Judgment :- 1. One of the defendants in a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage wants to get transposed as the plaintiff. But the application filed by him for that purpose was disallowed by the trial court. Hence he has filed this Civil Revision Petition. 2. The usufructuary mortgage was created by the father of the plaintiff early in 1100 M.E. On the death of the original mortgagor the right of redemption had devolved on his children. The plaintiff and this petitioner are brothers, being the children of the original mortgagor. The suit was filed by the sole plaintiff in which the other co-mortgagors were also made defendants. The petitioner is the 11th defendant. As he did not enter appearance in the suit earlier he was set ex-parte.. Though be made an attempt to have the ex-parte order against him set aside, he did not succeed. The main relief claimed in the suit is for redemption of the mortgage on behalf of all the mortgagors including the petitioner. 3. The suit was once dismissed for default. But the plaintiff then filed an application for restoration of the suit. Though the application for restoration of the suit was dismissed by the trial court, it was allowed by the appellate Court. In the present application to transpose him as the plaintiff the petitioner has stated that the plaintiff is unwilling to prosecute the suit. He has further averred in the said application (hat he has confidential information that the present plaintiff would have the suit again dismissed for default or due to non-prosecution. He apprehends that the plaintiff may even withdraw the suit without the consent of the other co-mortgagors. It was in the aforesaid background that he filed the application to get transposed as the plaintiff. 4. The application for transposition was not opposed by the plaintiff. However, the contesting mortgagees resist the application stoutly. Their main contention is two fold: The defendant in a suit for redemption of mortgage has no right to get transposed as the plaintiff and that once a defendant has failed to file written statement, he is debarred from participating in the suit at a later stage. 5. The trial court accepted those contentions. It held that the petitioner, having been treated as ex parte, cannot maintain an application for transposition. 6. The petitioner is one of the co-mortgagors. 5. The trial court accepted those contentions. It held that the petitioner, having been treated as ex parte, cannot maintain an application for transposition. 6. The petitioner is one of the co-mortgagors. If plaintiff has a right to redeem the mortgage, the petitioner also has the same right. There is no dispute on those aspects. But can he be debarred from seeking to get himself transposed as a plaintiff merely on the ground that he was set ex parte in the suit? Answer to this question depends upon the implications of non-appearance of one of the defendants in a suit. Summons is issued to a defendant "to appear and answer the claim" on a day to be specified therein. 0.5 R.1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short'the Code') makes it discretionary on the part of the defendant to appear in court when a summons is served on him. 0.9 R.11 provides that the suit shall proceed if one or more of the defendants do not appear. Every summons shall be accompanied by a copy of the plaint (Vide 0.5 R.1 (3)). If a defendant on reading the copy of the plaint finds that there is nothing to contest, why should he be compelled to file a written statement. 0.8 R.1 only envisages a written statement of his "defence". If a defendant does not intend to dispute the plaint averments, be is not obliged to file a written statement because he has nothing to defend himself against the plaint contentions. But by adopting silence he does not cease to be a party in the suit. The decree passed in the suit will be binding on him also. The omission to file a written statement at the worst would amount to his admitting the averments in the plaint. In this case it is important to note that the plaintiff has averred in the plaint that the redemption sought for is not only for himself but on behalf of the other co-mortgagors as well. In such circumstances the fact that the petitioner remained ex parte cannot debar him from making a claim for transposition, if he is otherwise entitled to it. Support to this proposition can be received from the decision in Bhagavati Prasad v. Pahil Sundari (AIR 1969 Patna 215). In such circumstances the fact that the petitioner remained ex parte cannot debar him from making a claim for transposition, if he is otherwise entitled to it. Support to this proposition can be received from the decision in Bhagavati Prasad v. Pahil Sundari (AIR 1969 Patna 215). It was held that transposition cannot be disallowed merely because the applicant did not contest the suit by filing a written statement. 7. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents raised an argument that as the transposition is not permissible under 0.1 R.10 of the Code, the court cannot permit it in exercise of the inherent powers. Sub-rule (1) of R.10 deals with a case where the suit is instituted in the name of a wrong person as the plaintiff or when it is doubtful whether the suit was instituted in the name of the right person. Sub-rule (2) deals with the situation when a party has been improperly joined. There is no case for any of the parties in this case that the plaintiff was improperly joined or that he is a wrong person. Counsel, who contended that inherent powers cannot be invoked for this purpose, has cited the decision in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar (AIR 1964 S. C. 993). The said decision, no doubt, says that inherent powers of the court cannot override the express provisions of law. The relevant observations are these: "If there are specific provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter the inherent powers of the court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code". Neither 0.1 R.10 of the Code nor any other provision in the Code deals with transposition of parties in a situation where the one or more of the defendants seek to be transposed as the plaintiff or plaintiffs. In the absence of specific provisions, the court can invoke inherent jurisdiction in appropriate cases when the ends of justice demands it. The Supreme Court has held in Saila Bala v. Nirmala Sundari (AIR 1958 SC 394) that the court can transpose an appellant as a respondent in exercise of its inherent powers. 8. In the absence of specific provisions, the court can invoke inherent jurisdiction in appropriate cases when the ends of justice demands it. The Supreme Court has held in Saila Bala v. Nirmala Sundari (AIR 1958 SC 394) that the court can transpose an appellant as a respondent in exercise of its inherent powers. 8. One of the earliest decisions in which the principle for transposition of parties gained recognition is Bhupendra v. Rajeswar (AIR 1931 P. C. 162). It was held that "the course of adding pro forma defendants as co-plaintiffs should always be adopted where it is necessary for a complete adjudication upon the questions involved in the suit and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings". The said principle was reiterated by the Privy Council in Monghibai v. Cooverji Umersey (AIR 1939 P.C.170). The Allahabad High Court has held in an early decision that if the plaintiff desires to withdraw his original case, but the defendant desires the case to proceed "the proper course is to transpose the plaintiff and make the defendant the plaintiff". (Vide Debi Chand v. Parbhu Lal -- AIR 1926 Allahabad 582). Those decisions would support the position that the court has power, over and above the provisions in 0.1 R.10 of the Code, to permit transposition of parties in appropriate cases. 9. In this case when the petitioner has sworn to about his information that the plaintiff would not prosecute the suit diligently, the plaintiff has not disputed it. So, the apprehension of the petitioner is well founded. The petitioner can justifiably be permitted to prosecute the suit for which purpose he can be transposed to the role of the plaintiff. In the result, I allow this revision and set aside the impugned order. The application for transposing him as the plaintiff stands allowed. C. R. P. is disposed of in the above terms.