JUDGMENT V. K. Mehrotra, J.—Himachal Pradesh Housing Board (briefly, "the Board") had filed an appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act read with section 96, C. P. C. against the judgment/award of the District Judge, Mandi, Kullu and Lahaul and Spiti Districts at Mandi, in this Court. It was feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned District Judge dated September 11, 1986, by which compensation for acquisition of land belonging to the respondents had been enhanced from Rs. 14.17 paisa per square metre to Rs. 70 per square metre The State Government had acquired 8710 square metres of land for the Board for building a Housing Colony in Sundernagar in District Mandi. The money required for the acquisition was to be paid by the Board. The award was made by the Land Acquisition Collector, Sundernagar, on March 3, 1984, and the amount thereof was deposited by the Board on March 13, 1984. 2. Alongwith the appeal, an application was also filed by the Board in this Court seeking permission to file the appeal. The Board said that it was an interested party and was aggrieved by the order of the District Judge because it has to make payment of exhorbitant amount of compensation determined by the learned District Judge. This application was rejected by the learned Chief Justice, sitting singly, by his order dated November 12, 1987. 3. The first five respondents are the persons whose land has been acquired. The State of Himachal Pradesh has been impleaded as the sixth respondent, inasmuch as, it did not file an appeal against the order of the learned District Judge. The present Letters Patent Appeal by the Board is under Article 10 of the Letters Patent. The respondents having interest in the land are represented by a counsel who appeared in consequence of notice, pending admission of the appeal, being issued to these respondents by this Court He was also heard. As prayed by the learned Counsel for the appellant-Board as also for respondents, this appeal is being disposed of finally at the admission stage itself. 4. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereafter, "the Act") defines a person interested as including all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the Act in section 3 (b). 4. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereafter, "the Act") defines a person interested as including all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the Act in section 3 (b). While dealing with an enquiry and award by the Collector, it provides in section 11 (1) that the Collector shall make an award under his hand of— (i) the true area of the land ; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land ; and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land. 5. By the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, a proviso has been added to this sub-section which says that except in such class of cases, as the appropriate Government may specify, no award shall be made by the Collector under sub-section (1) without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in that behalf. Part III of the Act deals with Reference to Court and Procedure thereon. Section 18 (1), occurring in this part, says: "18. Reference to Court.—(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested." 6. Section 23 enumerates the matters which are to be considered in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under the Act while section 24 mentions those matters which are not to be taken into consideration by the Court in doing so. Section 25 says that: "25. Amount of compensation awarded by court not to be lower than the amount awarded by the Collector.—The amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11." 7. Part VIII of the Act deals with miscellaneous matters. Section 50, occurring in this part, reads thus:— "50. Amount of compensation awarded by court not to be lower than the amount awarded by the Collector.—The amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11." 7. Part VIII of the Act deals with miscellaneous matters. Section 50, occurring in this part, reads thus:— "50. Acquisition of land at cost of a local authority or company.—(1) Where the provisions of this Act are put in force for the purpose of acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority or of any company the charges of land incidental to such acquisition shall be defrayed from or by such fund or company. (2) In any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation: Provided that no such local authority or company shall be entitled to demand a reference under section 18." Section 53 provides that: "53. Code of Civil Procedure to apply to proceedings before Court.— Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act." Section 54 says that; "54. Appeals in proceedings before Court.—Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLV thereof." 8. Section 54 contemplates an appeal against an award to the High Court. The provisions relating to appeals contained in the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to an appeal against an award. Section 54 contemplates an appeal against an award to the High Court. The provisions relating to appeals contained in the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to an appeal against an award. The applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to all the proceedings before the Court under the Land Acquisition Act, except insofar as those provisions are inconsistent with those of the Act, has been ensured by section 53. In other words, the provisions relating to an appeal from a decree, contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, are applicable to an appeal against an award under the Act. All those considerations which govern the right of an appeal against a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure would, therefore, be attracted even in the case of an appeal against an award under the Act. 9. The right of a party to a decree, to assail it in an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, is not in doubt. In addition, a person, aggrieved by the decree, can also assail it by filing an appeal with the leave of the appellate Court. Such leave is to be granted if a person, though not a party to the decree, would be prejudicially affected by the decree, for, as observed by the Supreme Court in Smt. Jathan Kanwar Golcha v. M/s. Golcha Properties Private Ltd., (In Luquidation), AIR 1971 SC 374, "it is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate Court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment". "………The words persons aggrieved are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him ; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interest" (See Attorney General of Gambia v. Peirra Serr N Jie, 1961 AC 617). These observations of Lord Denning were noticed by the Supreme Court in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar etc. etc, AIR 1975 SC 2092. These observations of Lord Denning were noticed by the Supreme Court in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar etc. etc, AIR 1975 SC 2092. The Constitution Bench observed in Dabholkar that "the test is whether the words "person aggrieved" include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests". This was reiterated in Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1976 SC 26 J2. 