JUDGMENT R.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against an order passed by the IInd Addl. District Judge, Moradabad, dated 9.10.87, allowing the appeal setting aside the order passed by the Prescribed Authority and thereby allowing the application of the landlord No. 2 for the release of the accommodation in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 2. The facts of the case briefly stated are that respondent No. 2 is the landlord of the shop in dispute situate in Chandausi town of which the petitioner is the tenant. The application for release of the shop in dispute was moved by Smt. Santosh Goel, wife of respondent No. 2 as his guardian alleging that respondent No. 2 is a person of unsound mind and need for the shop in dispute is bonafide and genuine for setting up his unemployed son Navin Kumar in business who has passed his B.Com. in the year 1982 and since then is unemployed and that the petitioner has shifted his business to Lucknow where he is having many shops and further that Navin Kumar son of respondent No. 2 wants to start the business of general merchant in the shop in dispute and he being unemployed the need of the landlord for the disputed shop is bonafide and genuine and further that greater hardship would be caused if the same is not released in favour of the landlord. The application was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the need of the landlord for the shop in dispute is not bonafide and genuine and further that respondent No. 2 is not a person of unsound mind and, therefore, his wife Smt. Santosh Goel has no right to move the application for release of the shop and on this ground alone the application for release of the shop is liable to be dismissed. It was further alleged that the petitioner has not shifted his business to Lucknow but is looking after business at Chandausi and on the ground of comparative hardship also his case was that he would suffer greater hardship in case the shop is released. 3. It was further alleged that the petitioner has not shifted his business to Lucknow but is looking after business at Chandausi and on the ground of comparative hardship also his case was that he would suffer greater hardship in case the shop is released. 3. The Prescribed Authority on consideration of the evidence held that the respondent No. 2, Mahendra Kumar was not a person of unsound mind and hence the application moved by his wife Smt. Santosh Goel is not maintainable and it is only the landlord who is entitled to move the application for release of the shop under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The Prescribed Authority further held that the need of respondent No. 2 for the shop in dispute is not bonafide and genuine and comparative hardship also tilts in favour of the tenant, i.e., the petitioner in the case and hence dismissed the application vide his order dated 28.3.85. Feeling aggrieved the respondent No. 2 went up in appeal before the IInd Additional District Judge, Moradabad who on perusal of the evidence on record and applying his mind to the same held that Mahendra Kumar, respondent No. 2 is a person of unsound mind and hence the application for release moved by the wife Smt. Santosh Goel is maintainable and competent and further on the question of bonafide need, held that the need of the landlord-respondent No. 2 for the shop in dispute for setting up his unemployed son in business is bonafide and genuine and on the question of comparative hardship also, in view of the fact that the petitioner has mainly shifted his business to Lucknow where he is having a flourishing business, the hardship tilts more in favour of the landlord-respondent No. 2 and greater hardship would be caused in case the shop is not released in his favour and on these findings, allowed the appeal vide his order dated 9.10.87 which is in challenge in the present writ petition filed before this Court. 4. Heard Shri S.N. Verma, Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Shri K.M. Dayal, Senior counsel for respondent No. 2. 5. 4. Heard Shri S.N. Verma, Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Shri K.M. Dayal, Senior counsel for respondent No. 2. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri S.N. Verma firstly contended that Mahendra Kumar, respondent No. 2, the landlord in case, is not a person of unsound mind and, hence, the application moved by Smt. Santosh Goel, his wife, on his behalf as his guardian, is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the need for the shop in dispute for respondent No. 2 was not bonafide and genuine and lastly, that greater hardship would be caused in case the application for release of the shop is allowed in favour of respondent No. 2. On the other hand, Sri K.M. Dayal, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 strenuously contended that Mahendra Kumar respondent No. 2 has rightly been found to be a person of unsound mind by the Additional District Judge on appraisal of the evidence on record and in that view of the matter application for release moved by his wife Smt. Santosh Goel is competent and maintainable. The learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the need for the shop in district Judge on appraisal of the evidence on record and further on the question of comparative hardship also the Additional District Judge has held that greater hardship would be caused in case the shop in dispute is not released in favour of the landlord and since the findings on these points having been arrived at on appraisal of the evidence on record by the Additional District Judge, it is not open to his Court to reappraise the evidence and come to a finding different than that arrived at by the Additional District Judge. 