JUDGMENT 1. - This civil misc. appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, is directed against the judgment passed by the Family Court, Jaipur by which it dismissed the appellant's application moved under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for brevity, 'the Act'). 2. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that, the appellant filed an application under Section 13 of the Act, before the District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur on March 26, 1985, which was transferred to the Family Court, Jaipur. The appellant in his application, averred that he married Gayatri Devi (respondent) on April 19, 1979 at Jaipur, and have two sons-one born on Sept. 27, 1980 and another on February 22, 1982; that uptil the birth of his second son, he and the respondent had good relations but, thereafter, there was change in the behaviour and manners of the respondent and even she began with quarrelling on very trivial matters which continued then; and that on January 20, 1983 when he got up at 6 O'clock, he found the respondent not at home though both the children were there; therefore he went to his in-law's house where he found her and persuaded to accompany him to which she refused and acted in cruel manner. 3. The appellant also averred in the aforesaid application that after his return from Udaipur, he repeatedly asked the respondent to accompany him but she refused and since then she has not returned to her in law's house, and that, even the respondent refused to look after the innocent kids and to take them with her. In these circumstances, as alleged, the appellant sought divorce on the ground of desertion on account of cruelty. 4. The respondent filed her return to the application under Section 13 of the Act, wherein she denied the allegation made by the appellant with regard to the cruelty as also to the facts narrated constituting desertion. 5. The Judge, Family Court thereafter recorded the evidence of the parties and passed the impugned judgment. Hence aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the Family Court, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 6. Shri K.K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant, reiterating the points raised in memo of appeal, submitted that looking to the conduct of the respondent it has abundantly been clear and proved that the respondent has deserted the appellant. Hence aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the Family Court, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 6. Shri K.K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant, reiterating the points raised in memo of appeal, submitted that looking to the conduct of the respondent it has abundantly been clear and proved that the respondent has deserted the appellant. 7. Shri N.K. Mishra, learned Counsel for the respondent did not contest this appeal on the point of desertion and he frankly conceded that he has no objection in case decree of divorce is granted in favour of the appellant but, he submitted that while passing a decree of divorce, the appellant may be directed to pay a reasonable amount of maintenance to the respondent. 8. Although the learned Counsel for the respondent has expressed his no objection in passing decree of divorce in favour of the appellant but, before passing such a decree we would like to look into the matter and in order to satisfy ourselves as to whether there are grounds to pass decree of divorce in favour of the appellant. 9. Before expressing any opinion of the merits of the case, we think it proper to mention the principles to be considered before passing the decree in the matter of desertion. 'Desertion' means the desertion of one of the spouse by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent and against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of other spouse. In its essence, it signifies the internal permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion includes also the wilful neglect of one of the spouses by the other. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must exist: (1) the factum of separation and (2) intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, coupled with the conditions of absence of consent and absence of conduct giving responsible cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention. 10. In the case in hand, the Judge of Family Court after discussing the evidence of the parties, came to this conclusion that the desertion is not proved by the appellant. 10. In the case in hand, the Judge of Family Court after discussing the evidence of the parties, came to this conclusion that the desertion is not proved by the appellant. As stated earlier, the desertion could be assumed not only on the basis of oral evidence but on the basis of circumstances also. It has not been disputed that the respondent did not care to see her minor children even and she left her matrimonial home on January 20, 1983 leaving behind a son of tender age (11 months). This shows cruel attitude of the respondent not only towards her husband but also to her minor sons one of 21/2 years and another of 11 months who were sleeping in the room at the time of her leaving of matrimonial home. 11. The Steps were taken by the learned Judge of Family Court for reconciliation between the parties but were of no use. It is not clear from the order sheets as to on whose part/instance, the reconciliation failed. This Court has also made efforts for reconciliation between the spouses by issuing notice to the respondent. The respondent appeared before this Court on 23.2 1987 and the reconciliation proceedings were undertaken. The appellant had expressed his desire to live with the respondent and has also stated that he is prepared to live separately with the respondent away from his parents as per the desire of the respondent expressed before this Court. The appellant accordingly took a house on rent on the assurance of the respondent that she was also prepared to live with him as soon as her examination of B. Com. (Final) was over. The matter was, therefore, adjourned to 4th May, 1987 on which date, the respondent agreed that she was prepared to live with the appellant and, therefore, it was agreed that the appellant would pick up the respondent from her counsel's house. And, this Court postponed the hearing of the case for three months on 4.5.1987. It has come in order sheet of 4th January, 1988 that the respondent did not come to the house of the Advocate N.K. Mishra as directed by this Court on 4.5.1987. And, this Court postponed the hearing of the case for three months on 4.5.1987. It has come in order sheet of 4th January, 1988 that the respondent did not come to the house of the Advocate N.K. Mishra as directed by this Court on 4.5.1987. The matter was taken upon 4.1.1988 by this Court and the respondent totally refused to go to her in-laws' house with the appellant, on any term, and ultimately, the efforts by this Court for reconciliation between the parties were in vain. The case was then ordered to be listed for admission on 9.5 1988. On that day, the matter was heard by this Court and it was again asked whether the respondent was willing to go with the appellant or not, whereupon the counsel for the respondent stated that the respondent was not prepared to live with the appellant under any circumstances. And, therefore, the appeal was admitted for hearing. 12. As stated earlier, on July 21, 1988, learned Counsel for the respondent reiterated that the respondent wife is not prepared to go back and live with the husband inspite of several efforts made by the appellant on his behalf. 13. The aforesaid extraction of circumstances convinced us that in this case the respondent-wife has deserted the appellant for continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition for divorce on the ground of desertion. In this view of the matter, certainly the appellant is entitled to a decree of divorce against the respondent by dissolving the marriage. 