10. The interest of the appellant-Board is undoubtedly prejudicially affected by the enhancement of the amount of compensation by the learned District Judge. It is, therefore, a person aggrieved against the award made by the learned District Judge. A body, like the appellant-Board, for whom the land is being acquired and which has to pay the compensation is an interested party in relation to the proceedings. (See The Khurshed Bagh Co operative Housing Society Ltd., Lucknow v. Smt. Satya Devi and others, AIR 1971 All 426. As an interested person it is entitled to file an appeal before the High Court against the judgment of the District Judge. (See National Thermal Power Corporation v. Raghunath Pd. and others, AIR 1981 All 344). 11. Before noticing decisions of the various Courts which reflect divergence in opinion, on the question whether an appeal can be filed against the award by a party, like the appellant-Board, we may consider the basic sub mission made by Shri Devinder Gupta on behalf of the first five respondents to the maintainability of an appeal at the instance of the appellant-Board. He has urged that sub-section (2) of section 50 permits a Company, for whom the acquisition has been made, to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation but precludes, in express terms, in its proviso, that no such company shall be entitled to demand a reference under section 18. According to him, this should lead to the conclusion that the Company was not to have the right of assailing an award made by the Collector by filing an appeal against it. 12. An award made by the Collector, it is settled, is in the nature of an offer made to the persons who have interest in the property which is acquired. 12. An award made by the Collector, it is settled, is in the nature of an offer made to the persons who have interest in the property which is acquired. In the case of a local authority or a company, for whom acquisition is made by the appropriate government, also the award made by the Collector is in the nature of an offer made to the persons having interest in the property which is acquired. The offer, in such a case, will be deemed to be made by the Collector on behalf of the local authority or the Company itself. Quite clearly, therefore, while permitting the local authority or the Company an opportunity of appearance and of placing evidence for deter mining the amount of the offer, the Parliament considered it proper not to give it the right of assailing the quantum of the amount of offer made on its behalf by the Collector to the persons having interest in the property which is acquired, by demanding a reference under section 18 of the Act. It clearly intended to bind the local authority or the Company to the amount of offer which it makes through the Collector to those persons who have an interest in the property which is acquired. This appears to be the reason for making a provision in sub-section (2) of section 50 to the effect that no local authority or the Company, for whom the land is acquired, would be entitled to demand a reference under section 18. If one reads sub-section (2) in its entirety it would be clear that while providing in the opening part that the local authority or the Company concerned may appear and adduce evidence before the Collector or the Court for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation, limitation was placed only in respect of a demand for a reference under section 18, as far as the local authority or the government is concerned. It is implicit in the provision, as enacted, that it was not intended to place any fetter on the right of the local authority or the company to assail the decision of the Court in the matter of the amount of compensation and that the only intention was to fetter their right in the matter of a challenge to the amount determined by the Collector by precluding them from seeking a reference to the Court under section 18 of the Act. 14. In M/s. Indo Swiss Time Limited, Dundahera v. Umrao and others, AIR 1981 P & H 213, a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held, by majority, that the Company for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person so as to give it a right to become a party to the proceedings before the District Judge and that by itself, the Company would have no right to file an appeal. The majority felt that it would prefer the view taken by a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and others, (1971) 3 SCC 82!, wherein it was held that the Municipal Corporation was not entitled to maintain an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Gujarat which had allowed a writ petition filed by the owners of the land which had been acquired by the Government for the use of the Municipal Corporation. This is what the Supreme Court observed (in paragraph 2 of the report): "The Municipal Corporation was impleaded as the fourth respondent before the High Court but no relief was claimed against the Municipal Corporation The property, it is true, was notified for acquisition by the State Government for the use of the Municipal Corporation after it was acquired by the Government, but that, in our judgment, did not confer any interest in the Municipal Corporation so as to enable it to file an appeal against the order of the High Court allowing the petition. Substantially the grounds on which the petition was filed were that the notifications were invalid on account of diverse reasons. Some of these reasons have been upheld and some have not been upheld but all those grounds related to the validity of the Notifications issued by the Government of Bombay and the Government of Gujarat. Substantially the grounds on which the petition was filed were that the notifications were invalid on account of diverse reasons. Some of these reasons have been upheld and some have not been upheld but all those grounds related to the validity of the Notifications issued by the Government of Bombay and the Government of Gujarat. Not even an order of costs has been passed against the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad. We fail to see what interest the Municipal Corporation has which would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the first respondent," 15. Chief Justice Sandhawalia, who wrote the minority judgment, however, felt that the preferable view was the one taken subsequently by another two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P.) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead), AIR 1980 SC 1118. In that case, the Supreme Court reversed the view taken by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court to the effect that a Company for whom land had been acquired by the State Government had no locus standi to file a letters patent appeal against the decision of a learned single Judge, inasmuch as, it was not a person interested within the meaning of section 18 (1) of the Act. The Supreme Court said (in paragraph 7 of the report) that:— "It seems to us that the definition of ‘a person interested given in section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the lands were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the company under the agreement entered into between the company and the Government. Thus it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. Thus it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this purpose, the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantum of compensation." 16. It also said (in paragraph 13 of the report) that: "Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of person interested must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good con science we hold that the appellant was undoubtedly a person interested as contemplated by section 18(1) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it had no locus to file an appeal before the Bench." 17. Shri Devinder Gupta attempted to urge that the Supreme Court had not noticed the proviso to section 50 (2) of the Act in its decision in Himalaya Tiles. As such, the earlier view in the case of Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad was preferable. We find it difficult to accept this sub mission, particularly, in the view that we have taken of the scope of the provisions of section 50 (2). The Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s. Indo Swiss Time Limited was taken to the Supreme Court. There, the parties agreed that the Company, for whose benefit the acquisition had been made, may be impleaded as a party to the proceedings. Special leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was allowed in terms of the agreement. The matter came up again before a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s. Kulbhushan Kumar and Co., Ahmadgarh v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1984 Punjab and Haryana 55. Speaking through Sandhawalia C. J., the Full Bench said that the ratio of the earlier Full Bench decision in M/s. Indo Swiss Time Limited still held the field. Speaking through Sandhawalia C. J., the Full Bench said that the ratio of the earlier Full Bench decision in M/s. Indo Swiss Time Limited still held the field. 18. A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in The Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University Rajendranagar v. Mahmoodunnisa Begum and another, AIR 1976 Andhra Pradesh 134, held that the person for whose benefit land had been acquired could not be said to be a person interested under section 18 (1) nor could it be a party to the reference even if it applied to be added as one. Such a person was excluded from the reference proceedings before the Court. Since an appeal was only a continuation of the proceedings in the Court below, such a person could not file an appeal even with the leave of the Court. The decision of the Allaha bad High Court in The Khurshed Bagh Co-operative Housing Society, AIR 1971 Allahabad 426 was dissented from in this decision. In a later decision in the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University, Rajendranagar, Hyderabad v. Naseema Bibi and others, 1983 Andh WR 330, a single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court took the view that the Agricultural University for whose benefit land had been acquired was competent to maintain an appeal against the award made by the Third Addl. District Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. He observed that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd., wherein it did not agree with the view taken by the Orissa and Calcutta High Courts in the two cases noticed by the Supreme Court, which was similar to the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mahmoodunnisa Begum and another, AIR 1976 Andbra Pradesh 134, the view taken by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was no longer good law. 19. In Gujarat Housing Board, Ahmedabad v. Nagajibhai Laxmanbhai and others, AIR i986 Gujarat 81, a Full Bench of that Court, speaking through Shri Gokulakrishoan C. J, took the view that the Housing Board for whose benefit land is acquired was an interested party and had every right to be added as a defendant to the suit challenging the acquisition. 19. In Gujarat Housing Board, Ahmedabad v. Nagajibhai Laxmanbhai and others, AIR i986 Gujarat 81, a Full Bench of that Court, speaking through Shri Gokulakrishoan C. J, took the view that the Housing Board for whose benefit land is acquired was an interested party and had every right to be added as a defendant to the suit challenging the acquisition. More so, where the entire amount of compensation was to come out of the fund of the Housing Board and even the cost of the litigation challenging the acquisition was to be borne by the Board irrespective of its result. The Full Bench noticed the two decisions of the Supreme Court in the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and in Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd., and, following the principle that the later of the two decisions given by benches consisting of equal number of Judges, preferred to follow the view expressed in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd., AIR 1980 SC 1118. Likewise, a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Amar Singh Yadav and