself and has prayed for declaration that the charge-sheet dated: 31/05/1986 is illegal and void and also prayed to direct the respondent to ignore the impugned charge-sheet for all purposes and to direct the respondents to confer all benefits upon the petitioner accordingly. ( 2 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner when he was at the fag end of his service. He was about to retire within a period of fifteen days when he was served with the charge-sheet. Moreover it is submitted that the charge pertains to an incident which took place sometime in July 1981 and September 1981. Therefore no departmental inquiry on the basis of such stale incident should be permitted much more so when the petitioner was about to retire. Moreover it is submitted that the charge pertains to an incident which took place sometime in July 1981 and September 1981. Therefore no departmental inquiry on the basis of such stale incident should be permitted much more so when the petitioner was about to retire. The aforesaid submission cannot be accepted for the simple reason that before initiating the regular inquiry by serving charge-sheet as the petitioner was served with a show cause notice dated: 25/02/1983 The petitioner replied to the same on 30/10/1983 After the preliminary inquiry was over the regular charge-sheet has been served upon the petitioner. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the inquiry has been initiated at the fag end of the service carrier of the petitioner. In fact the inquiry was started in the month of February 1988 Moreover it cannot be laid down and it has not been so laid down in any binding decision as a general principle of rule that no Departmental Inquiry should be initiated wherein an employee is about to retire. In a given case if the charge is trivial and if it is alleged to have been committed in the remote past it may be said that Departmental Inquiry on such charge may not be instituted when an employee is about to retire. But when a serious charge of misuse of discretionary power while deciding a case or cases under the relevant provisions of Statue concerned are made against the employee it cannot be said that the inquiry should be dropped or should not have been initiated when the employee is about to reach the superannuation age. Initiation of Departmental Inquiry even in the last days of service of an employee would upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case it cannot be said that the inquiry had been initiated in the last days of the service of the petitioner nor can it be said that there is an attempt to make up stale incidents. Therefore the aforesaid submission cannot be accepted. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to certain provisions of the Act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the charge alleged against the petitioner has its roots in certain decisions taken by the petitioner in judicial proceedings. Therefore the aforesaid submission cannot be accepted. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to certain provisions of the Act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the charge alleged against the petitioner has its roots in certain decisions taken by the petitioner in judicial proceedings. Therefore it is submitted that no Departmental Inquiry whatsoever can be made in respect of something done or omitted to have been done while deciding a case in judicial proceeding. In support of the aforesaid submission the learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to Sec. 48 of the Act which provides that all inquiries and proceedings before the Mamlatdar the Tribunal the Collector and Gujarat Revenue Tribunal shall be done to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Secs. 193 219 and 288 of the 1. P. C. Section 50 of the Act extends protection to the persons for anything which is done in good faith or purported to be done in good faith under the Act. The Government Resolution dated 4/07/1972 bearing No. I. C. H. 2572-14832-J also provides that the officers exercising powers under the Act are required to act independently and they have to act as judicial authority and their decisions should confirm with the principles of natural justice failing which the decision would be invalid and ineffective in law. In the background of the aforesaid provisions it is submitted that the decision taken by the petitioner under the provisions of Sec. 21 of the Act which forms the basis of charge is a decision taken in judicial proceedings. Therefore it is submitted that no departmental inquiry can be held against him in respect of this charge. ( 4 ) IT is difficult to agree with the broad general submission made by-the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Normally an officer charged with duties to function as a judicial officer will take decision in judicial proceedings only. He will have ample discretion in all such matters while deciding the cases. The discretionary power is confirmed upon judicial officers on the basis that the power shall not be misused and the same shall be exercised reasonably and in accordance with law. Most of the Judicial officers have not to take decision in respect of any other matter at all which may be executive in nature. The discretionary power is confirmed upon judicial officers on the basis that the power shall not be misused and the same shall be exercised reasonably and in accordance with law. Most of the Judicial officers have not to take decision in respect of any other matter at all which may be executive in nature. If the aforesaid contention is accepted it would amount to saying that even if an officer while taking decision in judicial proceedings acts with mala fides and/or with dishonesty his conduct cannot be inquired into at all. In that case there would be a license to indulge in arbitrary and unreasonable behaviour and to act with dishonesty. Moreover it would lead to chaos in the working of the judicial administration; or for that matter in the working of any other sphere of administration wherever an officer is charged with duties to act judicially and to take decision in judicial proceedings. There is no provision of law which prohibits inquiry into the alleged misconduct of an officer who has taken decision in judicial proceedings. Therefore the broad contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. ( 5 ) THE contention that adequate check can be exercised by appellate and/or revisional authority and therefore departmental inquiry is redundant may be examined. The appellate and/or revisional authority can exercise its power on the basis of the record available to it. If an officer takes upon his mind to take decision in a particular fashion then he would prepare the record in