JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This bunch of petitions is being disposed of by a common judgment as the principal controversies raised therein are identical. The petitions are directed against the orders passed by the Vice-Chairman, Allahabad Development Authority, cancelling the orders of allotment passed in favour of the petitioners in regard to shops constructed by the Development Authority under a self financing scheme floated by it for the construction of a multi-storeyed Commercial Complex in the prestigious Marketing Area situate in the Civil Lines, Allahabad. 2. Applications were invited by the Allahabad Development Authority for registration of the persons interested in the allotment of shops in the aforesaid Commercial Complex. In pursuance of this invitation, the petitioners deposited various sums depending on the storey in which they sought allotment of the shops with the Allahabad Development Authority (ADA for short). In the case of the fast petitioner (Smt. Nivedita Singh) a sum of Rs. 15,000/- was deposited for registration of her application dated 9-5-84. In course of time letters were issued by the Secretary of the ADA stating that allotment of shops shall take place on 5-8-85 through draw of lots. The petitioners were further required to deposit varying sums(Rs. 20,000/- in the case of Smt. Nivedita Singh) prior to 5-8-85 so that their applications might be considered for the allotment of shops on the ground and first floors of the building. The balance was required to be deposited in quarterly instalments of 15% thereof. Annexure 2 in Writ Petition No. 1958 of 1987 filed by Smt. Nivedita Singh is a copy of such a letter dated 25-7-85 issued to her. Identical letters were issued to others. Writ Petition No. 4958 of 1987 shall be treated as the leading case as the factual picture projected by it is materially the same as in the other cases. The difference, if any, in dates or amounts are inconsequential The allotment orders and the demand notices issued from time to time are also expressed in the same terms in all the cases. 3. The letter dated 25-7-85 was followed by the order of allotment dated 16/23-8-85 laying down the terms and conditions of allotment. As the principal thrust of the petitioners' counsel revolved round the terms and conditions of these allotment orders, we shall have a closer look at the same. 3. The letter dated 25-7-85 was followed by the order of allotment dated 16/23-8-85 laying down the terms and conditions of allotment. As the principal thrust of the petitioners' counsel revolved round the terms and conditions of these allotment orders, we shall have a closer look at the same. It begins with the recital that in pursuance of the application for allotment, the shop specified therein was being allotted to the concerned petitioner upon terms and conditions laid down therein. Condition No. 2 of this order mentions the estimated cost of these shops, which was Rs. 98,310/- in the case of Smt. Nivedita Singh. Adjusting Rs. 35,000/- (made up of Rs. 15,000/- paid towards registration and a further sum of Rs. 20,000/- deposited as demanded prior to allotment) there remained a balance of Rs. 63,310/- which, together with interest thereon at the rate of 19% per annum was required to be deposited in six quarterly instalments. It is also mentioned. that the allottee shall be shortly informed about these instalments which, in the context, meant that the ADA shall work out the precise amounts of these instalments as well as the dates by which the same may be deposited and inform the allottees about it. 4. Leaving out the terms not material for our purpose we come to the all important condition No. 9 which says that in the event of the quarterly instalments not being deposited by the allottee within time they shall carry an additional interest at the rate of 15% per annum. Further, if the instalments are not deposited on time, the ADA shall have the right to cancel the allotment order and to take back possession from the allottee with the added liability of the registration amount being forfeited. 5. These allotment orders were followed by identical letters issued to each of the petitioners in Dec. 1985 whereby they were informed of the final costs of the shop as well as the exact amount remaining due after taking into account the registration amount as well as the amount required to be deposited before the allotment of shops. The letters also stated that the allottees may deposit the amount representing 30% of the balance mentioned therein by the end of December and that the next instalments shall fall due in the first quarter of 1986. The letters also stated that the allottees may deposit the amount representing 30% of the balance mentioned therein by the end of December and that the next instalments shall fall due in the first quarter of 1986. These letters purported to convey the information about the instalments which was undertaken by the ADA under the allotment orders the relevant part whereof has been quoted above. The striking feature to be noticed here is that the letters demanded the allottees to deposit 30% of the balance within less than one month whereas the representation made by the ADA under the allotment orders was that the balance shall be payable in six quarterly instalments. 