JUDGMENT 1. - All the above mentioned revisions are disposed of by one single order as these revisions arise out of a common order passed by District Judge, Kota, dated September 8, 1987. 2. Brief facts of the case are that M/s. J.K. Synthetics Ltd., Kota (here-in-after referred to as 'the Company') filed tour suits for an injunction restraining the Municipal Council, Kota not to realise any octroi on the raw material consumed in their factory for expanded capacity for a period from April 1, 1986 to March, 31, 1988. Applications for temporary injunction were also filed alongwith the suits. Learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Kota (North) by his order dated August 22, 1987. dismissed all the four applications for temporary injunction tiled alongwith the suits. Learned Munsif while passing the above order gave the following direction in the last part of his order: " izkFkhZ dEiuh }kjk izLrqr vLFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk ds pkjksa izkFkZuk&i= fo:) vkizkFkhZx.k vLohdkj fd;s tkrs gSaA vizkFkhZ dks ;g Hkh funsZ'k fn;s tkrs gSa fd os 20&2&87 ds vkns'k dh ikyuk esa ;fn izkFkhZ dEiuh foLrkj ls iwoZ dh {kerk ds dPps eky gsrq pqaxh vnk dj nsrk gS rks mls dsoy foLrkj dh xbZ {kerk ds fy, vk;kfrr eky ij pqaxh eqfDr dk ykHk nsosA " 3. The Company filed four appeals, which came up for consideration before the District Judge, Kota. Learned District Judge observed that the above order passed by Munsif can be divided in two parts Learned District Judge then observed that in the first part of the above order Munsif had dismissed the applications for temporary injunction while in the second part he had granted the entire relief to the company for which applications for temporary injunction were filed. According to the District Judge this had created an unusual situation. Learned District Judge then considered the case set up by both the parties and held that the argument of learned counsel for Municipal Council was not correct that no law can be given retrospective effect. According to the District Judge this had created an unusual situation. Learned District Judge then considered the case set up by both the parties and held that the argument of learned counsel for Municipal Council was not correct that no law can be given retrospective effect. It was held that the original order granting exemption was dated May 18, 1982 and the order dated February 20, 1987 was merely an order of compliance of the original order dated May 18, 1982 According to the District Judge the second reason for taking the aforesaid view was that the order dated February 20, 1987 itself mentioned that it was made effective from April 1, 1986. Whatever octroi so far been paid by the Company was on such raw material on which the octroi was already payable, In these circumstances there was no question of giving any retrospective operation to the Notification dated February 20, 1987. Learned District Judge then observed that the last reason for taking the above view was that learned counsel for the Company had not raised any argument for the refund of any amount of octroi already paid by the Company. Thus, according to the learned District Judge, there was no controversy at this stage regarding the payment of any additional octroi but the only question was to grant exemption on the expanded capacity of raw material. 4. Learned District Judge also repelled the contention at learned counsel for Municipal Council that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. Reliance in this regard was placed by the learned District Judge on (1) Singhai Tantilal v. City of Jabalpur Corporation, AIR 1960 M.P. 223 . Learned District Judge then decided the question of balance of convenience and irreparable loss also in favour of the Company Learned District Judge, in these circumstances, allowed all the four appeals filed by the Company and set aside the first part of the order of the Munsif and maintained the second part. Learned District Judge ultimately gave a direction that the Municipal Council, Kota shall grant exemption of octroi to the Company on the expanded capacity of raw material in compliance with the order dated February 20, 1987. Learned District Judge ultimately gave a direction that the Municipal Council, Kota shall grant exemption of octroi to the Company on the expanded capacity of raw material in compliance with the order dated February 20, 1987. It was also directed that the appellant Company would furnish the entire details regarding the import of raw material from April 1, 1986 till the date of pronouncing the order (dated September 8, 1987) within 30 days. It was also directed that the Company would also produce the concerning invoices, bills, etc. for perusal of the Municipal Council, Kota. 5. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order of the learned District Judge, Kota, the above mentioned four revisions have been filed by the Municipal Council, Kota. 6. Mr. Mebrish, learned counsel for Municipal Council contended that the plaintiff Company did not comply with the conditions laid down in the Notification of the State Government dated May 18, 1982 and as such the plaintiff was not entitled to get any exemption. It was submitted in this regard that according to Condition No. 1 of the Notification dated May 18, 1982, only that much quantity of raw material could be considered for the extension of the industry regarding which the Industries Department or its authorised nominees had in advance sent a certified list to the Municipal Council. In the present case, the plaintiff Company or the Industries Department did not send any certified list of the quantities of raw material which was imported for the purpose of extension of the industry, the Company was not entitled to claim any exemption. It was also argued that the Industries Department had issued a certificate on February 20, 1987 granting exemption and it cannot be applied to any raw material imported prior to February 20, 1987, as no retrospective exemption could be granted by the Industries Department. It was argued that no retrospective exemption could be granted under Section 107 (5) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. 1959 and as such the Notification dated May 18, 1982 and certificate of the Industries Department dated February 20, 1987 were wholly void and illegal being in excess of the authority granted by the Statute. Mr. It was argued that no retrospective exemption could be granted under Section 107 (5) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. 1959 and as such the Notification dated May 18, 1982 and certificate of the Industries Department dated February 20, 1987 were wholly void and illegal being in excess of the authority granted by the Statute. Mr. Mehrish also argued that the revenue earned through octroi is spent by the Municipal Council on development activities and other works of utility of the general public and there was no justification in granting any injunction against the realisation of octroi from the Company. It was also argued that the plaintiff Company was obliged to pay octroi and in case it claimed any exemption from payment of octroi then according to sub-rule (8) of Rule 14 of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Octroi) Rules, 196?, it was subject to the production of certificate from concerned authority. If the person bringing such goods did not produce the requisite certificate at the time of entry of the goods within municipal limits, he was bound to forthwith deposit such amount as was equivalent to the amount of octroi leviable on such goods. The proviso to sub-rule (8) of Rule 14 provided that the amount so deposited can be refunded to the payee if he made an application within a period of two months from the date of such deposit alongwith the aforesaid certificate. Mr Mehrish thus submitted that any octroi already paid in the absence of producing the requisite certificate at the time of entry of the goods within municipal limits, could only be refunded in accordance with the proviso to sub-rule (8) of Rule 14. It was also submitted that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is barred by Section 143 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act which clearly provided that no objection shall be taken to a valuation or assessment nor shall the liability of a person-assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or by other authority as provided in this Act Reliance in support of this contention was placed on (2) Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. City of Jabalpur Corporation, (1977) 2 SCC 472 . It was also argued that the plaintiff Company has already realised the amount from the consumers and there was no balance of convenience in granting any injunction. Ltd. v. City of Jabalpur Corporation, (1977) 2 SCC 472 . It was also argued that the plaintiff Company has already realised the amount from the consumers and there was no balance of convenience in granting any injunction. There was also no question of irreparable loss to the plaintiff Company and thus the learned District Judge committed a material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order Mr. Mehrish also contended that the Supreme Court in (3) Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandao Nagar v. Dunlop India Ltd. and others, AIR 1985 SC 330 , has deprecated the practice of granting interim order which practically gave the principal relief sought in the petition for no better reason than that a prima facia case had been made out, without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the public interest and a host of other relevant consideration. The Supreme Court also observed in the above case that the collection of public revenue is seriously jeopardised and budgets of Government and local authorities affirmatively prejudiced to the point of precariousness consequent upon interim orders made by the Courts Since the Law presumes that public authorities function properly and bona fidely with due regard to the public interest, court must be circumspect in granting interim orders of far reaching dimensions or orders causing administrative burden-some inconvenience or orders p eventing collection of public revenue for no better reason than that the parties came to the Court alleging breach, inconvenience or harm and that a prima facie case had been shown. The supreme Court further observed that there could be no hard and fast rule but prudence, discretion and circumspection were called for. There were other vital considerations apart from the existence of a prima facie case. There is the question of balance of convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury. There is the question of public interest. There are many such factors worth consideration. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Surana supported the order passed by the District Judge as regards the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the present suits. Mr. Surana argued that if the levy and realisation of octroi itself was unconstitutional and illegal, the same could be challenged in a Civil Court. There are many such factors worth consideration. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Surana supported the order passed by the District Judge as regards the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the present suits. Mr. Surana argued that if the levy and realisation of octroi itself was unconstitutional and illegal, the same could be challenged in a Civil Court. Reliance in this regard was placed on a decision of Division Bench of this Court in (3-A) M/s. J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Municipal Council, Kota (O.13. Special Appeal No. 154/73 decided on July 3, 1984) . It was submitted that in the above case M/s. J.K Synthetics Ltd the present plaintiff had filed a suit against Municipal Council. Kota for grant of the declarations that the levy and collection of Dharmada tax on any goods brought within the limits of the Municipal Council, Kota was void, illegal ultra vires and unauthorised. The trial Court in the above cave had held that the suit was maintainable in a Civil Court and the Division Bench upheld the above order passed by the learned District Judge and it gas observed by the Division Bench that they agreed with the conclusion that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. 8. It was further submitted by Mr. Surana that the case of the plaintiff Company was based on exemption Notification dated May 18, 1982 issued by the State Government itself and the certified list issued in pursuance of the same on March 12, 1985 covering the period of exemption from October 30, 1983 to March 31, 1936 and the certified list dated February 20, 1987 covering the period from April 1, 1936 to March 31, 1988. It was submitted that even prior to March 12, 1985. certified list had been issued on May 7, 1984 and November 22, 1984. It was submitted that the impugned Notification in the present case was wholly prospective. It was argued that when the tax is annual and an exemption certificate is issued at any point of time during the financial year, it operates for whole of the financial year and in the present case when the exemption is for a period of five years. It was argued that when the tax is annual and an exemption certificate is issued at any point of time during the financial year, it operates for whole of the financial year and in the present case when the exemption is for a period of five years. the certified list becomes operative for the whose period of five years for the purpose of exemption of raw materials imported for expanded capacity Reliance in support of the above contention is placed on (4) M/s. Nathmal Tara Chand v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1963 RLW 23 , (5) M/s. Dispensing Chemist v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 RLR 488 . 9. It was also argued by Mr. Surana that the delay has always been at the level of Industries Department of the State Government for which the plaintiff Company cannot be held responsible. Moreover, the Municipal Council, Kota was well aware in the present matter that an exemption certificate had been granted on March 12, 1985 and even prior to that on May 7, 1984 and November 22, 1984. In those certificates it was clearly stated that the Company has expanded its production capacity on October 30, 1983 and as such it was entitled for exemption of octroi on the goods imported for its expanded capacity. The Municipal Council. Kota has no authority to go behind the certified list. Mr. Surana also contended that the Notification dated May 18, 1982 no where mentioned that the Industries Department will issue certified list for a particular period only out of the period of five years. Director, Industries Department had no power under the Notification dated May 18, 1982 to superimpose any particular period on the basic period of exemption issued and notified by the State Government ...................which, in the present case, was five years from the date of expansion of additional capacity. 10. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and have thoroughly perused, the record. 11. The present four suits have been brought on the basis of the certificate issued by the Industries Department dated February 20, 1987 covering the period from April 1, 1986 to March 31, 1988. 10. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and have thoroughly perused, the record. 