By this petition under rule 13 of the Khasi Siemships (Administration of Justice) Order, 1950, and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged an order dated 24.9.80 passed by the District and Sessions Judge-cum-Additional Depaty Commissioner Shillong in Criminal Revision No. 3 (T) of 1980. 2. The facts of the case may briefly be stated. On an application made by the Chief Conservator of Forests, MeghaUya (whom I shall refer to as the "First Party"), on 9.1.80 the Magistrate of the 1st Class Shillong drew up a proceeding under section 145, CrPC against fifteen (15) persons (whom I shall collectively refer to as the "Second Party") and fixed 24.1.80 for the appearance and filing of written statement. On 24.1.80, the First Party was present, but the Second Party were absent as the notices were not served on them. On 24.1.80, the learned Magistrate issued bailable warrant of arrest against the Second Party fixing 13.2.80 for appeaiance. On 13.2.80 the First Party appeared and filed kis written statement. The Second Party did not appear on that day. There was also no report whether the warrant issued was executed or not. The learned Magistrate fixed 12.3.80. On 25.2.80, an off-date, the case was put up. The Additional Public Prosecutor appeared on behalf of the First Party. The Second Party appeared by their lawyer. Second Party Nos. 7,8,10 and 11 filed their written statements and the learned Magistrate vacated the order of attachment which was passed on 24.1.80. On 12.3.80 the Additional Public Prosecutor on behalf of the First Party and the Second Party appeared before the learned Magistrate along with their counsel and 28.3.80 was fixed for evidence with the direction that the First Party was to take steps. On 21.3.80 the lawyer of the First Party did not appear, nor appeared the First Party in person and no step was also taken as directed by the Magistrate. The Second Party were present alongwith their counsel. The proceedings were adjourned and 3.4.80 was fixed for evidence with the direction that the First party was to take steps and that if the First party failed to take steps or produce witnesses on 3.4.80, the evidence of the First party shall be treated as closed. The Second Party were present alongwith their counsel. The proceedings were adjourned and 3.4.80 was fixed for evidence with the direction that the First party was to take steps and that if the First party failed to take steps or produce witnesses on 3.4.80, the evidence of the First party shall be treated as closed. On 3.4.80, the date fixed for the evidence of the First party, the lawyer of the First party did not appear nor appeared the First party in person. Second party appeared with their counsel. However, the learned Magistrate adjourned the hearing until 12.4.80 "for evidence and hearing". It appears from the records that 12.4.80 was a local holiday. However, the case was put up on 14.4.80 when the Court reopened. On 14.4.80, when the case was called on for hearing, the First party was absent and the Second party appeared with five (5) witnesses. Those witnesses present were examined and discharged. The evidence was recorded in the absence of the First party. After recording the evidence, the learned Magistrate heard the argument and the case was adjourned till 24.4.80 for order. On 24.4.80 the learned Magistrate delivered the judgment declaring that the Second party would be entitled to the possession of the disputed land until evicted therefrom in due course of law. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Magistrate the First party filed the Criminal Revision No. 3(T) of 1980 against the Second party in the Court of the District and Sessions Judge-cum-Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shillong. The learned Sessions Judge by an order dated 24.9.80 set aside the order of the learned Magistrate and the case was remanded to the learned Magistrare for disposal afresh. 3. Before dealing with the substantive arguments which were addressed to me on the hearing of the petition, let me deal with the procedure to be followed in such a situation in a proceeding under section 145, CrPC. There is no provision in section 145, CrPC for dismissal of an application in default of appearance of the party at whose instance the proceeding was initialed, that is, the section does not contemplate dismissal of an application for default. There is no provision in section 145, CrPC for dismissal of an application in default of appearance of the party at whose instance the proceeding was initialed, that is, the section does not contemplate dismissal of an application for default. The section requires that once the Magistrate is satisfied that dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or boundaries thereof, and passes the preliminary order under sub-section (1), he shall complete the enquiry under subjection (4) and pass final order under sub-section (6). However, the Magistrate shall cease to have the jurisdiction to make enquiry under sub-section (4) and pass final order under sub-section (6), if the Magistrate under sub-section (5) cancells the preliminary, order, or, if he makes an order of attachment of the subject of dispute under section 146, CrPC until determination of the rights of the parties by a competent Court with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof. As the sub-section (5) provides that the preliminary order of the Magistrate shall be final, if not cancelled under that sub-section (5), the Magistrate is not required to enquire into the question as to the existence of the breach of the peace at other stages of the proceedings. 