Judgment :- 1. Petitioner (first accused) along with two others stood trial for offences punishable under S.292 (2) (a) read with S.34 I P C and S.2 (a) and 3 (b) of Young Persons (Harmful Publication) Act. Petitioner was convicted, while others were acquitted. Unsuccessful in appeal, petitioner challenges the conviction and sentence passed on him. 2. On 23-7-83, the Assistant Commissioner of Police (PWB) alongwith PW6 -- Sub Inspector of Police, PW7 -- Probationary Sub Inspector of Police, and PW2 -- Police Constable, raided the premises of petitioner, on information that obscene publications were printed and stocked for sale. They found several copies of magazines --'Stunt' (New Year's Special Issue) and 'Bharatha Dhwani' (MO 1 series)-as also MO 2 blocks, and seized these under Ext. PI mahazar. Ext. P2 is the search memorandum, and Ext. P5 is the licence issued in the name of petitioner, by the Additional District Magistrate, Ernakulam. The Publication contained obscene photographs and drawings of nude men and women in lewd postures. This, in brief, is the prosecution case. Courts below, relying on the evidence of PWs. 2, 6, 7 and 8, and Exts. P1, P2 and P5 found the charge. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner did not dispute that the material seized are obscene-rightly I think. The photographs, drawings and caricatures portray incredibly lewd themes. The writings reach the omega of obscenity. 4. Counsel contends that, involvement of petitioner is not proved. Courts below thought otherwise-for good reasons. The establishment belongs to petitioner and he does not deny this. The licence is in his name. Counsel argued that seizure was made from premises different from that shown in the licence. There is evidence that those premises were demolished and that press was functioning at the premises, raided by police. Evidence of PW8 on these aspects have not been challenged, as noticed by the learned Sessions Judge in Para.8 of his judgment. 5. But, counsel would submit that petitioner had no knowledge of what was being printed in the press, and that he was only getting material printed for monetary consideration. Petitioner himself had no such case. His case was one of denial, and it was not his case that he was printing material that others brought. That apart, it does not stand to reason that petitioner who "owned the press and was present there, was unaware of what was being printed in his press. Petitioner himself had no such case. His case was one of denial, and it was not his case that he was printing material that others brought. That apart, it does not stand to reason that petitioner who "owned the press and was present there, was unaware of what was being printed in his press. Large quantities of printed matter was stocked in the premises. A like quantity was lying around, unbound. Large size cover pages printed in art paper carrying colour photographs, could not have escaped anybody's attention, and certainly not that of the person who owns the establishment and who must have been spending long hours therein, having regard to the normal course of events. It is unreasonable to think that some other person must have printed these, spending much time and using paper, material and stationery in the press. It will be the height of hazard to think that paid employees of petitioner would have embarked on such a large scale venture, without petitioner's knowledge or consent. Law cannot be oblivious of inferences, obvious to any reasonable person instructed in the ways of human affairs. In the facts of the case S.292 cannot be interpreted to understand that petitioner did not have conscious possession of MOS 1 and 2. Possession in such large quantities, in commercial premises -- a printing press -- can only be "for purposes of sale, hire, distribution or circulation". 6. Relying on the decision in Narayanan v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT 605), counsel for petitioner submitted that petitioner cannot be found guilty. On the facts, of this case the decision aforesaid, can have no application. Applying the rule in one case, without reference to facts of another will lead to 'precedential tyranny', subverting justice, as counselled by the Supreme Court in Rafia v. State of Bihar (AIR 1981 S. C. 559). 7. Cannons of construction are clear. Courts must give effect to the intent of the legislature, expressed in clear language. Interpretative process must be purposive -- not purpose defeating. Provisions must be read to find their meaning and to divest them of their obvious meaning and message. In Gujarat Steel Tubes v. Its Mazdoor Sabha (AIR 1980 S. C. 1896), the Supreme Court observed: "Statutory construction which fulfills the mandate of the statute must find favour with the judges except when the words and,the context rebel against ". Provisions must be read to find their meaning and to divest them of their obvious meaning and message. In Gujarat Steel Tubes v. Its Mazdoor Sabha (AIR 1980 S. C. 1896), the Supreme Court observed: "Statutory construction which fulfills the mandate of the statute must find favour with the judges except when the words and,the context rebel against ". In the words of Sir Kenneth Diplock, "If courts can identify the target of legislation, their proper function is to see that it is hit, not to record that it has been missed". In S. P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta; Ors. ( (1987) 1 S. C. C. 191) the court observed: "Law should take a pragmative view of the matter and respond to the purpose for which it was made It is well settled that the purpose of law provides a good guide to the interpretation of the meaning of the act". The beacon light to guide the search for meaning has been identified in Mohan Lal v. Jaibhagwan (1988 (2) SCC 474). Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. observed: "It has to be borne in mind that the meaning of the expression must be found in the fact necessities of the time". Not different is the position in criminal law. In Nobarak Ali v. State of Bombay (AIR 1957 S. C. 857) it was stated: "It is not necessary and indeed not permissible to construe the Indian Penal Code at the present day in accordance with the notions of criminal jurisprudence prevailing at the lime the Code with reference to modern needs wherever this is permissible,". The observations of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984 (2) S. C.C.183) shed light on the perspectives, in criminal law: "Legislation must at all costs be interpreted in such a way that it would not operate as a rogue's charter". (emphasis supplied) In Shaw v. D. P. P. ( (1962) A. C. 220) Viscount Simon said: "In the sphere of criminal law I entertain no doubt that there remains in the courts of law a residual power to enforce the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law, to conserve not only the safety and order, but also the moral welfare of the State and that it is their duty to guard it against attacks which may be the more insidious because, they are novel and unprepared for. That is the broad head (call it public policy if you wish). If common law is powerless in such an event, then we should no longer do her reverence. But, I say that her hand is still powerful and that it is for Her Majesty's judges to play the part which Lord Mansfield pointed out". The administration of criminal law, has an impact on the quality of life, in any society. It must be poised to meet the challenges that criminal enterprise offers. Living law must meet contemporary challenges, lest it loses credibility and becomes an archaic burden and deadwood. Crime escape is not the clarion call of criminal law. 8. So viewed, it is not possible to understand the expressions "make" or "produce" occurring in S.292 IPC, as excluding printing from its ambit. The expressions are wide in thefr ambit. The large quantity of obscene matter, seized from the petitioner's premises, where he was running a commercial venture, and where he must obviously have been spending much time, clearly establish the charge under S.292 IPC. The conviction for the offence under the Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act, 1956 is also proper, as petitioner had in his possession, publications comprehended by S.3 (1) (b) of the Act, obviously for 'sale, distribution or circulation'. 9. Neither the words of the sections, nor the rules of construction, throw chains and fetters on the court, leaving it to look agape at the mass of obscenity helplessly. The sentence, too does not merit interference, for. the merchants of depravity who corrupt the human mind, must receive deterrent sentences. Conviction and sentence are confirmed and revision petition is dismissed.