JUDGMENT 1. - This revision by the plaintiff is directed against the judgment of learned Additional District Judge, No. 4, Jaipur City, Jaipur dated April 16, 1987 whereby he reversed the order passed by learned Additional Civil Judge No. 1, Jaipur City dated August 8, 1985. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a suit for eviction against the defendant non-petitioners on July 25, 1977 on the ground of default in the payment of rent for more than six months and sub-letting. It was alleged in the plaint that the defendants were tenants of the premises mentioned in para 1 of the plaint at Rs. 175/- per month. The suit premises were on rent with Bhogilal Chiman Lal Shah & Company at Rs. 125/- per month on January 1, 1962. The defendants were paying the rent at the rate of Rs. 175/- per month and Rs. 2/- per month for using water. House rent is not paid by the defendants. It was further alleged that taking in view the situation of the premises the rent of Rs. 175/- per month was too low and the plaintiff was entitled to rent at the rent of Rs. 375.50 per month. It was further alleged that the rent had fallen due since May 1, 1976. 3. The defendants filed written statement on January 5, 1976 and denied the allegation made in the plaint The trial court determined the provisional lent under Section 13(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (here-in-after referred to as 'the Act') by order dated October 6, 1977. In the above order the provisional rent was determined at the rate of Rs. 275/- per month from October, 1977. So far as the arrears are concerned, the same were determined from May 1, 1976 to September 30, 1977 amounting to Rs. 2,975/- and interest amounting to Rs. 127/-. Thus in all Rs. 3,102/-. There is no controversy that the aforesaid arrears of rent were paid within 15 days and the future rent at the rate of Rs. 275/- per month was also paid up to ten month of May, 1980. The plaintiff submitted an application on August 30, 1982 under Section 13(5) of the Act to the effect that the defendants had neither paid nor deposited the rent from June, 1980 to July, 1982. 275/- per month was also paid up to ten month of May, 1980. The plaintiff submitted an application on August 30, 1982 under Section 13(5) of the Act to the effect that the defendants had neither paid nor deposited the rent from June, 1980 to July, 1982. The defendants submitted a reply to the aforesaid application on October 30, 1982 and alleged that the rent had been paid to the plaintiff upto the month of July, 1982, and entries regarding the payment of rent were contained in the account books maintained in a regular manner. After July 1982, the plaintiff himself stopped the earlier practice and refused to accept the rent from the month of August, 1982 though the defendants were always paying the rent in time and were also willing to do the same now. In view of the fact that the plaintiff refused to accept the rent from the month of August, 1982 as such the rents for the month of August & Sept., 1982 have been deposited in the Court. It may be mentioned at this stage that the defendants also submitted an application on December 6, 1982 under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to the effect that the receipts of rent issued for every month from June, 1980 to July, 1982 by the plaintiff were kept in a file but the same had been unfortunately lost from the office of the defendants and inspite of every effort made for their search, it was now impossible to find those receipts. The above mischief had been done either at the instance of the plaintiff or some other person and the defendants came to know about the missing of the file only when the plaintiff raised an objection of default in the payment of rent. The defendants firm was a reputed firm of Chartered Accountants and there was no question of non-payment of rent within time. It was again reiterated that the entries with regard to the payment of rent were contained in the account books maintained in a regular manner. The defendants in the aforesaid application submitted on December 6, 1982 prayed for allowing them to lead secondary evidence with regard to the receipts. The plaintiff then submitted a reply to the aforesaid application on January 15, 1983 and denied the averments made by the defendants in their application dated December 6, 1982. The defendants in the aforesaid application submitted on December 6, 1982 prayed for allowing them to lead secondary evidence with regard to the receipts. The plaintiff then submitted a reply to the aforesaid application on January 15, 1983 and denied the averments made by the defendants in their application dated December 6, 1982. The learned trial court by order dated January 31, 1983 dismissed the application filed by the defendants for allowing them to lead secondary evidence. The trial court further held that when the defendants had come forward with a case that payment of rent was made and the plaintiff had issued receipts for the same, the defendants cannot be allowed to lead any other evidence for proving the payment of rent except the rent receipts and the production of secondary evidence for such receipts having been refused, the trial court held that the