6. In pursuance of these letters the petitioners made some deposits from time to time though the assertion of the ADA is that the deposits were made beyond time and/or with the permission of the Dy. Secretary of the ADA who was not authorised to accept the same. Finally in August 1986 the ADA called upon the petitioners to deposit 75% of the cost by the end of Aug. 1986 failing which the allotment orders shall stand cancelled. The petitioners assert that even after this they made further deposits. But there is a controversy whether the deposits were full and made with the permission of the competent authority. Taking the view that the petitioners had committed default in depositing 75% of the costs as demanded in Aug. 1986, the Vice-Chairman of the ADA passed orders cancelling the allotments made in favour of the petitioners on 17-1-87 which was communicated to the petitioners through a letter of the Secretary dated 30-8-87. After this letter the ADA issued a general notice published in the newspapers on 9-2-87 calling upon the defaulters to deposit the balance by 14-2-87 and stating that in the event of default the allotment orders shall stand cancelled and the shops re auctioned. When the ADA attempted to reauction the shops the petitioners rushed to this Court asserting that they did not know about the general notice and that in any case the cancellation of allotment orders was completely null and void. 7. The cancellation of the allotment orders has been challenged by the petitioners on several grounds with which we shall deal later. The main assertions of the petitioners are that the ADA has acted arbitrarily in cancelling their allotments. 7. The cancellation of the allotment orders has been challenged by the petitioners on several grounds with which we shall deal later. The main assertions of the petitioners are that the ADA has acted arbitrarily in cancelling their allotments. It had not conveyed the information about the instalments as was mandatory under the allotment order. Further it began to demand instalments which had not even become due. In any case the petitioners had not committed any default in paying the instalments and, if there was any delay in depositing the same, it was duly condoned by the acceptance of the deposits made by them by the officers of the ADA. The cancellation was also challenged on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice etc. etc. 8. The ADA has contested these petitions and have filed counter affidavits refuting the allegations made in the petition mentioned above. In reply, the petitioners have filed rejoinder affidavits. Before we deal with the contentions raised in support of the petition, we may dispose of a preliminary objection raised by Sri Ashok Mohiley, learned counsel for the ADA. He submitted that the petitioners could not be permitted under Article 226 of the Constitution to seek enforcement of contractual obligations or to raise disputes which are purely contractual in nature. Such a relief, it was urged, could be claimed only by way of a civil suit and not under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under the Constitution. 9. The preliminary objection is obviously based on a misconception of the precise grievance sought to be raised by the petitioners. The complaint of the petitioners is that the allotment orders passed in their favour have been cancelled by the ADA arbitrarily and capriciously thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution. They are not claiming enforcement of obligations flowing merely from the contract but those which are founded on Article 14 of the Constitution. It is unnecessary to stress and indeed it cannot be seriously disputed that all actions of the State and its instrumentalities have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Where, therefore, the challenge is that the State has in dealing with the petitioner acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the petition cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that arbitrariness is in relation to a contract entered into between the State and the petitioner. Where, therefore, the challenge is that the State has in dealing with the petitioner acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the petition cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that arbitrariness is in relation to a contract entered into between the State and the petitioner. If any authority is needed in support of this, reference may be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 and a host of other decisions starting from Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 . This is how their Lordships stated the law in Shetty's case (supra) : "Now, obviously where a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government, it would, in the exercise of its power or discretion, be subject to the same constitutional or public law limitations as Government. The rule inhibiting arbitrary action by Government -which we have discussed above must apply equally where such corporation is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise, and it cannot -act arbitrarily and enter into relationship with any person it likes at its sweet-w but its action must be in conformity wit some principle which-meets the test of reason and relevance. This rule also flows directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14. It is now well settled as a result of the decisions of this Court in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 2 SCR 348 : AIR 1974 SC 555 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is non-discriminatory; it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant consideration, because that would be denial of equality. The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is projected by Article 14 and it must characterise every State action, whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law. The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is projected by Article 14 and it must characterise every State action, whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law. The State cannot, therefore, act arbitrarily in entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise with a third party, but its action must conform to some stank. and or norm which is rational and non- discriminatory" (emphasis added). 