6. Coming to the first and the main question involved in the case whether Mahendra Kumar, respondent No. 2, the landlord in the case is a person of unsound mind, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Section 21(1)(a) of the Act provides that the landlord alone is competent to move an application for release of the building and Rule 15(2) of the Rules framed under the Act also provides that every application for release under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act shall be signed by the landlord. Section 12 of the Contract Act provides that a person is said to be of sound mind for the purpose of making a contract if at the time when he makes it he is capable of understanding it and forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his interest. In the application for release that was moved by Smt. Santosh Goel on 14th November, 1983, Smt. Santosh Goel has described herself as guardian and best friend of her husband Mahendra Kumar and she has stated in her application that Mahendra Kumar is suffering from mental ailment he is not capable of doing any business. Both the parties filed affidavits and counter-affidavits in support of their case. While the affidavit filed on behalf of the landlord alleges that Mahendra Kumar is a person of unsound mind, the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner alleges that Mahendra Kumar respondent No. 2 is not a person of unsound mind. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the definition of the term 'lunatic' under Section 3(5) of the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912 which describes 'lunatic' as an idiot or a person of unsound mind. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the case of Joshi Ram Krishan v. Rukmini Bai, reported in AIR 1949 Allahabad 449, where it was observed that unsoundness of mind implies some unusual feature of mind as it tended to make it different from the normal and has in effect impaired the man's capacity to look after his affairs in the manner to which another person without such mental irregularity would be able to do in the matter of his own. The idea suggests some derangement of mind, whatever be its degree and it is not to be confused or taken as analogous to a mere mental weakness or lack of intelligence. The idea suggests some derangement of mind, whatever be its degree and it is not to be confused or taken as analogous to a mere mental weakness or lack of intelligence. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the case Rami V. Papi Reddi Reddi reported in AIR 1963 Andhra Pradesh 160, where it was held Order 20XII, Rule 15 C.P.C. applies to a person adjudged to be of unsound mind and also to a person of weak mind and where in a suit filed by the plaintiff through his next friend an application is made by the next friend that the plaintiff is of friend an application is made by the next friend that the plaintiff is of unsound mind or mentally infirm the extent of infirmity has to be found by the Court on inquiry which should consist of examination of the alleged lunatic by the Judge and also evidence of medical expert should be taken. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in the present case Mahendra Kumar was neither produced before the respondents 1 and 2 nor any cogent medical testimony was produced in support of the case of the landlord that Mahendra Kumar respondent No. 2 is a person of unsound mind and hence there is no satisfactory evidence to prove that Mahendra Kumar was of unsound mind. The learned counsel for the petitioner further relied on the case of R. Lingaraj and others v. Parvathi, reported in AIR 1975 Madras 285, where it was observed thus :- "As stated above, the capacity of a person to manage himself and his affairs may vary from person to person but the total incapacity which alone would justify a Court finding a person to be of unsound mind is wholly different from the inadequate ability of a person to look after himself and his affairs according to accepted norms and standards and by no stretch of imagination be equated with incapacity flowing from unsoundness of mind." It was further observed in that case that the mental condition of a lunatic described under the Act as an idiot or a person of unsound mind, has reference to deranged or dishevelled mind which is on an entirely different plane than the dull wit or weak intellect of a simpleton or booby. It was held in that case that a person of unsound mind is one who is totally un-suited to manage himself and his affairs and such incompetency is directly referable and attributable to the incapacity of his mind. 8. In Sarjug Singh v. Gulabo Kuer, reported in AIR 1969 Patna 33, the Court observed thus :- "Section 3(5) of the Act defines 'lunatic' as an idiot or a person of unsound mind but the said words have not been defined and both these terms indicate an abnormal state of mind as distinguished from weakness of mind or senility following old age and that a man of weak mental strength cannot be called an idiot or a man of unsound mind, and the Act is not intended to protect dull witted people but only those who suffer from mental disorder or derangement of mind. 