defendants failed to prove the payment of rent for the aforesaid period and as such their defence against eviction was liable to be struck out under Section 13(5) of the Act. 4. The defendants aggrieved against the aforesaid order filed an appeal. The learned District Judge, Jaipur City by his order dated August 26, 1983 allowed the appeal and remanded the case back for granting an opportunity to the defendants to prove the payment of rent by other evidence also even though the defendants were not allowed to lead secondary evidence with regard to the receipts for payment of rent. Learned District Judge accepted the appeal to the extent that it maintained the order of the trial court so far as rejecting the prayer of the defendants for leading secondary evidence, but set aside the order striking out the defence against eviction and granted opportunity to the defendants to prove the payment of rent by other evidence. The defendants after remand examined Lal Chand DW 1, Promed Patni DW 2, Pradeep Patni DW 3, Prakash Chand DW 4 and Hanuman Prasad DW 5. The plaintiff in rebuttal examined Shanti Chand PW 1 and Chandra Shekhar PW 2. Parties also produced certain documentary evidence in support of their case. Learned Addl. The defendants after remand examined Lal Chand DW 1, Promed Patni DW 2, Pradeep Patni DW 3, Prakash Chand DW 4 and Hanuman Prasad DW 5. The plaintiff in rebuttal examined Shanti Chand PW 1 and Chandra Shekhar PW 2. Parties also produced certain documentary evidence in support of their case. Learned Addl. Civil Judge No. 1, Jaipur City by order dated August 8, 1985 held that the defendants failed to prove the payment of rent from June, 1980 to July, 1982 and as such allowed the application filed by the plaintiff under Section 13(5) of the Act and ordered for striking of the defence against eviction. 5. The defendants aggrieved against the aforesaid order filed an appeal. The defendants also submitted an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C on October 2, 1986 before the Appellate Court. Learned Additional District Judge No. 4, Jaipur city allowed the appeal and believed the case of the defendants that rent had been paid from June, 1980 to July, 1982 and had not committed any default in the payment of rent so as to make them liable for the striking of their defence. The plaintiff aggrieved against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge has filed the present revision. 6. I have heard Mr. R. M. Lodha for the plaintiff-petitioner and Mr. G.C. Lunia for the defendants non-petitioners. It was first contended by Mr. Lodha that no appeal was maintainable against the order dated August 8, 1985 passed under Section 13(5) of the Act. It was submitted that it was a suit for eviction filed under the general law of Transfer of Property Act and any order passed in such suit was not appealable under Section 22 of the Act. Mr. Lodha submitted that under Section 22 of the Act, an appeal could lie only against any decree or order passed by a Court under this Act and not against any order passed by the court in a suit tried and determined under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act or Contract Act. Mr. Lodha placed reliance in support of the above contention on a decision of the Supreme Court in Gyan Chand v. Kunj Behari Lal and others, AIR 1977 SC 858 . Mr. Lodha placed reliance in support of the above contention on a decision of the Supreme Court in Gyan Chand v. Kunj Behari Lal and others, AIR 1977 SC 858 . It was contended that in the above case their lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (as amended in 1975) considered the provisions of Section 22 which provided for appeals and revisions and held as under:- "Section 22(1) refers to every decree or order passed by a court under this Act. The decree or order passed under this Act must, therefore have reference to those passed under Section 6, 7, 11, 19A and 19C. Sub-section (2) provides that no second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order. Such decrees or orders are, therefore, again referable to those passed under the above mentioned sections under the Act. While a second appeal is barred in case of those decrees and orders under the Act, the High Court's power of revision is not barred. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 provides for appeals from an order of a Magistrate to the District Magistrate or such authority as may be appointed by the Government. As noticed earlier certain orders are passed by the Magistrate under Section 12(3), Section 17 and Section 19, Section 22(3) makes provisions of appeal against such orders passed under Section 12(3), Section 17 and Section 19. It is, therefore, clear that the Act provides for the institution of actions in two different forums and also makes provision for appeals and revisions against orders and decrees passed under the Act. There is no provisions in the Act for institutions of suits for eviction which will, therefore, lie, in the ordinary courts of competent jurisdiction. Appeals, also revisions, where competent, will lie against decrees in eviction suit in the usual hierarchy of courts. II is manifest from a perusal of the scheme of the Act that appeals or applications