10. The matter can be viewed from another angle. The transaction in the present case between the Development Authority and the petitioners in regard to allotment of shops is not purely commercial in character wholly lacking in statutory flavour. The Development Authority had undertaken to construct the Commercial Complex and to make allotment of shops therein to individuals in the discharge of its primary functions under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. The objects for which these Development Authorities were created under the said enactment, inter alia, are to promote and secure the development of any area in a planned way and for that purpose the authorities have been empowered to acquire, hold, manage and dispose of land and other property as well as to carry out building operations among others. To develop a commercial area in a planned way by arranging for the construction of a shopping complex is, therefore, one of the prime concerns of the Development Authorities. It was in furtherance of this object that the Allahabad Development Authority had decided to build the Commercial Complex in question and to 'allot shops therein. 11. The Allahabad Development Authority was, therefore, not free to deal in these matters like private builders concerned solely with making profits. On the authority of the decisions cited above and other decisions touching on the subject therefore it seems too late in the day to contend that in matters of contract falling within the realm of public law the actions of the ADA are immune from scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, reject the preliminary objection. 12. Having disposed of the preliminary objection, we take up the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing in various petitions. We, therefore, reject the preliminary objection. 12. Having disposed of the preliminary objection, we take up the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing in various petitions. The first and the principal contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the ADA did not have any absolute and unfettered discretion in cancelling the allotment order being an instrumentality of the State and that it could cancel the allotment order only on grounds which were just, fair and rational. In the present case, however, the ADA has cancelled the allotment orders on grounds which are, ex facie, arbitrary and capricious. 13. The submission deserves serious consideration. As already observed, the ADA being admittedly an instrumentality of the State was subject to the same constitutional and public law constraints as the Government itself was. Reasonableness and rationality must, therefore, on the ratio of Shetty's case, (supra) characterise every action of the Development Authority whether it is performing its statutory duties or its contractual obligations, of course falling within the purview of public law. The construction of the Commercial Complex in question and allotment of shops in pursuance thereof being undisputedly one of the primary functions and duties of the ADA under the provisions of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, the impugned action, in our considered view, falls within the purview of public law. This conclusion is further fortified by averments made in para 4 of the counter affidavit filed in Smt Nivedita Singh's case according to which the terms and conditions of allotment are based on regulations framed by the ADA under S. 56(2) of the U.P. Urban planning and Development Act, the regulations having received the approval of the State Government and duly published in the Extraordinary Gazette dated 3-9-83. That being so, the ADA did not enjoy any absolute and unfettered discretion. It was on the contrary required to exercise the discretion vesting in it under condition No. 9 in a just and fair manner and not capriciously. 14. With these legal premises, we proceed to examine the next contention urged in support of the petition. The submission was that there was a clear representation in the allotment orders that the balance shall be payable in six quarterly instalments and that the information about the instalments shall be conveyed to the allottees soon. 14. With these legal premises, we proceed to examine the next contention urged in support of the petition. The submission was that there was a clear representation in the allotment orders that the balance shall be payable in six quarterly instalments and that the information about the instalments shall be conveyed to the allottees soon. The ADA, however, completely went back on these assurances and started making demands of instalments which had not even become due. They also started threatening that if the instalments were not paid as demanded the allotment orders shall be cancelled. By the impugned orders they have carried out that threat. 