4. The question then is what procedure is to be followed while making an enquiry under sub-section (4) of section 145, if a party fails to appear. The section has not provided the procedure for such a case. The procedural law is to facilitate justice and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. In other words, the rules of procedure are meant to advance the cause of justice and not to short-circuit decision oil merits. Laws for procedure are based on a principle of natural justice which requires, subject to certain exceptions, that men should not be condemned unh ard, that decision should not be reached behind their backs, that the proceedings that affect their lives and properties should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. 5. In view of the above principles, Magistrate may adjourn the hearing if the parties are absent on the dase fixed for hearing. The next question which, therefore, arises is whether the Magistrate can proceed 'exparte' in such a case under section 145. 5. In view of the above principles, Magistrate may adjourn the hearing if the parties are absent on the dase fixed for hearing. The next question which, therefore, arises is whether the Magistrate can proceed 'exparte' in such a case under section 145. When the party, who has been given sufficient opportunity of being heard, does not appear when the case is called on for hearing, it will hamper the working of the Court. Although, there is no provision for proceeding 'expart' as well as for dismissal for default, the working of the Court would become near to impossible. On the other hind, the Magistrate has to complete the enquiry unless he cincels the preliminary order as is provided under sub-section (5), or attachment under section 146 is made, as already stated. This being the position, the Court can proceed 'exparte'. But it wauld be applicable only to the particular date of hearing on which a party is absent. If the party does appear on the day to which the hearing of the case is adjourned, he cannot be stopped from participating in the proceeding; simply because he did not appear on the first or some other hearings. Although he has riiht to appear at an adjournment hearing, he cannot be relegated to the position that he would have occupied if he had appeared and he must accjptall that has goje before and be content to proceed from the stage at which he comes in unless he can show good cause for default. 6. Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that "the First Party did not know the proceeding was going on unrepresented at his back; for otherwise the First Party would not have given up the case filed by him unceremoniously," has error aparent on the face of the records as the records show that he was given sufficient and reasonable opportunity. 7. This application has been filed under rule 13 of the Khasi Siemship (Administration of Justice) Order, 1950 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 7. This application has been filed under rule 13 of the Khasi Siemship (Administration of Justice) Order, 1950 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is purely a discretionary one and exercise of the power to interfere with the order of the inferior Court or Tribunal cannot be claimed as a matter of right The power under Article 227 of the Constitution is an extraordinary one and intended to be used only in exceptional cases and not as a substitute for ordinary revi-sional or appellate power. The power is not to be exercised for the purpose of correcting every errors of law in a decision of an inferior Court or Tribunal. 8. Rule 13 of the Khasi Siemship (Administration of Justice) Order, 1959, hereinafter referred to as the "Rule," runs : "The High Court or the Deputy Commissioner or the Additional Deputy Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any proceedings of the Subordinate Criminal Courts for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentences or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such subordinate court and enhance, reduce, cancel or modify any sentence or finding passed by such Court or remand the case for' retrial." Atlhough the power of the High Court under rule 13 is as wide as the power of the Court of appeal, the question which arises for consideration is whether the High Court is expected to act as if it is hearing an appeal in such a case under section 145, Cr. P. C, more particularly so when case was remanded. The answer is in the negative. I approach the matter as follows. An order under section 145, Cr. PC is only a temporary order and to be operative until evicted in dum course of law and title of the parties is not declared. In such' a case, jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or' there is a manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. In such' a case, jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or' there is a manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. In spite of wide language in rule 13 as if the High Court is not expected to act under rule 13 as if it is hearing an appeal in such a case under section 145, Cr. P. C.. 9. Keeping the above principle in view, I now return to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has some force. From the facts stated above and procedure to be followed as discussed above, it cannot be said that the First Party was not given an opportunity of being heard. But there may be omission or inaction or fault of the lawyer. It is settled that a party should not be allowed to suffer for the omission or inaction, or for the fault of a lawyer. In this sence, the learned Sessions Judge gave the finding that "the first party did not know that the proceeding was going on unrepresented at his back". Be it noted, I am giving this opinion assuming that the Magistrate could hear the case on 14.4.80. Considering the over-all circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the learned Sessions Judge has not committed any error of fundamental principal of law which has resulted in miscarriage of justice while reminding the case. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted 10. In the result, the petition is dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.