11. The present four suits have been brought on the basis of the certificate issued by the Industries Department dated February 20, 1987 covering the period from April 1, 1986 to March 31, 1988. So for as charging of octroi after February 20, 1987 and upto March 31, 1988 is concerned, I am clearly of the view that the plaintiff Company has a strong prima facie case of getting exemption from the levy of octroi on the raw material required for expanded production capacity. Now so far as any octroi charged on goods brought within the limits of Municipal Council, Kota from April 1, 1986 to February 20, 1987 the matter stands on a different footing at this stage. There is a clear procedure prescribed under the Octroi Rules for the refund of octroi already paid by the plaintiff Company. There is no question of claiming any injunction for such octroi already paid by the plaintiff Company and utilised by the Municipal Council for its developmental activities or for other public utility services. Mr. Surana was unable to refute the contention of Mr. Mehrish that the plaintiff Company had already realised the amount from the consumers and in this view of the matter I am clearly of the view that there is no balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff Company, for seeking any injunction with regard to octroi already paid upto February 20, 1987. There is also no question of any irreparable loss as the matter relates to monetary payment of octroi and even if the same is held to have been realised in excess or in illegal manner, the same can only be refunded according to rules or adjusted in future payment of octroi 12. Learned District Judge at this stage committed a material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in deciding the question of maintainability of the suit in a Civil Court as well as the question of retrospectivity of the Notification dated February 20, 1987. These questions cannot be decided while disposing of an application for temporary injunction and can only be decided in an appropriate manner in the main suit. These questions cannot be decided while disposing of an application for temporary injunction and can only be decided in an appropriate manner in the main suit. Learned counsel for both the parties had made a long argument and cited authorities on the aforesaid questions because the same had been finally decided by the learned District Judge but, in my view, such questions need not have been decided by the District Judge. I, therefore, set aside the finding recorded by the learned District Judge on the aforesaid questions and the learned trial Court would now decide these questions in the main suit after framing proper issues and after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. 13. I was greatly concerned in view of the fact that after the decision of the District Judge, the plaintiff Company moved applications before the trial Court for granting injunction against the two notices dated May 5 and 6, 1988 asking the plaintiff Company to deposit octroi to the extent of nearly 37 lacs. The plaintiff Company submitted before the trial Court that in view of the order passed by the District Judge dated September 8, 1987, the plaintiff Company had already paid much more octroi and the plaintiff Company was even entitled to Rs. 26,00,000/- from the Municipal Council, Kota Learned trial Court by order dated June 16, 1988, gave a direction restraining the realisation of any octroi in pursuant to the notices issued on May 5 and 6, 1988. Learned trial Court in this regard considered itself to be bound by the order of the District Judge and further left it open to be finally decided according to the decision given by the High Court in the present revision petitions. 14. These suits are not for rendition of accounts and I fail to understand as to how the plaintiff Company can seek any injunction in respect of any future levy of octroi on the basis of any alleged payment of octroi prior to February 20, 1987, As already mentioned above the plaintiff Company is entitled to injunction on the levy of octroi on the raw material used in the production of goods under the expanded capacity of the plaintiff Company, There cannot be any controversy in the present suits with regard to any period prior to April 1, 1986. Now, so far as the period between April 1, 1986 to February 20, 1987 is concerned, the octroi having already paid the controversy for its refund would be decided in the main suits but there is no balance of convenience or irreparable loss to the plaintiff Company if no injunction is granted with regard to this period. The plaintiff Company may have a prima facie case with regard to this period also but as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dunlop India Ltd. case (3) (supra) there are several other considerations apart from the existence of a prima facie case Municipal Council has already spent the amount for its public needs and there is no question of balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff Company as the amount has already been realised by it from the customers, "that apart, there is no irreparable injury to the plaintiff Company if no injunction is granted for the period between April 1, 1986 to February 20, 1987. 15. In the result, all these revisions are allowed in part, the judgment of the District Judge is set aside aid the Municipal Council, Kota is restrained from realising any octroi from February 20, 1987 to March 31, 1988 on the raw material brought within the limits of Municipal Council, Kota for expanded capacity as certified by the Industries Department in their order dated February 20, 1987.Revisions Partly allowed. *******