'Unsoundness of mind' implies some unusual feature of mind as has tended to make it different from the normal and has in effect impaired the man's capacity to look after his affairs in the manner in which another person without such mental irregularity would be able to do in the matter of his own. The idea suggests some derangement of mind whatever be its degree, and it is not to be confused or taken as analogous to a mere mental weakness or lack of intelligence. A man may find it difficult to answer question of particular class but if he intelligently answers question of various other sorts concerning himself, his family, and property, he cannot be classed with man of unsound mind being unable to manage their affairs. If a man is able to understand the questions on various matters except those relating to arithmetical calculations, he cannot be regarded as mentally unsound although he would be held as having a weak or undeveloped mind. 'Unsoundness of mind' or as it is sometimes styled lunacy or insanity may be shortly defined as a defect of reason consisting either in its total or partial absence or in its perturbation. The perturbation or absence of reason which constitutes insanity is an abnormal state of mind of a man judged by a standard which recognises a normal standard or rationality and pronounces that man to be insane. The perturbation or absence of reason which constitutes insanity is an abnormal state of mind of a man judged by a standard which recognises a normal standard or rationality and pronounces that man to be insane. Sanity exists when the brain and the nervous system are in such a condition that the mental functions of feelings are knowing emotion and of willing can be performed in their regular and usual manner. Insanity means a state in which one or more of the above named mental functions is or are performed in the abnormal way or not performed at all by reason of some disease of brain or nervous system." 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner was an agent of Preet Textiles of Ludhiana and the petitioner had filed certain papers regarding placing of orders and supply by Preet Textiles on the basis of which it is contended that if Mahendra Kumar respondent No. 2 would have been a person of unsound mind, he could not have received orders for supply from Preet Textiles. The petitioner also placed reliance on a copy of the agreement which was said to have been entered into between Mahendra Kumar, the landlord on the one hand and petitioner on the other on 1.10.84 by which the rent of the shop was enhanced by Rs. 50/- and it was agreed that in turn the landlord Mahendra Kumar will never have right to get the shop vacated even for personal need of himself or any member of his family and further that the release application filed by his wife Santosh Goel shall be got dismissed. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the signature of Mahendra Kumar on this agreement, a copy of which was produced as Annexure 3 to the writ petition, is uniform which indicates that he was not a person of unsound mind. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the case of Ganga Bhavanamma and others v. Somaraju and another, reported in AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 938, where the Court dealing with a case of a lunatic under the Lunancy Act observed thus :- "They also bring out the meaning of words 'idiot' and 'unsoundness of mind'. Both indicate an abnormal state of mind as distinguished from weakness of mind or senility following old age. Both indicate an abnormal state of mind as distinguished from weakness of mind or senility following old age. A man of weak mental strength cannot be called an idiot or a man of unsound mind. An intellectual competency of the human mind is of varying degrees. It fluctuates between brilliance and dullness. Some times in the same individual brilliance in one filed surprisingly appears in juxtaposition with normal practical apprehension in an allied field. The Act is not intended to protect dull witted people but only those who suffer from disorder or derangement of mind." 11. The learned counsel for the respondent in reply submitted that there is ample evidence on record to show that Mahendra Kumar, respondent No. 2 is a person of unsound mind and for that reason his wife Smt. Santosh Goel had to conduct business on his behalf as his guardian and best friend and was also appointed as a guardian by the District Judge. The learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the petitioner had been treating Smt. Santosh Goel as guardian of her husband Mahendra Kumar and, as such, the petitioner is bound by his own conduct and estopped from challenging that Mahendra Kumar is a person of unsound mind for which person the application for release had to be filed by his wife Smt. Santosh Goel on his behalf. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that prior to the present application for release another application for release was moved earlier on 8th June, 1981 when the release application was moved for the shop in dispute for setting up his other son Praveen Kumar in business. Praveen Kumar, however, later got employed in Modi Tyres with the result that the case was compromised on 26th August, 1981 by the parties by which the rent was enhanced from Rs. 75 per month to Rs. 300 per month. This agreement shows that the compromise was entered into on behalf of Mahendra Kumar by his wife Santosh Goel as guardian and best friend of Mahendra Kumar. A copy of this compromise has been filed as High Court 11 to the writ petition which shows that Santosh Goel has signed the compromise as guardian and best friend of Mahendra Kumar while Govind Ram petitioner has signed whose signature is identified by his counsel. A copy of this compromise has been filed as High Court 11 to the writ petition which shows that Santosh Goel has signed the compromise as guardian and best friend of Mahendra Kumar while Govind Ram petitioner has signed whose signature is identified by his counsel. Hence, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the petitioners themselves having signed the compromise which showed that Smt. Santosh Goel was entering into the compromise on behalf of her husband Mahendra Kumar as his guardian. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decision in the case of Subba Rao v. Jagannatha Rao, reported in AIR 1967 Supreme Court 591, wherein it was held that a decree passed on compromise cannot operate as res judicata but such a decree might create an estoppel by conduct between the parties. The same view was held in Sendi Bai v. Devaji, reported in AIR 1954 Supreme Court 80, where it was held that the rule of estoppel by conduct is binding. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that various rent receipts have been filed which show that the landlord's name is shown as Mahendra Kumar through Smt. Santosh Goel wife and guardian. These rent receipts have been signed by the petitioner also. My attention has been invited to Annexures 1 and 2 of the counter-affidavit which clearly indicate that the rent receipts were issued by Smt. Santosh Goel as guardian of Mahendra Kumar for the accommodation in dispute. The payment of rent by the petitioner to Smt. Goel as rent of the accommodation in dispute and Santosh Goel having signed the rent receipts as wife and guardian of Mahendra Kumar does indicate that the petitioner had been treating Smt. Santosh Goel as guardian of her husband obviously for the reason that Smt. Santosh Goel was conducting and managing the affairs on behalf of husband Mahendra Kumar on account of Mahendra Kumar being of unsound mind and incapable of understanding or managing his affairs. This conduct of the petitioner also shows that petitioner is bound by his own conduct in treating Smt. Santosh Goel as guardian of her husband Mahendra Kumar. 13. This conduct of the petitioner also shows that petitioner is bound by his own conduct in treating Smt. Santosh Goel as guardian of her husband Mahendra Kumar. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent then placed reliance on the order of the District Judge, Moradabad dated 15..85 appointing Smt. Santosh Goel as guardian of her husband Mahendra Kumar, a copy of which has been annexed as annexure 9 to the counter-affidavit. A perusal of this order shows that the District Judge appointed Smt. Santosh Goel as guardian of person and property of her lunatic husband Mahendra Kumar and this also lends support to the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that Mahendra Kumar was a person of unsound mind and hence Smt. Santosh Goel was appointed as his guardian to look after the affairs and business of Mahendra Kumar. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that on behalf of respondent No. 2, copies of certificate and admission card of the Mental Hospital, Bareilly of Mahendra Kumar has been filed which shows that Mahendra Kumar was admitted in the Mental Hospital, Bareilly for treatment of his luancy and unsoundness of mind. Annexure 4 is a copy of the certificate issued under Section 18 of the Luancy Act. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that this is a public document admissible under the Evidence Act. Section 18 of the Luancy Act provides that every medical certificate under this Act shall be made and signed by a medical practitioner and shall be in a prescribed form and that every medical certificate made under this Act shall be evidence of facts appearing and of facts therein stated to have been formed by the person certifying on such facts, as if the matters therein appearing have been verified on oath. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied on Section 351 of the Evidence Act which provides that an entry in any public or other official book, register or record stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and made by the public servant in the discharge of his official duty or any other person in the performance of his duty specially enjoined by the law of the country to which such book, register or record is kept, is itself relevant fact and on the basis of this the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the entry made in this public document which is a copy of the official record or register, is a relevant fact under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. This shows that Mahendra Kumar was admitted for treatment of his lunacy in the mental hospital and in view of this evidence of unsound mind of Mahendra Kumar, the initial onus that lay on respondent No. 2 that Mahendra Kumar was of unsound mind, has been discharged and then the burden shifts on the petitioner to prove sanity of Mahendra Kumar. Since the petitioner is alleging that Mahendra Kumar is sane, the burden of proving his sanity is on the petitioner who is alleging it. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the case of Bahadur Singh v. Bir Bahadur Singh, reported in AIR 1957 Calcutta 213. It was held in that case normally, the presumption is of sanity. However, if there is evidence to prove that person had been adjudged under the Lunancy Act to have been a lunatic or if there is other sufficient evidence to show that a person had at a certains stage been of unsound mind, the burden shifts to the person who alleges his sanity. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent also placed reliance on the case of Mohanlal Madan Gopal v. Vinayak Sadashiv, reported in AIR 1941 Nagpur 251 , where it was held that no doubt the onus of proving insanity is in the first place on the person who alleges it, the normal presumption being of sanity, but once when it has been established that the person is usually of unsound mind the burden of proof is on the party who alleges that the document was executed during a lucid interval. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that since the copy of the official document showing the admission of Mahendra Kumar in the mental hospital, Bareilly shows that the petitioner was treated for his insanity, the burden now shifts on the petitioner to prove that Mahendra Kumar is now sane and the same having not been discharged by the petitioner, Mahendra Kumar respondent No. 2 would be deemed under the law to be a person of unsound mind and hence his wife Smt. Santosh Goel was competent to institute the proceedings for the release of the accommodation on behalf of her husband Mahendra Kumar as his guardian. No evidence seems to have been adduced by the petitioner to show that Mahendra Kumar was cured some time after to his mental derangement. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent then submitted that a feeble attempt has been made on behalf of the petitioner by producing some papers to show that Mahendra Kumar was appointed as an agent by Preet Textiles of Ludhiana but these papers could have been proved only by persons who had issued the papers from Preet Textiles. However, no person has come forward from Preet Textiles, Ludhiana to prove these papers. Hence these papers are of no assistance to the petitioner to prove the sanity of Mahendra Kumar. Moreover, it is not explained how the petitioner came in possession of these papers so as to have filed photostat copies of the same. Then the order for supply appears to have been made for a paltry sum of Rs. 72 from Preet Textiles on 22.8.84, hence these papers could not be of any help to the petitioner to prove the sanity of Mahendra Kumar. 18. The learned counsel for the respondent then contended that much reliance has been placed by the petitioner on the agreement that was said to have been signed by Mahendra Kumar on 1.10.84 by which it was agreed that the rent of the accommodation may be raised from Rs. 300 to Rs. 350 per month and in lieu thereof landlord is shown to have agreed that he will never have any right to get the shop vacated even in future for his personal need by himself or any member of his family. 300 to Rs. 350 per month and in lieu thereof landlord is shown to have agreed that he will never have any right to get the shop vacated even in future for his personal need by himself or any member of his family. The Additional District Judge has, in my opinion, rightly concluded that this could never have been a decision of a sane person that the landlord would never have any right to get the shop vacated for his personal need or of any members of his family in future simply because of raise of rent by Rs. 50 and the agreement purports to have further provided that the release application already moved for the release of the accommodation which was pending would be got dismissed and further Santosh Goel, the wife of Mahendra Kumar will have no right to move an application for release of the shop in dispute. Such could never have been a decision of a sane person and it clearly shows that it could be an act of a person who is not of a same mind and it could certainly be an act of an unsound mind. Hence this act of Mahendra Kumar also only points in direction of insanity and unsound mind of Mahendra Kumar and hence also his wife Smt. Santosh Goel was fully competent to move an application for the release of the shop in dispute for his unemployed son Navin Kumar. 19. The Additional District Judge on perusal of the evidence on record and applying his mind to the same has reached a conclusion that Mahendra Kumar respondent No. 2 was a person of unsound mind and the finding has been arrived at after applying his mind to the entire evidence on record. There is no reason to upset this finding the hence Smt. Santosh Goel had the right to move the application for the accommodation as his guardian. 20. The term 'landlord' has been defined under Section 3(i) as a person to whom its rent is payable and includes the agent or attorney of such person. The facts of this case show that the rent was being paid by the petitioner to Smt. Santosh Goel who was signing the rent receipts as guardian of Mahendra Kumar. Thus Santosh Goel who is the wife of the landlord Mahendra Kumar and acting on his behalf could also be termed as landlord. The facts of this case show that the rent was being paid by the petitioner to Smt. Santosh Goel who was signing the rent receipts as guardian of Mahendra Kumar. Thus Santosh Goel who is the wife of the landlord Mahendra Kumar and acting on his behalf could also be termed as landlord. Though the definition has not specifically included wife also in the term 'landlord' but in the circumstances of this case when the wife is acting as the agent of the landlord, and rent was being paid to her she was in my opinion competent to move an application for the release of the disputed shop under Section 21(1) of the Act on behalf of her husband Mahendra Kumar and for this reason also I hold that the application moved by Smt. Santosh Goel was maintainable and competent. 