Judgment :- 1. Violation of R.18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules and refusal of opportunity to the vendor to sell representative sample of ice-cream to the Food Inspector are the only reasons for the acquittal against which the Food Inspector has come up in appeal. Those are the only reasons urged before me also. Hence the appeal must stand or fall on those grounds alone and nothing more need be considered. 2. What R.18 enjoins is that a copy of the memorandum and a specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet shall be sent to the Public Analyst separately by registered post or delivered to him or to any person authorised by him. That only means that whatever be the method, those two items alone should reach the Public Analyst separately. That is only one of the several safeguards provided under the Act and Rules to ensure that there is no tampering with the sample which has to be analysed. In this case it is not necessary to decide whether the rule is mandatory or whether its violation is fatal and operate as a technical defence by itself. Such a question may arise only if the Rule is seen violated. 3. While examined as PW.1 the Food Inspector categorically said that the Rule was complied with and he sent a copy of the memorandum and a specimen impression of the seal to seal the packet in a separate cover to the Public Analyst by registered post. One specimen impression of the seal was produced and proved by him as Ext.P7. He said that on that day he took action in some other cases also and there is only one postal receipt for having sent some of those items including the 'specimen impression of the Seal and copy of the memorandum in this case sent separately. In the complaint and in the box he said so and proved Ext. P8 as the true copy of the postal receipt certified by him. It is true that this evidence was challenged in cross-examination. He said that the original of Ext. P8 was produced by him in S.T. 13 of 1985 filed by him before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Chengannur. This version he mentioned in the complaint also. He was only discharging an official duty. It is true that this evidence was challenged in cross-examination. He said that the original of Ext. P8 was produced by him in S.T. 13 of 1985 filed by him before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Chengannur. This version he mentioned in the complaint also. He was only discharging an official duty. Normally no court will disbelieve him in that respect by a fair assessment of the evidence. When the correctness of the true copy is capable of verification by the original which itself is before another court, nobody could think that the Food Inspector who was discharging only an official duty will run the risk of filing a wrong copy with his certification. The attitude of the Magistrate has not in any way advanced the cause of justice. 4. If the magistrate thought that Ext. P8 is not acceptable as it is not an authenticated copy, he could have asked the complainant to obtain and produce an attested copy. Or else in exercise of the powers under S.311 he could have called for production of the original from the court, where it is produced, for perusal. But instead the magistrate has chosen to reject Ext. P8 as it is attested only by the complainant and found that compliance of R.18 was not proved by the best evidence possible. Courts are existing for dispensation of justice and the aim should be to find out the truth and decide cases fairly and justly. 5. I said so because even without placing reliance on Ext. P8 itself the evidence of PW.1 that he complied with R.18 could have been accepted on the basis of other materials if the magistrate was inclined to have a just and fair approach. PW. 4 is the Local (Health) Authority. PW.1 said that he prepared 5 copies of the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal and three were sent to the Local (Health) Authority along with other items. PW. 4 gave evidence that he received these items by parcel. His evidence in this respect was not even challenged in cross-examination. Ext. P11 report of analysis is not at all challenged in this case. Under S.13 (5) it has to be used as evidence of the facts stated therein. Ext. PW. 4 gave evidence that he received these items by parcel. His evidence in this respect was not even challenged in cross-examination. Ext. P11 report of analysis is not at all challenged in this case. Under S.13 (5) it has to be used as evidence of the facts stated therein. Ext. P11 which is under the signature and seal of the Public Analyst shows that he received the sample properly sealed and fastened, and that he found the seal in tact and unbroken. So also the seal fixed in the container and the outer cover of the sample were found by him totally with the specimen impression of the seal separately sent to him by the Food Inspector and the sample was in a condition fit for analysis. Especially in the absence of any material or even contention to the contrary challenging Ext. P11, the magistrate was legally bound under S.13 (5) to accept the statements in Ext. P11 including those that the specimen impression of the seal was separately sent and the sample was fit for analysis. The magistrate was not satisfied with any of these things. He did not consider any of them and said that Ext.P8 is not acceptable and R.18 is violated. When the Public Analyst received everything in tact with the sample in good condition and his report shows that R.18 was also properly complied with, why should the court reject the evidence of PW. 1 supported further by Ext. P8 and the evidence of PW. 4. 