for revision under Section 13A (c) relate only to decrees in suits for eviction based on the ground of non-payment of rent. Such appeals or applications for revision under Section 13A(c) are not contemplated under Section 22 of the Act. II is manifest from a perusal of the scheme of the Act that appeals or applications for revision under Section 13A (c) relate only to decrees in suits for eviction based on the ground of non-payment of rent. Such appeals or applications for revision under Section 13A(c) are not contemplated under Section 22 of the Act. As shown above, decrees or orders passed by the court under the Act against which appeals and revisions are provided in Section 22 do not take in decrees or orders passed in a suit for evidence. Usual rights of appeal and revision will be available in the latter class or suits. To hold otherwise, will be to deny a right of second appeal to a litigant, be he a landlord or tenant, against a decree in an eviction suit which is clearly not the intention of the legislature. Second appeal is only barred in case of decrees or orders passed under the Act to which a copious reference has been made hereinabove with reference to the various provisions of the Act." 7. Mr. Lodha thus contended that as no appeal could lie against the order of the trial court dated August 8, 1985 the judgment of learned Additional District Judge dated April 16, 1987 was illegal and without jurisdiction. 8. On the other hand Mr. Lunia submitted that the order dated August 8, 1985 was passed by the trial court on an application filed under Section 13 (5) of the Act and as such it was an order passed by a court under this Act and an appeal lay to the District Judge against the order of the trial court. It was argued by Mr. Lunia that there was no provision for determination of provisional rent nor any provision for striking out defence against eviction, in the Transfer of Property Act or under the law of Contract and such provisions were special provisions contained in the Act itself and in this view of the matter the appeal under Section 22 of the Act was perfectly valid and competent. It was also argued that no such objection was raised before the learned Addl. District Judge nor such ground has been taken in the memo of revision. Mr. It was also argued that no such objection was raised before the learned Addl. District Judge nor such ground has been taken in the memo of revision. Mr. Lunia submitted that above decision of the Supreme Court in Gyan Chand v. Kunj Behari Lal and others , (supra) was based on the question whether an application for special leave to appeal to Supreme Court or appeal by Special Leave to Supreme Court can be considered as an appeal or proceeding within the meaning of Section 13-A of the Act. Thus, the aforesaid authority of the Supreme Court was clearly distinguishable. Mr. Lunia further submitted that S.K. Mal Lodha, J in Ranchhodmal v. Newaratanmal, RLW 1979 Page 418 has clearly held that an order passed under Section 13 (3) is appealable under Section 22 of the Act. It is no doubt correct that specific objection of the above nature was not taken in the grounds of revision, but the petitioner submitted an application on August 1, 1988 allowing him to raise this ground. The ground raised by the petitioner, goes to the root of the matter and is purely a question of law as such 1 allowed the learned counsel for the petitioner to raise the ground regarding the maintainability of appeal against the order of the trial court. 9. In order to appreciate the contention raised by Mr. Lodha it would be proper to reproduce Section 22 of the Act. "22. Appeal and Revision:- (1) From every decree or order passed by a Court under this Act, and appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from original decrees and orders passed by such former Court. (2) No second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order ; Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the powers of the High Court for Rajasthan in revision. (3) Any person aggrieved by the Magistrate may, within fifteen days, from the date of such order, appeal therefrom to the District Magistrate or such authority as the State Government may from time to time appoint in that behalf." 10. A perusal of the above section clearly shows that Section 22 (1) refers to every decree or order passed by the Court under this Act. A perusal of the above section clearly shows that Section 22 (1) refers to every decree or order passed by the Court under this Act. The Supreme Court in Gyan Chand v. Kunj Beharilal and others , (supra) was considering the question whether proceedings in the Supreme Court (application for appeal by special leave of an appeal by special leave) would fall or not within the ambit of Clause (a) and (b) of Section 13-A of the Act. Their lordships in the above context examined the provisions of Section 13-A as well as Section 22 of the Act. The appellant in the above case bad lodged on September 23, 1975 an application under Article 136 of the Constitution praying for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court. The ordinance No. 26 of 1975 was passed on September 29, 1975. Under Section 13-A, as amended, the tenants right to pay