15. There is considerable substance in these submissions. The allotment orders categorically state that the balance shall be payable in six quarterly instalments and that 'Kishton ke garna se aapko sheeghr avgat karaya jayega' which, in the context, meant that the amounts of instalments after they had been quantified upon calculation of final costs of the shops as well as the dates by which the same were required to be deposited shall be conveyed soon. The ADA has, however, completely ignored these assurances. It issued a letter dated 17-12-85 (annexure 4 in Smt Nivedita Singh's petition) mentioning the final cost of the shop as well as the balance remaining due, after adjusting the initial deposits made by the allottee prior to the allotment of shops. It stated that the balance had to be paid before possession of these shops was taken. In the second paragraph of this letter, however, the ADA asked the allottee to deposit 30% of the balance by the end of Dec. 1985. It is apparent that the ADA demanded the allottees to deposit two quarterly instalments within less than a fortnight. Even if one were to assume that the first instalment could be demanded immediately on the issue of this letter dated 17-12-85 the second instalment would not, under the clear terms of the allotment order, become payable before the expiry of three months from 17-12-85. The demand of 30% straightway was hence clearly arbitrary and unjust, quite apart from the fact that it was in the teeth of the representation made by the ADA under the allotment orders. The further statement in this letter that the next instalment i.e. the third instalment shall become due in the first quarter of 1986 was also for the same reason wholly un-understandable. 16. The further statement in this letter that the next instalment i.e. the third instalment shall become due in the first quarter of 1986 was also for the same reason wholly un-understandable. 16. Further all the orders of cancellation are founded on the supposition that the first instalment had become due on the date of the allotment orders itself. It is on that supposition that when issuing letters in Aug. 1986 to the allottees the Secretary of the ADA demanded from the allottees 75% of the costs to be deposited by 30-8-1986. The premise was entirely fallacious. As mentioned above the allotment orders had not required the deposit of the first instalment immediately. It is only when letters were issued in Dec. 1985 that one could say that the liability to deposit the first instalment had arisen. If we calculate the instalments as commencing from Dec. 1985, 75% (or the fifth instalment) would become due only in Dec. 1986 and not earlier. Even assuming that the third instalment had become due in the first quarter of 1986 as mentioned in the letter dated 17-12-85, the fifth instalment (or 75%) would have become due only in September and not in August 1986, when the demand notices were issued by the ADA directing the allottees to deposit 75% by 30-8-86. 17. It is thus apparent that the allotment orders have been cancelled by the ADA completely arbitrarily and in total disregard of the representations which, it had made from time to time. The ADA was demanding deposit of instalments which had legally not become due. To make the failure of the allottees to comply with such arbitrary demand a ground for cancelling the allotment orders was hence grossly unjust and unfair to the allottees. It cannot be disputed that where so serious a civil consequence as cancellation of allotments is to result from the proposed action, the decision must be founded on the breach of a condition which is clear and unambiguous. The picture projected in the present case is, however, very different. The record leaves no manner of doubt that the ADA itself was labouring under a confusion as to the date from which the instalments were to commence. This has been amply demonstrated above. To take recourse to the extreme step under the residuary power under cL 9 to cancel the allotment orders was in this backdrop plainly unreasonable. 18. The record leaves no manner of doubt that the ADA itself was labouring under a confusion as to the date from which the instalments were to commence. This has been amply demonstrated above. To take recourse to the extreme step under the residuary power under cL 9 to cancel the allotment orders was in this backdrop plainly unreasonable. 18. Incidentally, it may be mentioned, the ADA was supposed to have completed the constructions latest by Dec. 1986, if not earlier. It has specifically said so in its letters and it was on that basis that the allottees were required to deposit the balance in 6 quarterly instalments before taking possession. We were, however, informed that when the impugned action was taken the shops were not even ready for occupation. Coupled with this fact is the admitted position that the allottees had already deposited substantial amounts which had gone into the construction of the building. In view of these facts the ADA should have adopted a more humane approach rather than act as private financiers or builders. 19. That takes us to the next argument. It was urged that cancellation of the allotment orders entitled serious civil consequences in that not only were the registration amounts directed to be forfeited the petitioners were also going to be deprived of valuable rights of using these shops for their living by carrying on business and other trading activities in the shops earmarked for them. That being so, they were plainly entitled to some opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action. 