JUDGMENT A. P. Misra, J. - The petitioner by means of this writ petition has sought for quashing of the order of the Labour Court, dated 23 October 1982 (annexure IV to the writ petition). 2. By means of the impugned order the Labour Court held, the termination of the services of respondent 3 was illegal and liable to be set aside and he was directed to be reinstated and paid full salary along with the benefit, which would have accrued to him in case his services were not terminated. 3. According to the petitioner, the respondent 3 was appointed temporarily on the post of apprentice in the society on 25 October 1980, and his services were terminated by the petitioner by means of letter, dated 30 June 1980, sent by the Managing Director. Thereafter, respondent 3 moved an application on 11 September 1980, under S. 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central), 1947, before the Conciliation Officer, Jhansi. The case set up by respondent 3 was that his services were terminated without any notice or charge-sheet and against the provisions of rules ; and even one month's salary in lieu of notice was not paid. In the objection filed by the petitioner before the Conciliation Officer it was stated that the society of the petitioner is a registered society under the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1945 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 1947 Act), are not applicable and as such the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter and thus the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent 3 does not come within the purview of S. 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central), 1947. After hearing, the Conciliation Officer recommended the matter to the State Government, who, in turn, under S. 4 K of the 1947 Act referred the matter to the Labour Tribunal. According to the petitioner, it had no knowledge of the information of the date of hearing and the statements in the impugned order that the petitioner was served about the date of hearing is wrong. According to the petitioner, it had no knowledge of the information of the date of hearing and the statements in the impugned order that the petitioner was served about the date of hearing is wrong. Further, the impugned order holding that the services of the respondent 3 were wrongly terminated and further direction to the petitioner to pay salary to the respondent 3 up to date were challenged as having been made illegally and without jurisdiction. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner mainly urged that, in fact, it had no notice and service was not properly made on him and, therefore, the Labour Court committed an error in deciding the matter ex parte and, therefore, it is liable to be set aside. Secondly, it was urged even if the Labour Court proceeded ex parte it has not applied its mind in coming to the conclusion whether the respondent 3 had proved his case or not. Merely non-participation of the petitioner cannot be a ground for decreeing the claim of respondent 3 by the Labour Court and in doing so even on merits it has committed an error, which is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that the ground urged that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction in view of S. 135 of the Act is not correct since no notification has yet been issued to exclude the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (both Central and Uttar Pradesh). In this case, first attempt was made to prove that there was no proper service on the petitioner and, therefore, proceeding to decide ex parte was not justified. An attempt was made by showing the certified copy of the order-sheet that no intimation was sent to the petitioner and thus drawing an inference that service was made and proceeding to decide ex parte is not-sustainable. On the perusal of various grounds raised in the present writ petition, I do not find any such ground was raised. In fact, when I called upon the learned counsel for the petitioner, to show whether he had made any such averment even before the Labour Court to show that there was no proper service on it, I find that nothing has been shown nor any such foundation was laid even before the Labour Court. In fact, when I called upon the learned counsel for the petitioner, to show whether he had made any such averment even before the Labour Court to show that there was no proper service on it, I find that nothing has been shown nor any such foundation was laid even before the Labour Court. The question whether a party was properly served or not is a question of fact and that having not been raised either at the stage of proceeding before the Labour Court, nor in the writ petition, it would not be right to permit the petitioner to raise such a plea at the stage of hearing of the case. 5. It is significant under rule 16 of the Ottar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Rules, 1947, there is a provision and petitioner had an alternative remedy to take recourse to apply for setting aside the order passed ex parte. Under sub-rule (1) of the said rule 16, if on the date fixed, any party to the proceeding before the Labour Court is absent though duly served with the summons such Court may proceed with the case even in his absence and pass such orders as it may deem fit and proper. Under sub-rule (2) the Labour Court is empowered to set aside such an order against a party who is absent if within ten days of such order the party applies in writing for setting aside such order and shows sufficient cause for his absence. It seems not only, as what has been recorded by the Labour Court, the petitioner did not participate in spite of his appearance at the initial stage, but did not make such an application as contemplated under rule 16(2) of the rules. An argument was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that rule 16 of the rules only speaks about the order and would not cover the award and thus there is no provision under this rule under which the petitioner would have applied. The point is directly covered by the decision of this Court in Badri Prasad Hari Dass v. Barton Nirmata Mazdoor Sabha, Mirzapur, and others [1984-II L.L. N. 113]. The relevant portion in Paras. 11 and 12, at page 116 is quoted below : " There is no difference between an order and an award. The point is directly covered by the decision of this Court in Badri Prasad Hari Dass v. Barton Nirmata Mazdoor Sabha, Mirzapur, and others [1984-II L.L. N. 113]. The relevant portion in Paras. 11 and 12, at page 116 is quoted below : " There is no difference between an order and an award. Under sub-rule (2) of rule 16, it may be correct that the word used is `order,' but once an order is set aside the necessary consequence is that the award given in pursuance of the decision of the Labour Court or Tribunal to proceed ex parte would automatically fall down. Sub-rule (2) of rule 16 is an enabling provision and, therefore, if sufficient cause has been shown by a party against whom the case has proceeded ex parte, the party would become entitled to be heard. It necessarily follows that if any award has been given against him, that is liable to be set aside. It often happens that a Tribunal or Labour Court may make and order of proceeding with the case ex parte and thereafter on that very date it may give the award. It may be correct that the Act does not confer any power on the Labour Court or Tribunal to set aside an award once it has been finally made, but the rules have to be read along with the Act. If read together, no power to recall an award given ex parte would be found lacking." In that case also the Court gave an award and similar question was raised but. the Court found that a party could always make an application under rule 16 for setting aside an order proceeding ex parte even though the word "order" does not include the award. It is held that once that order is set aside the award also falls. In view of this, the contention on behalf of the petitioner that he had no remedy under this cannot be sustained. Admittedly, not only the finding has been recorded in this case he was duly served and he having not raised this point neither before the Labour Court, nor in the present writ petition and he having failed to avail the alternative remedy admissible to him under law under rule 16(2) of the rules the contention of the petitioner on this is not sustainable and cannot be accepted. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would not reappraise the evidence to come to a fresh conclusion regarding service of notice on him on various dates fixed by the Court. 6. It is significant in this context from a perusal of the grounds raised in the present writ petition that the main ground raised was that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute between the petitioner and respondent 3. This main ground was split into various grounds in the writ petition. He raised this question even before the Conciliation Officer. The Labour Court rejected this contention. The plea was raised in view of S. 135 of the Act. However, that exclusion was subject to the notification issued by the State Government. It is not in dispute that no such notification has yet been issued and thus question of ouster of jurisdiction of the Labour Court is unsustainable. This point has fairly been conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner and thus the petitioner cannot avail any benefit on this ground. 7. Next, the contention was that even if the Labour Court proceeded ex parte it was incumbent on the Court to have recorded a finding that respondent 3 has proved his case before decreeing the claim and relief made by him. In the instant case the finding is recorded merely on account of the absence of the petitioner and in doing so it committed an error and thus the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 8. From a perusal of the impugned order, I find that the Labour Court has clearly stated the case taken up by respondents. It has also recorded that in support of the case respondent 3 also tendered eight documents, while the petitioner did not adduce any evidence, nor participated in the said proceedings after the initial filing of the written statement. In this context the Labour Court recorded a finding, there is nothing to disbelieve that the case set up by respondent 3, which the Court believed in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. It is not that the Labour Court merely described the claim of respondent 3 in the absence of petitioner but recorded a finding holding that respondent 3 has proved his case as he has stated in his written statement. It is not that the Labour Court merely described the claim of respondent 3 in the absence of petitioner but recorded a finding holding that respondent 3 has proved his case as he has stated in his written statement. The case set up by respondent 3 was that he was in service for more than one year and the case set up by him is that he had worked continuously for 240 days and thus termination of his service without payment of retrenchment allowance as contemplated under the Industrial Disputes Act was illegal and he having not even paid one month's salary in lieu of notice the order cannot be sustained. 9. It is relevant to refer here to rules 12(8) and 12(9) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957. Rule 12(8) contemplates that the written statement filed by the union or the workman shall state the grounds on which the claim of the concerned workman is based and the written statement shall be accompanied by an affidavit in which the contents of the written statement are sworn to. Sub-rule (9) stipulates that if the affidavit accompanying the aforesaid written statement is not rebutted by the employers, the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, shall presume the contents of the affidavit to be true and make an award accepting the facts stated in the written statement. Thus, under sub-rule (9) if there is an affidavit accompanying written statement of the employer or the workman and if the same is not rebutted the Court is empowered to presume the contents of the affidavit to be true and make an award accepting the affidavit stated therein. In this case, it was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, since the petitioners have also filed a written statement and that should be treated to be the rebuttal, if any, of the contents made in the written statement filed by the workman. It is significant, perusal of sub-rules (8) and (9) of rule 12 of the rules makes it clear that rebuttal which has to be made is to the written statement filed either by the union or the workman. Therefore, the rebuttal has to follow the written statement. It has not been urged on behalf of the petitioner that any rebuttal to the written statement which is accompanying the affidavit was ever filed by the petitioner. Therefore, the rebuttal has to follow the written statement. It has not been urged on behalf of the petitioner that any rebuttal to the written statement which is accompanying the affidavit was ever filed by the petitioner. Reference was made to annexure III to the writ petition, which was an objection filed by the petitioner. On perusal of the said objection I do not find any rebuttal specifically to the case set up by the workman. In this light if the Tribunal accepted the case of the workman in view of rules 12(8) and 12(9), I do not think that it committed any error. 10. During the course of argument reference was made by respondent 3 that even termination of the service was not in consonance with rule 29 of the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975. According to him, before retrenchment approval from the Registrar was necessary which was not obtained. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that this argument is unsustainable as this rule could not apply to agricultural credit society and thus respondent 3 cannot take benefit of it. It is not relevant for me to go into this question. I find this question was neither decided by the Tribunal nor raised by either of the parties before the Labour Court and the same cannot be permitted to be raised at the stage of argument by either party. Suffice it to say, if the case taken up by respondent 3 that his services were illegally terminated and as per his written statement he has specified the period for which he was in service, which is admittedly according to respondent 3 for a period of more than one year and he having continuously worked during that period for 240 days under S. 6N his services could not have been terminated as has been done in the present case, and, therefore, the Tribunal rightly set aside the termination order. An attempt was made on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner that according to the written statement filed on behalf of the employer during that period for certain period, it was clearly stated, that he absented himself from duty without any authorisation and thus excluding that period it could not be said that he continued for 240 days in continuous service. The case set up on behalf of the petitioner in his written statement further discloses that respondent 3 was continuously working. What was urged was that in fact that period should not be treated to be in service as he absented himself without authorisation or leave being granted and thus he would not be said to be in continuous service. The petitioner after making such averment has not substantiated by leading any evidence to prove to that effect. Once having taken such a case unless it was proved a presumption contrary could not be drawn. Admittedly, in the present case the petitioner did not lead any evidence to prove the same and thus the petitioner drawing any infirmity in the impugned order does not have any leg to stand. Thus, the contention raised by the petitioner before this Court is not sustainable. 11. I have perused the impugned order and given my anxious considerations and having perused the various grounds in the present case, I find that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or any such infirmity which calls for any interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 12. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed with costs.