the arrears with interest and costs was made available within the outside limit of two months and after payment of the same no decree for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent could be passed. In the alternative, the appellant also submitted that at any rate after the special leave had been granted by the Supreme Court there was an appeal pending against the judgment of the High Court and since he submitted an application within 30 days from the grant of special leave his case was covered by Section 13-A (c) of the Act. Their lordships then considered whether the connotation of the word 'proceeding' as given under the explanation to Section 13-A it is impermissible to extend the meaning of the word 'proceeding' to include an application for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Their lordships held that the collocation of the words, "suit, appeal or application for revision" in the explanation to denote "proceeding" would go to show that suits, regular appeals therefrom, as provided under the ordinary law and applications for revision alone are intended. It is inconceivable that if the legislature had intended to include within the ambit of "proceeding'' an application for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution it would have omitted to mention it in express terms. Their lordships then dealt with the question whether Section 22 of the Act was of any assistance in deciding the above controversy. It is inconceivable that if the legislature had intended to include within the ambit of "proceeding'' an application for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution it would have omitted to mention it in express terms. Their lordships then dealt with the question whether Section 22 of the Act was of any assistance in deciding the above controversy. Provisions of Section 6, 7, 11, 19A and 19C were considered and it was observed that Section 22(1) refers to every decree or order passed by a Court under the Act. The decree or order passed under this Act must, therefore, have reference to those passed under Sections 6, 7, 11, 19A & 19C. Thus, I am clearly of the view that their lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case were only considering the provisions of the Act in the back ground of the controversy raised before them Their lordships were not laying down that there can be no other order appealable under Section 22(1) of the Act except those passed under Sections 6, 7, 11, 19A and 19C of the Act. It may also be mentioned that though a suit for eviction based on default in the payment of rent or other grounds may be considered as a suit for eviction under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, but so far as any orders under Sub-section (3) (4) and (5) are concerned such orders are not contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act but are only passed under the special provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Thus, any order passed under Sub-section (3) (4) or (5) of Section 13 of the Act would be appealable under Section 22(1) of the Act. The sections of the Act enumerated by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Gyan Chaud v. Kunj Behari Lal and others (Supra) were not exhaustive but merely illustrative. This is also clear from the fact that Section 15 also provides for a special provision of restoration of possession to evict tenant and this Section was also not mentioned by the Supreme Court in the above case. S.K. Mal Lodha, J. in Ranchhodmal v. Nawaratanmal , (supra) held as under:- "The words used in section 22(1) of the Act are "every decree or order". S.K. Mal Lodha, J. in Ranchhodmal v. Nawaratanmal , (supra) held as under:- "The words used in section 22(1) of the Act are "every decree or order". 'Decree' or 'Order' which could be appealed against for the purpose of appeal under section 22(1) must have been passed under the Act. From what has been stated above, in my opinion, the words "every order" include provisional or interlocutory order, which the court passes under the provisions of the Act as it is binding in ail subsequent stages of the suit. The determination under section 13(3) and directions made in persuance thereof under section 13(4) in my opinion, though provisional in nature, determine the rights of the parties with regard to the matters in controversy". 11. Thus, I am clearly of the view that the order passed by the learned trial court under Section 13(5) of the Act is appealable under Section 22(1) of the Act. 12. It was next contended by Mr. Lodha that the learned Addl. District Judge committed a serious error in allowing the application filed by the defendants under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. It was contended that Appellate Court did not follow the procedure prescribed under Order 41 Rule 27. Neither any reasons were recorded nor any opportunity was given to the plaintiff-petitioner to explain and rebut the additional evidence produced before the learned Addl. District Judge. The provisions under Order 41 Rule 27 are not meant to fill any lacunas of the case left by the defendants before the trial court. The trial court had found the statement of accounts Ex. A-40 to A-47 given by