20. The petitioners are clearly right there. As mentioned above delayed deposit of instalments already carried an additional interest of 15% over and above the already none too small rate of interest of 19% fixed under cl. 2 of the allotment order. A total of 34% of interest was by all standards pretty high if not punitive. Consequently the extreme step contemplated under the latter part of CL 9 ought to have been invoked only in exceptional cases and only on substantial grounds. Further it was not disputed that cancellation of allotment order upon default was not compulsory or automatic. It only vested a discretion in the ADA. We have already reached the conclusion that as an instrumentality of the State, the ADA was obliged to exercise this discretion in a rational and reasonable manner and not capriciously. Further it was not disputed that cancellation of allotment order upon default was not compulsory or automatic. It only vested a discretion in the ADA. We have already reached the conclusion that as an instrumentality of the State, the ADA was obliged to exercise this discretion in a rational and reasonable manner and not capriciously. In order, therefore, to enable it to exercise this discretion in a reasonable manner the ADA had to base its decision on relevant facts and circumstances. As the decision of the ADA was bound to have serious repercussions on the allottees, the allottees should have been informed of the tentative decision of the authority to cancel and afforded an opportunity to show cause why the allotment order should not be cancelled. If afforded such an opportunity the allottees may have established either that there was no default (as was demonstrated before us in quite a few cases) or that the default was occasioned by circumstances which were beyond human control or that the default was at best hypertechnical or inconsequential Indeed, it is not difficult to visualise a host of other circumstances in which an authority acting reasonably will not be persuaded to cancel the allotment order, even if there is some delay or a default here and there. 21. For all these reasons, we hold that having regard to the nature of rights enjoyed by the allottees the principles of natural justice were clearly attracted to the situation at hand warranting issue of a show cause notice before the cancellation of the allotment orders. Such a notice was not issued by the ADA. 22. Learned counsel for the Development Authority, however, submitted that the notice issued in Aug. 1986, or on other dates calling upon the petitioners to deposit 75% of the cost of the shop by a stated date sufficiently complied with the principles of natural justice in that there was a clear warning therein that on the failure of the allottees to make the deposit by the specified date, the allotment orders were liable to be cancelled and the registration amount forfeited. We do not think that these notices (vide annexure 5 in Nivedita Singh's case) could be treated as a show cause notice for more reasons than one. We do not think that these notices (vide annexure 5 in Nivedita Singh's case) could be treated as a show cause notice for more reasons than one. In the first place, in each of these cases, we find that the demand of 75% was being made requiring deposit by a date by which the fifth instalment had not become due, i.e. the demand of 75% was ex facie fallacious. Secondly, these notices could not by any stretch be treated as show cause notices calling upon the allottees to show cause why in consequence of the default or delay in their depositing the instalments, the allotment orders should not be cancelled. To our mind, these notices were more in the nature of an ultimatum rather than a show cause notice Properly so-called. The opportunity which, in our opinion, the allottees were entitled to be afforded before cancellation in view of the nature of power exercisable by the ADA under the residuary powers vesting in it under cl. 9 was an opportunity to show cause t hat even if there is delay in making the deposits the principle of rationality and reasonableness demanded that the allotment order ought not to be cancelled. Such an opportunity was admittedly not given by the ADA in any of these cases. 23. For the same reason we cannot treat the general notice published in the newspapers on 9-2-87 requiring the allottees to deposit the balance by 14-2-87 as compliance with the principles of natural justice. The tenor of the general notice was the same as that which was issued in Aug. 1986. Further a notice of that nature ought to have been served individually- and not by publication in newspapers. As already observed, the action proposed to be taken by the ADA was drastic in character and consequently the notice should have been served individually by some recognised mode of service as contemplated under S. 43 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, which requires that all notices, orders and other documents required by the Act or any other rule or regulation made thereunder, be served on any person unless otherwise provided by tendering it to him or by registered post or in the manner provided under cL (2) of S. 43(1)(d). Learned counsel for the respondents could not point out any provision in the Act or Rule or Regulation made thereunder under which such a notice could be served by publication in the newspapers. 24. Sir Ashok Mohiley also strenuously contended that the Shopping Complex was to be built under a self-financing scheme the total cost of which was estimated to be 4.17 crores out of which 1.5 crores was raised by the ADA by way of a loan from the United Commercial Bank. The remaining amount was to be contributed by the allottees. The construction work undertaken by the ADA thus necessarily depended on a regular cash flow, arising from the timely payment of instalments. The ADA was hence fully justified in cancelling the allotment orders of the petitioners in Jan. 1987 on the ground of delay and default. 