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1988 DIGILAW 59 (ALL)

Raghujbir Narain Singhal v. Punjabi Avas Sahkari Samiti

1988-01-14

S.K.LAKHTAKIA

body1988
JUDGMENT S.K. Lakhtakia, Member - These are two revisions against the order of the Additional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut dated 30-9-1987 through which the order passed by the trial court dated 10-4-1986 was set aside. 2. The facts of this case in brief are that the plaintiffs P.N. Singhal & others brought a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act before the trial court and they applied for a temporary injunction. The trial court, by its order dated 10-4-1986, issued an ex parte order directing the parties to maintain status-quo till further orders. The defendants filed a revision against this order. Further plaintiffs had moved the trial court for appointing a receiver also, but the S.D.O. did not pass any order on the said application, hence an appeal was preferred by the plaintiffs before the Commissioner, in which the learned Commissioner issued an ex parte order about the appointment of the receiver. Subsequently that appeal was converted into revision no. 71 of 1985-86 and was transferred to the Additional Commissioner for disposal. Both the cross revisions were disposed of by a single order by the learned Additional Commissioner vide his order dated 30-9-1987 and both the orders were set aside and the case was sent back to the trial court to dispose of the application of the plaintiffs moved under Section 229-D of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act afresh after hearing both the parties. This revision has been filed against the same order. 3. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties. Perused the impugned orders. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist argued that the learned Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to allow the revision by himself. No doubt he had jurisdiction to dismiss the revision but in case he came to the conclusion that the order of the trial court was liable to be set aside, modified or altered, he himself could not do the same and could refer the revisions to the Board to pass orders accordingly. It was, therefore, argued that the order passed by the learned Additional Commissioner is illegal being beyond jurisdiction and must be set aside. 5. It was, therefore, argued that the order passed by the learned Additional Commissioner is illegal being beyond jurisdiction and must be set aside. 5. The learned counsel for the opposite party conceded that the Additional Commissioner did not have jurisdiction to allow the revisions but he contended that the order passed by the trial court was illegal, hence, even if the order of the additional Commissioner is not legal, the order of the trial court can be set aside by this court in these proceedings. It was further argued on his behalf that the plaintiffs had not made out any prima facie case for obtaining temporary injunction and, therefore, his application was liable to be rejected. 6. From the arguments of both the parties it is clear that the learned Additional Commissioner has gone beyond jurisdiction by passing the impugned order. He has usurped the powers of his court and has allowed the revision by himself which was not required of him under law. In case he found that the revision deserved to be allowed he should have forwarded the same to this court with his recommendation. On this ground alone the order of the Additional Commissioner is liable to be set aside. 7. As regards the propriety of the order of the trial court I find that it had merely issued an order in maintaining status-quo and had not issued any further direction to the parties. However, since the defendants did not move the trial court itself for vacating the said temporary injunction and directly went up in revision there is, therefore, no material on record at present to place their contention. It is however clear that no court can grant even a temporary injunction without issuing a notice to the opposite party under Order 39 of the C.P.C. unless the circumstances are really compelling. From a perusal of the order passed by the trial court I find that it has not given any reasons in its order nor has given any reasons as to why it has issued such order without issuing any notice to the opposite parties. In such circumstances the order of the trial court is also not legal and must be quashed. The question of the appointment of the receiver is also still pending before the trial court because no final orders have been passed. 8. In such circumstances the order of the trial court is also not legal and must be quashed. The question of the appointment of the receiver is also still pending before the trial court because no final orders have been passed. 8. In view of such peculiar condition of the case I allow the revisions, set aside the order passed by the Additional Commissioner dated 30-9-1987. The order of the trial court dated 10-4-1986 is also set aside and the order passed by the learned Additional Commissioner for the appointment of the receiver is also set aside and the case is remanded back to the trial court to decide the applications moved by the plaintiffs for issuing temporary injunction and for the appointment of the receiver after hearing both the parties and after affording full opportunity to them to produce evidence in this context. The trial court is further directed to dispose of the case finally within 4 months from the receipt of this order. This order shall govern Revision No. 10 (z) of 1987-88/Bulandshahr. The parties are directed to maintain status quo till their appearance before the trial court, the parties are directed to appear there on 23-1-88.