the bank as useless and the First Appellate Court committed a serious error in allowing the certified copies of such documents to be placed on record and to place reliance on them. It was also submitted that under Sub section (8) of Section 2 of the Banker's Books Evidence Act, 1894 certified copy must be certified and subscribed the principal accountant or Manager of the Bank with his name and official title. It is submitted that in the present case the documents submitted before the First Appellate Court are certified by the Assistant Manager and as such the same were net admissible. Reliance in this regard was placed on Fatima Bee Bee and others v. Official Trustee, AIR 1941 Rangoon 344. It is submitted that in the present case the documents submitted before the First Appellate Court are certified by the Assistant Manager and as such the same were net admissible. Reliance in this regard was placed on Fatima Bee Bee and others v. Official Trustee, AIR 1941 Rangoon 344. It was contended that in the above case an extract was prepared from the ledger books of the bank. It was not a true copy and it was signed by the Sub-accountant for the Manager. The certificate read as follows : "Be certified that this is a true extract from the books of the bank". 13. It was held that it was not a certified copy as defined under Section 2(8) of Bankers' Books Evidence Act. 14. On the other hand it was submitted by Mr. Lunia that Exs. A-40 to A-47 which were accounts of United Commercial Bank and Bank of India were even produced before the trial court and were exhibited but no objection was taken from the side of the plaintiff regarding the admissibility. Reliance in support of the above contention is placed on P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumel, AIR 1972 S.C. 608 . It was also contended that though the above documents had already been produced in evidence and exhibited before the trial court, but the trial court in its judgment had considered them as useless because the same were not certified true copies issued by the bank and in order to meet this technical objection, the certified copies of the accounts of the banks were filed before the First Appellate Court under Order 41 Rules 27 C.P.C. The plaintiff filed no objection to the application submitted by the defendants under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. before the First Appellate Court nor any objection has been raised in the memo of revision. 15. There was a serious dispute between the parties regarding the payment of rent from June 1980 to July, 1982. The defendants had come forward with a case that whenever these payments were made, the entries were made in their account books which were maintained in regular course. 15. There was a serious dispute between the parties regarding the payment of rent from June 1980 to July, 1982. The defendants had come forward with a case that whenever these payments were made, the entries were made in their account books which were maintained in regular course. Some times the amount was paid from cash in balance and sometimes when cash was not there in balance then cheques were issued in the name of self or in the name of the plaintiff and then the money had been paid after encashing the cheques from the bank. The defendants had produced counter files (sic-foils) of the cheques Ex.A-30 to A-39. In support of the encashment of these cheques from the banks Exs. A-40 to A47, the statement of bank accounts were produced which were proved and exhibited in the statement of Lal Chand DW 1. No objection was raised from the side of the plaintiff when these documents were exhibited in the statement of DW1 Lal Chand. The trial court in its order dated August 8, 1985 did not place reliance on Exs. A-40 to A-47 on the ground that the same were not certified according to the Bankers' Book Evidence Act. Learned trial court also held that it was not proved from the above documents that the amount was really withdrawn from the bank in respect of the cheques whose counter files (foils) were marked as Ex. A-30 to A-39. The defendants in view of these circumstances submitted an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC before the Appellate Court along with the copies of these account books of United Commercial Bank of India with a certification as contemplated under Section 2 (8) of the Bankers Books Evidence Act. The order sheets of the First Appellate Court show that the plaintiff had taken time to file the reply of the aforesaid application and case was adjourned to January 21, 1987, On January 21, 1987 the case was adjourned on account of the strike of the lawyers. On February 25, 1987 the plaintiff respondent submitted that he did not want to file any reply and only wanted to make an argument. The entire judgment of learned Additional District Judge dated April 16, 1987 shows that no objection was raised regarding the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. On February 25, 1987 the plaintiff respondent submitted that he did not want to file any reply and only wanted to make an argument. The entire judgment of learned Additional District Judge dated April 16, 1987 shows that no objection was raised regarding