6. Under Art.141 of the Constitution the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. So far as the judiciary in a State is concerned, the decisions of that High Court are also having the binding force subject to Art.141 of the Constitution. When a particular position of law applicable to a case is covered by Supreme Court decisions or Kerala High Court decisions the subordinate judicial officers may have no justification in overlooking them and rendering decisions based oft law to the contra laid by some other High Court. That may not be conducive to judicial discipline. If that is by ignorance or oversight and as such bona fide it may not present a serious problem even though that itself has to be avoided. But if it is conscious it presents a serious problem. 7. That may not be conducive to judicial discipline. If that is by ignorance or oversight and as such bona fide it may not present a serious problem even though that itself has to be avoided. But if it is conscious it presents a serious problem. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent cited certain decisions to argue that the contents of Ext. P11 report of analysis, inspite of S.13 (5), cannot be read for finding compliance of R.18. Nirmal Kumar v. State (1987 Crl. L.J. 46) quoted the Supreme Court decision in Municipal Corporation, Delhi v. Kacheroo Mal (AIR 1976 SC 394) and said that S.13 (5) does not mean that the ipse dixit of the Public Analyst would be conclusive and binding on the court. I do not think that it is necessary for me to consider that aspect because no such question has arisen. In that case after analysing the evidence on record the court said that it is unsafe to decide that all necessary steps were taken. In our case the position of the evidence is entirely different. There is no room for any doubt that R.18 was not complied with. 8. Shashi Mehta v. The State of Punjab (1986(1) F.A.C. 155) and Murlidhar Laxman Dhadge v. The State of Maharashtra (1987(1) F.A.C. 208) were relied on to argue that the printed portions contained in the report of analysis which is in printed form cannot be taken as the result of application of the mind of the Public Analyst because he has not written these portions in his hand. In other words the printed pro forma was not considered as part of the observations of the Public Analyst on the ground that they were mechanically signed by him, In the first case that opinion was formed because the Food Inspector admitted that he did not sent the specimen impression of the seal separately whereas that printed portion in the report of analysis was not scored. In the second case also the opinion was on the basis of the evidence in the case. 9. In the second case also the opinion was on the basis of the evidence in the case. 9. With due respect to those decisions, I am not in a position to agree that whenever a printed form is used for an official or personal section, what is written in hand or typewritten in it alone could be taken as the result of application of mind and the rest which is in print will have to be rejected as mechanical. That may be so in a given case where there is evidence to show that some printed portion is wrong and it was omitted to be scored off. When a judicial or official act is proved to have been performed, Illustration (e) to S.114 of the Evidence Act comes into play and the court may presume that the judicial or official act has been regularly performed. Printed forms are permitted in all dealings and there is no legal bar. In fact in many cases such forms are necessary for the smooth, efficient and speedy discharge of functions. It may be necessary to avoid omissions also. 10. An officer who is performing an. official duty by filling up a printed form must be expected to do it regularly and properly by due application of mind. He will be making entries wherever necessary and scoring off printed portions also wherever that is needed. The contrary is a matter for proof or inference from circumstances or proved facts. If the seals are not intact or the specimen impression of the seal was not separately received or the sample was not fit for analysis, the Food Inspector is expected to score the relevant portions in the printed form and he may even refuse to analyse the sample if that is the position. Without anything the court may not be justified in drawing a conclusion that the printed portion under the seal and signature of the public analyst is not part of the facts stated in the report and that it is mechanically there without application of the mind. Therefore in disagreement with the magistrate, I find that R.18 was properly complied with. Acquittal on that ground is illegal and against the weight of the evidence. 11. The next question is whether the acquittal on the ground that respondent did not get an opportunity of selling a representative sample could be accepted. Therefore in disagreement with the magistrate, I find that R.18 was properly complied with. Acquittal on that ground is illegal and against the weight of the evidence. 