another v. Shanti Devi and others, AIR 1987 Patna 191, speaking through Sandhawalia, C. J., preferred to follow the view taken by the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. not only on the ground that it was a later decision but also on the principle that it appeared to state the law accurately or, in any case, more accurately than the earlier judgment in The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad. In doing so, the learned Chief Justice drew support from the observations of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, (1949) 2 All England Reporter 155 where he stressed that "when a Judge faces a difficult task of making a choice between decisions of the superior Court when they are in direct conflict with each other, he is not to fold his hands and it is his duty to iron out the creases and when such a divergence arises and the litigants fortune depends thereon, the issue has to be frontally adjudicated upon". To borrow the words of the learned Chief Justice from paragraph 23 of the report:— "……………………Obviously, in such a situation, it is not the province of the High Court or the subordinate court to comment on the judgment of the Supreme Court, which are patently entitled to respect. To borrow the words of the learned Chief Justice from paragraph 23 of the report:— "……………………Obviously, in such a situation, it is not the province of the High Court or the subordinate court to comment on the judgment of the Supreme Court, which are patently entitled to respect. Its plain duty, in the interest of justice, is to respectfully follow that which appears to it to state the law accurately or, in any case more accurately than the other conflicting judgment ……………….. " 20. In Santosh Kumar and others v. Central Warehousing Corporation and another, (1986) 2 Supreme Court Cases 343, the Central Warehousing Corporation, at whose request land had been acquired, challenged the awards made by the Collector under the Act, before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, by way of writ petitions on the ground that the amount awarded was excessive. The High Court set aside the awards and itself determined the compensation at a reduced rate. Erstwhile owners of the land filed appeals before the Supreme Court after obtaining special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, after noticing the scheme of the Act, including the provisions of section 50 (2) and the proviso thereof, held that the nature of the award of the Collector being an offer made by him on behalf of the Company, as its agent, it was difficult to appreciate how the company or any one who could claim through the Government, would be entitled to question the award apart from fraud, corruption or collusion, by challenging it in a petition under Article 276 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court said that sections 25 and 50 (2) of the Act lead to the inevitable conclusion that the Company at whose instance acquisition was made could not seek a reference under section 18 of the Act, nor could the amount of compensation be reduced by the Court below the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11 of the Act. While dealing with a reference under section 18, it was not permissible for the Company to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector and to have it reduced. While dealing with a reference under section 18, it was not permissible for the Company to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector and to have it reduced. Chinnappa Reddy, J., speaking for both the Judges who decided the case, specifically observed that the question did not turn on the meaning of the expression person interested but turned on the scheme of the Act and the scope of sections 25 and 50 (2) thereof. 21. The question whether the Union of India, for whose benefit acquisition was made by the State Government, was entitled to prefer an appeal against the award made by the Civil Judge fixing the market value was entitled to appeal against the award of the Court, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Kassappa Madivallappa Kuikarni, 1986 (1) SCALE 546. The decision was rendered by P. N. Bhagwati, C. J., and Ranganath Misra J. The view taken was that since the acquisition was made for the construction of Civil Aviation at Sambra, the Union of India, which was, admittedly, to put up the construction and which was the party ultimately liable to pay compensation, was clearly interested in the determination of the amount of compensation payable to the respondents and was, therefore, entitled to appeal against the award made by the Civil Judge. 22. We have analysed the general scheme of the Act earlier. Our analysis impels us to the view that while expressly prohibiting a demand for a reference under section 18 at the instance of the Company or the local authority, even after permitting them to appear and adduce evidence before the Collector as well as the Court, and not providing expressly that the decision arrived at by the Court shall also be immune from challenge, under the proviso to section 50 (2) of the Act, the Legislature made its intention absolutely clear. It has not precluded a challenge to the amount of compensation determined by the Court by the local authority of the Company. It has not precluded a challenge to the amount of compensation determined by the Court by the local authority of the Company. Not much assistance can, therefore, be drawn by the learned Counsel for the respondents from the proviso to section 50 (2) for the submission that the local authority or the Company for whom the land was being acquired could not maintain an appeal under section 54 of the Act against the award made by the Court. 23. As observed by the Supreme Court in Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha, AIR 1971 SC 374 a person who is not a party to the suit, may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court. And, such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment. The appellant-board was entitled to the grant of leave by this Court for filing an appeal against the award made by the District Judge, Mandi, Kullu and Lahaul and Spiti Districts, in the present case. The learned single Judge was in error in refusing that leave. 24. The appeal succeeds. The order of the learned single Judge under challenge is |set aside. The application made by the H. P. Housing Board for leave to appeal against the award of the learned District Judge dated September 11, 1986, shall stand allowed. Appeal allowed