25. While we fully appreciate the anxiety of the ADA to ensure that the building activities were not hampered by any suspension in the cash flow, we cannot overlook that as an instrumentality of the State, it could not claim to act as private builders guided solely by profit making motives. The petitioners had by the time their allotment orders were cancelled already made substantial deposits towards the cost of the shops and if there was any delay in making further deposits they were also incurring substantial financial liability by way of a penal interest of 34%. Coupled with all this was the important fact that when the allotment orders were cancelled the building was still not ready for occupation. One could understand the anxiety of the ADA to cancel the allotment orders if the Shopping Complex had been completed and the ADA would have been losing revenue by the failure of the allottees to pay the entire dues and occupy the shops. But that was not the case. In view of these facts the impugned orders were clearly unjustified. 26. In the view that we have taken on the various contentions noticed hereinabove in favour of the petitioners, it is not necessary to examine the facts of each case on the issue which was strenuously raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in any case there was no default on their part and that if there was any delay in making the deposits the same stood condoned with the acceptance of those deposits by the ADA. 27. 27. Without, however, expressing any final opinion on factual controversy in view of the fact that the petitions are succeeding on other points, we are constrained to observe in passing that in several cases it was demonstrated before us prima facie that either there was no default at all in the deposit of instalments or the default was technical or inconsequential not warranting the extreme step of cancellation. We, however, reject the contention of the learned counsel for the ADA that the deposits made with the permission of the Dy. Secretary must be ignored on the ground that only the Vice Chairman could permit the acceptance of delayed payments. Such a plea would have had some validity if the amounts tendered by the petitioners had been returned to them on the plea which is now being advanced before us. Once the deposits were credited to the account of the petitioners it did not benefit the ADA to take this technical plea. As, however, we are not expressing any concluded finding on these factual contentions, we leave the matter at that. 28. Finally we come to the last submission. The petitioners contended that cl. 9 authorising the ADA to cancel the allotment order in the event of default comes into play after the expiry of the date fixed for the last instalment and only after the allottees have been put in possession in view of the plain language used in that clause. The contention is devoid of any substance. Clause 9 has to be read along with the other clauses of the allotment order including clause 2 which categorically states that possession shall be delivered only after the entire amount of cost has been deposited by the allottee. The provision under cl. 9 enabling the ADA to take back possession has been made by way of abundant caution to meet the exigency of a situation where an allottee may have entered into possession in ignorance of the fact that he had not deposited the entire instalments within time or at all. 29. The result is that these petitions are entitled to succeed. The question is what relief should be granted to the petitioners. Each-of them have already deposited various amounts in pursuance of the interim orders passed by this Court upon the petition being admitted. 29. The result is that these petitions are entitled to succeed. The question is what relief should be granted to the petitioners. Each-of them have already deposited various amounts in pursuance of the interim orders passed by this Court upon the petition being admitted. We think that interest of justice will be sufficiently served if we direct the petitioners to deposit any further amount which may still be due together with the interest which may have accrued in respect of the delayed deposit of instalments. Under the allotment orders the petitioners were liable to pay an interest of 19% on the balance + = 15% on the delayed deposit of instalments. The running of interest was automatic. Such interests are payable even if the deposits were accepted beyond time. 30. If, however, they fail to deposit the balance within the time fixed hereinbelow, the allotment orders made in their favour shall stand cancelled and the registration amounts deposited by them, forfeited. 31. The result is that these petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders cancelling the allotment orders are quashed subject to the conditions indicated hereinbelow : (i) The petitioners shall, within 15 days from today, appear either personally or through their authorised representative before the Secretary of the ADA who will intimate in writing the balance due from the petitioners (including the amount of interest) after making adjustment for the deposits made by the petitioners both before the filing of the petition as well as in pursuance of the interim orders passed in these petitions. (ii) The petitioners shall thereupon deposit the amount indicated by the Secretary of the ADA within 15 days from the date of such intimation failing which the allotment orders shall stand cancelled and the registration amounts, forfeited. If the petitioners do not comply with these conditions and make the deposit as indicated hereinabove, the ADA shall be free to take such steps as it may deem fit and proper for allotment of the shops of such petitioners. 32. No orders as to costs.