21. Now coming to the question of bonafide need of the disputed shop, the need as set up in the release application was to settle his unemployed son Navin Kumar in business. Navin Kumar, after passing B.Com. in 1982 remained unemployed and the shop was required to settle him in business. Need to set up the unemployed son in business has always been recognised as bonafide and genuine need. In the case of Deep Chand and Ram Chand Jain v. Prescribed Authority, reported in 1980 ARC 479, it was held if some members of the family of landlord are engaged in business, the contention that the building under tenancy could not be released for enabling the unemployed or enengaged member of the family to start business of his own in that building, cannot be accepted as a proposition. It was held that each adult member of the family is entitled to work for his own independent existence and he is entitled to choose a vocation suiting his individual aptitude, education and qualification. It was further held that the need of such an unemployed member cannot be dismissed by telling him that he should get absorbed in the business already carried on by the family. 22. In the case of N.S. Dutta v. VIIth Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, reported in 1984(1) ARC 113, the facts of the case were that Harsh Tandon, the only son of the landlord had completed his study and secured B.Com. degree and also of Master of Business Administration from Allahabad University. 22. In the case of N.S. Dutta v. VIIth Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, reported in 1984(1) ARC 113, the facts of the case were that Harsh Tandon, the only son of the landlord had completed his study and secured B.Com. degree and also of Master of Business Administration from Allahabad University. The landlord filed release application on the ground that he has to settle his son who was keen to run a hotel. On the other hand it was urged on behalf of the tenant that the son might join his father in the jewellery shop. It was held in that case that even if it was assumed for the sake of argument that Harsh Tandon assisted his father in the business of jewellery it was a stop-gap arrangement in absence of his being able to immediately start the hotel business and the release of the accommodation for setting up his son in hotel business in the disputed building was allowed. 23. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Navin Kumar had been carrying on business in Sri Ram Automobiles. This fact has been denied on behalf of the respondent and the affidavit of Naresh Chand Sharma who is the owner of Sri Ram, Automobiles has been filed which shows that Navin Kumar was in service in Sri Ram Automobiles from 1.2.85 to 28.2.85 on payment of Rs. 150 per month. Hence it was clearly a very temporary employment which also appears to be for a very meagre sum of Rs. 150 per month. Affidavit of Chandra Pal who is owner of Chandrapal Motor Works has also been filed which shows that Navin Kumar was employed with Sri Ram Automobiles only for the period 1.2.85 to 28.2.85. Navin Kumar himself has filed an affidavit that he was employed only for a temporary period from 1.2.85 to 28.2.85 at a salary of Rs. 150 per month and thereafter he had not been employed anywhere and remained unemployed. Thus Navin Kumar is proved to be unemployed and the Additional District Judge on appraisal of the evidence has rightly held that Navin Kumar was unemployed and hence the need for setting up the unemployed son in business was rightly held to be bonafide and genuine. 24. Thus Navin Kumar is proved to be unemployed and the Additional District Judge on appraisal of the evidence has rightly held that Navin Kumar was unemployed and hence the need for setting up the unemployed son in business was rightly held to be bonafide and genuine. 24. Now coming to the comparative hardship the Additional District Judge has held on appraisal of the evidence on record that the financial circumstances of the landlord are not happy. Mahendra Kumar respondent No. 2 is the person of unsound mind and he is not, doing any business. The other son of respondent No. 2 namely, Pravin Kumar is employed in Modi Tyres on a salary of only Rs. 800 per month. On the other hand, the petitioner appears to have established a large business at Lucknow. A copy of the Telephone Directory of Lucknow has been filed in the case which shows that there are four telephone numbers in Lucknow in the name of the petitioner. The petitioner has a shop at 40, Aminabad and another shop at house No. 40-41, Janpath Market, Hazaratganj, Lucknow. Four telephone numbers at Lucknow out of which three are at the business premises of the petitioner while one is at his residence clearly go to show that the petitioner is having a flourshing business in Lucknow while on the other hand, the circumstances of the landlord are not happy and hence the Additional District Judge has rightly held that much greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if the shop in dispute is not released in his favour. In Dr. Munnilal v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Etah and others, reported in 1984(1) ARC 378, Hon'ble N.D. Ojha, J. held that financial status of the landlord in that case was not found to be very good, on the other hand the tenant had been having a good practice as a medical practitioner and this was held an additional circumstance indicating that preference has rightly been given to the landlord for releasing the accommodation in his favour. 