Judgment :- 1. The appellant is an assessee under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. He was assessed to tax for the assessment year 1984-85 by Ext. P3 order. According to the appellant, unauthorised additions were made to his taxable turnover resulting in an inflation of the total tax due. He filed an appeal against that order (Ext. P6). That was accompanied by Ext. P7 application for stay of recovery of disputed tax. On the complaint that the appellate authority was not passing orders on Ext. P7 and the assessing authority is proceeding with recovery of the arrears of tax due, be filed O.P. No. 7943 of 1988 seeking the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash Ext. P3 order and Exts. P4 and P5 demand notices. In the alternative, be sought a writ of mandamus directing the 2nd respondent to dispose of Exts. P6 appeal and P7 stay petition. Another relief which he sought was an interim order restraining respondents 4 and S to refrain from taking revenue recovery proceedings against him on the basis of Ext. P3 order. 2. The learned single judge who beard the matter was of the opinion that the assessment order having furnished materials and reasoning which prima facie would indicate a justification for the liability and since an appeal is admittedly pending, it was not necessary to examine the contentions of the petitioner in greater detail. The learned single judge also found that the tax liability as found could not be said to be totally lacking in justification or resulting from an arbitrary fixation. He also adverted to the fact that irregularities resulting in additions which were made to the taxable turnover were the subject matter of penalty proceedings against the petitioner. It was for these reasons that the learned single judge dismissed the Original Petition. The appellant assails that judgment. 3. We are of the opinion that in a case where the extra-ordinary discretionary jurisdiction of this Court is invoked and a single judge has exercised discretion, one way or the other, it is not for an appellate court to interfere lightly with that discretion unless there are compelling circumstances. Only in cases where discretion was exercised in a perverse or arbitrary manner, has the appellate court to interfere. Only in cases where discretion was exercised in a perverse or arbitrary manner, has the appellate court to interfere. The mere fact that a different view is possible on the same set of facts does not justify interference in appeal; nor can such interference be justified for the only reason that the judgment could have been written in a more felicitous manner. Unless the order under appeal is shown to be clearly wrong, the appellate court ordinarily does not interfere. It shall not interfere for the only reason that the judgment under appeal was not right. The possibility of an alternative view by itself is no reason why the appellate jurisdiction shall be invoked or exercised. These propositions are well settled. We need refer only to a few of the number of precedents in this regard. 4. Asquith L. J., observed in 1948 (1) All England Report 343: "We are here concerned with a judicial discretion, and it is of the essence of such a discretion that on the same evidence two different minds might reach widely different decisions without either being appealable It is only where the decision exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, and is, in fact, plainly wrong that an appellate body is entitled to interfere". 5. Lord Goddard C. J. held in 1949 (1) All England Report 256: "It is constantly said (although I am not sure that it is always sufficiently remembered) that the function of a court of appeal is to exercise its powers where it is satisfied that the judgment below is wrong, not merely because it is not satisfied that the judgment was right". 6. Dealing specifically with an appeal from a judgment rendered under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court held in Gujarath Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Its Mazdoor Sabha, AIR. 1980 SC. 1896, a. p. 1916: "Moreover, we sit here in appeal over the High Court's judgment. And an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong. The difference is real, though fine". 7. The very question of the amplitude of the appellate power of a Division Bench from a judgment of a single judge in exercise of the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution was considered by a Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 202 of 1973. The difference is real, though fine". 7. The very question of the amplitude of the appellate power of a Division Bench from a judgment of a single judge in exercise of the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution was considered by a Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 202 of 1973. Govindan Nair C.J., speaking for the Bench held: "It is thus clear that even exercise of discretion can be interfered with if the Appellate Court is convinced that the exercise of discretion by the subordinate authority was wrong. But as we said earlier, this is not a case of exercise of a discretion and the view taken by Justice Nambiyar cannot be said to be wrong". We do not think that it is necessary to multiply authorities in support of this accepted but of forgotten principle. 8. We do not find any plea that the learned single judge was clearly wrong or that he exercised discretion in an arbitrary or perverse manner in dismissing the Original Petition. It is not for this Court to interfere in appeal, even on the assumption most favourable to the appellant that we would, perhaps, have taken a different view bad we or either of us heard Original Petition initially. 9. There is no likelihood of any prejudice to the appellant in this case, since the application for stay is still pending before the appellate authority. It has not so far been disposed of. It is for the appellant to approach the appellate authority either to expedite the disposal of the appeal or to obtain an order of stay of recovery as is provided under S.34 of the General Sales Tax Act. The appeal is therefore, dismissed.