JUDGMENT 1. - Admittedly, Badan Singh (plaintiff-respondent) was appointed as Assistant Public Prosecutor (A. P. P. II) vide appointment order dated 8.10.1976. The services of the plaintiff-respondent were terminated by the defendant/appellant which led the plaintiff to file the present suit out of which the present second appeal has arisen, with the aver men. that the order of termination was in violation of the provisions of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 2. In the written statement, the defendant-State's plea was that since the plaintiff-respondent was temporarily appointed, it was within its competence to terminate the services without giving any cause or notices to the plaintiff- respondent. On the basis of the pleadings necessary issues were framed and the evidence was recorded by the learned trial Court. After hearing the parties, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid decree, the present appellant went in appeal which was also dismissed vide impugned judgment under appeal before this Court. 3. The plaintiff-respondent in his plaint has come out with a case that a false case was registered against him by the Anti-corruption Department on 22-4-1977 wherein he was arresed, as a result of which he was suspended on 24-4-1917; notice for terminating the services was issued. According to the plaintiff, the termination order was passed by the defendant after being influenced by the case registered against him. 4. Thus, it is not disputed that the case was registered against the plaintiff-respondent and he was suspended and a notice for terminating his services was also issued. But, in the written statement of the defendant, it has been averred that the services of the plaintiff were not terminated on the ground that the case was registered by the Anti-corruption Department against the plaintiff; and that, the termination order was passed without being influenced by the investigation conducted against the plaintiff by the Anti-corruption Department. 5. Both the courts below in the impugned judgments observed that the termination order was passed after being influenced by the investigation initiated against the plaintiff. 6. I have beard the learned counsel for the parties. 7. First submission made by the learned Additional Government Advocate on behalf of the State-defendant-appellant is that the services of the plaintiff were terminated because, his appointment was temporary one and its issuing authority was fully competent to terminate his services. 6. I have beard the learned counsel for the parties. 7. First submission made by the learned Additional Government Advocate on behalf of the State-defendant-appellant is that the services of the plaintiff were terminated because, his appointment was temporary one and its issuing authority was fully competent to terminate his services. Next contention on behalf of the defendant-appellant is that against an order of termination, the plaintiff would have gone before the Services Appellant Tribunal to get his grievances redressed. Last attempt of wrangle by the Government advocate is that during the course of investigation in A,C, D, case, the appointing authority was fully competent to terminate the services of the plaintiff-respondent because, at the time when his services were terminated, the plaintiff was on probation. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that the plaintiff's services were terminated by the appointing authority as a measure of publishment (sic punishment) and the Services Appellate tribunal was not competent to take cognizance of such dispute. Next limb of his argument is that other persons who were also temporarily appointed as Assistant Public Prosecutor II alongwitb the plaintiff have been in continuous service without any termination, which according to the plaintiff's counsel shows and on the basis of which it can be assumed that termination order was passed against the plaintiff after having influenced by the proceedings initiated by the Anti-corruption Department. Chen, the learned counsel contended that in reply to para 6 (A) of the plaint, the defendant has clearly admitted the plaintiff's services were terminated because a case was registered against the, plaintiff by the Anti-corruption Department; and that as criminal case was registered against the plaintiff and he was arrested apart from the fact that his services were of temporary nature, his services were terminated. Learned counsel then added that in view of the afore-averred admission it can be assumed that the plaintiff's services were terminated on the ground that a case was registered against the plaintiff, and in this view of the matter, both the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the points raised by bath the learned counsel. 10. 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the points raised by bath the learned counsel. 10. I may state that undoubtedly, the services of the plaintiff could be terminated in case his conduct was found to to not satisfactorily (sic) but in the present case, that was not the ground for termination of his services. According to the admissions made in the written statement (in reply to para 6 of the plaint) admittedly because of the criminal case having been registered against the plaintiff, and his arrest in criminal case, his services were terminated, and if that. was so, then it was necessary to issue show cause notice before passing an order of termination of the services of the plaintiff. 11. In P.L. Dhingra's case (P.L. Dhiogra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC p.36) , their Lordships of the Apex Court observed as under : "ln short, if the termination of services is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carried with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with." 12. As already stated, if the servant has got right to continue on the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provided to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311 for it operates as forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. 13. The real test for determination of the question. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311 for it operates as forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. 13. The real test for determination of the question. Whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out, if the order for the reduction also visits the servant, with any penal consequences thus, if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government bad purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. 14. In the case in hand is examined in the light of the observations made in P.L. Dhingra's case (supra), I am of the opinion that initially, the plaintiff- respondent was appointed as Assistant Public Prosecutor II and has joined his duty as such, and his services were terminated by the appointing authority, which was influenced by the investigation conducted in a criminal case wherein the plaintiff was arrested by the Anti-corruption Department, and, therefore, in these circumstances,' the provision's of Act. 311 of the Constitution of India are clearly attracted to the case in hand. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it can also be observed that this is a case of punishment where the services of the plaintiff have been terminated after being influenced by the proceedings initiated by the Anti-corruption Department. Thus. looking to the provisions of section 2 (f) and Section 4 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters) Appellate tribunal Act, I am also of the opinion that the Service Tribunal was not competent to decide the dispute under Section 4 of the said Act because, the order passed against the plaintiff terminating his services is not covered by the definition of the service matter as the order of punishment has been passed against the plaintiff-respondent. 15. 15. Thus, considered, I may say that the services of the plaintiff- respondent were terminated without being given any reason while some other employees who were also appointed as A.P P.(II), were retained in service. The plaintiff-respondent was not at all served with a notice showing cause questioning his integrity and fidelity but the Government ultimately adhered to the stand that the order of termination was passed after being influenced by the case registered against the plaintiff and his arrest in that criminal case. The stand taken against the plaintiff-respondent at one time, in written statement, is that because, the plaintiff-respondent was purely temporary employee and was working on probation so, the appointing authority was competent to terminate his services but on the other hand, in the written statement, it has been admitted that the appointing authority was being influenced by the criminal case registered against the plaintiff-respondent and so also the arrest of the plaintiff. In these circumstances, it can safely be held that the termination off' services was made arbitrarily and not on the ground of inefficiency, unsuitable (sic) or other reasons. 16. Last plank of attack by the learned counsel for the appellant is that where there were no express words in the impugned order itself which throw a stigma on the Government servant, the Court would not delve into secretariat files to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred on such research. To substantiate his contention; the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra, (AIR 1976 SC p. 2547) . I am of the opinion that this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is without any force because, as stated earlier, termination order was passed by the appointing authority after having influenced on the proceedings initiated by the Anti-corruption Department in a criminal case and there upon the strut of the plaintiff. 17. As stated earlier, both the courts-below have given concurrent finding, and the similar are the observation of the subordinate courts which are concurred by me. Because of this reason also, the interference at the stage of second appeal is not possible under fettered jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100, C.P.C., and which is possible only when the findings recorded by the subordinate courts are perverse or erroneous. 18. In view of the foregoing discussions. Because of this reason also, the interference at the stage of second appeal is not possible under fettered jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100, C.P.C., and which is possible only when the findings recorded by the subordinate courts are perverse or erroneous. 18. In view of the foregoing discussions. I do not find any reason to interfere in the judgment and decree under appeal. 19. Consequently, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******