25. 25. In Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahmad Khan, reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court 272 , the Supreme Court observed thus :- "In view of our finding it has been established that the landlords have not only a genuine requirement to possess a house, but it is necessary for them, to do so in order to augment their income and maintain themselves properly. Being the owners of house they cannot be denied eviction and be compelled to live below the poverty line merely to enable the respondents to carry on their flourishing hotel business at the cost of the appellants. This shows the great prejudice that will be caused to the plaintiff if their suit is dismissed................ The building belongs to him and there is no reason for us to think that he cannot establish a hotel business................. It was then submitted by Mr. Andley, counsel for the respondents that if the respondents are evicted, they will be thrown out on the road; that hotel is the only source of their sustenance and they are not likely to get any alternative accommodation on being evicted. If the defendants had proved that they will no be able to get any accommodation anywhere in the city where they could set up a hotel, this might have been a weighty consideration, but the evidence of all the witnesses examined by the defendants only shows that the defendants may not get alternative accommodation in that very locality where the house in dispute is situated.......... The defendants are tenants and had taken the lease only for ten years but had over-stayed for 20 years and they cannot be allowed to dictate to the landlord that they cannot be evicted unless they get a similar accommodation in the very same locality". 26. The Additional District Judge on consideration of the evidence on record and in view of the fact that the petitioner is happily settled in a flourishing business at Lucknow and has partly shifted from Chandausi where the shop in dispute is situate and on the other hand, the landlord is not in a happy financial position and his need to settle the unemployed son is bonafide and genuine, has rightly held that the hardship in favour of the landlord will be much more if the shop in dispute is not released in his favour. 27. 27. The learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the findings are based in the case on irrelevant consideration and material and by ignoring material piece of evidence and hence such a finding in writ jurisdiction. In support of his case he placed reliance on Ram Babu and others v. A.D.J., reported in 1983(2) ARC 416. Prithvi Raj Therad and others v. Uma Nath and others, reported in 1983(2) ARC 531. Ashfaq Ahmad and others v. State of U.P., reported in 1980 ARC 497. As far as the proposition of law, it is well-settled that if a finding is based on irrelevant considerations and by ignoring relevant evidence, the same is not binding on this Court and can be interfered with. But nothing could be shown in this case how it can be said that the findings in the case have not been based on consideration of the evidence on record or that they have been arrived at by ignoring the relevant evidence. Hence these cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are of no help in the facts and circumstances of the present case when findings have been arrived at by the Additional District Judge on the question of bonafide need and comparative hardship after appraisal of the evidence on record. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Munni Lal v. Prescribed Authority, reported in AIR 1978 Supreme Court 29, that :- "It is not for the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by District Judge or the Prescribed Authority." 28. In a later case of Harbansh Lal v. Jagmohan Saran, reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court 302 , the Supreme Court again observed that there is no sanction enabling the High Court to re-appraise the evidence without sufficient reason in law and reach findings of fact contrary to those rendered by an inferior Court or subordinate Court. When a High Court proceeds to do so, it acts plainly in excess of its powers. 29. When a High Court proceeds to do so, it acts plainly in excess of its powers. 29. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court since the findings on the question of bonafide need and comparative hardship have been arrived at by the Additional District Judge after appraisal of the evidence on record and applying his mind to the same, cannot be interfered with by this Court and it is not open to this Court to re-appraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that arrived at by the Additional District Judge. 30. In the result, there are no merits in this writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs.