ORDER A.P. Misra, J. - The aforesaid two revisions arise out of judgment and decree dated 14th Mar. 1984, by virtue of which the suit of the plaintiff.for the recovery of damages only was decreed while the suit for ejectment was dismissed. The plaintiff filed Civil Revision No. 264 of 1984 and the defendant filed Civil Revision No. 367 of 1984 as against the part which was decided against them. Since both the revisions arise out of the same judgment they are being disposed of. by means of this common judgment. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant from the first floor of premises No. 109/253, Ram Krishna Nagar. Kanpur, and also for recovery of Rs. 3220/- as arrears of rent and Rs. 520/- as damages pendente lite and future damages of Rs. 600/- per month. 3. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff is the owner of the said premises and defendant was inducted as tenant of the entire first floor of the said house. The plaintiff's case is that the monthly rent of the accommodation in question is Rs. 600/- per month. Since he fell in arrears with effect from 1st September, 1982, consequently, composite notice of demand and eviction was served upon him personally on 4th Jan., 1983, but in spite of that since he did not vacate, hence the suit. 4. The defendant resisted the allegations. He admitted himself to be in occupation and possession of the accommodation with the further averment that he is also tenant of the open roof and : e runt was only Rs. 200/- P.M. while Rs. 4th/- was for other facilities, namely, separate water line and electric meter etc. The rent is admitted to have been paid to the landlady to the tune of Rs. 600/- per month up to 31st Aug., 1982. His case was that it is understood between the parties that the landlady would get the accommodation allotted in his favour and since the defendant was let into possession without any allotment order in contravention of law his status is t ha t of an unauthorised occupant and the contract of tenancy, if any, is void and thus the plaintiff is not entitled to seek any relief as claimed by him. A replication thereafter was filed in which it was clarified that only the front two rooms are governed by the provisions of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 1972 Act) while the back portion is newly constructed. 5. The Court held that contract of tenancy between the parties was void and it cannot be given effect to, though plaintiff landlady has been able to prove her case on merits. Thus, only a decree for damages was passed. Aggrieved as against the said judgment the plaintiff and the defendant both filed the aforesaid revisions challenging the findings which were decided against them. 6. It is significant in the revision filed by the defendant the challenge is confined to the award of damages as the decree should not have been awarded on the basis of a void contract and thus, it was urged, that since contract of tenancy, the foundation of the suit of the plaintiff was void the suit itself was not maintainable. There was no challenge to the other findings recorded as against the defendant, viz. tenancy does not include the open roof; the rent is not Rs. 200/- per month but Rs. 600/- per month; the notice was valid and was duly served; the defendant has committed default in payment of arrears of rent. 7. The main challenge in the revision of the plaintiff is the finding of the trial Court that in the absence of allotment order the contract of tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendant was void and hence he is not entitled for a decree of eviction while the main challenge in the revision of the defendant was that once the trial Court held the lease to be void it committed error in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for damages. In effect, both these grounds raise a common question, namely, whether in view of provisions of the 1972 Act could there be such tenancy on the basis of agreement between the parties. According to the defendant in view of Sections 11, 13 and 31 of 1972 Act any such tenancy would be against public policy and would be in contravention of the Act and thus void and the landlord cannot derive benefit out of this contract and hence the suit based on this is liable to be dismissed. According to the defendant in view of Sections 11, 13 and 31 of 1972 Act any such tenancy would be against public policy and would be in contravention of the Act and thus void and the landlord cannot derive benefit out of this contract and hence the suit based on this is liable to be dismissed. On the other hand, the case of the plaintiff that such a tenancy is not hit by any public policy and does not defeat any provisions of the Act as it neither affects any provisions o f t he Actin its implementation nor it nullifies it and hence the trial Court committed an error in not decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 8. The aforesaid point has been drawing attention of the Courts since long under the various Rent Control Acts and has been subject to adjudication. Before adverting to those cases it is relevant to examine the provisions of 1972 Act, which are applicable to the facts of this case. S. 3(a) of 1972 Act defines "tenant", in relation to a building, meaning a person by whom its rent is payable. Sub-sec. (f) of S. 3 of 1972 Act defines "landlord" in relation to a building means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let, would be payable..... S. 8 defines disputes regarding amount of standard rent. S. 9 deals with determination of standard rent. S. 11 is a prohibition of letting without allotment order, which is quoted below : "Save as hereinafter provided, no person shall let any building except in pursuance of an.allotment order issued under S. 16". Section 13 is restriction on occupation of building without allotment order. Relevant part of this section is quoted below : "Where a landlord or tenant ceases to occupy a building or part thereof, no person shall, occupy it in any capacity on his behalf or otherwise than under an order of allotment or release under 'S. 16, and if a person so purports to occupy it, he shall, without prejudice to the provisions of S. 31, be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant of such building or part." Section 14 deals regularisation of occupation of existing tenants. S. 15 deals obligation to intimate vacancy to District Magistrate, and S. 16 governs allotment and release of vacant building by the District Magistrate. S. 15 deals obligation to intimate vacancy to District Magistrate, and S. 16 governs allotment and release of vacant building by the District Magistrate. S. 17 lays down conditions of making allotment order. It prescribes where the District Magistrate receives an intimation under sub-sec. (1) of S: 15, of the vacancy he shall pass an order of allotment and communicate it to the landlord within twenty-one days from the date of receipt of such intimation, and where no such order is made within the said period the landlord may intimate to the District Magistrate the name of a person of his choice, and thereupon the District Magistrate shall allot the building in favour of the person so nominated unless for special and adequate reason to be recorded he allots it to any other person within ten days from the receipt of such intimation. Section 20 is a bar of suit for eviction of tenant, Section 21 gives procedure for release of building under occupation of tenant. Section 31 provides penalties where any person contravenes any of the provisions of the Act or any order made therein. 9. From the aforesaid provisions it is clear that the object of 1972 Act was to overcome the situation of shortage of accommodation. Earlier, when the United Provinces (Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the old Act) was passed it was thought that it would be an Act of temporary nature, but in spite of passage of time and with increase of population with exodus of urban (rural) population and multifarious activities increasing situation did not improve and it became necessary to bring forth the 1972 Act by eliminating the temporary nature into a permanent feature. The object was to make such an accommodation available and to be brought under the absolute control of the authorities and to allot it to a needy through an authority established under the Act withdrawing the right of the landlord and controlling the letting obviously for public purpose. The 1972 Act not only lays down the procedure and control of such accommodation falling under that Act bur also provides penalties to the person violating the provisions of law. Under S. 16, sub-cl. The 1972 Act not only lays down the procedure and control of such accommodation falling under that Act bur also provides penalties to the person violating the provisions of law. Under S. 16, sub-cl. (4) where the allottee or the landlord has not been able to obtain possession of the building allotted to him, the District Magistrate on an application of the allottee or the landlord, may by order evict or cause to be evicted any person named in the order as well as every other person claiming under him or found in occupation, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and put the allottee or the landlord in possession of the building. Sub-sec. (5)(a) ' of S. 16 of 1972 Act provides that where the landlord or any other person claiming to be a lawful occupant of the building or any part thereof comprised in the allotment or release order satisfies the District Magistrate that such order was not made in accordance with cl. (a) or cl. (b), of sub-sec. (1) of S. 16, he District Magistrate may review the order. Thus, sub-sec. (4) deals with eviction.of any unauthorised person whereas sub-sec. (5)(a) deals with persons who may defend their possession by challenging the order passed by the District Magistrate not to be in accordance with law as provided under S. 16(1)(a) and (b). It is also significant that S. 2-A is special provision for short term licence. It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a person occupying a building as owner or as tenant or in any other capacity, may permit any other person to occupy for purely temporary. residential accommodation for a period not exceeding three months without any order of allotment under S. 16 provided the intimation of the grant of such licence shall be given jointly by the licensor and the licensee to the District Magistrate within one month from the date of occupation of the building. Thus,' the Act permits a person to be inducted in the occupation as licensee to a building t which 1972 Act applies even without the allotment order. However, if a person doe not fall either under S. 2-A or who is a person occupying the building without an allotment order could. be an unauthorised occupant liable for eviction under S. 16(4). However, if a person doe not fall either under S. 2-A or who is a person occupying the building without an allotment order could. be an unauthorised occupant liable for eviction under S. 16(4). Thus, the scheme of the Act is very clear. 10. There is absolute control of letting by the authorities with further power to evict an unauthorised person who has been inducted into the accommodation not in accordance with the provisions.of the Act with further penal consequences on the person violating the provisions of the Act. It cannot be doubted if any contract is entered which obstructs the public policy laid down therein in its implementation or nullifies the effect of such policies, would be void. However, any contract even if otherwise illegal or even if it in contravention of some of the provisions of the Act but it does not obstruct the public policy such a contract could always be implemented inter se between the parties so long as the authorities do not act in pursuance o the provisions of the Act. Such contract or ease would be void qua authorities who could proceed to exercise the powers under the Act irrespective of such contract or lease and by virtue of such contract or lease neither the power exercisable by such authority is nullified nor there is any impediment in the exercise of such power. In a given case, if a contract is entered by the parties by virtue of which the provisions of the Act are made a nullity then such a contract could not survive as it directly obstructs the public policy as laid down under the Act. This can be better understood in a case where the landlord performs his act by intimating the District Magistrate under Section 15 about the vacancy and even after the expiry of the said period no allotment is made and thereafter even after nomination for allotment of a person of the choice by the landlord is communicated yet no allotment order is passed. In such a situation if a man is inducted in tenancy into the occupation till the allotment order is passed could it be said that even for this period if there was an agreement it would be void as per the provisions of the said Act. In such a situation if a man is inducted in tenancy into the occupation till the allotment order is passed could it be said that even for this period if there was an agreement it would be void as per the provisions of the said Act. What is taken away from the landlord and given to the authorities is the right of letting, but suppose in spite of vacancy an authority does not act for months and may be year, the landlord in such a case would be losing income of the said property on account of inaction of the authorities and there is. nothing, on account of this induction of a person by the landlord, to show that it amounts to any obstruction in the public policy as laid down under the Act. The public policy is the absolute right of letting by the authorities and is not obstructed even by unauthorised person coming in possession since he could be evicted under S. 16(4) of the Act. Thus, any contract short of obstruction of the public policy could not be said to be such as to be void inter se between the parties to the contract though it may be void qua authorities. 11. In Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeo Das Maiya, AIR 1959 SC 781 , it was held: "The common law of England and that of India have never struck down contracts of water on the ground of public policy; indeed they have always been held to be not illegal notwithstanding the fact that the statute declared them void." In this case their Lordships laid down what is "public policy". The relevant portion is quoted here : "Public policy or the policy of the law is an illusive concept; it has been described as 'untrustworthy guide', variable quality', 'uncertain one', 'unrulyhorse', etc. The relevant portion is quoted here : "Public policy or the policy of the law is an illusive concept; it has been described as 'untrustworthy guide', variable quality', 'uncertain one', 'unrulyhorse', etc. the primary duty of a Court of law is to enforce a promise which the parties have made and to uphold the sanctity of contracts which form the basis of society, but in certain cases, the Court may relieve them of their duty on a rule founded on public policy; the doctrine of public policy is extended not only to harmful cases but also to harmful tendencies; this doctrine of public policy is only a branch of common law, and, just like any other branch of common law, it is governed by precedents; the principles have been crystallised under different heads and though" it is permissible for Courts to expound and apply them to different situations, it should only be invoked in clear and incontestable cases of harm to the public; though the heads are not closed and though theoretically it may be permissible to evolve a new head under exceptional circumstances of a changing world, it is advisable in the interest of stability of society not to make any attempt to discover new heads in these days." 12. In Udhoo Dass v. Prem Prakash, AIR 1964 All I (FB) it was held: "Though the U. P. Act (3 of 1947) contains provisions punishing a person for letting out without permission or letting out in contravention of an order of allotment or refusing to let out in spite of an order of allotment and punishing abetment of the above acts and rendering a person liable to be evicted if he has occupied an accommodation in contravention of an allotment order, .....there is no provision whatsoever rendering a contract of tenancy entered into by a landlord and another person void or even illegal." 13. In Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 1924 , a question was raised where a lease was made in violation of S. 7(2) of the 1947 Act and their Lordships held to the following effect : "A lease made in violation of the provisions of S. 7(2) would be valid between the parties and would create the relationship of landlord and tenant between them although it might not bind the authorities concerned. Therefore, the lessee who had been paying the rent to the lessor was a tenant and permission under S. 3 to file a suit for eviction was necessary. In this case another question was raised that the agreement in lease deed mentioned that parties will never claim benefit of the Act and that the provisions of the Act will be inapplicable to lease deed then where (therefore?) the tenant is precluded from contending that the suit for eviction without permission under S. 3 is not maintainable. To this, their Lordships held to the following effect : "Therefore, an agreement in the lease deed, providing that the parties will never claim the benefit of the Act and that the provisions of , the Act will not be applicable to the lease deed, is illegal in view of S. 23 of the Contract Act and it will not preclude the tenant from contending that the suit for eviction filed without the permission of the District Magistrate was not maintainable..... The object of S. 3 is to give protection to a tenant from eviction from an accommodation. Section 3 is based on public policy..... The language of the section is prohibitive in character. It precludes a court from entertaining the suit." 14. The aforesaid decision clearly carves out that the portion of the lease which hits; the public policy would be void while the other part could be a valid lease. 15. In Satya Vir Singh v. Kewal Ram, 1977 All WC 550, it was argued that after the, Court having held that sub-tenancy was illegal in law and void, it was not open to the Courts below to have passed the decree for eviction of the defendant on the alternative ground of the defendant being a trespasser in the property. The contention was that it -was almost indirectly enforcing the contract which the courts themselves held was strictly prohibited in law. In this case it was held: ".....the fact that a contract of sub-tenancy is illegal in law does not mean that the tenant should stand permanently deprived of the accommodation in his tenancy. It will be the same as is a contract of tenancy were held to be void and illegal. In this case it was held: ".....the fact that a contract of sub-tenancy is illegal in law does not mean that the tenant should stand permanently deprived of the accommodation in his tenancy. It will be the same as is a contract of tenancy were held to be void and illegal. Surely, it cannot be held that the owner of the property would stand permanently deprived of his property and the defendant would never be called upon to vacate the same merely because the contract of tenancy is held to be illegal and void." 16. Similar is the position in the present case that if the contention raised on behalf of the defendant is to be accepted it amounts to permitting the defendant (tenant) to continue ad infinitum without any liability for eviction. In fact, such contract of tenancy does not hit any public policy as laid down in the 1972 Act. On the contrary if so held it would lead to an anomalous situation. 17. Similarly, in Bhagelu Ram Tewari v. Judge, Small Causes, Allahabad, 1977 All Rent Cas 75, it was argued that a contract of tenancy entered into privately by the landlord and tenant without an order of allotment is void and the possession of the person who occupies the premises is that of a trespasser. Their Lordships in this case relying on the case of Murlidhar Agrawal ( AIR 1974 SC 1924 ) (supra) held that the lease made even in violation of S. 7(2) of the 1947 Act is valid between the parties and creates relationship of landlord and tenant. It was further held, after such a lease has been entered into, the tenant is estopped from denying that he is a tenant of the premises. 18. In Shanker Lal Gupta v. Jagdishwar Rao, AIR 1980 Andh Pra 181 (FB) their Lordships came to the same conclusion that a tenancy created even in contravention of the Act is not illegal and void inter se between the parties though it is void as against a controller. Relying on the case of Murlidhar Agrawal, ( AIR 1974 SC 1924 ) (supra) the Full Bench had gone to the extent of holding such an agreement to be valid even if it is opposed to public policy in terms of S. 23 of the Contract Act. Relying on the case of Murlidhar Agrawal, ( AIR 1974 SC 1924 ) (supra) the Full Bench had gone to the extent of holding such an agreement to be valid even if it is opposed to public policy in terms of S. 23 of the Contract Act. In the present case, it is not necessary to go to that extent as I have already held above that such a contract would not hit any public policy or put obstructions in its implementation under the said Act. 19. The case Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd., Allahabad v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, 1982 All Rent Case 585 : (1982 All LJ 857) is a case on which strong reliance was placed by the defendant. The relevant portion is quoted hereunder : "Section 11 prohibits a person from letting any building except in pursuance of an allotment order issued under S. 16. Since there is a prohibition imposed on the right of any person, which will include a landlord and tenant both, the person occupying the premises would be in an unauthorised possession. Such a person could not be treated to be a tenant. The authorised possession of a person gives a right or authority to occupy it, whereas unauthorised would mean that the person occupying is not possessed of right full or legal power, and, as such no legal competency, which can have any recognition in the eye of law, as a result of which the premises would be deemed to be unoccupied or unfilled, or empty. If that is so, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under S. 16, would be entitled to pass an order of allotment. The vacancy talked of in S. 16 takes within its purview also possession of a person which is not recognised in law. If a person without any authority occupies a premises, his possession would be of no value and the premises would be available to the District Magistrate for passing an allotment order under S. 16." 20. The proposition laid down by the Division Bench is in consonance with the other authorities. So long there is no obstruction to the authorities performing their obligations for the public good, at the most possession of such person could be treated to be unauthorised and illegal, but it would, not make the agreement inter se between the parties as void. The proposition laid down by the Division Bench is in consonance with the other authorities. So long there is no obstruction to the authorities performing their obligations for the public good, at the most possession of such person could be treated to be unauthorised and illegal, but it would, not make the agreement inter se between the parties as void. In this case, their Lordships also relied on the case of Murlidhar Agrawal ( AIR 1974 SC 1924 ) (supra) also and held to the following effect : "However, what is material to consider is that even in that case the Supreme Court found that such a contract was not binding, on the District Magistrate and he could treat the building as vacant and evict therefrom the tenant. S. 11 has made the position crystal clear. The District Magistrate can ignore the contract arrived at between a landlord and the tenant and pass an appropriate order for allotment under S. 16. What he may be required to do is to afford an opportunity of hearing before evicting the tenant." Thus, even in this decision such a person was treated to be a tenant, but that never fettered the power of the authorities to pass an allotment order, evict the tenant or put back the allottee in place of such tenant. It is significant in para 13 of this case it was held : "From the above, it would appear that in case of an illegal letting or subletting, the view taken was that the contract may be binding on the_parties to it, but_ not on the authorities, which would mean that the possession of a person who has been illegally let in would be unauthorised." 21. On behalf of the respondent reliance was placed in the case Brij Mohan Parihar v. M. P. State Road Transport Corpn., AIR 1987 SC 29 . It was urged that in this case an agreement between the Corporation and the private vehicle owner allowing him to operate his vehicle under permit obtained by Corporation as its nominee was held to be not valid, as it was in contravention of the Act. This case has no application to the principle as discussed above. This was a case under Motor Vehicles Act. Sections 42 and 59 clearly debar all holders of permit including the State Road Transport Corporation from indulging in unauthorised trafficking in permits. This case has no application to the principle as discussed above. This was a case under Motor Vehicles Act. Sections 42 and 59 clearly debar all holders of permit including the State Road Transport Corporation from indulging in unauthorised trafficking in permits. Therefore, the agreement entered into by the petitioner unemployed graduate, with the State Road Transport Corporation to ply the bus as nominee of the Corporation on the route in respect of which the permit was issued in favour of the Corporation for a period of five years was clearly contrary to the Act. This was a case where permit was issued to Corporation by the authorities and since it did not permit it to be used by somebody else to run his vehicle, it was held that the Corporation cannot indirectly clutch at the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority. In the present case the question is entirely different. The landlord is the owner of the property and that right is not abrogated by 1972 Act and except for the right taken away by the authorities the exercise of other rights by such landlord could not be said to be such as obstruction to the policy under the said Act. Thus, the defendant does not get any help from the said authority. 22. In Nanakram v. Kundalraj, AIR 1986 SC 1194 , the question was again directly raised when the landlord urged in a proceeding for permission to terminate the tenancy and for possession that the lease between the parties is void inasmuch as it was entered in contravention of Cl. 22 of the Rent Control Order. The case was under the. Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. Their Lordships while relying on the case of Murlidhar Agrawal, ( AIR 1974 SC 1924 ) (supra) and Udhoo Dass, (AIR 1964 All I (FB)(supra) held: "It is not open to a landlord in a proceeding for permission to terminate the tenancy and for possession of the premises, to urge that the lease between the parties is void inasmuch as it was entered in contravention of Cl. 22 of the Rent Control Order." It is further held : "Nowhere does the Rent Control Order mandate that the Deputy Commissioner must eject a person who has entered into possession of a house in violation of Cl. 22. 22 of the Rent Control Order." It is further held : "Nowhere does the Rent Control Order mandate that the Deputy Commissioner must eject a person who has entered into possession of a house in violation of Cl. 22. If upon a view of the circumstance prevailing then, the Deputy Commissioner takes no action in the matter, there is no reason why the lease between the landlord and the tenant, although inconsistent with Cl. 22 should not be binding as between the parties thereto. It is not a void transaction. There is nothing in the Rent Control Order declaring it to be so. If the lease is not void it is not open to either party to avoid the lease on the ground that it is inconsistent with Cl. 22. The parties would be bound, as between them, to observe the conditions of the lease, and it cannot be assailed by either party in a proceeding between them." 23. In view of the clear enunciation of law on this point there is no room for doubt that any lease or agreement would not be void merely because it is illegal or in contravention of the Act unless it can be shown that it is an obstruction in the implementation of the public policy laid down under the said Act. Even in the present case, nothing has been shown as to the Act which declares such transaction to be void. The only argument on behalf of the defendant is the difference in the language of old Act of 1947 and the 1972 Act that now under S. 13 the position of such person is treated to be unauthorised, while there was no such provision under the old Act. May be that the position remained that if such possession is unauthorised, but it does not make the contract . of tenancy between the landlord and tenant before the allotment order by the authorities to be illegal. It only becomes void the moment the authorities wake, pass any order to implement the public policy and the moment it is done there is no fetter on the power of such authority and not only possession of such a person is unauthorised for the purpose of the Act it would bedeemed to be vacant. It only becomes void the moment the authorities wake, pass any order to implement the public policy and the moment it is done there is no fetter on the power of such authority and not only possession of such a person is unauthorised for the purpose of the Act it would bedeemed to be vacant. Thus, I do not find an obstruction by the said contract, which fetters the power of the authority for implementing the public policy. 24. Strong reliance was placed by the defendant on a decision reported in the case. Navin Chandra Sharma v. VIth Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Meerut, 11983 1 All Rent Cas50: ( AIR 1983 All 116 ). It was held in this case : "Therefore, in the instant case, the contract of tenancy relied on by the petitioner was forbidden by law by virtue of the express prohibition contained under Sections 11 and 13, and, is by its very nature such that if permitted it would defeat the provisions of the Act. The contract is plainly opposed to public policy being repugnant to public interest." In this case it seems that the submission was that Sections 11 and 13- of the Act prohibit only initial act of letting and it is for this initial act penal consequences under S. 31(1) have been made. Repelling this it was held that this would lead to strange results as it would lead to large scale evasion of the Act. "There are many a landlord or tenant who would be willing to enter into contracts of .tenancy thereby taking out of the field of immediate availability of a large number of buildings which would otherwise be available for allotment to persons whose need might be far far greater, by carrying out the operation in a clandestine and surreptitious manner. There will be no dearth of such daring landlords and tenants who would be willing to go to any length, including running the risk of being prosecuted in the event of being caught, in their desire to make money or to pay money for giving or taking on rent, houses under such private arrangements in order to avoid going through the cumbersome process of allotment prescribed under the law." Their Lordships held that if it is permitted it would defeat the provisions of law and such contract or lease would be void. In this case, reliance was placed in the case of Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer : (1982 All LJ 857) (supra) it seems that para 13 of the judgment in this case was not brought to the notice of their Lordships, in which it was held that in case of a landlord letting or subletting while referring to Murlidhar Agrawal's case, ( AIR 1974 SC 1924 ) (supra) their Lordships held : "....It would appear that in case of an illegal letting or subletting, the view taken was that the contract may be binding on the parties to it, but not on the authorities, which would mean that the possession of a person who has been illegally let in would be unauthorised." 25. Thus, right from Murlidhar Agrawal's case, ( AIR 1974 SC 1924 ) (supra) there is no difference on the consensus about the principle. Thus, in view of the aforesaid authorities I find the contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff has strength, and finding by the trial court that in the absence of allotment order the suit for eviction by the plaintiff cannot be decreed as tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendant would be void cannot be sustained. As I have' expressed above, such a lease would be binding between the plaintiff and the defendant and would be void only against the authority created under the said statute. It is not in dispute in this case, the defendant has accepted the plaintiff to be the landlord an took the accommodation in question as a tenant and it is only in defence the defendant alleged that since his possession was not through allotment order the allege agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant would be void to 1972 Act. The defendant having accepted the plaintiff to be the landlord his only case was that he w inducted with a promise that the plaintiff would obtain the allotment order in his favour and since no allotment order was obtained the plaintiff cannot file a suit for eviction as the accommodation is covered under the 1972 Act. This argument is not sustainable. 26. This argument is not sustainable. 26. Some argument was advanced on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff did not perform his obligation under the Act of intimating the District Magistrate of the vacancy and thus the action was in contravention to the obligation cast on him under the Act. In this case, a finding has been recorded by the trial Court that the landlord intimated the District Magistrate of the vacancy and when even after 21 days no allotment order was made he sent the intimation to the District Magistrate nominating the very defendant in this case as his nominee, but it seems in spite of this the District Magistrate did not pass an allotment order. I have perused the evidence in the matter. This was a clear statement made by, the husband of the landlady in the witness box and he even filed copy of such application sent to the District Magistrate. There is no cross-examination on this point by the defendant. In view of this, the contention of defendant is unsustainable. 27. Lastly, learned counsel for the defendant relied on the case Ram Singh v. Ajay Chawala,(1988) 1 All Rent Cas 150 : ( AIR 1988 SC 514 ) to show that where a person is in unauthorised occupation the suit for his eviction would lie in the Civil Courts and not in Small Cause Court. However, in the said decision, the provision applicable to the resent case was neither in question nor was raised, nor was decided. 28. Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act provides for cognizance of suit by the Court of Small Causes. It excludes) the suits specified in the Second Schedule. A proviso has been added by amendment to U. P. in sub-sec. (3), which is quoted below : "Provided that in relation to suits by the lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease, or for recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for the use and occupation thereof after such determination of lease, the reference in this sub-section to two thousand rupees shall be construed as a reference to five thousand rupees." The amount of Rs. 5,000/- mentioned has subsequently been increased to Rs. 10,000/-. 5,000/- mentioned has subsequently been increased to Rs. 10,000/-. Under second schedule the relevant Articles are Articles 4 and 8. Article 4 is for suit for the possession of immovable property or the recovery of interest in such property. There is a U. P. Amendment by virtue of which the said Article has been substituted which is quoted below: "(4) a suit for the possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property, but not including a suit by 'a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of lease, and for the recovery from him of compensation for the use and occupation of that building after such determination of lease. Explanation- For the purpose of this Article, the expression building means a residential or non-residential roofed structure, and includes any land (including any garden), garages and out-houses, appurtenant to such building, and also includes any fitting and fixtures affixed to the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof." Thus, a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of the lease and for the recovery of agreed amount of compensation for use and occupation of the building after such determination has been excluded from Article 4 and thus by virtue of that amendment Judge, Small Cause Court would have jurisdiction to deal with a suit of lessor and lessee. Article 8 is for suit for recovery of rent other than house rent unless the Judge or the Court of Small Causes has been expressly invested by the Government with authority to exercise jurisdiction with respect thereto. However, U. P. Act excluded Article 8 from its application. Thus, it is clear that as far as the eviction of a lessee by the lessor is concerned it is Judge, Small Causes Court who easily has the jurisdiction for such suit. Even if a person could be said to be in unauthorised occupation by virtue of 1972 Act since lease or an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant would be valid and not void and binding on the parties, their relationship of lessor and lessee would continue inter se between them and thus a suit by the lessor for eviction of * the lessee even if lessee is unauthorised under 1972 Act would be cognizable by Judge, Small Cause Court. The decision of Ram Singh ( AIR 1988 SC 514 ) (supra) thus could not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 29. . In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order so far as it dismissed suit of the plaintiff for eviction of the defendant is set aside. In view of the finding recorded by the trial &urt that the valid notice was served on the defendant terminating his tenancy his suit is liable to be decreed both for eviction and for the arrears of rent and damages as prayed for and findings to the contrary by the trial Court by virtue of the impugned order to that extent is hereby set aside. The decree of plaintiffs suit for damages is converted into a decree of rent and damages and pendente lite and future damages as prayed for in the plaint. 30. Subject to aforesaid, Civil Revision No. 264 of 1984 is allowed and Civil Revision No. 367 of 1984 is dismissed. On the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case costs shall be borne by the parties.