14. Now we pass on the next phase of the arguments which relates to the matter of grant of maintenance to the respondent. Before "we deal with this aspect, a brief reference to the relevant provisions of the Act would be advantageous. 15. 14. Now we pass on the next phase of the arguments which relates to the matter of grant of maintenance to the respondent. Before "we deal with this aspect, a brief reference to the relevant provisions of the Act would be advantageous. 15. Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that any court exercising jurisdiction under the Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband as the case may be, order that the respondent shall pay to the applicant for grant of maintenance for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as having regard to the respondent's own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant, the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the court to be just. 16. Thus, on a bare look at the provisions of Section 25(1) of the Act, it is manifest that this section empowers the Court passing any decree including that of divorce as in the present case, to grant maintenance to the parties in order to support the applicant. While calculating the quantum of maintenance, not only the income and property of both the parties but also their conduct and other circumstances are required to be taken into consideration. In other words, the sum to be awarded is for maintenance and support of the applicant and not a share in the income or property of the respondent. The quantum has to be just taking into consideration not only the income and property of both parties but also their conduct and other circumstances. Further, Section 25 lays down that in the matter of the determination of the quantum of permanent maintenance awardable to either spouse on the application made by that spouse either at the time of the passing of the decree or subsequent thereto, the conduct of the parties is not only a relevant but & very material consideration that ought to be taken into account. 17. 17. Sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act empowers the Court to vary, modify or rescind the maintenance order already made, if there is a change in the circumstances of either party. In the context particularly of Sub-section (3), the "circumstances" obviously means the economic or financial circumstances of the parties. Sub-section (3) also provides for varying, modifying or rescinding of the order of maintenance in two eventualities, viz., the beneficiary of the maintenance order had remarried or has not remained chaste. Even in such cases the maintenance order is not necessarily to be varied, modified or rescinded but "may" be varied or modified or rescinded or only varied or modified instead of being rescinded and that too in such manner as the court may deem just. 18. Here, we would like to observe that the history of the sub-section shows that prior to its amendment by Act 68 of 1976, for the words, "it may at the instance of the other party vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the court may deem just" the words were "it shall rescind the order". The change apparently deliberate which the legislature has made in the language of the sub section therefore shows that the Court is given a wide discretion in the matter depending upon the facts of each case. 19. The scheme and provisions of Section 25 as discussed above show that an applicant is entitled to maintenance under Sub-section (1) thereof not with standing the kind of matrimonial decree that is passed and the ground on which it is passed. A decree passed against the applicant-wife on the ground of desertion is no bar to her claiming maintenance either at the time of passing such decree or any time subsequent thereto. The Court has ample discretion to grant or refuse maintenance, and the extent to which to grant the same, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, it cannot be said that the legislature intended to lay down a rule that in all cases where the claimant has been proved to be guilty, he or she should be denied maintenance. On the contrary, the legislative approach on the subject appears to be liberal, reformative and conciliatory. The circumstances in which decree on the ground as envisaged in the Act are passed may also differ from case to case. On the contrary, the legislative approach on the subject appears to be liberal, reformative and conciliatory. The circumstances in which decree on the ground as envisaged in the Act are passed may also differ from case to case. No two situations are comparable much less similar. Life is complex and human behaviour inscrutable and complicated. This consideration appears to have weighed with the legislature in refraining from being dogmatic on the subject, and in adopting a realistic approach in the matter. Hence, in our view, however repugnant or repulsive may appear the idea to a mind traditionally steeped in one set of moral code, the section does not disentitle a party to maintenance even if a decree is passed against him or her on the ground of desertion held to be proved. 20. Thus, having benefitted by the enlightenment derived from the scheme and relevant provisions of the Act referred to above, and looking to the entire facts and circumstances of this case, including the conduct of the parties, we are of the opinion that though the applicant-wife who sought relief for grant of maintenance, had failed to reconcile and had deserted her husband as held above, but as enlighted above as law & morality meet and Section 25, the respondent wife should be awarded monthly allowance in order to maintain and support herself. 21. We therefore advert to the last plank of controversy in the matter of quantum of allowance. In the application tiled by the respondent wife it has been prayed that a sum of Rs. 600/-per month may be awarded to her so as to maintain and support herself. In reply to this application, the appellant-husband has contended that he at the relevant time, was under suspension from service of the Bank and had been drawing Rs. 1169/-,as subsistence allowance; and further that, he has two sons from the wed-lock with the respondent and they have been living with him, to whom he has to support coupled with his parents who are dependent on him without any support from any income other than subsistence allowance. The appellant has been regularly paying a sum of Rs. 200/-as interim maintenance to the respondent. 22. Taking an over all view of the facts and circumstances of the case narrated above, we are of the opinion that a sum of Rs. The appellant has been regularly paying a sum of Rs. 200/-as interim maintenance to the respondent. 22. Taking an over all view of the facts and circumstances of the case narrated above, we are of the opinion that a sum of Rs. 300/-per month as allowance to the respondent-wife so as maintain and support herself is just and reasonable especially keeping in view the status, conduct of the respondent-wife who deserted her husband without any consent leaving two kids of tender age all alone in the room & they are still with their father, and the income of the appellant. Accordingly we award an amount of Rs. 300/-per month as allowance to the respondent-wife which shall be deducted from the salary of the appellant by his salary withdrawing officer of the Bank/department and the same shall be deposited in the Saving Bank Account of the respondent and for this purpose, the respondent would open her Bank account in a scheduled Bank and inform the concerned Officer of the Bank/department where the appellant-husband has been serving. 23. With the above advertence, we allow this appeal and accept the application filed by the appellant-husband under Section 13 of the Act and dissolve the marriage by passing a decree of divorce in favour of the appellant and against the respondent. No order as to costs.Appeal allowed. *******