11. The next question is whether the acquittal on the ground that respondent did not get an opportunity of selling a representative sample could be accepted. In this respect also, as on the previous ground, the approach of the magistrate was not able to inspire confidence in me. The sample is ice cream. It was prepared and kept in the freezer in a condition fit for sale. In the cross-examination of PW.1 a suggestive question was asked whether the respondent refused to sell ice cream in that condition and offered to sell it only after taking it out from the freezer, liquifying it and then stirring it. PW.1 was prepared to agree and he further added that he did not allow and wanted it to be in the condition as it is. The magistrate had absolutely no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the accused is prejudiced because he was not able to sell a representative sample. 12. In arriving at that conclusion the magistrate sought support from the decision in Food Inspector v. Hameed (1983 KLT 901). That was also a case in which the sample was ice cream. The judgment of the magistrate is capable of giving an impression that he read the entire decision because he referred to the elaborate discussion there. But still he considered and quoted only the portion which may favour an acquittal. He quoted that portion of the decision which said that it was not a case of compulsory taking of the sample by the Food Inspector, but one of sale by vendor. In such a case it was said that it is the duty of the vendor to make what is sold a satisfactory portion of the whole stock if that is the usual practice in sale. Relying on these portions alone the magistrate said that the accused was not allowed to liquify and stir the sample and it is fatal because he was denied his genuine right. 13. That portion of the judgment which quoted with approval and emphasis (by giving italics and stating "emphasis supplied") the following passage from Food Inspector v. Hassan (1982 KLT 941) was ignored. 13. That portion of the judgment which quoted with approval and emphasis (by giving italics and stating "emphasis supplied") the following passage from Food Inspector v. Hassan (1982 KLT 941) was ignored. It reads: "Ice cream is a commodity which is not expected to loose its shape and form when the sale is effected. Ice cream when liquified is no longer treated as ice cream. It will not be taken by a customer as ice cream then. It is too unreasonable therefore to expect that a representative sample of ice cream could be taken by the Food Inspector only by stirring the entire mass of ice cream available for sale and taking the sample thereafter. Hence there is no justification to apply any such rule of representative sample." 14. So also the magistrate overlooked that portion of the judgment which said: "One would naturally be sceptical about any such process by which solid or viscous ice cream is reduced to liquid form before sale". 15. Without referring to the above findings which laid down the law to be followed, he found satisfaction by quoting and following a hypothetical statement which was not intended as an affirmative finding. It was only a statement that if the contention is like that it could be so done. This method of approach in quoting and following decisions is far from being satisfactory. In fact he was overlooked and ignored the decision on its material aspects and interpreted and used it in the way he wanted. 16. It appears that the Food Inspector was only obliging the respondent on the basis of collusion to wriggle out of the compulsory imprisonment. When he visited the shop ice cream was ready for sale in the freezer in the solid condition. There is no question of de-freezing or liquifying it before sale because in that portion it will not be ice cream and nobody will purchase it as ice cream. Therefore there is absolutely no possibility of the respondent having refused to sell and wanted the ice cream to be taken out, liquified and stirred. The Food Inspector had no such case in the mahazar or complaint. That part of the evidence of the Food Inspector in cross-examination has only to be rejected as collusive and improbable. Evidently it is a false statement. The Food Inspector had no such case in the mahazar or complaint. That part of the evidence of the Food Inspector in cross-examination has only to be rejected as collusive and improbable. Evidently it is a false statement. Even if it is not false such a situation cannot operate to give any valid defence to the accused who was bound to sell and who will be selling ice cream in the condition in which it was in the freezer. The second ground also must inevitably fail. 17. No other contention is there. Respondent is proved beyond doubt to be guilty as alleged. No ground was alleged before me to award anything below the minimum sentence though the counsel was heard on that question. The criminal appeal is allowed. Acquittal is set aside. Respondent is convicted under S.16(1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. He is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for two months. The magistrate will see that the sentence is executed.