the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. That apart I have gone through the ground of revision and I find no such ground raised even in the memo of revision that the First Appellate Court wrongly allowed the additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. These documents had already been produced before the trial court and also exhibited but the same were not certified in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 (8) of the Bankers Books Evidence Act and now copies duly certified have been filed before the First Appellate Court. Mr. Lodha was unable to show any ground or circumstance to doubt the genuineness of these documents. The certificates are containing the seal and signatures of Assistant Manager/Branch Manager. Johari Bazar, Jaipur in the case of United Commercial Bank and that of Assistant Manager (Admn.) Johari Bazar, Branch in the case of Bank of India and there is no reason to doubt such authentication and certification. The plaintiff had not raised any objection before the First Appellate Court that these documents are not certified by the principal accountant or Manager of the Bank. The branch manager of the bank being the principal officer was competent to certify the accounts and in any case if such objection would have been raised by the plaintiff before the First Appellate Court then alone he was entitled to raise such objection before this Court. So far as Fatima Bee Bee and others v. Official Trustee (supra) case is concerned an extract prepared from the ledger books of the bank was produced in that case. The defects were immediately pointed out at the trial stage and the evidence of P. David a clerk in the Mercantile Bank of India was not relied. The above case thus renders no assistance at all to the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 16. Mr. Lodha also argued at great length that the finding recorded by the learned First Appellate Court on merits regarding the payment of rent was erroneous. Mr. Lodha tried to assail the finding of the learned Addl. The above case thus renders no assistance at all to the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 16. Mr. Lodha also argued at great length that the finding recorded by the learned First Appellate Court on merits regarding the payment of rent was erroneous. Mr. Lodha tried to assail the finding of the learned Addl. District Judge as if he was arguing an appeal. Mr. Lodha submitted that the trial court had given number of reasons for dis-believing the case of the defendants, but the learned First Appellate Court set aside the above finding without giving adequate reasons. The finding of learned Addl. District Judge according to Mr. Lodha is based on surmises and conjectures and by ignoring important salient features of the case which were found in favour of the plaintiff by the trial court. Mr. Lodha reiterated the grounds and circumstances which were found by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff and in dis-believing the case of the defendants. 17. On the other hand Mr. Lunia submitted that the First Appellate Court has given detailed reasons for holding that the defendants had proved the payment of rent for the period in question after discussing the entire oral and documentary evidence. Such finding of fact cannot be challenged in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. It was also contended that there was no merit in the main case and the plaintiff was not producing evidence inspite of 32 adjournments granted from February 7, 1979 to July 12, 1982 and was merely banking upon a futile and baseless plea of subsequent default in payment of rent in older to succeed in the suit. It was submitted that neither the judgment of learned Addl. District Judge is perverse nor the plaintiff has shown any miscarriage of justice and in view of these circumstances also no interference can be made by this Hon'ble Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 18. The question whether the defendants had paid or not the rent to the plaintiff from June, 1980 to July, 1982 is purely a question of fact. Learned Addl. District Judge has reversed the finding of the trial court on this question but has given detailed reasons for doing so. It cannot be said that such finding is perverse or based on omission of any material evidence. Learned Addl. District Judge has reversed the finding of the trial court on this question but has given detailed reasons for doing so. It cannot be said that such finding is perverse or based on omission of any material evidence. It is well settled that this court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC can only interfere when there is any error of jurisdiction committed by the First Appellate Court. No interference can be made by this court even if the finding of fact arrived by the Appellate Court is wrong or erroneous. I am not in agreement with the arguments of Mr. Lodha that the First Appellate Court has over-looked the reasons given by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff. A perusal of the lengthy judgment of the First Appellate Court shows that it has considered all the circumstances in detail and was not agreeable with the view taken by the trial court. The First Appellate Court has perfect jurisdiction to do so and it cannot be said that the learned Addl. District Judge committed any error of jurisdiction in recording the finding in favour of the defendants. 