ORDER Chettur Sankaran Nair, J. 1. Courts below concurrently found first petitioner guilty of offences under S.450 and 376 I.P.C. and second petitioner of offences under S.450 and 376 read with S.34 I.P.C. Charge found is that petitioners entered the house of P.W. 1, a twenty one year old harijan girl, at or about 7 p.m. on 23rd August 1983, that they pushed her down, that A-1 committed rape on her while A-2 pressed her down, and that after A-1 committed rape A-2 also attempted to commit rape. Mean while, P.W. 1 took out the cloth with which she was gagged and cried out, attracting attention of P.W. 3, who then came on the scene. She then called out to P.W. 2, and she too came. PWs 2 and 3 are sisters of P.W. 1. Petitioners then attempted to run away, but P.W. 3 caught hold of first petitioner. P.W. 1 then told P.W. 3, not tox let go first petitioner, saying that 'he had ruined her'. First petitioner assaulted PWs 2 and 3 and made good his escape. Second petitioner also fled, in the meanwhile. PWs 2 and 3 would say that they saw their sister P.W. 1, in tattered clothes. The three sisters went to the Police Station. Instead of registering a report, they were asked to proceed to the hospital, promising that Police also would reach there immediately. At the hospital, P.W. 4 Doctor examined PWs 2 and 3, and referred P.W. 1 to the Lady Doctor P.W. 8. P.W. 4 noticed tenderness on the cheek, eyelids and scapula of P.W. 2, and issued Ext. P-1 Certificate. Injuries on temporal region and tenderness in the abdomen were noticed on P.W. 3. Ext. P-2 is the Certificate in respect of P.W. 3. He examined first petitioner also, who had reached the hospital meanwhile, and noticed abrasions on the scrotum, scapular region, and both knees. Ext. P-3 is the Certificate in respect of the injuries on first petitioner. 2. P.W. 8 Lady Doctor who examined P.W. 1, noticed abrasions in sternum, left forearm and left wrist. Ext. P-5 is the wound certificate. P.W. 1 told P.W. 8 that she was raped at 7 p.m. on that day. P.W. 8 took vaginal swabs, but sent them for examination only after ten days. The report was negative. No vaginal injuries were noticed. 3. Ext. P-5 is the wound certificate. P.W. 1 told P.W. 8 that she was raped at 7 p.m. on that day. P.W. 8 took vaginal swabs, but sent them for examination only after ten days. The report was negative. No vaginal injuries were noticed. 3. Courts below relied on the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 and medical evidence relating to injuries on P.W. 1 and first petitioner, to find the charge. Learned counsel for petitioners would submit that absence of injuries on the genitalia of P.W. 1, would negative the case of rape. According to P.W. 8, if a woman is subjected to rape during menstrual period, injuries are not likely, due to vagina being moist. Therefore, absence of injuries is not conclusive one way or the other. It is pertinent to notice the decisions of the Supreme Court in Harpal Singh and others v. State of H.P. AIR 1981 SC 361 and in Rafiq v. State AIR 1981 SC 559 , to the effect that, absence of injuries does not negative a charge of rape. 4. Question then is, whether the offence is proved by other evidence. Courts below found that the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 proved the charge. But, counsel would submit that these witnesses were declared hostile, and therefore that their evidence cannot be relied on. There is no general rule that the evidence of a 'hostile witness' must be rejected outright. The decisions in K. Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1976 SC 980 , Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka AIR 1979 SC 1848 and Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration AIR 1976 SC 294 , illustrate the law. In Syed Akbar's case AIR 1979 SC 1848 , the Court stated the law thus: "Evidence of prosecution witnesses cannot be rejected wholesale merely on the ground that prosecution had dubbed him hostile and cross examined". There is no exclusionary rule. Merely because a witness is contradicted with his or her previous statements, or alleged previous statements, the evidence does not become tainted. 5. Evidence of PWs 1 to 3 cannot be rejected, because they were labelled 'hostile witnesses'. Value of their evidence must be assessed with regard to its intrinsic worth and with reference to corroborative circumstances. Expression 'hostile witness' is alien to the Evidence Act. 5. Evidence of PWs 1 to 3 cannot be rejected, because they were labelled 'hostile witnesses'. Value of their evidence must be assessed with regard to its intrinsic worth and with reference to corroborative circumstances. Expression 'hostile witness' is alien to the Evidence Act. One would understand the expression to mean a witness, who does Hot support the case of prosecution. So viewed, the Courts below did not treat PWs 1 to 3 as 'hostile witnesses'. Because P.W. 1 denied the signature in Ext. P-10 First Information Statement, she is not hostile to the prosecution. It only means, she did not support the evidence of P.W. 18-Assistant Sub Inspector, on one Point. It is difficult to assume that, what P.W. 18 states is unimpeachable truth, and that anything inconsistent with that, is untrue. For that matter, the role played by P.W. 18 Assistant Sub Inspector, is "highly suspect. PWs 1 to 3 state that the First Information Report was recorded from the hospital. P.W. 18 does not deny this. In all likelihood, P.W. 18 himself forged or caused to be forged, the signature of P.W. 1 on the First Information Report. Chances are that the register in which First information Report is to be written was not taken to the hospital. The time of report shown in the First Information Report is 8 p.m. It would have been recorded it the hospital. The two signatures purported to be that of P.W. 1, vary with each other. Besides, they appear to be in the hand of someone who is literate. It does not appear to be in the hand of a near illiterate woman, like P.W. 1. The learned Trial Judge commented on the role played by the Prosecutor and P.W. 18. Without any provocation, the Public Prosecutor declared P.W. 1 hostile and cross examined her. Almost at the beginning of the chief examination, even before she narrated the incident, she was asked whether the signature in Ext. P-10 was her's. She disowned it and she was cross examined. It eludes comprehension why the Public Prosecutor resorted to such a course and why he thought of throwing the whole prosecution case out of gear, even as the examination of prosecution witnesses began. He must have had his reasons. P-10 was her's. She disowned it and she was cross examined. It eludes comprehension why the Public Prosecutor resorted to such a course and why he thought of throwing the whole prosecution case out of gear, even as the examination of prosecution witnesses began. He must have had his reasons. P.W. 18, for what reasons I do not want to guess, put a signature or got signatures put in the First Information Report, which are clearly not that of the first informant. 