such a way that decision even if examined at the appellate or revisional stage would be on the same line. The record of the judicial proceedings right from the beginning may be prepared dishonestly and with mala fides with certain ulterior motives. In such situation the appellate or revisional authority would be helpless. While proceeding further with a case if an officer shuts out evidence favourable to a party and then takes decision against that party on record it may not be possible to say that the decision is not in accordance with the provisions of law Again it depends upon the ability of the Advocate or the party presenting the case before the appellate or revisional authority. It could be that these aspects whereby the evidence is shut out dishonestly and/or with ulterior motive may by the judicial officer may not be brought to the notice of the appellate or revisional authority. If such circumstances are brought to the. notice of appellate or revisional authority the decision may be reversed But the appellate or revisional authority cannot take any disciplinary action against the officer concerned. On the other hand if such conduct is brought to the notice of Disciplinary and/or any other appropriate authority which can take action departmentally such conduct can surely be examined into. On examination of the record and other evidence that may be produced in Departmental Inquiry if it is found that while conducting the judicial proceedings certain acts of misbehaviour were indulged into by the officer concerned then the same can be made the basis of departmental conviction. Moreover it should be note that all matters are not carried upto the appellate or revisional stage. Therefore the argument that because there is appellate or revisional authority which can correct the decision of the officer concerned the departmental proceedings should not be held cannot be accepted. ( 6 ) BE it noted that the very basis of democracy and the Rule of law is that no one can exercise the powers conferred upon him without there being corresponding accountability. Moreover it is the basic canon of the Government run on democratic principles that power conferred upon any officer shall be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily. In a given case if it is shown that the decisions taken in judicial proceedings are consistently unreasonable and it amount to arbitrary exercise of power and if it is also shown that the same is done with ulterior motive such conduct would surely be misconduct requiring investigation at the appropriate level. In democracy no one including officers exercising judicial power can claim that they have unbridled and unrestricted power to decide the question in whatever manner they like. The power can be exercised reasonably and for the purpose of which it is conferred. Erroneous exercise of power on certain erroneous assertions and beliefs is one thing and unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power with ulterior motive is all together a different thing. Such unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power with ulterior motive even if it be in respect of judicial proceedings would surely amount to misbehaviour. Erroneous exercise of power on certain erroneous assertions and beliefs is one thing and unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power with ulterior motive is all together a different thing. Such unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power with ulterior motive even if it be in respect of judicial proceedings would surely amount to misbehaviour. Be it noted that even the highest Judicial Officers in the country are not totally immune from appropriate action if it is shown that there is misbehaviour on their part. Art. 124 (4) of the Constitution provides for impeachment of Supreme Court and High Court Judges. The impeachment can be on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. The misbehaviour or incapacity in the context can very well be with respect to the decisions taken in judicial proceedings. ( 7 ) IN above view of the matter the broad proposition canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the decision taken in judicial proceedings cannot be a matter of charge and departmental inquiry cannot be accepted. There may be cases wherein either on the reading of the decision itself or on the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances of the case it can reasonably be inferred that the power to take decision is not exercised in accordance with law and that the decision is actuated by mala fides and or for some dishonest motive. If prima facie this is established and prima facie if it appears that the decision taken by officer concerned even in judicial proceedings is for extraneous consideration the Departmental proceeding are not barred. To hold otherwise would amount to granting license to the officers exercising judicial powers to take decision on extraneous considerations and for ulterior motive. This would be against the basic canons underlying the system governed by rule of law and democratic principles. True such officers would have certain protections which are normally provided for in the relevant statute. In Sec. 50 of the Act it is provided that no suit prosecution or other legal proceedings lies against any person for anything which is done in good faith or purported to have been done in good faith under the Act. True such officers would have certain protections which are normally provided for in the relevant statute. In Sec. 50 of the Act it is provided that no suit prosecution or other legal proceedings lies against any person for anything which is done in good faith or purported to have been done in good faith under the Act. Similar general protection is given under he provisions of Judicial Officers Protection Act 1850 Moreover mere erroneous decision or a decision contrary to the belief of superior officer can never be considered to be a misbehaviour or misconduct but that will be all together a different matter. It will be for the petitioner to show that there was no extraneous consideration and/or no ulterior motive when he took the decision in question which forms the basis of charge for the Departmental Inquiry. ( 8 ) NO other contention is raised. There is no substance in the petition. Hence rejected. Notice discharged. Ad-interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner requests that the ad-interim relief granted earlier on 24/06/1986 be continued for some time so as to enable the petitioner to challenge the legality and validity of the aforesaid order before appropriate forum. In the facts and circumstances of the case the ad-interim relief granted earlier shall continue upto April 18 1988 rule discharged. .