19. I have also considered the bread facts and circumstances of this case. The suit was filed as early as on July 25, 1977 based on default and sub-letting. Issues in the case were framed on December 5, 1978 and the case was fixed for plaintiff's evidence on February 7, 1979. The plaintiff did not examine any evidence from February 7, 1979 to July 12, 1982 inspite of 32 adjournments granted to him and then submitted an application under Section 13(5) of the Acton August 30, 1982 for striking of the defence against eviction of the defendants. Admittedly, the plaintiff is a landlord keeping 10-12 tenants and must be knowing the full impact of any default in the payment of subsequent rent even for a single month after the determination of provisional rent under Section 13(5) of the Act. The case law in Rajasthan State was clear that the provision for payment of rent of every subsequent month after the determination of provisional rent was mandatory and default in such payment of rent even for a single month was sufficient to make the defendant liable for eviction of his defence. The case law in Rajasthan State was clear that the provision for payment of rent of every subsequent month after the determination of provisional rent was mandatory and default in such payment of rent even for a single month was sufficient to make the defendant liable for eviction of his defence. In the present case silence of the plaintiff for 26 months without reasonable explanation is a strong circumstance against him and it strengthens the case of the defendants that be filed such application only when he came to know that the receipts of rent have been lost by the defendants. The provisional rent was determined by order dated October 6, 1977 and the defendants had agreed without any demur to get the provisional rent increased from Rs. 175/- per month to Rs. 275/- per month from the month of October, 1977. Admittedly, ail the arrears of rent were paid within the period allowed in the order dated October 6, 1977 and future rent from the month of October, 1977 to May, 1980 was also paid always within time i.e. before the 15th of next succeeding month. It is the admitted case of the plaintiff that such rent from October, 1977 to May 1980 was received by the plaintiff directly from the defendant and the defendants were not required to deposit the rent in the Court. The defendants are Chartered Accountants and are running their office in the suit premises and it is not the case of the plaintiff that the defendants had no financial capacity to pay the rent or had any other ulterior motive to harass the plaintiff landlord. Thus, there does not appear any valid reason for not paying the rent when the same was regularly done for a long period from October, 1977 to May, 1980. Apart from the oral statement of defendants Lal Chand, Pramod Patni and Pradeep Patni proving the payment of rent, they have also produced entries of Rokad Exs. A-1 to A-24, petty cash book Ex.A-25 and A-26, Khata Exs. A-27 to A-29, Cheque counter files (sic foils) Exs. A-30 to A-39 and statement of bank accounts Exs. A-40 to A-47 supporting the payment of rent. The account books have been maintained in regular course and are admissible under Section 34 of the Evidence Act. A-1 to A-24, petty cash book Ex.A-25 and A-26, Khata Exs. A-27 to A-29, Cheque counter files (sic foils) Exs. A-30 to A-39 and statement of bank accounts Exs. A-40 to A-47 supporting the payment of rent. The account books have been maintained in regular course and are admissible under Section 34 of the Evidence Act. All the counter files (foils) of the cheques are corroborated from the statement of bank accounts that the amount of these cheques had been debited in the account of the defendants and this clearly proves the case of the defendants that they had withdrawn the money from the bank and had made payment of rent, to the plaintiff himself or his wife Smt. Urmila Devi or his children Aditya Kumar and Kumari Saloni or his munim Mehtab Chand. I do not see any force in the contention of Mr. Lodha that even if the entries of the bank accounts may be taken to the correct still it was not necessary that the amount withdrawn from the bank may have been paid towards rent to the plaintiff. There is no basis for taking such view specially when the actual payment of rent is corroborated with the entries in the Rokad maintained in regular manner. The Learned Appellate Court has considered the entire oral and documentary evidence led by both the parties, and after analysing the entire facts and circumstances of the case arrived to the conclusion that preponderance of probability was in favour of the defendants case. Thus, I am clearly of the view that there is no error of jurisdiction committed by the learned Addl. District Judge in his order dated April 16, 1987 and no interference can be made by this Court in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. 20. In the result, this revision having no force is dismissed with no order as to costs.Revision dismissed. *******