6. Within minutes of the alleged occurrence, P.W. 1 reported at the Police Station. Soon thereafter, she went to the hospital. Both the Doctors PWs 4 and 8, say that she complained of rape. P.W. 8 noticed tell-tale injuries on the bosom of P.W. 1, and on her wrist and forearm. In the First Information Statement itself, she named petitioners, and stated every material particular relating to the commission of offence. Her evidence, warp and woof, brings out the picture of an outraged and indignant woman, telling her tale of woe, truthfully. The view taken by Courts below regarding the credibility of P.W. 1, is beyond reproach. 7. P.Ws. 2 and 3 corroborate P.W. 1 in depth and dimension. I am aware that, tainted evidence cannot corroborate tainted evidence. That is not the case here. Unerring circumstances, lend assurance to the oral evidence of PWs 1 to 3. For example, PWs 2 and 3 say that they were assaulted by first petitioner. P.W. 4 the Doctor, who examined them within an hour of the alleged occurrence, noticed injuries on them, corresponding to the injuries said to have been caused on them by first petitioner. This is a very significant and assuring circumstance. Likewise, injuries on the knee of first petitioner noticed by P.W. 4, corroborate the evidence of P.W. 1. Evidence to the effect that P.W. 1 was in tattered clothes, spoken to by PWs 1 to 3 stand corroborated by the evidence relating to recovery of her clothes in a torn state. The clothes were recovered under Ext. P-6 mahazar proved by P.W. 12. Brassiers had recent tear marks. Likewise, the shirt worn by P.W. 1 showed signs of violence. The clothes were recovered under Ext. P-6 mahazar proved by P.W. 12. Brassiers had recent tear marks. Likewise, the shirt worn by P.W. 1 showed signs of violence. Thus, (a) the prompt report made by P.W. 1 to P.Ws, 4 and 8 containing graphic details of the incident, (b) injuries on her bosom noticed by P.W. 8 corroborating, (c) injuries on the accused noticed by P.W. 4 in Ext. P-3, (d) medical evidence and Exts. P-2 and P-3 corroborating the evidence of PWs 2 and 3, (e) the torn clothes of P.W. 1 recovered. (f) Ext. P-11 Body Note in respect of P.W. 1, showing that her shirt was torn; Exts. P-12 and P-13 body notes of PWs 2 and 3 showing swellings and contusions on the face of both. etc. are circumstances, that vouch the truth of the case. These are unering circumstances that cannot be ignored. 8. It was then argued that the First Information Report being a fabricated document, the whole prosecution must fail. To mean that P.W. 18 forged the signature of P.W. 1, in the First Information Report, the Trial Judge called the First Information Report, 'fabricated': He himself did not treat it as fabricated. This is not a situation, where axioms can be applied. It is not possible to say, the F.I.R. was fabricated, in its true sense. P.W. 1 has adhered to its contents, in its essential details. A suggestion thrown by the Public Prosecutor and denied by P.W. 1, will not make the F.I.R. fabricated. The F.I.R. is essentially the report and its contents, and not signature in it. That the maker did not sign it, does not make it a fabricated document. An act of impropriety by P.W. 18, does not make the report, untrue. That calls for action against P.W. 18, and there is evidence that, action was initiated far back by the Director General of Police. Relying on the decision in Marudanal Augusty v. State AIR 1980 SC 638 counsel contended that the prosecution must fail. On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court found that the F.I R. therein was fabricated, and that the prosecution case was not credible. Applicability of the rule would depend on facts. The facts of that case are distinguishable. But for the signature, there is nothing whatsoever suspicious in the First Information Report justifying its description as fabricated. On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court found that the F.I R. therein was fabricated, and that the prosecution case was not credible. Applicability of the rule would depend on facts. The facts of that case are distinguishable. But for the signature, there is nothing whatsoever suspicious in the First Information Report justifying its description as fabricated. Precedents without reference to facts can lead to situations not intended. As stated by the Supreme Court in Rafic v. State AIR 1981 SC 559 inferences to be drawn vary with the facts: "For one thing, Pratap Misra's case (supra) laid down no inflexible axiom of law on either point... .Indeed, from place to place, from age to age, from varying life-styles and behavioural complexes, inferences from a given set of facts, oral and circumstantial, may have to be drawn not with dead uniformity but realistic diversity lost rigidity in the shape of rule of law in this area be introduced through a new type of precedential tyranny". 9. On a careful consideration of the evidence, I am inclined to think that the findings of facts reached by Courts below are well justified, and that they do not call for interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, The sentencing discretion exercised by the two courts below also does not justify interference. Conviction and sentence are confirmed, and Petition is dismissed. I express appreciation of the help rendered by Sri K.C. Peter as amicus curiae and also Sri Prasad Mathew, counsel for petitioner.